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ABSTRACT 
The current turmoil in the financial markets raises important questions regarding the risk-
taking behaviour of conventional banks and other financial institutions in Western 
countries. In this context, it is important to compare the risk taking behaviour of 
conventional banking to that of Islamic banking. Today, Islamic banking is increasingly 
being scrutinised and compared by investors, depositors and researchers around the world 
(Muslim and non-Muslim). Because of the differences in the nature of transaction 
instruments, goals and the obligations between conventional banking and Islamic banking 
institutions, it is important to differentiate which banking system is more efficient in 
terms of risk assessment and decision-making on lending. This study aims to identify the 
similarities and differences between Islamic banking (IB) and conventional banking (CB) 
systems on issues related to risk taking behaviour and the rationality of lending decision 
making. Hence, the research question is: How do banking institutions determine and 
assess risk factors and how do those factors influence the rationality of lending decision 
policies in conventional and Islamic banking systems?  
The main objectives of this study are to investigate the differences between IB and CB in 
terms of (1) risk-taking behaviour (risk assessment), (2) making rational lending decisions 
and (3) lending policy effectiveness (banking efficiency). To achieve these objectives, two 
focus groups––Islamic and conventional banks––in five different countries in the Middle 
East region (Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Libya) were selected to 
participate in this study. The study was based on a sample consisting of observations from 
annual reports and financial statements of 48 Islamic and conventional banks (24 banks 
each) for the period from 2002 to 2006. The study also utilised a questionnaire survey to 
collect data from five managers in each bank. Thus, primary and secondary data 
collection methods were used to obtain the required information for the analysis.  
Multivariate and principal component analyses were conducted to evaluate how 
conventional banking and Islamic banking systems determine and assess risk factors. 
Furthermore, how those factors influence the rationality of lending decisions was 
investigated. The results revealed that each of these banking systems performed this 
function in different ways. The study also contrasts the lending policies and instruments 
under each system. Results show that risk factors influencing lending decision making are 
dissimilar between these banking systems. These differences in risk-taking behaviour 
may contribute banks‘ efficiency. To investigate this point, the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) technique was applied to banking groups separately in order to isolate 
technical efficiency scores (large, medium and small banks‘ categories). The analysis 
revealed that Islamic banks—with medium and small bank size—operate and allocate 
their resources with a higher degree of efficiency than all other banking groups. This 
finding raises some very interesting evidence that may surprise the stakeholders of 
conventional banks.  
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1 CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH STRATEGY 
1.1 Introduction  
In the beginning, should be identified two different identities of banking systems ‗Islamic 
banking‘ (IB) and ‗conventional banking‘ (CB).  IB identifies financial institutions that 
provide products and services based on the principles of Islamic law (known as shari`a) 
and guided by Islamic economics. The two main principles are ‗sharing of profit / loss‘ 
and the prohibition of the collection (giving) and payment (charge) of interest. However, 
CB identifies financial institutions that provide services such as accepting deposits from 
depositors, corporate bonds government bonds, and providing business loans to 
consumers and businesses. It is guided mainly by the profit maximization Principle.  
Because of the special features of Islamic banking (IB), one cannot analyse IB lending 
policies and strategies by simply downloading models used to analyse lending policies in 
conventional banks (CB). Effective risk management in banks deserves priority attention. 
Risk taking behaviour entails many complex issues that need to be better understood in 
order to be successfully addressed. Islamic finance is now reaching new levels of 
sophistication. In this regard, many problems and challenges relating to Islamic 
regulations, lending instruments and risk taking behaviour must be addressed and 
resolved. Therefore, with recognition of growth in these new financial institutions, a 
comparison of managing risk and measuring performance of similar units within different 
organisations is the main objective of this study. The purpose of this chapter is to 
introduce a design/model of a study that attempts to compare Islamic and non-Islamic 
frameworks and contribute to knowledge about similarities and differences between IB 
and CB––theoretically and empirically––in issues relevant to risk taking behaviour and 
rational lending decision-making. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief descriptive background 
and introduces specific research issues in three areas: 1) banking history and principles; 2) 
banking growth and competition; and 3) the need for comparable banking systems. 
Section 3 highlights the specification of the study problem. In this section, the 
significance and motivation of the study, in addition to the theoretical basis and the 
study‘s conceptual framework is presented. An overview of the research methodology is 
offered in section 4. Section 5 introduces objectives and the study design. Contribution to 
the advancement of knowledge, and major findings and concluding remarks are provided 
in section 6. Finally, the organisation of the study is presented in section 7. Figure 1.1 
provides a visual overview of the structure of this chapter. 
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Figure 1.1: Outline of Chapter 1 Interrelations 
 
1.2 Background and Research Issues  
Both IB and CB systems have experienced substantial changes over the last 30 years or so 
(Levine, Loayza & Beck 2000) as banks transformed their operations from relatively 
narrow activities to those of full service financial institutions. Business banking is broadly 
defined to include all aspects of financial activities—including securities operations, 
insurance, pensions and leasing (Casu, Girardone & Molyneux 2004). To this extent, the 
performance of financial institutions is, without doubt, significantly influenced by the 
actions of banks against risks and strategies guiding lending decisions
1
. It seems very 
important to evaluate whether the conventional banking (CB) system is different to the 
Islamic banking (IB) system in terms of risk-taking behaviour. The next section highlights 
                                                 
1
 Rational decision making model is a process for making logically sound decisions. It is the process of 
realizing a problem, establishing and evaluating planning criteria, creating alternatives, implementing 
alternatives, and monitoring progress of the alternatives and is known as ‘rational planning model’. This 
multi-step model aims to be logical and follows the orderly path from problem identification through to 
solution. 
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the reasons for conducting research that involves the comparison of two different 
systems––CB and IB––in the banking and finance industry.  
1.2.1 Islamic Banking: A Challenge to Conventional Banking  
1.2.1.1 Islamic Banking: Basic Theories and Principles  
Exclusively, prior research divided contracts governing economic activities into 
transactional and intermediation contracts in the Islamic banking and finance industry 
(Ahmad 2000; Anwar 2003; Fuad & Mohammed 1996). A combination of transactional 
contracts with intermediation contracts in these institutions offers a set of instruments 
with varying purposes, maturities and risk sharing aimed at satisfying a diverse group of 
economic agents. In reality, there is no absolute difference in products and services 
between CB and IB (Driver, Lomonaco & Zaidi 2005). However, income sources need to 
be a foremost area of comparison due to the fact that CBs‘ and IBs‘ income sources are 
extremely different (Al-Jarhi & Iqbal 2001). CB income comes from fees, commission 
and net interest (the difference between interest revenues from lending and the interest 
cost on deposits). In contrast, the main sources for IB profit derive from Morabaha, 
Mushraka, Modaraba and Ijara.
2 
 
Islamic finance differs from conventional debt finance. It is attractive to a large number of 
individuals––not only Muslims––who believe in a financial system with a socioeconomic 
development outlook that combines goals of efficient economic growth and social justice 
(El-Gamal 2006). Islamic finance is governed by the precepts of shari`a, which are to 
establish social security, property rights and rights of progeny (Chapra & Ahmed 2002). 
In addition, a study by Mondher and Siwar (2004 p. 445) concluded that ‗Islamic finance is 
directly involved with spiritual values and social justice through an equitable distribution 
of wealth‘—which is completely absent from the conventional mode of finance.  
Islamic banks are at the forefront of ethical and socially responsible finance. They are 
prohibited from funding gambling, prostitution, alcohol, nightclubs and narcotics—
activities which are often seen as the main vehicle for money laundering and terrorism 
(Fuad & Mohammed 1996). Rather, ‗Islamic financial institutions provide asset-based 
finance and closely monitor the business of their clients. An axiomatic belief in Islamic 
finance is that the payment of a fixed and/or determined rate of interest on deposits and 
loans––rib'a––conflicts with fundamental principles of justice and participation in a 
productive economic life‘ (Hassan & Lewis 2007, p. 155). Instead, capital is rewarded 
with a variable rate of return depending on the profit or loss made by the bank during a 
given period, and return on assets varies with the mode of financing.    
1.2.1.2 The Growth and Competition of Islamic Banking  
Islamic banking and finance have increased dramatically around the world. There are 
approximately 370 Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) which operate in Islamic and non-
Islamic countries, managing assets estimated at over $270 billion (Hassan & Lewis 2007). 
While total funds under management are not, by themselves, considerable when 
compared to the volume of operation of large multinational banks, the average growth 
rate of 15% realised over the past three decades is impressive (Iqbal & Llewellyn 2002). 
                                                 
2
 Discussion of these Islamic instruments is provided in the next chapter, and relevant definitions are 
presented in Appendix A.  
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Several Muslim countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, have fully pledged their financial 
systems to shari`a principles and, in some countries such as Middle East countries, IBs 
operate alongside CBs. Indeed, the practice of IB is not restricted to Islamic countries 
(details in section 2.5), and major banking corporations such as Citibank and HSBC offer 
Islamic financial services. 
Recently, ‗the growth of IFIs was matched by progress on the legal, accounting and 
auditing, and regulatory and governance fronts‘ (Kahf 2002, p. 9). For example, in 1991 
the accounting organisation for IFIs was mandated to prepare accounting auditing, 
governance, ethics and shari`a standards for IFIs. Also, ‗the Islamic Development Bank 
(IDB) took the lead in establishing the International Financial Market (IFM) in April 2002 
to develop liquidity management instruments and create an Islamic financial market‘ 
(Kahf 2002, p. 10) and, more recently, the International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA) 
conducted research analysis and rating of the IF instrument and institutions.  
1.2.1.3 The Need for a Comparable Bank Rational Lending Decision 
Evaluation Methodology   
Typically, conventional instruments of finance have exhibited considerable drawbacks, 
resulting in the emergence of a number of new requirements in the banking and finance 
sector worldwide. Among these requirements, risk management and making rational 
lending decisions are regarded as considerable challenges by financial institutions. 
Although the discipline of IB and finance has progressed, it still faces the following major 
challenges (Hakim, Neaime & Colton 2005, p. 122).  
 ‗Firstly, similar to CB, IBs have to deal with moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems. Entrepreneurs with bad credit risk may seek funding on a profit and loss 
basis and take advantage of the financier, even though religious principles govern 
honesty and contractual responsibility.  
 A second problem with IBs is the lack of consistency regarding instruments that 
are legally permissible. It is not uncommon for the shari`a boards of IBs to have 
different views regarding the lawfulness of certain products and services, and 
cross border transactions may be hampered by this uncertainty. 
 A third more serious and common problem of conventional and Islamic banking is 
the asset liability mismatch between sources and uses of funds. Deposits are 
generally of a short term nature, limiting banks‘ ability to engage in profitable 
long term investment‘.  
Banking laws and/or regulations in most countries are fashioned on the Western model of 
finance. The recent expansion of IB, however, calls for re-assessment of these regulations 
on several fronts. For instance, IB in most countries operates under the supervision of 
central banks and IBs cannot receive interest on reserve requirements with central 
banks: other options are needed to provide them with fair returns. Therefore, central 
banks need to understand the nature of IB techniques which are different from debt-
financing.  
The performance and efficiency of both IB and CB needs to be studied and compared. 
Several studies have assessed the performance of IB (e.g.(Ahmad & Hassan 2007; Grais 
& Kulathunga 2000; How, Abdul Karim & Verhoeven 2005; Kahf 2002; Kuhn 1990), 
and others studies were applied on CB (e.g.(Beck, Cull & Jerome 2005; Berger & 
DeYoung 1996; Berger & Humphrey 1992; Berger & Humphrey 1997; Berry, Crum & 
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Waring 1993), but no comparative cross-banking system study has been conducted to 
compare the performance of IB with CB taking into consideration risk factor assessment, 
or to determine their influence on the rationality of lending decision.  
1.3 Problem Domain of the Study  
1.3.1 Research Problem  
Risk, in general, arises from the uncertainty of a project‘s survival. The higher probability 
of insolvency, the higher the risk to banks that loans cannot be repaid. Operations and 
procedures of lending are somewhat different in conventional and Islamic banking 
systems (Powell et al. 2004). This difference is a consequence of the nature, role and 
goals of both systems. Therefore, risks in both systems need to be considered from 
different angles, because risk assessment
3
 and risk determination are also practically 
different. Today, the Islamic banking system is being given more consideration by 
investors, depositors, and researchers (Archer & Abdel Karim 2006). It is important to 
determine how banking systems differ in terms of risk-taking behaviour and decision-
making on lending; and whether these banks are capable of better control and rational 
decision-making when formulating and implementing lending decisions. 
In general, rational lending decisions would be based on an in-depth study of several 
criteria. There are previous studies in the literature (Bessler & Norsworthy 2003; 
Deshmukh, Greenbaum & Kanatas 1982; Stomper 2005) wherein bankers reported some 
significant difficulties in both types of banking. These included difficulties in 
accumulating the information to evaluate customers and their projects, difficulties in 
encouraging borrowers to repay, and difficulties with seizing collateral and using legal 
action in collecting bad debts. Indeed, there are many variables surrounding lending 
decisions in banks which need to be considered (Andersen, Ewald & Northcott 2005; 
Jacobson & Roszbach 2003). Therefore, the process of making lending decisions in both 
systems needs further investigation and evaluation to fill the gap in the literature related 
to successful and safe lending decisions (Stanton 2002). Many problems of risk 
assessment are universal, and others seem specific to banks‘ lending policies. Hence, this 
study aims to address the following research question: 
How do banking institutions determine and assess risk factors and how do 
those factors influence the rationality of lending decision policies in 
conventional and Islamic banking systems? 
To address this research problem successfully, three sub-problems need to be considered: 
1. How do Conventional Banks and Islamic Banks determine and assess risk 
factors? In terms of: 
 What risk factors are considered? 
 How are they measured?  
 What is the relative importance of each factor in lending decisions?  
2. How do these factors influence the rationality of lending decisions policies in 
CB and IB systems? 
3. Is there a difference in efficiency performance in lending between the two 
banking groups? 
                                                 
3
 Risk Assessment means the process of what is being evaluated to make sure the right areas are being 
considered and minimise occurrence of unpredictable events. 
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The sound assessment of risk factors increases the chances of making rational lending 
decisions and contributes to improvement of overall banking efficiency. The assessment 
of risk factors in CB and IB is investigated and the factors that influence the rationality of 
lending decisions policies in CB and IB are determined. The study also aims to identify 
how similarities and differences of lending policies and risk-taking behaviour influence 
banking efficiency in lending, thus further investigation has been taken to answer the 
third question which has been incorporated in order to provide contextual completeness 
to the analysis.  
1.3.2 Motivation, Significance and Innovation  
Measuring risks has been a major focus in recent studies (Jimenez & Saurina 2003). Thus, 
the prime motivation of this study is to identify, investigate and evaluate whether risk 
factors have influenced lending decisions in Islamic and conventional banks. 
Furthermore, the study provides a basis for understanding the reasons for the fluctuating 
level of decision quality and for examining factors that can be used to remove or reduce 
credit defaults in both systems. A review of the literature, for example, El-Hawary, Grais 
and Iqbal (2004), Zaman and Movassaghi (2001) and Thomas (Thomas 2000), showed 
there is significant debate in Islamic countries about starting and operating financial 
transactions according to Islamic law–shari`a. Managing credits and measuring their risk 
is a basis of banks‘ performance and development. Thus, making a comparison between 
conventional and Islamic systems about managing risk and credit activities provides 
strong motivation to study credit risk evaluation and management in both systems (Hakim 
& Neaime 2001). 
Making lending decisions has not always been successfully achieved (Elsas, McNamara 
& Bromiley 1997). Furthermore, decisions need to be based on clear information and the 
possibility of drawing the objectives/variables as inputs and presenting accurate marginal 
contribution as outputs (Fujiwara 2003). These issues have provided the impetus for this 
study which seeks to identify and reduce the volume of risk factors, thereby increasing the 
efficiency of decisions in Islamic and conventional banking systems. This can be 
achieved through gaining a better understanding of how risk factors impact on quality of 
decision-making and efficiency.  
A previous study by Cowling and Westhead (1996) emphasised that credit risks are able 
to be controlled and managed in the public or private financial environment by applying a 
correct evaluation of costs and profits of loans. The study found that most default loans 
occur as a result of the loan‘s cost (input) being greater than the return on asset (output). 
Overall, the relationship between borrowers and the actions taken by banks at different 
decision-making levels is a relatively under researched area. This study will consider 
these aspects and provide a basis that may contribute to the avoidance of an increase in 
default loans as a consequence of weak decisions, which ultimately result in an increase 
in banks‘ losses. 
1.3.3 Conceptualisation of Theoretical Framework  
Theoretically, the study adopts a combination of four theories: 1) Transaction Cost 
Theory; 2) Decision-making Theory; 3) Agency Problem Theory; and 4) Social Theory, as 
well as the rationality of lending decision model (DGK) model. Joining of these theories 
has contributed a basis of methodology testing in this area. Also it implements Deshmukh 
Deshmukh, Greenbaum and Kanatas‘s (1983) model: to discuss outcomes of risk 
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factors/effects involving credit risk assessment which influence the rationality of lending 
decisions in banking institutions.  
There are many different types of risk factors and they can be summarized empirically in 
groups. In the related literature, total risk can be categorised into five main areas: 
transaction risk, business risk, treasury risk, governance risk and systematic risk (see 
section 3.4). However, for this study, recognising that total risk can be classified into two 
groups (internal and external) may assist in effective assessment of the risk factors as 
presented in Figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2: Conceptualisation and Theoretical Framework of the Study 
 
Source: developed by the author for this study, 2008. 
The main consideration in this research is determining the conceptual relationships among 
risks in Islamic and conventional banking systems, and the conceptual relationships 
among those factors and the rational lending decisions in both systems. Hence, referring 
to the related literature survey and the nature of the research questions, the 
conceptualisation and theoretical research framework has been suggested above (Figure 
1.2). Essentially, this framework illustrates that lending application processes begin with 
an evaluation of external and internal risk factors, and then banks seek successful loans by 
managing and controlling these factors. Basically, the framework is developed on the 
basis of the difference between banks that have considered risks and those that have not. 
1.4 Overview of the Research Methodology  
The target population is CBs and IBs in five different countries in the Middle East region, 
namely, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Libya. These countries have 
undergone a variety of economic and financial experiences, making them an interesting 
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case study to examine risk factors and the influence of risk factors on the rationality of 
lending decision processes (Zopounidis et al. 2002). Moreover, these countries in 
particular have directed much attention and resources to improving the scope and 
operation of their financial markets. 
Sample selection: By early 2000, when there were at least 176 Islamic banks worldwide, 
only 47 of those banks were located in the ME region. According to recent statistics, in 
terms of assets, ME countries—including GCC countries4—held the largest amount of 
assets [67%] of IBs worldwide (Zaman & Movassaghi 2001). 48 banks (24 IBs and 24 
CBs) have been selected for data collection. Because the banking population in ME is 
small, the sample of 24 IBs and 24 CBs consists 75% and 25% respectively from the 
targeted population. Banks that were considered to be dual-system have been excluded. 
This limits the number of banks. A sample consisting of at least 20% from the population 
is likely to be representative (Groves et al. 2009). Therefore, one can say a sample of at 
least 24 banks from each banking system is acceptable.   
Data collection: To cover the study‘s requirements, two different methods were used for 
data collection: primary and secondary data. The first data set is for five financial periods 
from 2002 to 2006 that are available from financial statements such as annual balance 
sheets, operation income statements, administration documents and reports. This data––
secondary data—typically focuses on a particular aspect of behaviour5. Thus, this study 
used this method to collect data used for banks‘ efficiency behaviour analysis to answer 
sub-question 3 of the study. The second data set is a questionnaire survey––primary data–
–which used to answer sub-questions 1 and 2. Five respondents in each bank were 
surveyed with a focus on decision makers in these banks: the credit department manager, 
financial department employees, executive manager and shari`a board member. The 
objective was to receive approximately 120 (5 x 24) questionnaire booklets from each 
banking group––IB and CB––which would facilitate a valid analysis. 
Study instruments: The research develops the links between theory and model, and 
phenomenon by deductive methodology (testing theory). Neuman (2006) argues that the 
deductive approach involves formulating a theory and model which is compared to 
observations of the phenomena that the theory and model seek to explain to discover if it 
is consistent with the facts. Statistical instruments will be used to test the hypotheses, and 
to make a statement about the statistical validity of the results (Sekaran 2000). There are, 
hence, three major constructs in this project: risk factors assessment, the rationality of 
lending decisions and banking efficiency in lending. Such constructs are 
multidimensional and they have multiple variables that incorporate multiple items of 
assessment for each variable. Accordingly, Multivariate Analysis was chosen for this 
study, because research statistics such as those yielded by Leedy and Ormrod (2005) and 
Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) point to MA being more appropriate for assessing the 
direction and strength of relationships between independent and dependent variables. 
Data analysis: The information obtained from 48 banks (24 banks in each group) using 
the questionnaire method was analysed using parametric statistical techniques with SPSS 
software. Accordingly, factor analysis and factor scores derived from the principal 
component (PC) were used to answer sub-question 1, and used as input values for the 
multiple regression analysis to answer sub-question 2 of the study. Regression was carried 
                                                 
4
 GCC stands for Gulf Cooperation Council, consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). 
5
 The behaviour is quantified in some way for the measurement purpose. 
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out to measure the association between the project variables which are measured by 
interval scales. Data gathered from five financial periods was used to answer sub-question 
3 of the study. It was analysed using two analytical software packages: non-parametric 
techniques with E.Views econometric software and DEA-Solver performance software. 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was used to analyse the decision performance 
(efficiency and quality). Finally, this study used a non-linear Tobit econometric model to 
establish which factors are relevant to the lending decision-making process and, further, 
how much each factor affects the outcome.  
1.5 Objectives and Research Design  
Although, generally, decisions made in banking institutions are ultimately the 
responsibility of an individual, often a group of people participate in the decision-making 
process (Huczynski & Buchanan 2001). Also, typically, major errors in decision-making 
can arise because the original decision problem has been incorrectly formed (Davis 2000). 
In particular, in lending decision-making the decision can be formulated in a way which 
fails to take into account fundamental changes that have occurred and affect loans‘ 
compensation rates (Goodwin & Wright 2004). Therefore, the primary purpose of this 
study is to uncover risk factors which affect the banks‘ performance, especially credit 
policies, by evaluating the process of lending decisions in CB and IB systems, evaluating 
whether both banking systems are managing the different risk factors, and recognising the 
lending and risks relationships. This focus will offer a potentially powerful tool for 
clarifying how risk factors influence the rationality of lending decisions in both CB and 
IB systems. Moreover, there are many default credit issues referred to higher financial 
authorities and the courts, in addition to issues registered at the public/private supervision 
sector (Banks 2004; Bashir 2000). This study, thus, attempts to investigate reasons 
beyond these issues by exploring the particular risk factors which influence the rationality 
of lending decisions. A further purpose of this study is to illustrate and explain the 
similarities and differences between IB and CB systems in aspects related to the default 
risk field and performance. Thus, a comparison between both banking systems reflects 
each system‘s ability to administer default risks.  
Figure 1.3: The Study Design and Achievement Guideline  
 
Source: developed by the author for this study, 2008. 
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Overall, investigating and developing more advanced techniques for risk factor 
assessment is an interesting and exciting field for research. Thus, in order to achieve the 
research objectives, Figure 1.3 shows the research design which has been developed as an 
achievement diagram of the study.  
1.6 Major Findings and Concluding Remarks  
The scope of the analysis is a comparison of banking systems: Islamic banks with 
conventional banks which operate in the Middle East region (Libya, Qatar, Bahrain, 
United Arab Emirates and Jordan). All banks in each banking sample are grouped 
together, and are stratified into small, medium and large size according to their total 
assets. Two different analyses have been performed in this study.  
Firstly, questionnaire survey method (primary data), principal component analysis, t-test 
and regression analysis are used to test the relevant research hypotheses (H1 and H2) and 
answer the first and the second sub-questions of the study. After testing these hypotheses 
(H1 and H2), the main findings are: 
 Risk factors assessment: To some extent, there is a difference between 
CB and IB in terms of risk visibility, but risk feasibility is almost the same. 
In addition, results indicate these counterparts of Islamic banking system 
are more efficient than non-Islamic banking system in terms of risk 
assessment. This means banks with Islamic law perform differently to 
banks without Islamic law in terms of risks assessment but, statistically, 
not significantly so. However, some differences were revealed: some risk 
factors which are applicable to CB, are inapplicable to IB (e.g. some 
transaction risks), and vice versa (e.g. sharing risk).  
 Approaches and importance of measuring risk factors: There are no 
specific models of risk measurement that have been used by both systems 
to measure such types of risk. However, banks in both IB and CB systems 
often follow a similar pattern in terms of measuring risk factors. Moreover, 
results confirm that the incentive of quantifying risk models designed by 
researchers and practitioners in the finance fields for the agent principals is 
beneficial in controlling risk exposure and banks‘ consistency.  
 Risk factors and rationality of lending decision relationship: Results 
reveal that relationships––positive/negative––exist between risk factors 
and the policies of lending portfolio management. Furthermore, results 
suggest that risk factors which influence the rationality of lending 
decisions are somewhat varied between IB and CB systems. Basically, to 
some extent, the results provide evidence that risk factors influence the 
rationality of the lending decision and these are different in IB and CB. 
Additionally, the rationality of lending decision is impacted by applying 
some risk measurement models/approaches that are broadly used in the 
finance industry. To sum up, even though the rationality of lending 
decision making in each banking system has been influenced by different 
risk factors, the correlation between some of them is not clearly formed.  
Secondly, annual reports from 2002 to 2006 (secondary data) and Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) technique are used to estimate scores efficiency (technical efficiency). 
Then, the efficiency scores are regressed as dependent variables with an independent 
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explanatory variable to examine whether lending policies in the IB and CB are 
significantly different. At this stage, the relevant research hypothesis––H3––can be tested 
and answer the third sub-question of the study. The third hypothesis is tested and it was 
revealed that: 
1. Banks’ efficiency and competition: A profile of a bank‘s risk-return is 
affected by its mix of debt and equity securities used to finance its asset 
portfolio. In particular, no banks with lower efficiency are even remotely 
ready to enter into competition with banks of higher efficiency. At the 
same time, the growth and experience of the Islamic banking system has 
allowed it to operate closer to efficient scales and with comparable or even 
better levels of managerial efficiency than conventional banks. Even 
though the Islamic banking system was established later than conventional 
banking, it appears to be the very best competitor amongst other systems 
in the finance industry, whereas the results suggest that the Islamic 
banking system, even the large, medium or small ones, have proved to be 
the expected formidable competitor. 
2. Risk Assessment Experience: Results revealed banks that have greater 
monitoring incentive and capabilities, higher risk, and greater control over 
borrowers, operate at higher yield efficiency and are sustainable for longer 
maturity of loans. Moreover, banks with lower monitoring of these factors 
actually attain lower performance. Islamic banks, despite their experience 
compared to conventional banks, appear to perform much better in terms 
of risk management and risk taking behaviour (risk sharing). 
3. Lending Decision Success: In making efficient or rational lending 
decisions, results presented indicate that many aspects need to be 
considered, but the success in Islamic banking mostly results from using 
the unique rule (shari`a law). Along with this rule, the Islamic banking 
‗outperformance‘ may be attributable to the instruments of finance which 
have been used in this system.  
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis—Thesis Outline  
The organisation of this thesis broadly falls under two segments, firstly, the comparative 
theoretical component and, secondly, comparative empirical investigation and discussion 
of the study results. After surveying and integrating the information available in the 
existing banking and finance literature regarding the role and nature of IB and CB, 
theories and evidence, banking experiences and capability, contemporary banking crises 
are elaborated on further in Chapter 2. Next, the rule of risk management and control are 
presented in Chapter 3. Third, the theoretical and empirical perspectives of managing and 
making rational lending decisions in both IBs and CBs are provided in Chapter 4. Sets of 
sampling selection, data collection methods used and testing instruments are outlined in 
Chapter 5. The remaining two chapters are integrated to present the comparative 
discussions and results. Chapter 6, therefore, provides comparative discussions on how 
IBs and CBs assess risk factors and whether these risk factors influence the rationality of 
their lending decision polices, and Chapter 7 provides comparative discussions on the 
banks‘ efficiency in terms of making rational lending decisions. Lastly, the conclusion, 
limitations and suggestions for future research are elaborated in Chapter 8, along with a 
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discussion on some of the implications arising from this study. Figure 1.4 provides a 
visual overview of the structure of this thesis.  
 
Figure 1.4: Organisation of the Thesis  
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2 CHAPTER TWO  
CONVENTIONAL BANKING VS ISLAMIC 
BANKING SYSTEMS: THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 
2.1 Introduction  
The primary objective of this chapter is to review the literature related to Islamic Banking 
(IB) and Conventional Banking (CB) in terms of the structure of the respective financial 
systems. The secondary objective is to provide a contrast between banks that are 
providing similar financial products and services, but hold different policies and 
principles (IB and CB), with a focus on the relevance of Transaction Cost Theory and 
Agency Theory to Islamic finance and conventional finance. Approximately three 
decades ago, Islamic banking was virtually unknown. Now, more than 55 developing 
Islamic countries have some current involvement with Islamic banking and finance. 
According to the International Association of Islamic Banks, Islamic financial institutions 
are operating not only in Islamic countries, but also in non-Islamic countries and regions 
such as the North and South Americas, Europe, Cayman Islands, South and South Eastern 
Asia, and Australia (Ahmad & Haron 2002). Regardless of the location, however, Islamic 
banks are required to operate under Islamic financing principles.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the classification of finance 
institutions by focusing on Conventional Banking and Islamic Banking contracts. 
Section 3 covers the similarities and differences between IB and CB systems. Section 4 
discusses the relevance of selected theories to Islamic banking and finance. The foci of 
section 5, section 6 and section 7 are Islamic banks‘ experience, banking crises, and 
capability respectively. Section 8 provides a summary of conclusions. Figure 2.1 provides 
a visual overview of the structure of this chapter. 
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Figure 2.1: Outline of Chapter 2 Interrelations 
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2.2 Classification of Financial Institutions 
Banks perform many functions, some central to their main role in financial intermediation 
and others more peripheral. Practically, there are three major interrelated banks‘ 
functions:  
1. The creation of money accomplished through lending and investing activities;  
2. The holding of deposits; and  
3. The provision of a mechanism for payments and transfers of funds or 
intermediation.  
These functions match the different types of banks. Roussakis (1997) argues that there are 
several ways of classifying a system of banking/financial institutions. From a regulatory 
perspective, however, banks are classified on the basis of different market segments as 
shown in Figure 2.2. Basically, banks are classified into seven groups based on their 
scheme of involvement: activities, operational structure, bodies, ownership, location, 
performance and their main objective. Definitions of some existing banks are provided in 
Appendix C.  
Figure 2.2: Overview of Financial Institutions  
 
 Source: developed by the author for this study, 2008    
These groups are depicted in Figure 2.3. Consequently, a comparison of banking systems 
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6
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Conventional banks (CBs) are usually the major type of financial intermediary in any 
economy. They are the main providers of credit to households and the corporate sector. 
CBs are typically partnership and corporation ownership (joint stock) companies and may 
be either publicly listed on the stock exchange or often privately owned (De Lucia & 
Peters 1993). Furthermore, Casu, Girardone and Molyneux (2006, p. 5) state ‗CBs deal 
with both retail and corporate customers, have well diversified deposit and lending bases 
and generally offer a full range of financial services‘. While CBs refer to institutions 
                                                 
6
 Shari`a is the sacred law of Islam.  It is derived from the Qur`an (the Muslim Holy Book), Sunna (the saying 
and deeds of Prophet Mohammed), Ijma (consensus), Qiyas (reasoning by analogy), and Maslaha (consideration 
of the public interest or common need). These shari`a sources are ordered from the most strength (Qur`an) to the 
weakest (Maslaha).   
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whose main business is deposit taking and lending, they are also engaged in the provision 
of other services such as investment banking, insurance and financial planning services 
and investment advisory services. They also hold a major share of the retail banking 
market. 
Figure 2.3: Classification of Financial and Banking Institutions  
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Casu, Girardone and Molyneux (2006) report that CBs are authorised deposit-taking 
institutions (ADIs) and are also known as monetary financial institutions (MFIs). They 
also emphasised that MFIs play a major role in a country‘s economy in that deposit 
liabilities form a major part of a country‘s money supply and MFIs are, therefore, 
indirectly responsible to governments and central banks for the transmission of monetary 
policy. Economists generally argue that bank deposits function as money; as a 
consequence, an expansion of bank deposits results in an increase in the stock of money 
circulating in an economy.  
The conventional financial system has experienced a metamorphism in the last few 
decades. This was brought about by three major factors:  
1. The concomitant decisions by the monetary authorities to adopt more market 
oriented policies in achieving their stated objectives (Brown & Skully 2003). 
2. The  impact of new technology on communication and data transmission which 
inexorably linked local financial systems to the international financial community 
and allowed specialist financial services providers to compete directly with 
traditional financial services organisation (James & Smith 1994). 
3. A decade or more of world economic instability led to an unregulated environment 
and resulted in misleading information on the quality of investment portfolios.      
Recently, MacDonald and Kock (2006) examined the operational and regulatory 
environment, as well as five fundamental forces of change that have changed the banking 
landscape, namely, market-driven competitive factors, product innovation in response to 
deregulation, securitisation, globalisation, and technological progress. In order to 
understand the development of modern banking systems, one must understand the 
changes in banking regulations (Barth, Caprio & Levine 2006). Notably, barriers that 
once separated banking from the other ‗non-bank‘ activities have rapidly disappeared 
after regulatory changes in the banking and financial services industry. This has created 
opportunities for efficient banks and related firms, but has also imposed pressure on 
management to bring about more competitive banking practices. 
As operational differences among CBs, savings and loans institutions, credit unions, 
investment banks, and insurance companies rapidly disappear, the concepts and business 
models identified in the finance and banking literature become generally applicable to any 
firms involved in the lending and deposit taking business. However, CBs have continued 
to be heavily regulated industry partners of financial institutions in worldwide business 
sectors (Brown & Skully 2003). This largely reflects the critically important role banks 
play in the financial services industry. 
The literature on finance presents five reasons for regulating banks, namely: 
1. To ensure the safety and soundness of banks and financial institutions.  
2. To provide an efficient and competitive financial system.  
3. To provide monetary stability. 
4. To maintain the integrity of a nation‘s payments system.  
5. To protect customers from abuses by credit-granting institutions.  
Goodhart (1998, p. 44) argued that ‗parliaments enact laws, impose regulations and 
supervise the banking and financials to prevent them (especially banks) from taking 
undue risks‘. Obviously, these five goals are not independent because the achievement of 
dependability cannot be self-sufficient.  
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As mentioned above, the metamorphosis in banking has, for the most part, occurred in the 
operational and regulatory environment. The introduction of changes had a significant 
impact on the structure, conduct and performance of the banking sectors—not only in the 
transition-economies, but also in developed-economies. In Australia, for instance, the first 
major development occurred after 1945 with the formation of the Reserve Bank (RB) as a 
separate entity from the Commonwealth Banking Corporation (Arpa et al. 2001). In the 
USA, the introduction of new technology has produced a wide range of product 
innovations such as point of sale terminals (POST), videotex, and delivery innovation 
such as automated teller machines to serve customers (Graddy, Spencer & Bransen 1985). 
Since the formation of monetary policy in 1959, and leading up to the late 1980s, some 
governments recognised the independence of the banks and their responsibility in the 
achievement of monetary policy targets. In recent years, the Central Banks have taken 
steps to ensure that monetary policies and their tools are transparent. A study by Jeon and 
Miller (2003) emphasised that, unlike past practice, changes in finance policy and related 
regulations are now clearly announced and explained by monetary authorities. In addition, 
banks have improved their public commentary on the economic outlook and monetary 
policy settings through the media and regular quarterly reporting. 
Such changes have given consumers more choices than ever before when purchasing 
financial services. Not surprisingly, firms in the financial services industry compete 
aggressively for new market niches and increased shares in existing markets. This means 
they need to work constantly on innovations in product and delivery services and ensure 
they provide personalised financial services for individuals and businesses. In some cases, 
however, opportunities are not the same for all service providers because the industry is 
yet to achieve a level playing field (Strandvik & Liljander 1994). Even though CBs have 
gained greater flexibility in diversifying their asset bases across geographic boundaries 
and the introduction of new product lines in recent years, disparities between regulatory 
regimes often place them at a competitive disadvantage compared with IB.  
2.2.2 Islamic Banking  
There are no clear-cut definitions of the terms of ‗IB‘ or ‗Islamic banking business‘ in the 
relevant contemporary literature. Instead, a flexible approach to defining such an 
institution and its business has been adopted. For example, Mudawi, cited in Archer and 
Karim (2002, p. 123), reported that the International Association of Islamic Banking 
(IAIB) has defined IB as follows:  
‗The Islamic Banking basically implements a new banking concept, in that it 
adheres strictly to the rulings of the Islamic law––shari`a––in fields of 
finance and other dealings. Moreover, the bank, when functioning in this way, 
must reflect Islamic principles in real life. The bank should work towards the 
establishment of an Islamic society; hence, one of its primary goals is the 
deepening of the religious spirit among the people‘.  
The above definition has failed to provide an accurate account of the very meaning of IB. 
It tends to highlight the objectives of IB more than anything else. The fact remains that 
‗an Islamic bank is a company that is acting as a financial intermediary between 
depositors or borrowers as the case may be, and fund users, as well as providing various 
other banking services‘ (Archer & Karim 2002, p. 75). Therefore, the functions of IB 
seem parallel to those of a conventional or interest-based banking, as both act as a 
financial intermediary.  
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In order to carry out banking business, IBs must comply with Islamic standards as well as 
the prudential requirements of the regulators. Thus, it is important to closely examine the 
meaning of the term ‗Islamic banking‘. According to the Islamic  Finance Act 1983 of 
Malaysia (section 2), an Islamic banking business is defined as one whose aims and 
operations do not involve any element which is not approved by the religion of Islam 
(Archer & Ahmad 2003). Thus, it appears that the term ‗Islamic banking business‘ has 
not been properly defined.  
In general, an Islamic bank is a company or corporation licensed by the relevant authority 
to carry out Islamic banking business according to the rules and principles of shari`a law 
(Zaher & Hassan 2001). Islamic banking business, on the other hand, means accepting 
deposits or investment from customers and providing financing facilities to customers 
(financial intermediation), as well as performing related services to customers under the 
purview of normal banking practices (Zaman & Movassaghi 2001). All of these activities 
must, however, follow the shari`a-compliance.  
Before considering an appropriate definition of IB and Islamic banking business, it is 
important to examine the recent development of the Islamic financial industry that is 
occurring in various parts of the world. Islamic law prohibits the payment of riba
7––
interest––but does encourage entrepreneurial activity (Zaman & Movassaghi 2001). As 
such, banks that wish to offer Islamic banking services have to develop and offer products 
and services that do not charge or pay interest. Their solution is to offer various profit-
sharing-related products whereby depositors have to absorb a share in the risk of the 
bank‘s lending investment.  
It is useful to note the specific characteristics of Islamic Banking Institutions (IBIs) which 
outline financial transactions under the rule of financial legislations and Islamic law, the 
method of funds re-deployment, and wealth distribution to benefit all members of the 
banks in accordance with the provisions of Islam or Islamic law––shari`a (Saeed 1999). 
The Islamic financial industry also accommodates customer expectations by introducing 
many Islamic investment techniques, such as speculation (Mudaraba)
8
, bargaining 
(Murabaha)
9
, and profit-sharing, to enhance its contribution to the financing of 
government and private sector projects (Mondher & Siwar 2004 ).  
2.2.2.1 Relevant Characteristics of Islamic Banking 
Islamic banks are funded organisations based on Islamic ethics and are established with 
the mandate to carry out their business and financial transactions in strict compliance with 
Islamic shari`a principles. To do so, every IB must have a board of shari`a scholars, a 
shari`a supervisory board (SSB), to review the juristic correctness of the bank‘s 
transactions (Archer & Karim 2002). Additionally, broad-based economic well-being, 
social and economic justice, and equitable distribution of income and wealth are the 
primary objectives of Islamic finance (Sarker 1999). To achieve these commitments of 
                                                 
7
 Riba (interest): this is any return/reward or compensation charged on a loan contract as well as charged in 
rescheduling debts; it is strongly prohibited in Islam. 
8
 Rabb -ul- mal (capital’s owner) provides the entire capital needed to finance a project while the 
entrepreneur offers his labour and expertise. Profits are shared between them at a certain fixed 
ratio, whereas financial losses are exclusively borne by rabb -ul- mal. The liability of the 
entrepreneur is limited only to his time and effort. 
9
 The seller informs the buyer of his cost of acquiring or producing a specified product. The profit 
margin is then negotiated between them. The total cost is usually paid in instalments. 
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Islam, different Islamic investments products have been established by Islamic 
institutions. 
Morabaha, for instance, which is equivalent to mark-up financing, ultimately creates 
instruments to provide financing of such economic transactions. Consequently, Morabaha 
is ‗[a] common instrument used for short–term financing based on the conventional 
concepts of purchase finance‘ (Dhumale & Sapcanin 2003, p. 34). The seller reports to 
the buyer the cost of acquiring or producing a good, and then a profit margin is negotiated 
between the two parties. ‗Typical asset-backed security in the conventional system is a 
claim against a pool of assets; Islamic instruments are claims against individual assets‘ 
(Anwar 2003, p. 63). A distinct feature of such financial securities is that they resemble 
conventional debt securities characterised by a pre-determined pay-off with the difference 
being that Islamic instruments are collateralised against a real asset or economic 
activities.  
In a Modaraba contract, an equivalent for a trustee finance contract, an economic agent 
with capital can develop a partnership with another economic agent who has expertise in 
deploying capital in real economic activities with agreement to share the profits (Hasan 
2002). Accordingly, losses are borne by the capital owner only, as the other does not hold 
any capital. Further, though the capital owner is exposed to a loss or risk, he is not 
entitled to participate in the management of the funds; this is exclusively left to the other 
partner.  
In the case of Mushraka
10
, which is similar to equity participation, the capital owner 
enters into a partnership by contributing equity with others in return for sharing profits 
and losses at a predetermined ratio. The partners‘ contributions need not be equal, and 
contributions may be in the form of physical or intangible capital, such as labour, 
management, skill and goodwill (Lewis & Algaoud 2001). Accordingly, profits are shared 
in pre-agreed ratios, but losses are borne in proportion to equity participation. It conforms 
to the principle of profit and loss sharing and it is suitable for long-term project financing; 
hence, it is considered to be the purest form of Islamic finance. Thus, Mushraka financing 
is closer to a traditional equity stake with rights of control. 
In between these three mainly used instruments of Mushraka, Modaraba and Morabaha, 
there are other collateralised securities, such as Ijara
11
 (similar to a lease, lease purchase 
arrangement), Kifala and Amana contracts. Figure 2.4 shows an exclusive classification 
of contracts governing financial activities into transactional and intermediation contracts 
in an Islamic financial system. Transactional contracts govern retail sector transactions 
that include exchange, trade and other financing activities. The intermediation contracts 
not only govern indirect financial instruments, but also facilitate the efficiency and 
transparency of the execution of transactional contracts (El-Hawary, Grais & Iqbal 2004). 
Transactional and intermediation contracts offer a set of financial instruments which 
could be used for varying purposes, such as aspects related to:  
- Medium and longer maturity investments, and  
- Degrees of exposure risk to satisfy a diverse group of financial principals.  
                                                 
10
 The bank enters into an equity partnership agreement with one or more partners to jointly 
finance an investment project. Profits (and losses) are shared strictly in relation to the 
respective capital contributions. 
11
 A party leases a particular product for a specific sum and a specific time period. In the case of a 
lease purchase, each payment includes a portion that goes toward the final purchase and 
transfer of ownership of the product. 
Chapter Two    Conventional Banking vs. Islamic Banking Systems:  
                           Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives 
21 
 
Figure 2.4: Islamic Financial System 
 
Source: El-Hawary, Grais and Iqbal (2004). 
2.2.2.2 Nature of Forbidden Contracts 
The term ‗forbidden contracts‘ in Islam arises from a number of barter arrangements 
peculiar to non-Islamic trading markets which are expressly forbidden by the shari`a. It is 
from the explicit prohibition of such barter arrangements that Islamic law developed its 
strict rules about the definition of the objects and terms of contract. Examples of 
forbidden contracts are found in: Muzabana, Muchaqalah, Mulamsah and Munbudha
12
. 
Generally, permissible contracts in Islamic law should be: 1) Halal trads or transactions 
(permissible products and services); 2) based on mutual agreement (both parties agree); 
and 3) in line with requirement of shari`a (e.g. not based on riba, haram or fraud).  
2.2.2.3 Forbidden Elements in Islamic Contracts  
Generally, the practice of including or excluding publicly traded securities from 
investment portfolios or mutual funds is based on the religious and ethical precepts of the 
Islamic law shari`a, and this is known shari`a screening function. This means Muslim 
investors seek to own profitable companies that make positive contributions to society. 
Certain transactions are incompatible with shari‟a. Consequently, stocks of companies 
whose primary business is not permissible according to the Islamic law shari‟a are 
excluded, such as companies that receive a major portion of their revenues from alcohol, 
tobacco and pork-related products or interest based financial institutions. ‗Among the 
most important teachings in Islam for establishing justice and eliminating exploitation in 
business transactions is the prohibition of all sources of unjustified enrichment‘ (Sarker 
1999, p. 17). There are three aspects of forbidden elements in Islamic contracts which 
may induce investors to seek unjustified enrichment; Riba, Gharar, and Maysir. These are 
explained as follows.   
1. Riba or Interest is completely prohibited under Islamic law. Riba is seen as a 
permanent source of unjustified advantage because shari`a does not consider money as a 
commodity with a price for its use (Saeed 1999). However, the term of riba or interest is 
used in the shari`a in two senses, riba-an-nasiah and riba al-fadl
13
.  
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 For further information,  see Appendix A. 
13
 For further information,  see Appendix A. 
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The absolute prohibition of riba or interest in the Qura`n and Sunna is a command to 
establish an economic system from which all forms of exploitation are eliminated; in 
particular, ‗the injustice of the financier being assured of a positive return without doing 
work or sharing in the risk, while the entrepreneur, in spite of his management and hard 
work, is not assured of such a positive return‘ (Sarker 1999, p. 24). The prohibition of 
interest is a way to establish justice between the financier and entrepreneur.   
2. Gharar or Dubiousness in Contract: the shari`a determined that in the interest 
of fair and transparent dealing in the contracts between the parties, any unjustified 
enrichment that arises out of uncertainty or from an effort to define the essential pillars of 
the contract is prohibited. Thus, gharer originated out of deception through ignorance by 
one or more parties to a contract. Sarker (1999) clearly states several types of gharar, all 
of which are forbidden (haram) in Islam, such as: 
1. Selling goods that the seller is unable to deliver. 
2. Selling known or unknown goods against unknown prices.  
3. Selling goods without specifying the price. 
4. Selling goods without a proper (or with a false) description. 
5. A contract conditional on/with an unknown event.  
6. Selling goods without allowing the buyer to properly examine them. 
The above points indicate that, in order to avoid gharar, the contracting parties must: 
1) ascertain that both the object and the price of the sale exist and subjects are able to be 
delivered; 2) specify the characteristics and amounts of the counter value; and 3) define 
the quantity, quality of goods/services and date of future delivery, if any.  
3. Maysir or Gambling: it is important to know what is the difference between 
speculation and gambling. Every trade involves speculation: the purchased goods may go 
up or down in price. Speculation in productive trade and investment creates value for 
society and, therefore, cannot be equated to gambling. In contrast, in pure gambling, 
money changes hands based on chance, without any underlying productive activity taking 
place. Of course, if a business‘s primary activity is deemed unproductive (e.g. a casino, or 
a beer brewery), then Muslims are not be permitted to own shares in that company since 
owning such shares constitutes an implicit participation in the business's activity. Thus, 
the prohibition of maysir arises from the premise that an apparent agreement between the 
parties is, in actuality, the result of immoral inducement provided by false hopes in the 
parties‘ minds that they will profit unduly by the contract (Grais & Pellegrini 2006; Lewis 
& Algaoud 2001). 
2.2.2.4 Islamic Contracts: Nature and Classification 
The legal form of an Islamic contract sheds light on how capital is raised, how labour is 
employed, how factors are remunerated, who makes decisions, how many enterprises or 
contracts are dissolved, and who bears the risk of failure. Those types of contracts that 
were in use before and during the time of the Prophet (Mohammed) and did not prohibit 
are accepted as legal forms of Islamic venture or contracts (Archer, Abdel Karim & Al-
Deehani 1998; Sarker 1999). Therefore, the shari`a provides various modes of finance or 
business contracts, each of which has its own distinctive features and utilisation methods. 
The implementation of the distinctive features of the above individual contracts is 
summed up by Sarker (1999), and Archer, Abdel Karim and Al-Deehani (1998) as 
follows: 
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1. Bay-salam and Murabaha (mark-up) can be regarded as debt-based modes of 
contract because the finance user is obliged to pay back the entire financing, while 
in Mudaraba and Musharaka the finance user pays according to the profit-loss 
sharing. 
2. In the Mudaraba and Bay-salam, the financier has no role in the management of 
funds in the contract. With Murabaha and Ijara, the financier has full control over 
the funds maturity.  
3. In Mudaraba mode, the owner (capital provider) is responsible for bearing all 
financial loss, while in Musharaka, the owner will bear the financial loss in 
proportion to the capital in the total investment. 
4. In Mudaraba and Musharaka, uncertainty of the role of return on capital is very 
high due to asymmetric information which creates moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. Further, the rate of return is fixed and pre-determined in other 
modes of contracts. Figure 2.5 shows different modes of Islamic contracts
14
. 
Figure 2.5: Islamic Banking Contracts––Conceptual Relations Outline  
 
Under corporate Islamic banking, the main consideration of these institutions is providing 
services to their customers free from interest, and the giving or charging of interest is 
prohibited in all transactions. Islam principles ban Muslims from charging or giving 
interest. This prohibition makes an Islamic banking system functionally different from a 
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 Due to the diversification of financial contracts, Islamic scholars and practitioners found that grouping 
them by some common characteristics is helpful in making empirical judgments. Accordingly, Islamic 
contracts can be classified into two broad categories: direct and indirect, as shown in Figure 2.5 above.  
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conventional banking system
15. Recall, also, that ‗technically, rib`a refers to the addition 
in the amount of the principal of a loan according to the time for which it is loaned and 
the amount of the loan‘ (Lewis & Algaoud 2001, p. 2). According to Vogel (2000), while 
previously there was a debate as to whether rib`a relates to interest or usury, there now 
appears to be consensus of opinion among Islamic scholars that the term extends to all 
forms of interest.  
Nevertheless, the term rib‟a in Islamic law (the shari`a) means an addition. Lewis and 
Algaoud (2001, p. 3) defined  the rib‟a as ‗[a]n addition, however slight, over and above 
the principal‘. Furthermore, according to Khan and Mirakhor (1990, p. 359), ‗the term 
rib'a means that the concept is extended to cover both usury and interest; is not restricted 
to doubled and redoubled interest; and applies to all forms of interest, whether large or 
small. Thus, the Islamic injunction is not only against exorbitant or excessive interest, but 
also against a minimal rate of interest‘.  
As previously asserted, an Islamic bank must comply with Islamic law; the shari`a. This 
involves a number of elements as follows:  
1. Rib‟a is prohibited in all transactions.  
2. Business and investment are undertaken on the basis of Hallal (legal, 
permitted) activities. 
3. Transactions should be free from Gharar (speculation or unreasonable 
uncertainty).  
4. Zakat16 is to be paid by the bank to benefit society.  
5. All activities should be in line with Islamic principles, with a special 
shari`a board to supervise and advise the bank on the priority of 
transactions.  
In the context of Islamic banking and finance, studies by Lewis and Algaoud (2001) and 
Iqbal (2006) have commented on these five elements. In brief, their comments assert that 
both Islamic finance centres and Islamic trading law in general are dominated by the 
doctrine of rib‟a.  
Some Islamic scholars have put forward a range of economic reasons to explain why 
interest is banned in Islam; others have taken a somewhat different tack by arguing that 
modern economic theory has not provided a justification for the existence of, or the need 
for, an interest rate (Khan & Mirakhor 1990). However, those arguments are strictly 
secondary to the religious underpinning. The fundamental sources of Islam are based on 
the Holy Qur‟an and the Sunna. Thus, financial systems based on Islamic tenets are 
dedicated to the elimination of the payment and receipt of interest in all forms (Lewis & 
Algaoud 2001). It is this taboo that makes Islamic banks and financial institutions 
different in principle from their conventional counterparts. 
In Islam, the whole fabric of Divine Law (DL) is contractual in its conceptualization, 
content, and application. Islam forcefully places all economic relations on the firm 
footing of ‗contracts‘. Vogel (2000) claimed that contractual foundation of the shari`a 
judges the virtue of justice in a person not only for his/her material performance, but also 
by the essential attribute of his/her forthright intention (niyya) with which he/she enters 
into every contract. ‗This intention consists of sincerity, truthfulness and insistence on 
rigorous and loyal fulfilment of what he/she has consented to do (or not to do). This 
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 The similarities and dissimilarities between these two banking systems of CB & IB are discussed on 
pp. 28-31. 
16
 This is a religious tax that has to be deducted from wealth to be paid to the needy. 
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faithfulness to one‘s contractual obligations is so central to Islamic belief that when the 
Prophet Mohammed was asked ‗who is the believer?‘, the Prophet said, none of you will 
have faith till he wishes for his (Muslim) brother what he likes for himself (narrated by 
Anas)‟17 (Sa`îdî 1995, p. 32) . This means a believer is a person in whom the people can 
trust their person and possessions.  
The above discussion has presented the principles of Islamic banking. Islamic institutions 
also collect deposits from investors in the form of investment accounts and other deposit 
accounts on one side of the balance sheet, and then invest these funds in a variety of 
Islamically acceptable forms on the other side. This is mainly considered to be how they 
operate in financial intermediation in financial markets (Chapra & Ahmed 2002). 
Nevertheless, they conduct financial intermediation in ways quite different from 
conventional banks, as seen in profit and loss sharing PLS modes of finance and 
investment in trade, and also in features of commodity exchangeability in their activities. 
In contrast to the IB model, CB uses different interest-based investment activities sorted 
under different investment portfolios.     
An Islamic banking and financial services system provides a variety of religiously 
acceptable products and services to Muslim communities. In addition to this special 
function, the Islamic banking and financial institutions, like all other firms of Islamic 
society, are expected to ‗contribute generously to the achievement of the major socio-
economic goals of Islam…‘ (Chapra1985, p. 34). Iqbal and Llewellyn (2002) point out 
that the most important of these goals is economic well-being with full employment and 
resultant high rate of economic growth, socio-economic justice and an equitable 
distribution of income and wealth, stability in the value of money, and the mobilisation 
and investment of saving for economic development in such a way that a fair profit/loss is 
shared among all parties involved. 
The validity of these goals is seldom questioned. However, there is no consensus about 
the structure of the overall financial system needed to achieve them. From an Islamic 
perspective, the main objectives of Islamic banking and finance can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. The abolition of interest from all financial transaction and the performance of all 
bank activities in accordance with Islamic principles. 
2. The achievement of an equitable distribution of income and wealth. 
3. The promotion of the objectives of economic development.   
2.3 Islamic Banking vs. Conventional Banking  
To understand how banks work generally, it is necessary to understand the role of 
financial intermediation in an economy. This understanding is of assistance in finding 
answers to many questions about banking systems. Mainly, banks as other financial 
intermediaries play a pivotal role in the ecomony, channelling funds from units in surplus 
to units in deficit (transformation function
18
). Allen and Santomero (1998) defined banks 
as financial intermediaries whose activities are to provide loans to borrowers and to 
collect deposits from savers (depositors), and perform assets securitisation. Therefore, 
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  In Sahih Al-bukhari, belief chapter (Volume 1, Book 2, Number 12) for more information, see:  
http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/bukhari/002.sbt.html 
18
 Its means the reconcile the different needs of borrowers and lenders by transforming, small size, low risk, 
and highly liquid deposits into loans which are of larger size, higher risk, and illiquid.  
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banks bridge the gap between the needs of lenders and borrowers by performing a 
transformation function, as shown in Figure 2.6.  
Figure 2.6: Direct and Indirect Financing 
 
Source: developed by the author, based on Casu, Girardone and Molyneux 
(2006) 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the function of financial intermediation with the working model of 
direct and indirect financing. It is necessary to point out that financial intermediaries 
create additional costs for borrowers and lenders for the transformation products and 
services. However, Allen and Santomero (2001) have concluded that intermediated 
finance is more advantageous than direct finance in that the benefits of such activity to the 
users outweigh the cost associated with the provision of intermediation. In the modern 
market environment, the role of financial intermediation has become more complex as 
intermediaries perform additional roles such as providing brokerage services and 
securitisation, thus creating an extra layer of intermediation (Elton et al. 2003). This role 
of financial intermediation is illustrated in Figure 2.7.  
Figure 2.7: Modern Financial Intermediation Functions 
 
  Source: created by the author, 2008 
When financial institutions hold claims issued by other financial intermediaries, they 
create an extra layer of financial intermediation. Given the increased complexity of credit 
flows in modern financial systems, it is not uncommon to have more than two layers of 
intermediation. Neave (1991), Allen and Santomero (1998), Howells and Barin (2000), 
Stomper (2005),  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006), and Faisal (2006) have advanced five 
reasons (or so-called theories) for the existence of banks as follows:  
1. Delegated monitoring theory, whereby the existence of banking relates to the role 
of banks as monitors of borrowers. Monitoring of the potential credit risk in 
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lending is costly, and a difficult task for surplus units (depositors). Therefore, it is 
efficient to delegate the task of monitoring to specialised agents such as banks. 
2. Information production theory, which states that if information about possible 
investment opportunities is not free, then economic agents may find it worthwhile 
to produce such information in a market driven environment (Allen & Santomero 
1998). 
3. Liquidity transformation theory, whereby banks provide financial and secondary 
claims to surplus units––depositors––that often have superior liquidity features 
compared to direct claims such as equity or bonds.  
4. Theory of consumption smoothing, which suggests that banks perform a major 
function as consumption smoothers, and financial institutions (especially banks) 
enable economic agents to smooth consumption by offering insurance agent 
shocks
19
 to a consumer‘s consumption path.   
5. Commitment mechanism theory, which aims to provide a reason why illiquid bank 
assets-loans are financed by demand deposits that allow the banks‘ consumers to 
demand liquidation of these illiquid assets. 
To illustrate, banks have the expertise and economies of scale in processing information 
on the risks of borrowers, while depositors would find it costly to undertake this activity 
and delegate responsibility to the banks. If there were no banks, there would be 
duplication of transaction costs as surplus units would individually incur considerable 
search costs before they committed funds to a borrower (Rose 2002). As banks acquire 
this information, they become experts in the provision of an information search. As such, 
they have a comparative advantage in information search and depositors are willing to 
place funds with a bank knowing that these will be directed to the appropriate borrowers 
without the former having to incur search costs.  
Nevertheless, banks‘ depositors can be viewed as contractors who offer high liquidity and 
low risk. These deposits are held on the liabilities side of a bank‘s balance sheet. As Casu, 
Girardone and Molyneux (2006) pointed out, the better banks are at diversifying their 
balance sheets, the less likely it is that they will default on meeting deposit obligations. 
MacDonald and Kock (2006) have argued that bank deposits have evolved as a necessary 
device to discipline banks. Accordingly, financial intermediaries in general, and banks in 
particular, provide these liquidity assets via lending and this helps to smooth consumption 
patterns for individuals.   
Consequently, the question of how an IB and CB financial system is organised and why 
financial systems assume certain configurations are important topics for an understanding 
of the financial services industry. These questions have not yet been addressed 
extensively. Rather, financial theorists have focused on explaining various specialised 
aspects of financial system functions. Elton et al (2003) and Turner, Turner and Voysey 
(1996) have suggested that modern financial theory and its applications consider some 
financial system components in great detail in both the context of IB and CB. 
It is important to conclude with a financial services definition. The provision of financial 
services attempts to meet the needs of individuals and organisations which can be 
                                                 
19
 The argument is that the economic agents have uncertain preferences about their expenditure and that this 
creates a demand for liquid assets; banks provide these assets via lending and this helps smooth 
consumption patterns for individuals (Casu, Girardone & Molyneux 2006, p. 16). 
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measured in money terms. Turner, Turner and Voysey (1996) have clearly defined those 
services which are provided by independent agencies and institutions on an existence 
basis but, in some cases, organisations may have their own specialist divisions which 
provide the services internally. The theoretical underpinning discussion to differentiate 
between IB and CB is presented in the next section.  
2.4 Theoretical Argument and Validation  
2.4.1 Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) 
One of the fundamental issues in the analysis of financial intermediaries is the effective 
application of transaction cost theory (TCT). In this context, financial intermediaries 
incorporate mutual funds, banks, and consumer finance companies. Benston and Smith Jr. 
(1976) concluded that an intermediary has a comparative advantage over a direct market 
exchange in serving a particular group. Accordingly, such intermediation exploits the 
returns to scale implicit in the structure of the transactions cost of exchange by purchasing 
large blocks of securities, packaging those securities in a form that is demanded by some 
individuals, and selling the package at a price which cover all its costs (Jones 1997). More 
specifically, there are three types of cost relevant to contracts: 
1. Search and/or information cost (including information asymmetry cost). 
2. Bargaining and decision cost (including opportunity cost).20  
3. Policy and enforcing cost (excluding sunk costs).21  
Benston and Smith Jr. (1976) argued that the demand for the services produced by 
financial intermediaries in general is derived from the consumer‘s ability to achieve a 
higher level of utility by incurring lower levels of these transaction costs. Since the above 
costs are significant (Jones 1997), they frequently determine whether a company uses 
internal or external resources for products or services. However, the addition of these 
costs would suggest that individually efficient opportunity sets would differ not only with 
the size of banks‘ portfolios, but also with physical location and the opportunity cost of 
portfolios. Thus, as banks face contracts, demands are also a function of the distribution 
of wealth among consumers might be considered.  
In the TCT literature, Williamson (1975; 1996) and Hart (1995) have considered the 
contractual bases on which IBs operate from the standpoint of TCT. In particular, 
consideration was given in that literature to the contractual arrangements under which IB 
accepts depositors‘ and other investors‘ funds on an Islamic PLS basis. A modified 
breakdown of transaction costs in the Islamic and conventional finance setting has been 
identified by Horngren, Foster and Datar (2000). In the context of CB, the following 
equation (2.1) shows the formula for the transaction cost function. 
 nn xbxbxbay 2211       (2.1) 
where:  
y : Full costs of the product to be predicted (exact transaction).22  
                                                 
20
 The contribution to income that is forgone––rejected––by not using a limited resource in its best 
alternative use. 
21
 In economics and financial decision-making, sunk costs are those costs that cannot be recovered once 
they have been incurred––cannot be changed no matter what action is taken. In microeconomic theory, in 
general, these costs are irrelevant to a decision. 
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a : Fixed costs.23  
1b , 2b : Variable costs (direct costs) which relate to the transaction itself.
24
  
1x , 2x : Independent variable on which the production is to be based (transactions volume). 
 :  Residual term that includes the net effect of other factors not in the model and 
measurement errors in the dependent and independent variables.   
Hart (1995) argues that in financial transactions (such as loans), and trade-offs that exist 
among these various ways of production, define one‘s self as a lender increasing the down 
payment required, pledging collateral, and inserting restrictive covenants in the credit 
contracts implies different combinations of information and monitoring costs over the 
maturity of the credit. In contrast, Islamic banking institutions provide contracts radically 
opposite to those of CBs in that IB embodies a number of interesting features such as 
equity participation. Thus, risk and profit and loss sharing PLS arrangements are 
considered as the basis of Islamic finance. Sarker (1999) pointed out that the combination 
of Islamic instruments would be such that the marginal reduction in expected costs would 
be equal for all instruments employed.   
Figure 2.8: Relationships among Return, Production Volume and Cost-behaviour Pattern 
 
 Source: developed by the author, 2008 based on Horngren, Foster & Datar (2000) 
Transaction theory suggests that as IB and CB institutions gain economies of scale, the 
average cost of financial products distribution should decline due to greater efficiencies 
and lower default rates (Mitton 2002). Figure 2.8 depicts the path of curvilinear cost and 
how economists deal with variable costs. In the economic field, economists argue that 
many costs that might be classified as variable costs actually behave in a curvilinear 
fashion (Garrison, Noreen & Brewer 2006). Garrison, Noreen and Brewer (2006) have 
also commented that although many costs are not strictly linear when plotted as a function 
of volume, a curvilinear cost function can be satisfactorily approximated with a straight 
                                                                                                                                                  
22
 The sum of all variable and fixed costs in all the business functions in the value chain, R&D, design, 
production, marketing, distribution and customer services. 
23
 The cost that remains unchanged in total for a given time period despite wide changes in the related level 
of total activity or volume, and which is related to most of the administration costs. 
24
 Variable cost changes in total in proportion to changes in the related level of total activity or volume, and 
relates to lending cost, mobilisation cost, operation cost and default cost. 
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line within a narrow band of activity known as the relevant range of the product 
completion cycle
25
.The relationship among costs, production (volume of transaction) and 
gain of economies scale are clearly outlined in Figure 2.8.  
To demonstrate, the cost per unit in various value-chain areas for transacting financial 
products decline as units produced increase. Furthermore, the cross-point indicates the 
lowest possible costs that correspond to offer a certain amount of products––transactions–
–within the productive capacity employed to meet consumer demand in the current 
period.
26
 This is important in employing information and available financial resources 
adequately for sustaining an advantage for banks working within efficient market 
strategy/policy (Chapra 1985). Thus, conceptually, transaction costs and products are a 
function in normal and abnormal modifications of strategy, which are typical acts in 
contract arrangements.   
It is essential that financial transaction costs are identified and measured in advance for 
achieving rationalisation of returns on banking transactions—a task not easily 
accomplished. Williamsom (1979, p. 233) has pointed out  that transaction costs have ‗ a 
well deserved bad name as …there is a suspicion that almost anything can be rationalised, 
by involving suitably specified transaction costs‘. Typically transaction costs have been 
identified as the ex ante costs of search and negotiation, and the ex post cost of 
enforcement (Benston & Smith Jr. 1976). However, given the existence of complexity 
and uncertainty, in conjunction with bounded rationality, decision makers are necessarily 
incapable of making a fully informed choice between alternative organisation modes
27
. 
The argument above implies that the boundary of agency problems and agency principals‘ 
interests are of concern.  
2.4.2 Agency Theory (AT) 
‗Agency‘ is that conductive mechanism by which the production functions of business 
enterprises are managed or conducted. The agency function is related to the policies of 
decision making and, more specifically, it is governed by the modalities of the agency 
principals‘ contracts (Sarker 1999). Agency Theory (AT) deals with the issues arising 
from the existence of the principal-agent problem; these are quite relevant to the majority 
of finance partnerships. According to the economic literature, the principal-agent problem 
arises from incomplete and asymmetric information when the principal hires an agent 
(Archer, Abdel Karim & Al-Deehani 1998). Agency Theory employed here is referred to 
by Williamson (1996, p. 172), following Jensen and Fama (1983), as ‗the positive theory 
of agency‘. In contrast to the more formal AT, which is concerned with the technique of 
efficient risk bearing (Eisenhardt 1989), AT applied here is concerned with the 
monitoring and bonding of contracts and organisations. 
Agency cost occurs in all types of financial contracts. In general, the differences in 
interests between principals and their agents, and the asymmetry of information may 
contribute additional cost to the contingent nature of the compensation contract. Different 
theories of agency show that the correlation between reward and productivity determines 
                                                 
25
 Relevant range is that range of activity within which the assumptions made about cost behaviour are valid. 
26
 As addressed in Figure 2.8, that cross-point occurs when a production at the level when total revenue is 
equal to total cost and the normal profit is showed. 
27
 Many economic models assume that people are rational and would never do anything that violates their 
preferences; the concept of bounded rationality is in fact a revising assumption that accounts for the fact 
that perfectly rational decisions are often not feasible. 
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the growth of the enterprise and the behaviour of the agency (Eisenhardt 1989). However, 
in reality, that ‗more-less‘ competition markets of complete information, perfect foresight 
and castles transacting are not able to accommodate a number of important finance 
phenomena sufficiently. This has led financiers to focus on ‗the process of contracting‘—
particularly its hazards and imperfections
28
.  
Adverse selection prior to the contract, and moral hazard during its performance, arise 
when the principal cannot cost or observe or monitor the agents‘ characteristics and/or 
actions. However, the issue is how the principal can induce the agent to act in such a way 
as to maximise the principal‘s utility. Typically, the contracts provide the framework for a 
complex set of interactions between the parties to economic relationships. Therefore, 
agency cost problem is an important determinant of reward-sharing in a production 
process which may be solved through efficiency attained in allocation of resources and 
the inclusion of a package of incentives in the reward-sharing structure (DeGeorge 1992).  
2.4.3 Combining TCT with AT 
Such theories focus on the transactions of financial institutions from different 
perspectives. The creation of new and specific advantages by applying these theories and 
combining their perspectives may require not only comparing perspectives using a case of 
banks‘ utilisation, but also the development of capabilities within banks, especially 
Islamic counterparts (DeGeorge 1992). Initially, it is most significant to start with the 
distinction of these perspectives. From the theoretical perspective, TCT and AT are 
contrasted according to general criteria, as listed in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1: Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) Vs Agency Theory (AT) 
Criterion  T C T A T 
Unit of analysis Transaction Principal-agent contract 
Focal dimension Various type of asset specificity  
Mal-adaptation 
For IB: Prohibition of taking/giving of 
interest 
Incentive, 
Residual loss  
For IB: Comply with teaching of 
Islam (Shari`a compliance)  
Focal cost concern Hold-up problem  Maximisation of interests & wealth 
Contractual cost Choice of ex post, 
Governance mechanism  
Ex ante incentive arrangement 
Monitoring mechanism 
Theoretical orientation Comparative assessment Constrained rationalisation 
Strategic intent Point view of shareholder & 
investment accounts holders (IAH) 
Point view of shareholder & 
investment accounts holders (IAH)  
Fundamental behaviour Bounded rationality/uncertainty  
Risk neutrality 
Information asymmetry opportunism  
Assets specified 
Information asymmetry 
Un-observable 
Risk avoidable.  
Moral hazard arises by agents mostly 
Principally, differences between TCT and AT arise from the fact that for TCT the basic 
unit of analysis is the transaction or contract, while for AT it is the contracting agent. 
Basically, TCT considers the dimension of the transaction itself, whilst AT is interpreted 
as the principal-agent contractual relationship (Benston & Smith Jr. 1976). Based on the 
research of Archer, Abdel Karim and Al-Deehani (1998), the relevance of the above 
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 The meaning of hazards and imperfections here relates to the condition under which the principal cannot 
be sure if the agent has put forth maximal effort. (For more information see, Eisenhardt 1989, p: 57-74). 
Chapter Two    Conventional Banking vs. Islamic Banking Systems:  
                           Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives 
32 
 
theoretical differences and their application to the financial services industry (including 
Islamic banks) is presented in Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2: Application of TCT and AT to Financial Services Institutions 
Criterion T C T A T 
Unit of analysis Individual trust  
Contractual transaction 
Donor principal 
Implementing partner 
Focal dimension Interdependence in funding decision 
(donors decision on project selection 
restricted to shari`a acceptance ) 
Incentive of unit operators 
(implementing partner may diverge 
from other donors, customers need 
and satisfaction ) 
Focal cost concern Mal-adaptation costs 
Potential (strategic) holdout 
Cost of monitoring and residual loss 
from imperfect incentive alignment 
Contractual cost Choice of efficient governance mode 
for both investment accounts holder 
and shareholders 
Implement monitoring mechanism 
Theoretical 
orientation 
Comparative assessment; choice 
between (imperfect) discrete structural 
form in modes of Islamic transaction  
Theory of the second best rational 
contract in the presence of constraints; 
information asymmetry and non-
observable 
Strategic intent Shareholder view; minimise transaction 
cost in order to create shareholder 
value (value added cost)   
Investment account holders view; 
utility maximisation and pay off in 
terms of objectives  
Fundamental 
behaviour 
Bounded rationality, and information 
asymmetry, in evaluating productivity 
Information asymmetry, risk 
management & moral hazard by 
agents, imperfect observable mode 
Because neoclassical economics is concerned with the effect that values, rules and 
governance standards might have upon the boundaries of the firm‘s maximised profit, 
both TCT and AT are subject to the standard neoclassical modelling of the firm as a 
production function to which a profit-maximising objective has been established, as 
depicted in Figure 2.8 (Ferris 1981). In terms of profit-maximisation, empirical research 
demonstrates that TCT regards the firm as a governance structure and AT considers it as a 
nexus of contracts. Therefore, fundamental behaviour assumptions of TCT are bounded 
rationality and opportunism (for example, self-interest plus guile); the former assumption 
has as a consequence incomplete contracting or involvement of misleading contract 
terms, whilst the latter assumption entails additional contractual hazards (Sarker 1999).  
AT exponents have been hesitant to adopt the assumption of bounded rationality, but 
notions of ex post ‗selling up‘ in AT as a means of mitigating ex ante incompleteness of 
contracts are consistent with bounded rationality. As can be seen from Table 2.2, while 
AT uses the term ‗moral hazard‘ rather than opportunism29, the two terms are virtually 
synonymous. Much the same may be said of information asymmetry (as used in the AT 
literature) and information impactedness (as used by Williamson 1996), the difference 
being that AT is concerned with principal-agent relations whilst TCT addresses all types 
of contracting relations. Finally, both theories normally assume risk neutrality on the part 
of contracting parties.  
Regarding efficient contracting, TCT examines alternative forms of financial 
organisations with reference to their capacity to economise with respect to the 
consequences of bounded rationality while safeguarding the transactions in question 
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against the hazards arising from opportunism (Benston & Smith Jr. 1976). The focus of 
AT has been more on the latter aspect. Additionally, while AT examines contracting 
primarily from the perspective of the ex ante alignment of incentives, TCT is more 
concerned with developing a governance structure that offers ex post measures to achieve 
the integrity of the contract. Moreover, for both theories, the board of directors has a 
function that arises endogenously as an instrument of residual claimants. This point is 
significant for the analysis of Islamic financial transactions.  
2.4.4 Relevance of TCT and AT to Islamic Banking and Finance 
2.4.4.1 Financial Contracting in IB: From the Perspective of TCT  
The market behaviour of the IB transactions has been intensely controlled in the 
application of Islamic rules and in research on Islamic banking in recent years. One of the 
goals of this argument has been to clarify patterns displayed in Islamic transactions 
instruments and to establish their consistency with the assumption of the rational, PLS 
rule of Islamic institutions behaviour. However, in Islamic finance the technical term for a 
transaction between an entrepreneur and the suppliers of funds is mudaraba. The 
bargaining between the two parties involved in the transaction (mudaraba contract) can 
vary substantially and is determined by contracts. However, the literature separates 
Islamic banking into three main activities: concessionary financing (minimum rate/cost), 
trade financing, and finance by participatory manner (Dhumale & Sapcanin 2003). Within 
these activities are various contractual forms that conform fully to the tenets of PLS such 
as mudaraba, musharaka, muzar`ah, etc. (see Figure 2.4). 
Moreover, as mentioned previously in this chapter, Islamic finance construes ‗equity‘ 
differently in some crucial respects. It involves a combination of both investment account 
holders (IAH) and shareholders. Therefore, it is somewhat like ‗debt-equity‘ in reverse, 
rather like debt with management discretion to present contractual rules so as to preserve 
value-enhancing investment projects (Suleiman 2000). For instance, mudaraba is like 
equity (share capital) in giving a residual PLS claim, and differs from it (equity) by either 
(a) contracting for the duration of the firm or (b) having the benefit of a board of directors 
to monitor management on its behalf.       
2.4.4.2 Financial Contracting in IB: From the Perspective of AT 
AT extends its coverage to the appropriate use of incentive systems to encourage positive 
behaviour by front-line staff in achieving the organisation‘s overall objectives (Eisenhardt 
1989). In Islamic finance, contracts used by IBs (i.e. mudaraba) for mobilising and 
managing investors‘ funds may involve complex agency problems (Archer & Abdel 
Karim 1997). The banks‘ management acts as an agent for shareholders, while the bank 
as mudarib acts as agent for the investment account holders (depositors). Those who 
provide funds to the agent, and the agent (bank) do not allow them to intervention in the 
management of their funds like shareholders, and in the bank their position is only as 
Modaraibs (entrepreneurs). This raises the possibility of a conflict of interest facing 
banks‘ managers, not just in their dealing with the interests of shareholders and 
investment account holders, but also between interests of the two categories of investors 
(shareholders and IAH). 
From the previous argument, the relation between IAH and Islamic finance institutions 
presents a distinctive type of agency problem that is hardly paralleled in the finance 
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literature. It has been noted by (Archer, Abdel Karim & Al-Deehani 1998) that the basic 
condition of the mudaraba contract is the separation of ownership from management of 
funds. This does not allow IAH to interfere in the management of their funds, which 
raises a possible conflict of interest between IAH and the IB—a problem that also exists 
in the principal-agent relationship in conventional banks. Accordingly, from the 
perspective of the finance literature, operationally, the obvious advantage of IB is its 
greater ability to allocate risk management through the sharing of project returns between 
the owner of the capital and the entrepreneur (Al-Deehani, Karim & Murinde 1999). 
Despite this positive risk sharing benefit, the PLS mode in Islamic banking also faces 
severe principal-agent problems arising from asymmetric information and costly 
monitoring (Archer & Abdel Karim 1997).  
The main focus of the PLS principle is placed on agency costs. Employment and 
investment decisions are also analysed in light of the cost of agency. However, the agency 
theory literature concerning the financial institution shows the relationship between 
various agents in the institution‘s production processes, especially the structure 
relationships between the capital-owner and entrepreneur. According to the PLS 
principle, there are many contractual aspects in financial production relations and 
processes which may also be developed within Islamic finance, for instance, accounts of 
net-income sharing, gross-income sharing and agriculture outcomes sharing which are 
incorporated on the basis of muzara`a and musaqat.   
2.4.5 Relevance of Theory to the Focus of the Study 
The focal point of section 2.4 is that the analysis of transactions costs and the principal-
agent problem is central to the theory of PLS. IBs not only offer financial products which 
can be invested in different ways, but also determine consumption decisions within the 
ethical framework of Islamic finance (DeGeorge 1992). However, providing trading 
information and continuously monitoring may be most useful for such financial 
transactions as loans and deposits, and also in reducing fraud, litigation and 
misunderstandings which can be more costly than the direct cost of the transaction itself. 
Although IBs use financial contracts which require performance analysis of transactions 
cost and principal-agent problems, they may have various principals which are rewarded 
by the shari`a committee board according to the PLS principle. However, concerning the 
theory of IB, it may be assumed, considering all internal and external active forces in the 
functions of Islamic financial institutions, that such institutions have an efficient 
entrepreneur seeking to maximise production at a level when total revenue equals total 
cost. 
The finance literature shows that TCT and AT have been adopted by several authors in 
their studies (Benston & Smith Jr. 1976; Ferris 1981; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Jones 
1997; Williamson 1975; Williamson 1996). Additionally, most of these studies highlight 
the importance of providing finance efficiently to institutions implementing partnerships, 
with restricted shari`a law offering the most cost effective processes. Therefore, the 
theory of transaction cost and theory of agency-problem with PLS principal provides an 
approach that might be used in IBs as a basis for assessing the impact of lending 
decisions. This is seen as the main focus of the study in terms of comparing factors that 
influence lending decision making in IBs and CB (this will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter 4). 
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It is important to ask whether the conventional banking system is in fact different to the 
Islamic banking system in terms of transactional operations aspects. Both systems have 
experienced substantial changes over the last 30 years or so as banks transformed their 
operations from a relatively narrow range of activities to ‗full services‘ financial 
institutions (Levine, Loayza & Beck 2000). The literature surveyed has obvious 
implications for the theory and practical viability of Islamic banking. Four main points of 
comparison between CB and IB––income sources, competitive environment, customer 
focus and strategic focus––are identified in Table 2.3.  
Table 2.3: Conventional Banking (CB) versus Islamic Banking (IB) 
Points of 
Comparison 
CB IB 
Income sources 
The main sources of CB income are: 
net interest income (interest revenue 
from lending activities), fee and 
commission income (selling non-
traditional banking products ) 
The main sources for IBs income are: 
Modaraba [trustee finance contract], 
Morabaha [mark–up financing], Mushraka 
[equity participation] and Ijara [lease, 
lease purchase] 
Competitive 
Environment 
Due to increasing competitiveness 
between banks, they have sought to 
diversify their earnings, focusing on 
meeting the needs of a more diverse 
and financially sophisticated client 
base (high competition) 
It has some restrictions which can be 
outlined in legitimate investment (Islamic 
principles or shari`a), the prohibition of 
interest(Rib`a), and religious supervisory 
board for supervision and control of the 
rules (fatwa committee) 
Strategic Focus 
The strategy of CB is to be able to 
meet as broad a range of customer 
financial service demands as 
possible, such as returns to 
shareholders, creating shareholder 
value (generating return-on-equity) 
(ROE),  
Strategically, IB focuses on profit-loss-
sharing and other forms of arrangements 
that enable a financial institution to operate 
without the use of interest (prohibition of 
interest); also maximising their asset value 
and banking growth in general. 
Customer 
Focus 
CB focuses on demand led 
community growth, and creating 
value for customers (strengthens 
clients‟ relationships and should 
boost returns to the banks over the 
longer period). 
The main mission of IB has been the 
achievement of social and economic 
development through the delivery of 
financial services in line with the principles 
and teaching of Islam (customers‟ 
satisfaction or attitude toward a 
product/service after it has been used) 
Accordingly, there are universal products and services provided in the financial industry, 
which are called ‗banks‘ activities‘, such as accepting deposits, granting loans, insurance, 
securities investment banking, pensions, etc. For instance, Saunders and Walter (1994) 
argue that, under the universal banking model, banking business is broadly defined to 
include all aspects of financial activities such as securities operations, insurance, pensions 
and leasing. Thus, there is no absolute difference in the range of products and services 
between CB and IB.  
There are a large number of aspects associated with the rationality of debt contracts. 
Rational, bilateral financial contracts depend on a variety of factors such as; 
1. The cost of output verification and/or monitoring against moral hazard; 
2. The presence of adverse selection; 
3. The degree to which wealth constraints bind the parties involved; and  
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4. The parties‘ attitude towards risk. Furthermore, particular features of real-world 
debt contracts, among them the use of collateral, credit rating and financing of 
loans, gain theoretical support as being incentive-compatible.  
Economists have argued that debt contracts are defensible in theory, given that they figure 
so prominently in financial arrangements and have done so for a very long time in 
conventional banking markets (Lucia 2003). This is rather less than reassuring from the 
viewpoint of the theory of Islamic banking. As a result of the standard of debt (rib`a) 
contract, collateral requirements, loan covenants, and enforced work outs––measures to 
ameliorate adverse selection and moral hazard––are all prohibited in Islamic financing 
(Rice & Mahmoud 2001). At the same time, Islamic banks exceed pure financial 
intermediation of the transactional sort, and have direct participation in business and 
investments with PLS along equity lines.   
Islamic economics is based on a set of contracts and instruments which form the 
backbone of Islamic finance, in addition to some elaborate transaction frameworks 
(Nomani 2003). In spite of this, several financial instruments acceptable in the pre-
Islamic period have been further developed and widely practiced after confirming their 
compatibility with the principles of shari`a; for instance, the elimination of riba and 
gharar. Further, the Islamic Financial Institutions Council (IFIC) is preparing standards 
for management control by focusing on how the development of control and guideline 
approaches will ensure the protection of the owners‘ rights and the accounts of investors 
(Anwar 2003; Pervez 1990). 
The rejection of interest raises the question of what replaces the interest rate mechanism 
in an Islamic framework. If the paying and receiving of interest is prohibited, how do 
Islamic banks operate? In responding, Lewis & Algaoud (2001, p. 3) indicated that ‗the 
PLS principle applies in substituting PLS for interest as a method of resource allocation
30
. 
Although a large number of different contracts feature in Islamic financing, certain types 
of transaction are central in Islamic contracts; these include trustee finance (Mudaraba), 
and transaction contracts such as equity participation (Musharaka), and mark-up methods 
(Murabaha)‘.  
In order to conform to Islamic rules and norms, Lewis and Algaoud (2001, p. 28) have 
reported ‗five religious requirements, which are well established in the literature, must be 
observed in investment behaviour features. These features are as follows: 
1. The absence of interest-based (rib`a) in financial transactions.  
2. The introduction of a religious levy or almsgiving (zakat). 
3. The prohibition of the production of goods and services which contradict the value 
pattern of Islam (haram).  
4. The avoidance of economic activities involving gambling (maysir) and uncertainty 
(gharar).  
5. The provision of takaful (Islamic insurance).  
These five features give Islamic banking and finance a distinctive religious identity‘. The 
following section highlights the experience of this identity through both historical and 
empirical dimensions.   
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UK.  
Chapter Two    Conventional Banking vs. Islamic Banking Systems:  
                           Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives 
37 
 
2.5 Dimensions of Islamic Banking Experience   
2.5.1 Historical Dimension   
In the 1970s, Middle Eastern countries experienced a major need for financial 
transactions and investment dealing within their religious affiliation. According to Iqbal 
and Llewellyn (2002), IB outside and inside Islamic countries had limited capacity to 
absorb the high cost of investment, which was often handled by conventional financial 
institutions. This situation was a major impetus in the development of Islamic banking 
institutions.  
Another major impetus came from the growing sense of Islamic identity and religious 
consciousness in these independent economies. The first Islamic Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) can be traced back to the late 1950s, even though the main development of such 
institutions did not actually start until the mid-1970s (Zaman & Movassaghi 2001). With 
the passage of time and with other socio-economic forces demanding more involvement 
of interest-free banks in such economies and financial activities, interactions with the 
banks became more common practice in Muslim countries. Basically, therefore, the need 
to engage in banking activities became more urgent (Haron, Ahmad & Planisek 1994). 
These dealings attracted the attention and concern of Muslim intellectuals. Thus, one 
could say, the story of interest-free or Islamic banking effectively began at this point.     
Over the last three decades, ‗interest-free‘ has attracted more attention, especially among 
various economists (Muslim and non-Muslim). Also, the involvement of Islamic religious 
awareness in institutions and governments in different economies resulted in the 
establishment of the first interest-free banks (Nomani 2003). Islamic institutional 
developments came to a head at the third Islamic conference of foreign ministers, held in 
Jeddah in 1972, when the programme to eliminate interest from Islamic financial 
institutions was presented by the finance ministers of eighteen (18) participating 
countries. A comprehensive plan to reform the monetary and financial system of the 
Islamic communities according to shari`a principles was laid out concurrently (Lewis & 
Algaoud 2001). Consequently, several countries undertook various efforts, including the 
establishment of Islamic banks, to support and realise these ambitions.  
Figure 2.9: Descriptive statistics of Islamic Institutions: Practicing & Distribution 
 
1. Middle East includes Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Sudan  and Yemen 
2. GCC stands for Gulf Cooperation Council, consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) 
Source: (Archer & Karim 2002; El-Hawary, Grais & Iqbal 2004; Fuad & Mohammed 1996) 
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According to the data collected by the International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB) 
in 1998 in Jeddah, there were more than 200 Islamic banks and financial institutions in 
Muslim and non-Muslim countries by 1997. Figure 2.9 shows the distribution of IBs and 
Islamic financial institutions; there were 9 in Europe and America, 47 in the Middle East 
(including 21 in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC countries), 35 in Africa, 
and 82 in Asia (of which 31 were in South East Asia and 51 in south Asia). This is in 
addition to a number of public and private banks which had not yet become members of 
IAIB: the IAIB database does not include the rapidly expanding deposits accepted by a 
number of conventional banks on an Islamic basis. 
2.5.2 Empirical Dimension  
As mentioned previously, the Islamic financial system was introduced into many Muslim 
and non-Muslim countries in the late twentieth century. In general, Islamic financial 
institutions were created mainly for the import-export requirements of the different 
enterprises, although Muslim traders avoided non-Muslim banks for religious reasons 
(Zaman & Movassaghi 2001). Khan and Mirakhor (1990) argued that, over time, Islamic 
financial industries found it difficult to engage in trade and other activities without 
making some use of the commercial banks, even though many confined their involvement 
to transaction services such as current accounts and money transfers.  
Consequently, IBs moved to offer a wide spectrum of financial services that comply with 
the shari`a. These services are provided to the retail savings and investment markets, as 
well as the market for consumer credit. The growth of Islamic finance continued in the 
following decades and, as Wilson (1990) showed in an evaluation of the Islamic financial 
system, there were more than 300 IFIs worldwide, managing assets and savings in excess 
of US$ 200 billion and US$ 160 billion respectively, in 1990. Thus, IB has made 
substantial progress worldwide, even though the position that it has created is very small 
when compared to the total volume of international or even Muslim world finance. What 
counts, however, is not the volume, but rather the respectability that the interest-free 
financial intermediary has attained and the positive evidence that its existence provides 
both workability and viability within the system (Archer & Karim 2002).  
While in the 1950s Islamic banking was only an academic dream of which few persons, 
even among educated Muslims, were aware, it has now become a practical reality. In 
addition, in the most advanced economies Islamic banks are characterised by a relatively 
high level of government control and restriction that inhibits competition and maintains a 
protected banking environment. Wilson (1990, p. 29) comments that, ‗…IB has attracted 
the attention of Western banks, as well as the involvement of stockholders and 
researchers‘ (see Figure 2.9 above). 
2.6 Contemporary Banking Crises 
Banking industry crises have been an integral part of the global financial landscape of the 
last several decades. Such crises reflect the central role of banks in crises-prone 
economies or instability in the banking sector itself. In general, banks‘ crises concentrate 
on two main aspects: liquidity availability and successful investment opportunity. These 
are necessary for stability of the banking sector and competitive conditions. Wilson and 
Caprio (2002) examined the role of loan concentration, or the lack of diversification, as a 
factor in banking industry crises. The risk-reduction and efficiency benefits of 
diversification create a benchmark against which the risk-taking activities of banks can be 
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judged. Their analysis concluded that loan concentration plays a significant role in major 
banking crises.   
Deregulation and financial liberalisation, in addition to the introduction of technological 
developments, has also changed the environment in which banks are operating (Barth, 
Caprio & Levine 2006). Furthermore, globalisation and religious affiliations have 
affected the operations of the financial industry in general and of banks in particular 
(Stomper 2005). For instance, in addition to the development of IB practices in parts of 
the world where the Islamic faith is an integral feature of the socio-economic make-up of 
the population, there has also been a growing interest from CBs in developing such 
services for their customers. In response to these pressures, banks have attempted to adopt 
strategies aimed at improving efficiency, in order to expand their output and increase the 
range of services offered.      
The role of financial intermediary undertaken by IBs raises issues of corporate 
governance over and above those that arise in the case of conventional banks. The latter 
receive deposits on the basis of what is essentially a debt contract, under which the 
depositors‘ capital and returns are not at risk (subject to the banks‘ solvency). Islamic 
banks, by contrast, receive deposits on the basis of a profit-sharing (Mudaraba) contract, 
under which both returns and capital bear risk similar to that borne by shareholders (El-
Hawary, Grais & Iqbal 2004). However, the depositors, that is, holders of profit-sharing 
investment accounts, do not have any rights, unlike shareholders in the corporate 
governance of the bank. This raises a number of regulatory issues, as discussed by Archer 
and Karim (2002). 
In terms of corporate governance in Islamic banking, Badr El-Din (2006) observes that 
the agency-principal of governance of Islamic banks includes a shari`a supervisory board 
(SSB) which is responsible for supervising the shari`a compliance of the banks‘ 
transactions and practices. According to Sarker (1999), Islamic finance involves a specific 
set of legal issues within fiqh al mu`amalat.
31
. Kahf (1999) emphasises that contract law, 
which concerns the shari`a permissibility and validity of different contractual forms that 
may be used in IBs transactions, is essentially a focus of contract partners. In addition, 
attention is drawn to problems of the enforceability of such contracts in secular courts 
from an international perspective. 
The future of banking will likely be shaped, to a large degree, by the environment 
(regulatory, technological and competitiveness) in which it operates. General 
macroeconomic conditions and demographic factors will impact highly on banks‘ 
performance (El-Gamal 2006). However, economic stability will ensure low bank failure 
rates and strong profit growth for both Islamic and conventional banks, whilst 
demographic trends in some countries could change savings demand and investment 
patterns (Williamson 1975). Hence, new regulatory structures will likely be necessary as 
banks become bigger in size and more exposed to risk originating from abroad, as well as 
risks of global finance instability. The capability of the IB system in terms of competition 
and ability to survive with other banking systems needs to be highlighted in terms of 
banking capability aspects as this system becomes part of the global financial system. 
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 Islamic commercial jurisprudence: a branch of Islamic law–shari`a–jurisprudence. It focuses on 
contracts; it lays down what types of contracts are permissible or valid and what types are impermissible 
or invalid. In particular, contracts are impermissible if they involve Rib`a (interest), Gharar (uncertainty 
or ambiguity as to subject matter, terms or conditions) or maysir (gambling or speculation). 
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2.7 Islamic Banking Capability  
The achievement of integrative management functions with particular application in the 
context of IB or Islamic finance differentiates this system from other systems. The 
literature surveyed in the Islamic finance and Islamic banking field has several 
implications for the capability of Islamic banking. This section highlights the general 
trends that have characterised the Islamic banking sector in most transition economies. 
Some of the most common capability aspects are presented. 
2.7.1 Product Innovation 
The future development of the Islamic financial industry––and IB in particular––depends 
crucially on its ability to innovate in order to offer a more complete and competitive range 
of financial products and services comparable in scope and pricing to that offered by the 
CB industry. Kahf (2002) observes that IB managed its risks efficiently to become more 
competitive. Consequently, a major factor in productivity development will be the ability 
of contemporary shari`a scholars to cope with the need for innovation in the products of 
financial institutions that are shari`a-compliant to meet present-day market needs. 
2.7.2 Shari’ a Rules and Standards Harmonisation 
One of the most important of those needs is for the harmonisation of shari`a rules through 
the acceptance of shari`a standards. This will allow scholars to promote and monitor the 
implementation of these standards, in contrast to a situation in which they reduce 
individual and diverse solutions to shari`a issues (Lewis & Algaoud 2001). However, the 
work of shari`a scholars needs to take place in a context of innovation based on research 
and development directed towards new transactional modes and solutions to problems of 
financing in a shari`a compliant context. 
2.7.3 The Emergence of Islamic Financial Markets 
The next major feature in this development will be the emergence of Islamic financial 
markets and institutions, such as insurance companies (takaful-based), and the 
organisation of a sufficient volume of shari`a-compliant assets in which such institutions 
can properly invest which called in Islam takaful-based companies (Grais & Pellegrini 
2006). It is operating on the basis of periodic contributions of a sum of money by the 
participants (policyholders) to the takaful fund, which is administrated by the takaful 
companies. The contribution is based on the concept of donation which is used to create a 
takaful fund to meet indemnities or claims in accordance with the conditions stated in the 
contract of takaful. The need for more engineering and assets specialists has labour 
market implications, notably in terms of challenges regarding competence and 
compensation. Relevant research and educational programmes have the capacity to help 
in raising awareness of problem areas that require attention and solutions to these 
problems (Grais, Pellegrini & Svetová 2006).  
Islamic financial and capital markets currently lack the information intermediaries, in 
terms of component financial analysts and commentators, who play an important role in 
making such markets efficient in developing economies (Honohan, Caprio & Vittas 
2002). The stock markets in countries where they operate do not exhibit informational 
efficiency, breadth or depth and, therefore, offer limited opportunities for financial 
institutions in these countries, including IFIs, to raise equity capital in the form of public 
Chapter Two    Conventional Banking vs. Islamic Banking Systems:  
                           Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives 
41 
 
share issues (Al-Deehani, Karim & Murinde 1999). However, these problems are due to a 
lack of volume which could be mitigated by the stock exchanges in certain Islamic 
economies merging—as their counterparts in efficient markets have done. This would be 
likely to engender the interest of financial analysts contributing to informational 
efficiency.   
2.7.4 Corporate Governance  
Greuning and Iqbal (2007, p. 24) argued that ‗corporate governance relates to the manner 
in which the business of bank is governed, including setting corporate objectives and a 
bank‘s risk profile, aligning corporate activities and behaviours with the expectation that 
management will operate in a safe and sound manner, and running day-to-day operations 
within an established risk profile, while protecting the interests of depositors and other 
stakeholders‘. In general, corporate governance is defined by a set of relationships 
between the bank‘s management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders. 
However, Greuning and Iqbal (2007) and Greuning and Brajovic (2003, p. 15) stated ‗the 
key elements of sound corporate governance in Islamic banking include:  
 A well-articulated corporate strategy against which the overall success and the 
contribution of individuals can be measured.  
 Assigning and enforcing responsibilities, decision-making authority and 
accountabilities that are appropriate for the bank‘s risk profile.  
 A strong financial risk management function (independent of business lines), 
adequate internal control systems (including internal and external audit functions), 
used to ensure compliance. This includes special monitoring of a bank‘s risk 
exposures where conflicts of interest appear (e.g. in relationships with affiliated 
parties).  
 Financial and managerial incentives to act in an appropriate manner offered to the 
board, management and employees, including compensation, promotion, and 
penalties. That is, compensation should be consistent with the bank‘s objectives, 
performance, and ethical values‘.  
Finally, Belton (1993) suggest that there is a need for firms that are active in financial 
markets to have a high quality of corporate governance which, in turn, depends on ethical 
standards being observed. In this respect, the role of financial regulators needs to be 
considered. For IB, a new regulatory body has been established on a consortium basis by 
the central banks of a number of countries in which IFIs operate. This body, the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB), will issue voluntary standards for Islamic financial 
services (Archer & Karim 2002; Casu, Girardone & Molyneux 2006). 
IFIs have another major body, the Accounting & Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) (Kahf 2002), that will promote international standards of 
excellence in key aspects of their operations, such as corporate governance, risk 
management and financial reporting. Provided the labour market challenges can be met so 
that the necessary expertise is on hand, these developments provide the ingredients for the 
potential success of the Islamic banking services in international, as well as regional, 
financial circles.  
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2.8 Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter denoted that banks, as the other financial intermediaries, play a 
role in the economy, channelling funds from units in surplus to units in deficit. They 
reconcile the different needs of borrowers and lenders by transforming small-size, low-
risk and highly liquid deposits into loans which are of large size, higher risk and 
illiquidity (transformation function). In addition, in the absence of IFIs, the western-style 
financial institutions were introduced in Muslim or non-Muslim countries because of the 
need for financial services and they thereby turned to the western-style, conventional 
banks and insurance companies, without giving too much attention to their non-
compliance with shari`a rules and principles. In the case of savings, an alternative was 
simply to hold them in the form of cash. 
A number of such instruments have existed for hundreds of years without the existence of 
Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). Because Islamic finance is based on contracts 
between providers and users of funds (or of financed assets) it was able to take place 
without the need for financial intermediaries. This chapter therefore highlighted the 
differences between Islamic and conventional finance instruments that take the form of 
contracts. In regard to the theoretical phase, surveyed literature showed that several 
banking and finance studies used TCT and AT. This chapter provided an explanation 
about how/why TCT and AT have been used for a justification of the study model; and 
what the relevance is of adopting these theories in this study.  
This chapter also detailed how the combination of these theories and the PLS model 
provide a sound basis for risk assessment and determining their impact on rationality of 
lending decisions in IB. This provides the main focus of the study in terms of comparing 
factors that influence financial decision makers in IBs and CBs. In short, this chapter 
provides relevant literature supporting the fact that there is a high consideration with 
reference to the financing behaviour and financing risks in both IBs and CBs industries. 
This indicates that financing patterns in demand dominate the risk factors in these banks 
and this aspect will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter (Chapter 3).  
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3 CHAPTER THREE 
THE INFLUENCE OF ASSESSING RISK 
FACTORS ON PERFORMANCE LENDING 
PORTFOLIOS  
3.1 Introduction 
Risk management is well recognised in the banking industry and encompasses an entire 
set of risk management processes and models, permitting banks to apply risk-based 
policies and practices. These risk models apply techniques and management tools 
required for measuring, monitoring and controlling risks (Abdullah 2003; Beasley, Clune 
& Hermanson 2005). Any uncertainty that might lead to losses has been designated as a 
risk. This chapter aims to shed some light on the risk taking behaviour in Islamic and 
conventional banking institutions. Traditionally, some banks have not fully examined the 
risk of their corporate strategies (Abdullah 2003). Many portfolio managers do not fully 
understand risk factors; and risk management is often left, by default, to those responsible 
for service promotion or transaction processing. Therefore, this chapter also describes 
how both IB and CB banking systems treat risks and the relative importance of risk factor 
assessment in lending decision-making.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews finance products management and 
control. Section 3 discusses risk quantification as a major challenge in the finance 
industry. Section 4 covers quantified risks in the Islamic finance industry with a focus on: 
1) common risk factors in CB and IB; and 2) specific practices such as risk sharing. 
Section 5 outlines risk assessment and risk management policies in practice. Section 6 
addresses risk and project finance management in Islamic banking, a subject more often 
known as ‗managing corporate risk‘. Finally, section 7 concludes the chapter. Figure 3.1 
provides a visual overview of the structure of this chapter. 
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Figure 3.1: Outline of Chapter 3 Interrelations 
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3.2 Management and Control of Financial Services  
3.2.1 Some Relevant Literature  
Natural forms of control and management are features of management functions. 
However, Dar and Presley (2000) differentiate between management and control, as a 
firm may be controlled without actual participation in management. Jensen and Fama 
(1983) defined control as an accurate management tool to approve the initial proposals 
and supervise the projects through internal monitoring or external mechanisms. Basically, 
control is viewed as the implementation of authority. In theory, within organisations the 
context of management and control functions have not been defined individually—
perhaps in the past, in owner-managed firms, a single individual performed these 
functions (Fraser, Gup & Kolari 2001; Jensen & Meckling 1976). However, with the 
expansion of businesses and their enhanced performance, these functions became more 
complicated. Thus, the distinction between the ownership and management functions 
meant the allocation of these functions to those who could most efficiently perform them. 
This allocation of management and control functions becomes even more important with 
an increase in the size of an organisation. 
In large organisations, however, separation between ownership and management 
functions causes conflict between the agents‘ and principals‘ interests, and gives rise to 
agency problems within the institutional structure. In this regard, several ways of 
controlling a corporation have been applied such as achievement control, majority 
control, quality control and management control (Berle & Means 1968). Therefore, the 
term ‗control‘ refers to agency problems and conflicts that occur between managers and 
owners/shareholders (Delfino 2007). Thus, a function of control is the action of 
measurement taken by owners to ensure managerial behaviour that corresponds with their 
interests. To extend this argument, the interrelation of management and control functions 
needs to be explained.  
The interrelation between functions of management and control consists of four basic 
elements: risk, reward, authority and responsibility. The management literature considers 
authority as a basic ingredient of ownership (Shen & Chih 2005; Sinkey 2002). Jensen 
(1996) argues that, [economically], the investment in resources limit and make the owners 
residual claimants on the return from the business activity in which decision-making 
(responsibility) is delegated to the managers. The main focus of the agency cost problem 
is the sharing of risks between managers and owners. Forcing the managers to share risk 
with the owners can mitigate the agency problem. Accordingly, Dar and Presley (2000, p. 
16) suggest the inter-relations of authority, responsibility, risk and reward—as depicted in 
Figure 3.2.  
Figure 3.2: Management and Control in an Organisation 
 
  Source: (Dar and Presley 2000, p.16) 
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Figure 3.3 shows the changes in the size of functions between management and control 
through the organisational structure elements (shown by shaded areas). The influence of 
control and management changes with the increase in size of these functions. For 
instance, replacement of a function with another (control/management) will be the highest 
at responsibility for control function, while risk in both Islamic and conventional agents 
needs control rather than management. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 indicate that management and 
control functions have commonly-shared risks and rewards when both agents and- 
principals are residual claimants. As a consequence of sharing risk and reward, complete 
specialisation of management and control functions is seldom achievable in the modern 
financial services industry.  
Figure 3.3: Composition of Management and Control Functions 
 
  Source: Dar and Presley, 2000 
To illustrate, the diversity in banks‘ product types that ‗cause risk and the variety of 
control options available for each product can make the control of operating risks seem 
unduly complicated‘ (Mayland 1993, p. 87). Most banks are well-positioned to make the 
necessary decisions because the risk-taking infrastructure is already in place. 
Nevertheless, management of risks is an integral part of banking operations. Crook, 
Edelman and Thomas (2007) argued that as a result of the variety of choices there were 
no absolutely right or wrong ways to manage operating risks.  
A bank‘s processes for managing operating risk should evolve gradually as its business 
grows, and the pace of evolution should be determined by management‘s analysis of the 
business trade-offs between the overall costs and benefits of risk control (Mayland 1993). 
In other words, the results of management‘s analyses are likely to be different for each 
bank‘s product. Further, control process concepts imply that different products offered by 
banks could require different levels of control (Giudici & Bilotta 2004). Accordingly, 
high risk products require stronger risk control than low risk products. It is not surprising 
that the existence of current risks may mean potential losses in the future. Research has 
seen the emergence of a number of risk models and risk management methods for 
quantifying and monitoring risk (Rosman 2009). Such methods significantly augment 
perspectives on risks and the ability to control them.  
In terms of risk control and management, the most important element of risk control and 
management refers to the use of information designed to reduce the unpredictability and 
variability of outcomes. According to transaction cost theory, banks will use the 
information thus obtained as a basis for lending decision-making to reduce costs (Bol et 
al. 2003; Simkins & Rogers 2006). Some bankers may favour ‗case-based‘ and others 
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customers
32
. But modern financial branches consider computer-based product assessment 
useful in the management and control of risk, and also welcome the standardizing effect 
of this assessment on the processing of product applications. As the focus of any bank is 
minimising losses, a suitable approach to assessing risks must be chosen. Thus, the study 
seeks to determine if this is applicable to IB. 
3.2.2 Profit/Loss Sharing and Agency Problem 
In a typical PLS arrangement, an Islamic finance organisation identifies/notifies the risk 
in investment to an agent—which is basically ghrar (speculation or unreasonable 
uncertainty). Executive and shari`a boards—Islamic agent boards—are responsible for 
making strategic and operational decisions. According to the PLS concept, the IB is liable 
for any financial loss, and shares in any profits. In this context, one can ask, is a 
combination of management and control rights with profit/loss sharing an agency 
problem? Normally, banks are able to comply with the Islamic financial law. Thus, no 
serious problems arise with this arrangement and in supervising the business operations of 
the agent (Iqbal & Mirakhor 1999). 
In the case of Mudaraba, proper monitoring mechanisms are yet to be devised for PLS, 
especially since IAH
33
 does not allow any control rights. The literature on Islamic 
financial transactions—Fiqh-al-muamlat—recommends serious reconsideration of this 
aspect. For example, Ahmed & Khan (2007) lists three rights and one responsibility of the 
IAH in a Mudaraba arrangement. The rights include the borrower being made aware of 
contract conditions, of profit sharing according to the contract, and of limited legal 
responsibility in the case of losses. But, IAH are also responsible for handing over the 
Mudaraba investment. The shari`a outlines two rights and two responsibilities of the 
entrepreneur. The rights include conducting the business in a completely free manner, and 
making accounting decisions (Alessi 1983). The entrepreneur is responsible for the terms 
of the agreement and liquidation of the Mudaraba business at the end of the contract. 
Recently, the contemporary usage of Islamic instruments as a method of financing (such 
as mudaraba, musarkah, murabaha) has required more than such initial arrangements of 
rights and responsibilities. Dar and Presley (2000, p. 17) have reported that, ‗there is a 
necessity for construction of standardised PLS contracts, or bylaws, in the light of the 
Islamic/legal frameworks of Muslim countries‘. These constructions should include the 
rights and responsibilities of various agent-principals within the organisational structure. 
It is often asserted that, where agency problems exist, IB arrangements are more critical 
than for CBs and Non Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs). Some solutions are provided 
in the modern finance literature (Jensen & Fama 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Williamson 1979). These solutions are summarised as follows:   
1. Managing and monitoring arrangements.  
2. Management separation (initiation and implementation of decisions). 
3. Control (approval and monitoring of decisions).  
4. Capital provision performance.  
5. Other control measures as discussed previously are also considered 
relevant. 
                                                 
32
 ‗Case-based‘ means the decision to lend a new loan is based on the processes of similar past loans, while 
the term of ‗class-based‘ means the decision to lend is based on the recorded character sheet or policy 
recorded in an advance.      
33
 Islamic banking in this case 
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The first two solutions—management separation and monitoring arrangements—are 
referred to as agency-solutions within the financial structure; while the other two—
control and capital provision performance—refer to venture capital financing. However, 
these solutions are also applicable to the agency problems faced by institutions using PLS 
as a primary approach of financing.  
Therefore, from both a theoretical and practical perspective, risk management and 
measurement are current issues in the contemporary finance industry (Woo & Siu 2004). 
However, the task of risk measurement is not an easy one, as credit risk methodologies 
are still diverse and it is very much a developing field. Existing literature supports the 
view that CBs and IBs in some economies have not performed well. However, their 
financial markets are rapidly expanding, with a resultant increase in the number of 
transactions on one hand, and limited relevant financial information on the other (Dietsch 
& Petey 2002). Therefore, one may question; are these markets performing well in terms 
of measuring risk?   
3.3 Risk as a Major Challenge to Banks 
Since risks are so important in banking, it is surprising that risk quantification and 
assessment remained a limited exercise in some institutions until recently. The 
quantitative finance literature addresses extensively the problem of risk in capital markets 
(Bessis 2001). However, Chapra and Ahmed (2002) argue that the extension to the 
various risks of financial institutions—capital markets—has remained a challenge for 
multiple reasons: 
1. Risks are less tangible and visible than income. 
2. Academic models provided functions for risk modelling, but did not provide 
instrumental tools to help decision-makers. 
3. A large fraction of the finance literature addresses the gap between conceptual 
models and banking risk management issues, rather than quantifying the risks. 
4. The regulators‘ focus on risks is still relatively recent.  
Despite recognition of these reasons, the prerequisites needed for quantifying 
instrumental risk remained non-existent. A survey of the finance literature sheds further 
information on the quantification problem. This is discussed below in terms of: risk 
recognition, risk assessment models, risk preferences and regulation related to risk 
environment. 
3.3.1 Recognition of Risk  
Risks remain intangible until they materialise into losses. Therefore, simple solutions do 
not help to capture all risk factors (Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts & Neslehova 2006). For 
instance, a risk exposure from a loan is not the risk. The risk depends on the likelihood of 
losses and the magnitude of repayment of credit, in addition to the size of the value at 
risk. Brooks and Persand (2003) argued that observing and recording losses and their 
frequencies could help. However, loss histories are insufficient, and it is not easy to link 
absorbable losses and earning declines with specific sources of risks. In contrast, 
recording the fluctuations in interest income is easy, but tracking such changes to interest 
rates changes is less obvious (Galluccio & Roncoroni 2006). Thus, without links to 
instrumental risk controls, earning and loss histories are of limited interest because they 
do not help in taking forward-looking corrective actions.  
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3.3.2 Risk Assessment Models 
Over the last two decades, models of risk assessment have been invented and improved 
(Woo & Siu 2004). Furthermore, Kurth, Taylor and Wagner (2002) argued that, in the 
approach to credit modelling, there are some key factors which have a strong influence on 
the practical implementation of theoretical models. Both the designer and user of risk 
evaluation models need to clearly understand the deep interrelation among variables and 
parameters, and thus understand the priority of the sequences in applying variations to the 
model of evaluation (Piramuthu 2004). Decisions based on financial risk evaluation are 
important for the financial institutions involved due to the high level of risk associated 
with less than rational decisions. 
In essence, the most appropriate way to quantify invisible risks is to model them. 
However, multiple risk aspects are considered as qualitative, and not substitutes for 
quantified measures. Observation of risk includes various items, for example, exposure 
size, watch list for credit risk, or value changes triggered by volatility in the markets 
(Fraser, Gup & Kolari 2001). These indicators capture the multiple dimensions of risk, 
but they cannot be quantified. Gardner (1997) pointed out that missing links between 
future losses from current risk and risk drivers, which are instrumental for controlling 
risk, make it infeasible to monitor risks in a timely manner. Therefore, the main 
contribution of modelling risk is it addresses such issues and provides quantified 
measures of risk.  
As noted above, there have been significant revolutionary changes in the structure of 
banks, and how these institutions can be used to provide new investment opportunities 
and ways of managing risk (Merton 1995). To some extent, those financial innovations 
can be attributed to a wide array of new security designs; advances in telecommunications 
technology; and important advances in the theory of finance. Consequently, the ability to 
quantify risk fostered major innovations in pricing market transactions and options that 
serve for investing and hedging risks, and in setting benchmarks and guidelines for the 
portfolio management of  market instruments (stocks and bonds) (McGrath & Viney 
2000). Innovations made it possible to customise products for matching investors‘ needs 
with specific risk-return bundles. It also allowed both financial and corporate entities to 
hedge their risks with derivatives.  
3.3.3 Risk Preferences  
The basic prerequisites for using risk management in banks are: first, risk measuring and 
valuation and, second, tracing risk back to risk drivers under management control. Pastor 
(2002) pointed out that jumping to the use of market instruments for measuring risks 
without prior knowledge of exposures to the various risks is meaningless; it is necessary 
to know the magnitude of the various risks to be controlled and what they actually mean 
in terms of potential losses. However, credit risk assessment remains a matter of 
judgment, a characteristic of ‗the credit culture‘ focusing on fundamentals: all qualitative 
variables that drive the credit worthiness of a borrower. Thus, the fundamental view on 
credit risk still prevails, and it will obviously remain relevant.  
3.3.4 Risk Environment and Regulation 
The risk environment has changed drastically in the last few decades (1970s to 2000s). In 
addition, mutual lending–borrowing and trading creates strong interdependencies among 
Chapter Three                The Influence of Assessing Risk  
  Factors on the Performance of Lending Portfolios  
50 
 
banks. A failure of a large bank might trigger the ‗contagion‘ effect through which other 
banks suffer unsustainable loss and eventually fail (Bessis 2001; Ramos, Jose & 
Santander 2000). However, a trend towards more internal and external assessment of risk 
and returns has emerged and is prominent in several areas of research (Altman, Giovanna 
& Saunders 1998). Through successive accords among transaction counterparts in the 
financial markets, regulators promoted the building up of information on all inputs 
necessary for risk quantification, and accounting standards evolved as well. 
In terms of regulation, the latest new Basel Accord promotes the ‗three pillars‘ foundation 
of supervision as follows (Basel Committee 2006): 
1. New capital requirements for credit risk and operational risks. 
2. Supervisory process.  
3. Disclosure of risk information by banks.  
Together, the three pillars allow external supervisors to audit the quality of information, a 
basic condition for assessing the quality and reliability of risk measures in order to gain 
more autonomy in the assessment of capital requirements and structures. Regulatory 
requirements for operating risks, plus the closer supervision of interest rate risk, pave the 
way for a comprehensive modelling of banking risks and a tight integration with risk 
management processes, leading to bank-wide risk management.(Barnhill & Maxwell 
2002).    
As a direct consequence, in terms of shifting from models to management approaches, 
there is a wide spectrum of modelling building blocks differing across and within risks. 
These ‗block‘ approaches share the ‗risk-based capital‘ and the ‗value at risk‘ concepts 
that are basic foundations of the new views on risk modelling, risk controlling and risk 
regulations (Mayland 1993). In contrast, risk management requires an entire set of models 
and tools for linking risk management problems with financial views on risks and 
profitability. Therefore, together they make up the risk management ‗tool box‘ which 
provides the necessary inputs to improve the risk management policies to finally close the 
gap between risk models and risk management.  
In terms of quantification, generally, use of risk models has two major benefits: 
measuring risks and relating these measures. Schroeck (2002) showed that modelling 
risks helps to manage and controls various risk. It pushes further away the frontier 
between measurable risk and invisible-intangible risk and, moreover, it links risks to the 
sources of uncertainty that generate them. Campbell and Huisman (2003, p. 121) 
observed that ‗credit spreads change over time for many reasons, such as market 
condition, change in credit ratings, change in expectations regarding recovery rate...‘. 
This means that risk factors need to be taken into account. However, there is no reliable 
method for combining these risk measures into one overall portfolio risk assessment as a 
consequence of risk factors‘ diversity.  
3.4 Quantified Risks in Islamic Banking  
3.4.1 Common Risk Factors  
As indicated in Chapter 2
34
, there is a differentiation across business lines, but risk 
management tools and borrowing apply the same techniques across the entire spectrum of 
banking activities that generate financial risks. However, ‗risks and risk management 
                                                 
34
 See section 2.2 in this study. 
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differ across business lines of lending activities‘ (Bessis 2001, p. 3). Risks are often 
considered the result of uncertainties, leading to adverse variations of profitability or 
losses (Allen, F & Santomero 1998). Whilst a substantial number of risks are well-known 
in the banking industry, there has been significant progress from traditional qualitative 
risk assessment towards quantitative management of risks due to the development of risk 
management practices and the existence of strong regulatory incentives.  
Figure 3.4: Main Categories of Risks Quantified in the Banking and Finance Industry 
 
   Source: created by the author, 2008 
Risks in banking are also defined as ‗unfavourable impacts on profitability‘ and represent 
distinct sources of uncertainty. Figure 3.4 shows risk categories that can be quantified. It 
demonstrates the risk types that capture the sources of uncertainty and the extent of their 
potential adverse effect on profitability in terms of both accounting and market-to-market 
measures (Archer & Abdel Karim 2009; Bansal et al. 1993; Bruni et al. 1996; Cade 1997; 
Santomero 1997; Schroeck 2002).  
Figure 3.5: Profile of Risks 
 
Source: El-Hawary, Grais & Iqbal 2004  
Risks in IB are similar to CB. A classification of risks in IB is presented in Figure 3.5. 
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complex and elaborate framework. However, several financial instruments, listed 
in the pre-Islamic period, were further developed and widely practised after 
confirming their compatibility with the principles of shari`a; for instance, the 
elimination of riba and gharar. Furthermore, in the last few years, the Islamic Financial 
Institutions Council (IFIC) is currently preparing standards for financial management and 
control by focussing on the development of controls and guidelines to ensure the 
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protection of shareholders‘ and IAH rights. Figure 3.5 classifies the risks typically faced 
in the Islamic banking and finance. The overview of the profile of operating risks in IB 
shows risks grouped into five broad categories: transaction, business, treasury, 
governance and systemic risks (El-Hawary, Grais & Iqbal 2004). While these 
categories are also applicable to non-Islamic finance, specific risks within them 
are more relevant to IB, and the nature of contracts it uses.  
The discussion above (section 3.4) focuses on risks related to: 1) financial or market 
movements; 2) risks relevant to make lending decisions; 3) risks relevant to financial 
transactions; and 4) risks relevant to the change of the banking environments, in particular 
for Islamic and conventional banks. Appendix D provides a brief definition of risks that 
need to be considered in the finance industry worldwide. However, the following 
discussion treats risks that are relatively easy to quantify in both IBs and CBs, and also 
risks that attract the attention of financial practitioners and financial analysts.  
3.4.1.1 Transaction Risk and Shari'a Principles    
In terms of importance, credit risk (or default risk) is more significant than all other risks.  
It is the risk that an obligor will not make future interest payments or principal 
repayments when due (Banks 2004). Credit risk arises because promised cash flows on 
the primary securities held by financial institutions may not be paid in full, or in a timely 
fashion. Gray and Cassidy (1997) define credit risk as the risk that covers the entire 
spectrum of financial institutions‘ activities, both on and off-balance sheet. Consequently, 
it not only includes the obvious review of loan portfolio quality, but also balance sheet 
structure, amounts and types of investments and securities held, risk concentrations, and 
provisioning adequacy.   
Credit risk simply is the risk of the borrowers‘ inability to repay the loans. Generally, it is 
the risk that the borrower will not be able to provide funds to settle transactions, usually 
due to bankruptcy or some other liquidity crisis. However, all deposit accounts have the 
potential for creating credit exposure. Palmer (1998) and Santomero (1998) point out that 
credit decisions associated with depository services fall into three fundamental 
categories
35
: funds availability; return items; and irrevocable payments. The exposures 
that result from these decisions can range from daylight overdrafts of several lines of 
credit to exposures that extend over several days (Ariffin, Archer & Abdul Karim 2009). 
In general, credit risk arises from the uncertainty of a project‘s stability and sustainability. 
Furthermore, the higher the probability of insolvency the higher the credit risk.  
In other words, a major source of loss is due to the risk when borrowers are not able to 
comply with their obligations to return bank debt. Within financial institutions, a 
deterioration of the credit standing of a borrower materialises into a loss. Pastor (2002) 
makes a distinction between the specific risk of a particular issue and among several of 
the same issues, depending on the credit magnitude and character of the transaction 
                                                 
35
 i. Funds availability: the decision to make deposits by cheque or electronic sources available to 
depositors for withdrawal, even though the bank itself may not have final viability in its own clearing 
account, is a credit decision. This is common practice in the banking industry and is usually driven by 
competitive pressures. 
ii. Return items: the decision not to return cheques or to reject electronic items presented for payment, 
even though the customer may not have sufficient funds deposited, is a credit decision.  
iii. Irrevocable payments: the decision to initiate an irrevocable payment on behalf of customers, based 
on expected funding in the future, is a credit decision. 
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(priority level guarantees). Thus, the view of banking portfolio risk and trading portfolio 
risk is different. In the context credit risk, conventional banking is more mature than 
Islamic banking in Islamic economies(Hakim, Neaime & Colton 2005). Furthermore, risk 
differs because of the differences in the nature of transactions, banks‘ roles, banks‘ goals, 
and the obligations between the institutions in both banking operations and procedures of 
lending have to be different (Powell et al. 2004). This difference between CBs and IBs 
means that assessment and treatment of credit risk may also be different. For instance, 
Islamic banking considers that Gharar (uncertainty of repayment) is a risk, and then 
credit or lending in cash is mainly prohibited.    
Due to the asset-backed structure of shari`a compliant modes of lending, Islamic banks 
are able to reduce the impact of credit risk inherent in their financing activities. The 
capital structure of IBs is a combination of shareholders and investment account holders. 
This means that IBs are always highly concerned with allocating more resources––loans–
–to target corporate and retail clients. Fuad and Mohammed (1996) rejected this notion, 
perhaps because Islamic banking has not developed sufficiently strong credit risk 
assessment procedures or somehow lacks the expertise necessary to make value 
judgements that would allow it to draw a level of comfort commensurate with greater 
lending activities.  
Additionally, provisions of shari`a which may limit the capacity of Islamic banks to 
enforce repayment in the event of delinquency are likely to increase the credit standards 
for borrowers that Islamic banks are willing to finance (Archer & Karim 2002). This 
problem can be mitigated by collateralising the asset involved in the transaction, similar 
to practice in CBs
36
. However, potential borrowers may not wish the asset to be 
collateralised. Probably the most stringent credit measure is the banks‘ ability to transfer 
borrowers‘ salary to their accounts. Banks are then able to deduct repayment in-
settlements directly without recourse to the borrowers.   
Unlike IBs, CBs are able to offer all-purpose interest-based loans. However, this type of 
lending arrangement may carry with it a greater credit risk since, in many instances, there 
may be no recourse to an underlying asset should the borrower fail to honour the loan 
obligations or repay the capital (Hakim & Neaime 2001). To reflect the greater credit risk, 
Hakim and Neaime (2001) suggest that conventional loans could be less competitively 
priced than Islamic alternatives. The end-users of Islamic financing arrangements may, 
however, feel unwilling to risk forfeiting their collateral in the event of unintentional 
delinquency.  
The comparison above implies that the relative under-representation of Islamic financing 
instruments facilitates understanding of the make-up risk of the asset portfolio in IBs and 
may, in part, be due to demand, as well as supply-side effects of risk aversion (Hasan 
2002). Broadly, the purchase price of the underlying asset effectively limits the degree of 
debt creation. In other words, as Laux (1990) noted, creditworthy customers will tend to 
prefer unsecured loans (or murabaha facilities) at rates that reflect their creditworthiness. 
A murabaha contract either involves: 1) the sale-repurchase agreement of a borrower-held 
asset (negative short sale) or 2) the lender‘s purchase of a tangible asset from a third party 
on behalf of the borrower (back-to-back sale). Thus, collateralisation is not a substitute 
for suitable stringent credit assessment procedures. 
                                                 
36
 For more information see (Archer, S & Karim, RA 2002, Islamic finance: Innovation and growth, 
Euromoney Books and AAOIFI, Landon, Uk. p.179). 
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3.4.1.2 Treasury Risk and Shari'a Principles    
Liquidity risk may become a key factor in an assessment of a bank‘s portfolio. Extreme 
lack of liquidity sources and liquidity management inevitably results in bankruptcy, 
making this risk critical. Conversely, Davis and Harper (1991) and Errington (1991) 
indicate that important unexpected losses raise doubts with respect to the future 
asset/liability of the institution and its liquidity position. Adaptation of an asset-liquidity 
management (ALM) approach in CB, IB likewise considers the availability of 
assets/liabilities and endeavours to control the liquidation cycle. Moreover, the purpose of 
debt management in both banking systems is to manage possible future liquidity crises 
(for instance, sources of funds, asset/liability uses, and liquidity availability) so that they 
remain within acceptable levels of market limitations and/or the bank‘s conditions. 
Accordingly, Abraham (1988) asserts that the liquidity-risk context is confusing and it 
could refer to many essential issues (liquidity risk source) which appear applicable to the 
IB as well, such as: 
1. Inability to raise funds at normal cost: in spite of any funding risk, this depends on 
the market risk exposure and the funding policy itself. This is despite negative 
signals being received from organisations in the market frequently seeking 
unexpected funds which may restrict the borrowing willingness of these 
organisations (Cade 1997). However, the cost of funds also impacts on the bank‘s 
credit standing if the risk exposure of the credit standing in a well-monitored fund 
becomes more costly. A liquidity crisis leads often to an institution‘s insolvency. 
2. Market liquidity risk: the liquidity of market risk exposure relates to the availability 
of liquid assets/liabilities volume. Market prices fluctuations—positive or 
negative—become highly unstable, and sometimes counterparties are unwilling to 
trade with decreasingly high discount rates (Bessis 2001; Brooks 2002). However, 
due to the market behaviour, funding risky transactions inevitably leads to much 
higher cost. Thus, market liability risk exposure decreases an institution‘s ability to 
raise money at a reasonable cost. 
3. Asset/liability liquidity risk: in terms of cash flow, asset liquidity risk is 
considerable in short-term funds. The source of this risk is the nature of the assets 
rather than the liquidity volume in the market. Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) argue 
that holding a sufficient fraction of liquid assets is the rationale behind a bank‘s 
regulatory rule. Calculating the liquidity ratio––capital adequacy––of banks, 
therefore, is considered as mandatory in deciding whether the bank considers 
minimum foundations of capital requirement and makes a reasonable matching 
between holding short-term assets and short-term liabilities in order to meet short-
term obligations. 
In this regard, market or asset liquidity risk remains a major issue that current techniques 
do not cover over the entire range of a bank‘s transaction practices (Bessis 2001). In fact, 
developing models to measure liquidity risk is not addressed fully in the finance services  
industry and in their instrumental applications (Ryan & Worthington 2002; Santomero 
1997). In contrast to market liquidity risk, market risk refers to adverse deviations of the 
trading portfolio within values of the same market, or among several market values.  Due 
to market movements during the period, institutions are often required to liquidate some 
assets. Wong, Cheng and Wong (2003) note that the ability to assess such adverse 
deviations during the period of liquidation has become a critical issue because of 
information asymmetry.  
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Market portfolio earnings—profit and loss—arise from transactions that have been made. 
However, the profit and loss between two dates is the variation of the market value, and 
any decline in value results in a market loss. Olekalns and Sibly (1992) recognised also 
that, as the lending period gets longer, the potential worst-loss can be higher due to 
market volatility—which tends to increase overall in the longer horizon of the transaction. 
Basically, market risk focuses on market value deviations and market parameters as the 
main risk drivers (Hogan & Sharpe 1988; Scott 2005). Figure 3.6 demonstrates specific 
market risk using the common structure followed throughout a bank for all risks. As seen 
from Figure 3.6 these risks are distributed in two main blocks: 1) standalone risk of 
individual transactions; and 2) portfolio risk. 
Figure 3.6: Recognition of Specific Market Risks 
 
Source: developed by the author, 2008 based on (Bessis 2001) 
Standalone risk indicates that all market risk results from the distribution of the value 
variations between a current date and other dates through individual assets maturity. 
Consequently, the measuring of such risk is needed for the distributions of the asset 
returns, between now and the future––short-term horizon (Basak & Shapiro 2001; Dangl 
& Lehar 2004). In contrast, portfolio risk refers to the ‗standard portfolio problem‘. This 
means that the opportunity to perform high level portfolio analysis is an advantage in 
reducing aversion risks to minimal level of risks. With such an investment program, the 
existence of different assets in one  portfolio––portfolio diversification––eliminates a 
large fraction of the sum of individual risks (Campbell & Huisman 2002). However, 
portfolio risk needs to calculate correlation values and to use them to model the 
distribution of the portfolio returns. Consequently, there is a two-stage modelling process 
which goes from institutional risk factors to market parameters (e.g. interest rates, equity 
indexes, exchange rate), and moves from these risk drivers to individual market value of 
exposures.  
However, as previously mentioned (section 3.4.1.2), it is possible to gain liquidity from 
tradable products (e.g. loans) or by hedging their future changes of value when they are 
needed. This could be an accurate method to limit market risk to the specific liquidation 
period. In general, Barnhill and Maxwell (2002) observed that the liquidation period 
depends on the types of transactions and their sizes. In the context of finance, the 
liquidation period has been ruled by regulators as a 10-days reference
37
. Consequently, 
pure market risks are completely different from market liquidity risk. Changes of market 
parameters, such as interest rates, equity indexes, and exchange rates lead to market risk 
(Tripe & Tozer 1998). This interaction raises important issues, such as what is the normal 
volatility of market parameters under a fair liquidity situation, how does it change under 
poorer liquidity situations, and how sensitive are prices to liquidity crises? However, asset 
                                                 
37
 Finance regulators use as reference a 10-day liquidation period and impose a multiple over banks‘ 
internal measures of market value potential losses. 
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prices in emerging markets are often significantly far removed from a theoretical ‗fair 
value‘ and liquidity is still a critical issue.  
3.4.1.3 Business Risk and Shari'a Principles    
Business risk is defined as the risk inherent in the institution, independent of the way it is 
financed. Business risk generally is reflected in the variability of net operating income or 
net cash-flows. As mentioned in section 3.4.1, three sources of business risk might be 
recognised in Islamic or non-Islamic institutions. These include displaced commercial 
risk, withdrawal risk and solvency risk (see Figure 3.5)
38
. How, Abdul Karim and 
Verhoeven (2005) noted that business risk is a combination of these sources. They also 
noted that the level of business risk might be influenced by internal factors such as 
investment decisions, management skills and capital adequacy. Hence, in this regard, 
regulators in the banking and finance field gave priority to banks‘ solvency risk which has 
been the focus of discussions in this section.  
In essence, solvency risk is a major area of business risk exposure facing managers in 
modern institutions. The risk refers to all types of risk relating to the inability to absorb 
losses generated with the available capital. Bankruptcy risk results from defaulting on 
debt obligations and an inability to raise funds for meeting such obligations (which is 
different from solvency risk). Drudi and Giordano (2000) describe solvency risk as 
similar to the credit risk of the bank. Additionally, Fooladi, Roberts and Skinner (1997) 
define default risk as the probability of the event of defaults.  
Further, default can be defined as a follows (Rochet 1999):  
1. Missing a payment obligation for a short-term or a long-term39.  
2. Filing for bankruptcy restructuring imposed by lenders.  
3. Breaking a covenant, triggering a cross-default for all lenders to the same entity. 
Depending on the default definition above, solvency is equivalent to default as a joint 
outcome of all risks relative to capital accessibility (Berger & DeYoung 1996; Elsas & 
Krahnen 2002). In this context, the capital adequacy principle, adopted by major 
conventional institutions and regulators for financial/business risk management, defines 
capital adequacy as the level of capital that allows a bank to monitor all current risks, 
which results in a reduction of potential losses and compliance with adequate capital 
levels
40
.  
Ideally, Muljawan, Dar and Hall (2004, p. 433) indicated that ‗an Islamic bank has an 
equity-based capital structure, dominated by shareholders‘ equity and investment deposits 
(investment accounts holders IAH) based on profit/loss sharing (PLS). There is no need 
for capital adequacy regulations if the Islamic banks are structured as pure PLS-based 
institutions. However, because of informational asymmetry and risk aversion by 
investors, there currently exists fixed claim liabilities on the Islamic banking balance 
sheets. This necessitates the imposition of capital adequacy requirements which aim at 
maintaining systemic stability by achieving two fundamental objectives:  
1. Capital regulations should protect risk-averse (assumed unsophisticated) 
depositors, which requires a minimum equity capital cushion and an 
optimal assets–liabilities composition.  
                                                 
38
 Definitions of such risks have been provided in Appendix D. 
39
 Short-term is less than 1 year, and long-term is more than 3 years, according to the accounting theory 
literature.   
40
 This is according to the Basel II requirements. 
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2. Capital regulations should give the right incentives to shareholders to 
promote prudent behaviour by the banks, which requires analysis of 
potential behaviour by shareholders when facing financial uncertainty‘. 
3.4.1.4 Governance Risk and Shari'a Principles        
The most important governance risk in banking institutions is operational risk. 
Operational risks impact on operating systems. These systems include strategies such as 
reporting systems, monitoring internal risk rules and internal risk procedures considered 
necessary to conduct information systems appropriately
41
. For instance, Di Renzo et al. 
(2007) pointed out that a specific policy such as an ‗internal auditing‘ incorporates all 
these rules. Additionally, to ensure survival, an institution needs to protect itself against 
these risks. Risk-monitoring strategies and risk-controlling procedures are designed to 
shield the institution from those risks considered sufficiently significant to cause the 
institution to fail to meet its obligations. 
Likewise, there are many external risk factors such as economy, market, individuals‘ 
behaviour (society) and technology which impact on credit operations in banks. Edelstein 
(1975) argued that bad loans may arise because of adverse economic circumstances 
beyond the bank‘s control, and protection against these risk problems is needed. 
Moreover, financial institutions are encouraged to consider the environmental impact of 
corporate borrowers‘ actions as part of their investment decision making (Olaf 2005). For 
example, Coulson and Monks (1999) have provided an overview of banks‘ commitment 
to the environment and consider the potential implications of corporate environmental 
performance for bank lending decisions in the UK.  
Although customers usually seek finance from banks, and expect to be questioned on 
their environment policy and management practices as part of the lending evaluation, 
banks do not want to be viewed as environmental regulators or become responsible for 
the environmental liabilities of their borrowers (Thompson & Cowton 2004). ‗These 
aspects add another dimension for decision-makers in banks. Managerial decision-making 
on risk in organizations and, more specifically, banks, will be shaped by all three types of 
institutional effects
42
: regulatory, normative, and cognitive‘ (Lane & Quack 2002, p. 4). A 
consideration of these factors is useful in order to understand possible changes in 
prevalent modes of risk behaviour. Therefore, risk assessment systems in the financial 
industry may have to look at operational risk from different angles.  
Typically, there is a need to be able to identify, articulate, and assess operational risk on 
an ongoing basis. Clearly, too much operational risk can be a significant obstacle to 
meeting one‘s business objectives. Di Renzo et al. (2007) noted that operational risk 
affects the ability to adapt and respond to unexpected circumstances and to make 
decisions in the absence of complete information. In addition, Mayland (1993) suggests 
there is a constant need to improve the management of, and increase the ability to 
anticipate, operational risk.  
                                                 
41
 The new Basel Accord of January 2001 (Basel II) defines operational risk as ‗the risk of direct or indirect 
loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events‘. 
42
- Regulatory effects mean that decision makers addressing various actions taken by the institution to 
address the effects of risks.  
 - Normative effects mean that decision makers will sort acts or actions according to strong connections to 
typical standards or models applied in the same field.  
- Cognitive effects mean that decision makers select a course of action among several alternatives.  
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Figure 3.7: Operational Risk and its Sources  
 
Source: created by the author, 2008  
Figure 3.7 presents a classification of operational risks. Clear definitions of the 
components of operational risk are still required for the proper development of best-
practice operational matrices. For instance: 1) processing risk arises in part as a function 
of the bank‘s controls, strategic alliances, information systems, employee integrity, 
operating processes, and so on; 2) technology risk is the risk of internal and external 
technology becoming ineffective, unreliable, obsolete or incapable of meeting business 
needs (Bansal et al. 1993); 3) recording risk arises in part from financial and non-financial 
transactions that may be recorded inaccurately or valued inappropriately; and 4) business 
continuity risk covers internal and external factors that can result in business interruption 
or failure.  
Typically, operational risk measurement addresses the likelihood and cost of adverse 
events. However, to some extent, a common events classification raises some practical 
difficulties, for example, in the data gathering processes: there are several potential 
sources of event frequencies which, to some extent, influence cost reduction 
measurement. Operation risk should be controlled in the financial industry by internal 
control procedures, including ‗physical security, systems testing, segregation of duties, 
backup systems, and contingency planning. In addition, a comprehensive audit 
programme to assess the risk adequacy of controls and compliance with bank policies is 
essential‘ (Cornalba & Giudici 2004, p. 169).  
Since most banks are third party participants in international networks, their ability to 
influence controls is limited. They must recognise risks to their own business operations 
and compensate through their own third party systems and, to the extent possible, insist 
upon sound operations for system continuity and integrity. Because Islamic banks are 
prohibited from entering into transactions based on riba (interest), they mobilise funds 
mainly on the basis of the profit-sharing form of contract (Archer, Abdel Karim & Al-
Deehani 1998). This type of investment raises a set of issues concerning the contractual 
relations between the bank and the holders of such investment accounts. In particular, 
Islamic banking and finance is a new invention in the finance industry worldwide, and 
new relevant risks seem to be involved in their operations which do not exist in other 
systems.    
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3.4.2 Specific Risk Practices:  
Understanding the specific risks in Islamic banking and how entrepreneurs or principals 
are dealing with ‗taking risk behaviour‘ is essential to the sustainability of Islamic banks‘ 
operations (Badr El-Din 2006). Under the ‗shari`a principle‘, Kuran (2005) considers the 
answer to what Islamic banks essentially do,: they fund from several sources, for 
example, IAH (depositors) and shareholders, and use the funds to acquire assets which are 
expected to yield a return sufficient to cover both the cost of these funds and any 
operating expenses incurred. According to shari`a, a new generation of risk may occur 
such as ‗risk sharing‘ and ‗risk aversion‘, and IBs will subsequently need to deal with this 
aspect (Van Greuning, Hennie & Iqbal 2008).  
3.4.2.1 Interest Risk vs. Interest Free Risk  
Basically, interest rate risk refers to an actual decline in earnings due to movements in 
interest rates. According to the context of investment theory (IT) and conventional 
finance theory (FT), two dimensions of investment have been considered: risk and  return 
(Basak & Shapiro 2001). Additionally, ethics are ignored, and a conventional investor
43
 
will accept any investments that are not actually illegal. The investment may be direct or 
indirect. Finance context analyses these types of investment separately based on portfolio 
theory, to deal with; 1) unlimited liability firms with high attention of risk (investment in 
share or bunds); and 2) limited liability firms with little attention of risk.  
In contrast to conventional investors, however, Islamic investors must consider the ethical 
aspects of their investment, and the types of economic activities in which they invest 
(Erol, Kaynak & Radi 1990). For example, Archer and Abdel Karim (2006) point out that 
while the insights of conventional financial theory apply to Islamic investment, the 
restrictions which apply to the Islamic investor make investment at IBs different from 
investment at CBs in several important respects: 
1. In Islam an investor must pay off his debts, and his death—even as a 
martyr—cannot cancel these debts. Since the full repayment of debts is a 
duty, limited liability arrangements are unacceptable in Islamic culture. 
2. A Muslim society would impose little tax upon profits. This would facilitate 
re-investment of profits, although there are Islamic rules about how this 
should be done in a partnership.  
3. Overall, an Islamic investor must avoid rib`a in any form (increase, interest, 
etc.). 
Islamic investors must also avoid forbidden economic activities which include producing 
or dealing in alcohol or drugs, unless needed for medical purposes (Segrado 2005).        
Typically, the distinguishing feature of an Islamic investor lies in the definition of 
‗interest‘—the one used as the basis of conventional financial theory (Zaman & 
Movassaghi 2002). In terms of risk, the Islamic investor‘s understanding is that no human 
being knows the future, should not worry about risk and should be ready to take 
investment with available returns, without demanding compensation for the risk. 
Similarly, a conventional investor does not know the future either, but bases his estimate 
of expected variance upon past data, and his expectations might often turn out to be 
wrong (Ahmad 1995). Thus, from an investors‘ point of view Islamic rules state that the 
only type of loan they should use is an interest-free one. 
                                                 
43 A term used for an investor in conventional banks. 
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To some extent, practical Islamic finance implies that the assets of IBs are exposed to 
interest rate risk where their pricing is concerned, insofar as they use conventional interest 
benchmarks to price their financing facilities. However, it should also be realised that the 
value of positions which reflect the earnings potential of assets in all periods is also 
sensitive to changes in interest rates since earnings potential is measured in relation to 
alternative investments of comparable risk and tenor (Ebrahim 1999 ). How, Abdul Karim 
and Verhoeven (2005, p. 81) add that, ‗even in the absence of conventional interest rate 
benchmarks, as already noted, Islamic banks are potentially exposed to a form of financial 
return risk related to unexpected changes in the rate of inflation and hence in nominal 
market returns‘.  
In this context, Islamic practitioners argue this is an operational concern that needs to be 
addressed. To sum up, asset/liability management is mainly the process of preserving the 
net worth of an institution, and being concerned with the difference between the value of 
assets and the value of liabilities (Oguzsoy & Guven 1997). If, therefore, the interest rate 
sensitivities of assets and liabilities, as measured by their duration, are not well-matched 
(the net duration is not equal to zero), then an institution may be exposed to a significant 
degree of risk. This is especially true of highly leveraged organisations. Only if this risk is 
measured and its significance to the future well-being of an institution be identified.   
3.4.2.2 Risk Sharing and Risk Aversion  
Regulators need to be conscious of further risks related to IBs. The first, or so–called 
displaced commercial risk, arises from commercial pressure from the bank‘s investors44 
(Ahmad 1995). For example, investors in bank (X) would like to earn the highest profit 
available in the market, otherwise they will move their funds to bank (Y). The second, 
fiduciary risk, arises from Islamic banks‘ role, for instance ‗Mudarib‘, and the 
jurisprudence concerning „mudaraba‟ contracts (Al-Deehani, Karim & Murinde 1999). 
According to this jurisprudence, if the mudarib is guilty of misconduct or negligence in 
the fulfilment of his obligations to investors, the investors‘ funds cease to have the 
character of equity investments and become a liability. This has obvious implications for 
capital adequacy and, indeed, solvency.   
In conventional banks, depositors have a fixed claim upon the bank‘s assets, according to 
a predetermined interest rate, plus the return of their capital (Booth, Bessler & Foote 
1989). A conventional bank must, therefore, service its obligations to depositors 
irrespective of its actual profitability (Chapra 2007). Consequently, any uncertainty in the 
income streams generated by implementing risky operations and in changes in the value 
of the bank‘s assets is borne by shareholders. Islamic banks, in contrast, are structured 
upon the principle of risk sharing. This applies to the sources of funds and may also apply 
to the instruments of funds such as mudaraba, musharak, etc.(Jamshed 1999). With 
respect to the former, holders of profit-sharing investment accounts (which take the place 
of conventional interest-bearing bank deposit accounts) are essentially stockholders. 
Consequently, the return on their investment in the bank is uncertain since they share in 
the profit (asset returns net of operating expenses) generated by the bank alongside the 
shareholders. 
Crane and Leatham‘s study (1993) evaluated profit and loss sharing instruments used in 
Islamic banking. They argued that USA financial intermediaries can use profit and loss 
                                                 
44
  The bank‘s investor here is ‗shareholders‘, not investment account holders.   
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sharing instruments to provide external equity capital needed to finance several 
investment projects. This also means that investment account holders are exposed to the 
risk of losing any or all their initial investment. Exposing the owners/shareholders of 
investment accounts to the unpredictable changes of asset return (probability) 
distributions has important consequences for several Islamic banks operating in 
economies in which depositors do not have access to conventional banking (Kahf 2002). 
In such economies, (for instance, Pakistan, Sudan and Iran) Islamic banks have a greater 
capacity than CBs to absorb negative shocks to their asset returns since generally both 
IAH and shareholders‘ funds absorb the impact of any potential losses (Kenneth 2002).  
The risk-sharing arrangements on the deposit side provide another layer of protection to 
the bank, in addition to its book capital. Also, ‗the need to provide stable and competitive 
return to investors, the shareholders‘ responsibility for negligence or misconduct 
(operational risk), and the more difficult access to liquidity puts pressures on Islamic 
banks to be more conservative‘ (resulting in less moral hazard and risk taking) (How, 
Abdul Karim & Verhoeven 2005, p. 77). Operating according to risk-sharing principles 
could, therefore, be expected to enhance the survival probabilities of these Islamic banks 
by reducing systemic risk and bringing long-term benefits to the economies in which they 
operate through stability in the banking industry. In such banking systems, risk 
management has become one of the most recent empirical challenges in terms of ‗risk 
aversion policies assessment‘.   
3.5 Risk Assessment in Practice 
3.5.1 What Does ‘Risk Assessment’ Mean? 
Risk is a concept that denotes potential negative impact on asset value that may arise from 
some present process or future event. Risk is also the possibility of an event occurring 
that will have an impact on the achievement of objectives. Assessment of risk involves 
the process of documenting aspects or acts, usually in measurable terms, such as 
knowledge, skill, attitudes, and beliefs. Therefore, the term ‗risk assessment‘ is 
considered as procedures for assessing an institution‘s system for managing all types of 
risks, credit, trading, liquidity, etc. If loss is defined as a decrease in the asset value based 
on a single security incident, the annualised adverse changes rate in the asset value can be 
calculated. In this case, the risk iR  is expressed as )( ii LpR  , where )( iLp  indicates 
expected loss that will occur
45
. Therefore, the annualised loss expectancy is a calculation 
of the single loss expectancy )( iLp  multiplied by the annual rate of occurrence iL , and 
individual risk expectancy can be expressed as: 
  
)( iii LpLR          (3.1) 
Equation 3.1 states how much an institution estimates to lose from an asset based on the 
risks, threats, and vulnerabilities. However, if the risk estimate takes into account 
information on the number of individual risks exposed given by the sum of individual 
potential risks 
i
ii LpL )( , it is termed a total risk totalR , and expected total losses per a 
time period can be expressed mathematically as: 
                                                 
45
 The annualised adverse changes are estimated based on the data of how often a threat would be successful 
in exploiting vulnerability. From this information, the annualized loss expectancy (ALE) can be calculated. 
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  
i
iitotal LpLR )(       (3.2) 
Assessing risk means determining the quantitative value of risk related to a particular 
action during a certain period. Calculations of two components of risk, R, are required:  
1. The importance of the potential loss L. 
2. The probability p that the loss that will occur.  
Then, from a financial perspective, justifying expenditures to implement counter 
measures to protect the asset has become possible. Nevertheless, calculations of total risks 
are of more use for cost/benefit analysis, however, individual risks are of more use for 
evaluating whether risk to individual market transactions are acceptable. Thus, measuring 
both the magnitude and the probability of the potential losses is part of the risk management 
difficulty, and risk assessment itself is considered very difficult (Van Greuning, Hennie  & 
Brajovic 2003). Despite the uncertainty present in both activities, risk management could 
be simplified if a single metric could represent all of the information in the measurement. 
Figure 3.8 shows that measuring two quantities in which risk assessment is concerned––
potential loss and probability of occurrence––can be very reasonable to measure.  
Figure 3.8: Risk Assessment Mechanisms in the Financial Markets 
 
 Source: Vicente Aceituno 2006. 
Figure 3.8 shows that expected losses in accounting value of the bank have declined 
gradually with the probability of discontinuation of the company per year increasing. This 
means, risk assessment must be treated differently from one with a large potential loss 
with a low probability of occurrence and another with a low potential loss and high 
probability of risk occurrence. Theoretically, both cases are almost similar in dealing with 
the potential loss. But practically, it is very difficult to manage them without adequate 
resources, especially at times of establishing the managing risk process.  
3.5.1.1 Risk Assessment: A Systematic and Continuous Effort 
In the risk management process, risk assessment is the most important step, and yet it may 
be the most difficult and complicated. The steps needed for identifying risks first, then 
assessing them, are considered as much more pragmatic than a selective approach. 
Therefore, techniques for managing risk built on the broad principles of risk management 
that are already deeply ingrained in banking practice. Nevertheless, non-credit corporate 
services often hold considerable risks to the point where participation by the credit 
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administration department with senior management services is necessary (Zopounidis et 
al. 2002).  
Figure 3.9: Administration of the Risk Management Process  
 
   Source: developed by the author, 2008  
   Based on (Siddiqui 2008; Sundararajan 2005) 
Figure 3.9 shows a basic model for the risk management process. This model was initially 
developed by Kloman and Hoffman (1974) who provide a concise overview of the risk 
management process. The model summarises risk management as a circle of interrelated 
and continuing steps as follows:  
 Exposure identification: is a continuous discovery process where alternative 
scenarios are explored as the operating environment changes over time. The 
operating environment includes external legal, regulatory and payments system 
factors, customer behaviour patterns, and internal bank policies, procedures and 
product features. It uses ongoing (what-if) analysis to understand the dynamic of 
exposure creation. 
 Risk assessment: attempts to measure the potential frequency and severity of the 
exposures that have been identified. It includes the continuous measurement of 
past and projected dollar flows associated with customers and products and the 
continuous evaluation of customer credit-worthiness. The process is supported 
with regular reports to alert management of any changes in risk assessment. 
 Risk control: is the application of techniques to reduce the probability of loss 
ranging from informal control, to periodic review and to interactive control. The 
key component of cost-effective risk control is the business decision that 
balances the trade-off between the costs of increased risk control with a reduced 
potential for financial loss. 
 Risk finance: is the provision of sufficient funds to meet loss situations as they 
occur. Funding can be accomplished by using a variety of internal and external 
financial resources, including insurance and risk-based pricing. 
Figure (3.9) above depicts these steps. Sellers (1988) has stressed that this model is the 
basis of recent policies adopted in the banking industry. Kloman (1996, 2001) notes that 
institutions implementing this type of processes achieved advance progress in terms of 
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risk management. Based on this literature, the model might be applicable to the new 
banking services institutions, including Islamic banks.  
Effective administration requires clear policies by the board of directors and senior 
management, designated responsibility for the function, commitment by operating 
officers, and periodic reports to the board. Stefanowski and Wilk (2001) indicated that 
financial institutions require written policies for the assessment and ongoing monitoring 
of payments system risk, with top management approval. Audits need to be included in 
the review, as well as compliance with these policies (Ramos, Jose & Santander 2000). 
Thus, it is most important for bankers‘ know how to conduct risk assessment within a 
practical framework. 
3.5.1.2 Getting Started  
Administrating a process to manage operating risks demands a distinctive combination of 
expertise. Also, an effective administrator requires a working knowledge of credit 
transactions (product administration, operations, and marketing). Allen et al. (1998) 
argued that if one individual/institution does not have the requisite knowledge, the 
process must ensure that needed lines of communication are established between the 
institutions that have expertise, as well as among the expertise within the institution itself. 
Accordingly, this program requires cooperation—unprecedented in many banks—
between credit administrations in banks, credit business units which provide financial 
corporate services, and corresponding operating areas. 
The discussion above highlights the necessary tools required to enable a bank to perform 
the initial exposure identification and risk assessment. In order to perform the risk 
management process well, appropriate guidance needs to be provided. It is necessary to 
make decisions on what risk controls are needed and to examine the need for risk-based 
pricing. Once the process is initiated, it will continue to evolve with exposure to the 
specific business needs at each bank. Thus, the objective should be two-fold, as follows
46
: 
1. To direct senior management on whether or not there is a business need to 
administer a formal risk management process. 
2. To integrate policy, procedures and documentation in a way that demonstrates the 
outline of an effective ongoing process. Each interlinking element of the process 
should be clear and be a useful prerequisite to the others. 
3.5.1.3 Risk Assessment Process  
The five-step approach outlined in Figure 3.10 is used to perform initial risk assessment 
and management study. Banks assess risks starting with analysis of borrowers‘ financial 
base to determine their credit classes. Lenders can determine the volume of credit and the 
borrower‘s capability to comply with the repayment schedule time frame. Thereafter, 
banks provide an initial descriptive profile on risks that might be involved so borrower 
risk might be also calculated to allow lenders to make required corrective actions if 
required. If the initial report (profile of risk) has been supported, banks consider 
alternative ways that allow review of policy procedures—called flexible policy—once it 
is needed. Finally, the recommended policy might be conducted and, accordingly, the 
                                                 
46
 For more details, see Chorafas, DN 2000, Credit derivatives and the management of risk including 
models for credit risk, New York Institute of Finance, New York. and Wehrspohn, U 2005 Credit risk 
evaluation: Modeling - analysis - management Center for Risk & Evaluation, Accepted Paper Series   
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potential risk could be also well-controlled. In summary, the first three steps show what 
banks do to build their credit strategies empirically; however, the last two steps indicate 
what processes have been taken by the risk assessors or risk assessment units to better 
administrate these policies. 
Figure 3.10: Five-Step Approach Process for Risk Management  
 
Source: developed by the author, 2008 based on (Bol at el, 2003, Chorafas, 2000) 
3.6 Risk Management in Islamic Project Finance  
Islamic shari`a-based financial products imply providing scarce contractual governance 
services that improve the risk-return ratio facing investors in a competitive international 
capital market (El-Gamal 2006). An assessment of the future growth prospects for the 
Islamic financial products industry is considered to be important. A salient feature of 
Islamic project finance is that Islamic banking could be required to use its funds to 
acquire assets that are expected to yield a higher rate of return than lower-risk 
alternatives. This requirement may lie at the root of one of the most significant challenges 
that Islamic banks face. Thus, if ever there was a suitable time for Islamic banking to 
develop risk management capabilities, now is that time.  
Besides the Islamic law (shari`a), regulatory changes on the horizon brought about by 
Basel Accord II will make it incumbent on Islamic banks, and their competing 
conventional counterparts, to develop suitable risk management capabilities (Honohan, 
Caprio & Vittas 2002). There are two critical steps that precede the development of a 
robust risk management capability:  
1. Proper identification of risks.  
2. Accurate measurement of such risks. 
‗However, the view that IBs are in some way insulated from certain types of risk, namely, 
for instance, financial return risk (FRR), which is similar to interest rate risk (IRR) for 
CBs, has prevented even the first step from being successfully taken by many Islamic 
banks‘ (Archer & Karim 2002, p. 167). In the case of managing project risk, an 
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explanation of how IBs deal with return risk is similar to managing interest rate risk in 
CBs, despite the fact that IBs do not directly pay or receive interest.  
Project finance in Islamic finance has the same purpose and meaning as it does in 
conventional finance. It is for financing a project on a non-recourse basis by structuring 
the financing around the project‘s own operating cash flows and assets without additional 
sponsor support. Consequently, Hirschey, John and Makhija (2003) noticed that if the 
project does not have the ability to repay the financing, the financiers do not have 
recourse to another counterparty
47
 which may be sovereign, institutional or corporate. 
Laeven and Mundial (1999) noted that it is not uncommon for there to be limited recourse 
project finance, where the arrangement between creditors and sponsors gives some 
recourse to the sponsors.       
A focus on project finance has stemmed from more reliance on the market mechanism to 
guide financial activity. This, in turn, has led to greater investment in establishing and 
sponsoring projects (Ahmad & Hassan 2007). Hence, project finance has two significant 
advantages over corporate financing: 
1. Increase in the availability of finance. 
2. Reduction in the overall risk for major project participants; at least 
bringing it down to an acceptable level. 
In Islamic finance, there is an emphasis on the sharing of risks and rewards and there is 
also a strong emphasis on financing productive endeavours. Both of these aspects are 
generally inherent in project financing (Jan Smolarski, Schapek & Tahir 2006). Thus, on 
a conceptual basis, Islamic finance should be well-suited for project financing solutions, 
all the more so because of the social and economic agenda inherent within it.  
Islamic bankers have long been aware of the advantages of project financing. However, 
very little project finance on an Islamic basis has taken place (Llewellyn & Iqbal 2002). 
The main reasons why project finance using Islamic finance has not taken place on the 
scale that one might have expected are outlined as follows: 
1. Assets and liquidities mismatch (liquidity risk). 
2. In-house capabilities to undertake project finance (project characteristics) 
or lack of sources. 
3. Willingness and capabilities of conventional banks to undertake project 
finance risk (volume).  
4. Securitisation (marketing). 
5. Development of project finance capabilities (regulations or requirement). 
6. Reduced global income levels (rise in economic inflation rate).  
7. Post-September 11, 2001 (negative target/ over–reliance). 
8. Enormous demand for project financing (lack of Islamic common 
markets—locally or globally).   
Selected techniques (Altman, Giovanna & Saunders 1998; Caouette, Narayanan & 
Altman 1998; Hamwi & Aylward 1999) that can be used in quantifying the risk of 
different Islamic contracts arrangement are discussed below. The specific techniques are 
value oriented as opposed to earnings oriented. The reason is that earnings techniques 
(for example, estimating the change in net earnings for the next 12 months, given stock 
earns to the current yield curve) focus on the temporal repricing characteristics of various 
assets and liabilities for the current period‘s earnings only (Ahmed 1989). On the whole, 
                                                 
47 Normally a stronger counter-party  
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such techniques ignore, for instance, the ‗out-of-period‘ impairment to the earnings 
potential of assets that can occur due to unfavourable changes in the yield curve; this can 
lead to an understatement of the actual risk.  
Perhaps the single most important contribution of this section (3.6) is the creation of 
awareness of the need for Islamic banks to manage their exposure to interest rate risk. 
Nevertheless, effective monitoring of shari`a compliance by an Islamic bank may involve 
reinforcing more remote shari`a supervisory board (SSB) oversight through the internal 
shari`a audit (ISA) process and by developing more knowledge and expertise within the 
institution. However, Anwar (2003) and Badr El Din (2006) both concluded that, to be 
successful, Islamic banks must have a more complete set of products that will permit 
active and positive balance sheet management. Just as in the way that conventional 
derivative products have served to make conventional banking markets more complete, 
IBs must introduce shari`a complaint risk management products to achieve the same 
objective.  
3.7 Conclusion 
Managing risk in banks is extremely important because they are regularly considered as 
‗risk spreading‘ machines: institutions obtain risks and transform them in the different 
banking products and services. This chapter confirms banking regulation guidelines and 
risk assessment have become increasingly global, the expanding risk taking behaviour 
development in both systems (Islamic and conventional), extending scope of risk taking 
decisions under an ex ante perspective, and the issue of risk monitoring under an ex post 
perspective once risk decisions are made. Thus, this chapter provides the motivation for 
both banking systems to implement risk-based practices; to create balance between risks 
and returns from both agent and principals‘ points of view; and to develop competitive 
advantages by complying with increasingly strong regulations. 
Although the overall credit assessment for project finance on an Islamic basis will tend to 
follow conventional banking techniques, the additional overlay is one of shari`a 
compatibility. But, an investor in both IB and CB is free to hold a diversified portfolio 
which could reduce exposure risks. In terms of productivity and efficiency, risk model 
applications and processes extend to cover many types of risks, such as credit risk, market 
risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk. Furthermore, the future growth 
prospects for the Islamic financial products industry are assessed to be significant. In 
summary, effective risk management requires clear policies by the board of directors and 
senior management, designated responsibility for functions, commitment by operating 
officers, and periodic reports to the board. This chapter has explained why banks require 
written policies for the assessment of risk and ongoing monitoring of risk system within 
banks‘ administrations. Aspects that have been acknowledged in risk assessment policies 
and that may lead to improve the quality of lending decision-making will be the focus of 
the next chapter.  
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4 CHAPTER FOUR  
MAKING RATIONAL LENDING DECISIONS IN 
THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY: ISLAMIC 
AND CONVENTIONAL BANKS  
4.1 Introduction 
‗Lending has always been a primary function of banking, and accurately assessing a 
borrower‘s creditworthiness has always been the only method for successful lending‘ 
(Basak & Shapiro 2001, p. 378). The aim of assessing borrowers‘ creditworthiness is 
always the same: to ensure that the borrower will have enough cash flow to repay the 
loan. With many financial institutions in the ME still struggling with the consequences of 
poor credit decisions over the past few decades, there is a strong incentive to look to fee-
based operating services to bolster earnings. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to 
provide the basis of making rational lending decisions with recognition of risk assessment 
policies in the finance services industry. Furthermore, differences between Islamic and 
conventional banking in lending models, lending policies and lending processes––lending 
performance––are also discussed.    
This chapter is developed to extend the literature provided in chapter 2 and chapter 3. 
Section 2 highlights the nature of lending with asymmetric information problem. Section 
3 discusses types of lending in IBs and CBs. Section 4 focuses on implications of theories 
used in lending decision-making policies. Section 5 explains development of a rational 
lending decision model, focusing on the relevance of efficient policy. Section 6 provides 
details on the effectiveness of lending decisions in the banking industry. Section 7 and 
section 8 present lending processes in practice and the performance of lending decisions. 
Finally, section 9 provides a conclusion to the chapter. Figure 4.1 provides a visual 
overview of the structure of this chapter.  
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Figure 4.1: Outline of Chapter 4 Interrelations   
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4.2 The Nature of Lending  
Although banking activity consists of lending financial resources to customers who are in 
need of financing, the exchange between the bankers and the borrowers does not concern 
a tangible product, but considers the borrowers‘ future capacity to honour the loan (Berry 
1993; Ferrary 2003). ‗[T]he nature of this activity, therefore, implies risk-taking by 
financial establishments since borrowers may not honour their debts‘ (Abdullah 2003, p. 
73). Thus, the profitability of banks depends on the quality of risk evaluation and this 
depends on an accurate assessment of the debtor‘s reliability. Banks, however, have the 
required expertise, experience, and customer focus to make them the preferred lender for 
many types of loans. Skilled administration staff in banks are well suited to this task. 
Berry (1993) noted that not all loans can be standardised, credit scored, and securitised 
(sold in marketable packages). Whilst the most commonly securitised loans are those with 
the most standard features (mortgages, government-guaranteed, student loan, small 
business loan sponsored by small business administration, credit cards, and auto loans), 
many other loans are more difficult to credit score and securitize, such as those that are 
designed to meet specific business needs or given to poor people as a part of society 
development commitments (e.g. benevolent loans hibah and good loan gard hassan in the 
Islamic lending mode) (Ahmad 2000).   
4.2.1 A Problem of Information Asymmetry  
Proprietary information generated through the process of lending can influence the 
structure of the banking industry in terms of an exchange relationship. In this regard, 
there is an information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders (Ferrary 2003; Holod 
& Peek 2007). Lenders seek to reduce this asymmetry via a risk evaluation process with 
risk evaluation methods such as those used by banks (Brown & Goetzmann 1995; 
Glennon & Nigro 2005). Two important questions arise that require consideration at the 
time of lending, namely: 1) has this risk assessment and bond management affected the 
relationship between borrowers and lenders? and 2) has the performance of lending 
operations affected banks‘ risk assessment?  
With a growth in the number of banks competing for business, borrower-specific 
information becomes more disperse, as each bank becomes informed about a smaller pool 
of borrowers. A new perspective modifies the nature of power relationships between 
lenders and borrowers. As observed in section 2.4.1, asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders significantly affects the cost of lending transactions. This reduces 
banks‘ screening ability, creating inefficiency as more low-quality borrowers obtain 
financing. Therefore, these relationships need careful consideration by decision makers in 
banks.  
Economists recognized that, in a variety of settings, perfect competition is precluded by 
asymmetric information. The fact that search and screening is costly and that information 
may be obtained in the course of an exchange relationship implies that new borrowers 
will be imperfect substitutes for old borrowers (Bell & Clemenz 2006). In the context of 
banks, as described in banking and financial theories, information asymmetry between the 
principal [borrowers] and the agent [financer] raises two aspects: adverse selection and 
moral hazard.  
Adverse selection––uncertainty of the viability of the project––basically, means banks 
are faced with uncertainty about the creditworthiness of the borrowers (Barucci 2003). If 
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banks experience low net worth of the borrowers after lending, they are able to reject 
riskier borrowers at the time of refinancing. Potential entrants into a lending business 
suffer an adverse selection effect stemming from their inability to determine whether 
applicant borrowers are new borrowers seeking financing for their untested projects or 
are, in fact, borrowers who have previously been rejected by an incumbent bank and are 
looking elsewhere for financing.  
Moral hazard means uncertainty regarding the reliability of the borrowers as described 
by Kiefer (1988), and also Scott and Dunkelberg (2003). A problem of moral hazard may 
arise when individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately 
taken actions affect the probability of the outcome. This situation is common in insurance, 
labour contracts and delegation of decision making respon sibility.  
Accordingly, some financial intermediaries such as credit rating agencies
48
 that assign 
credit ratings for issuers of certain types of debt obligations have played a significant role 
in demonstrating uncertainties in lending without taking into consideration the issuer‘s 
credit-worthiness (loan repayment). Credit rating agencies may also play a key role in 
structured financial transactions (Levich, Majnoni & Reinhart 2002). Essentially, these 
agencies facilitate increasing the range of investment alternatives and provide 
measurements of relative lending risk. This, in general, increases the efficiency of the 
lending decision-making and the lowering of costs for both borrowers and lenders. This, 
in turn, increases the total supply of assessing capital risk in the economy, leading to 
strong growth and more credible borrowers (Cantor & Packer 1997). A study by Hoff and 
Stiglitz (1997) analysed the effects of subsidies in a banking market, focusing on moral 
hazard rather than adverse selection. Furthermore, another study by Mailath and Nöldeke 
(2008) obtained similar results indicating that competition may have a negative and 
perverse effect on the equilibrium interest rate. In contrast, asymmetric information in IB 
is a driving force in a different kind of analysis.  
Unlike the role of insurance in CB, IB complies with the Takaful role which is an Islamic 
insurance concept grounded in Islamic muamalat (banking transactions). Theoretically, 
Takaful is perceived as cooperative insurance––solidarity (Anwar 2003; bt Shahimi & 
Ahmad 2005). However, Islamic scholars decreed that there should be a concerted effort 
to implement the Takaful concept as the best way to resolve these needs, for instance: 1) 
basis of co-operation or helping one another; 2) basis of responsibility or the place of 
relationships and feelings of people with faith; and 3) basis of mutual protection or by my 
life, which is in God (Allah)‟s power49. To illustrate, while some Muslims believe 
insurance is unnecessary, because a society should help its victims (Dhumale & Sapcanin 
2003), Muslims can no longer ignore the fact that they live, trade and communicate with 
open global systems, and they can no longer ignore the need for banking transactions and 
insurance instruments (Dhumale & Sapcanin 2003; Driver, Lomonaco & Zaidi 2005). 
Although insurance has been practised in different ways, lending classes differ across 
banks as each bank has superior experience with some types of loans but not others; or 
have superior knowledge about some borrowers but not others. Consequently, asymmetric 
information might not be a problem in this case. 
                                                 
48
 It is viewed as either a series of loans with different characteristics, or a number of small loans of a 
similar type packaged together into a series of loans.  
49
 IB prohibited unreasonable uncertainty in transaction contracts - gharar (see section 2.2.2.3.2), therefore, 
Islamic interpretation for the Takaful rule is: ‗nobody will enter Gana - Paradise - if he does not protect his 
neighbour who is in distress‘.  
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4.3 Types of Lending: IBs and CBs 
The starting point in analysing the creditworthiness of a client is to consider the types of 
lending proposed. It is important to establish this before analysing the financial condition 
of the borrower because there are different risks involved in the different types of lending 
(Smith & Nau 1995). Therefore, establishing what type of lending is being proposed will 
define the approach to be adopted in assessing the creditworthiness of a client.  
The theory of relationship lending is based on the idea that close ties between borrowers 
and banks may be economically beneficial. In this regard, Elsas and Krahnen (2002) state 
‗the empirical literature is mainly focused on assessing the consequences of relationship 
on loan pricing, credit availability or efficiency of deriving decisions by banks if 
borrowers faced financial distress‘. Their argument is closely related to the idea of good 
and bad credit. A loan applicant will be a good or bad customer depending on his/her 
credit-worthiness and the terms of the loan. Elsas and Krahnen (2002) found this to be the 
key to successful loan repayment performance.  
Usually, the bank (lender) considers the loan to be of two major types: secured or 
unsecured. Secured loan means that debt contracts often require borrowers to pledge 
collateral. The incidence of secured loans is positively related to the probability of 
default, loan size, loan maturity and marketability of assets. It is important to note that 
some loans in IBs are given voluntarily as a ‗benevolent‘ by banks to customers or to 
society members, namely Hibah
50
. Furthermore, some loans are also regarded as a token 
of appreciation to the borrowers and, this transaction is a true interest-free loan which is 
known as Qard-hassan (good loan). Basically, these types of loans are outside the scope 
of this study—which focuses solely on the project finance (see section 3.5).  
Figure 4.2: Banks Lending Classification 
 
However, from the borrowers‘ perspective, lending (loan) and associated risk are 
primarily
 
of three types
51
: temporary or seasonal finance, working investment finance, 
and cash flow and revolving lending. These types of lending present an interrelated 
                                                 
50
 Hibah is a voluntary payment made (or not made) at the bank‘s discretion, and cannot be ‗guaranteed.‘ 
51 Definition of Qard-hassan and Takaful are provided in Appendix A, and for more detailed information, see:  
Sathye, M 2003, Credit analysis and lending management, John Wiley & Sons Australia, Milton., and  
Rhodes, T 1993, Syndicated lending: Practice and documentation, Euromoney Publications, London. 
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perspective between lenders and borrowers, and are highlighted in Figure 4.2. These types 
of finance are discussed further in the following section. 
4.3.1 Temporary or Seasonal Finance 
Some loans are given to meet typically seasonal requirements in business such as farming 
and short term services. A lender dealing with a borrower would expect an increased 
over-draft during a production process, such as when input is acquired and then processed 
into finished products (Altunbas, Fazylov & Molyneux 2002). The over-draft would be 
substantially reduced as finished products are sold. Temporary or seasonal lending 
provides finance for the build-up of assets over one season and is the conventional and 
Islamic form of bank-lending to business. Since, Islamic law prohibits interest and gharar 
or dubiousness in contracts, this type of finance could be mainly in the agriculture sector 
and is known as muzarah contracts (specific counterparts in mudaraba contracts).  
However, the primary risk in this type of lending is the borrower‘s inability to generate 
liquidity through the conversion of the assets into cash due to failures in supply, 
manufacturing and sales. Lahiri (2002) indicates the analyst should be concerned with the 
liquidity of the assets being financed and management‘s ability to complete the asset 
conversion cycle. Further, Lucas et al. (2001) argue that the loan facility should be 
structured in such a manner that the lender can monitor the borrower‘s condition 
frequently and retain control in lending funds or renewing the facility. 
Successful completion of the asset conversion cycle is vital for any lender and influences 
all lending decisions. Additionally, in other types of lending such as working investment 
finance and revolving lending, there are further considerations. Nevertheless, a 
borrower‘s successful completion of the asset conversion cycle is a pre-requisite for a 
good loan in both banking systems. Lown and Peristiani (1996) however, investigated the 
loan pricing behaviour of commercial banks, where they found strong evidence that large 
undercapitalised banks contributed to the credit slowdown by charging consumers a 
higher average interest rate than well-capitalised institutions. However, IBs attempt to 
protect their assets from any charges of (small or large) interest rates rib'a.  
4.3.2 Working Investment Finance  
Not all borrowers use the seasonal method of lending. Instead, the majority have 
overlapping asset conversion cycles. For such borrowers, the relatively constant levels of 
securities such as stock and reserved money owed to them––known as accounts 
receivable or adaptors––must be financed from somewhere. Hannan (1991) indicated that 
a borrower cannot acquire stock and sell it on credit without either receiving credit from 
suppliers or borrowing money. In terms of stock levels, and the amounts owed by 
customers, when taken together, these are usually larger than the amount a borrower‘s 
suppliers have allowed to be lent as loans (Mingo 2000). Typically, this calls for 
borrowing, recognized as working investment finance and, hypothetically, most 
borrowers require it to some degree. However, Peek and Rosengren (1998) noted that the 
need for such borrowing is long term, whilst working investment finance is generally 
supplied on a short-term, revolving basis in terms of long investment term period. At this 
juncture, an important point to note about the working investment requirement is that it 
increases with the volume of business or trade growth and stock levels.  
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In the case of Islamic banking, investment financing is referred to medium or long term 
investment including sukuk issuing (Islamic bonds) (El-Gamal 2007). Sukuk is better 
described as Islamic investment certificates. Wilson (2004, p. 56) has argued that ‗this 
distinction is as crucial as it is important, and it is stressed throughout this pioneering 
work that sukuk should not simply be regarded as a substitute for conventional interest-
based securities‘. Ideally, Islamic fixed-income securities are already emerging as a 
significant class of asset, and are as potentially important for the Muslim investor as 
conventional bonds are for investors generally (Tariq & Dar 2007). In addition, for non-
Muslims who already own conventional bonds, the acquisition of sukuk introduces a new 
asset class into their portfolios, bringing further welcome diversity and a possible 
reduction in risk. What this means in practice is that IB provides assets with essential 
concepts such as: 1) transparency and clarity of rights and obligations; 2) income from 
securities must be related to the purpose for which the funding is used, and not simply 
comprise interest; and 3) securities should be backed by real underlying assets, rather than 
being simply paper derivatives. 
Basically, the risks to consider here are the viability and reputation of the borrower, as 
well as the quality (liquidity) of the assets if the borrower goes into liquidation. The 
quality of the assets should be such that, if sold, the amount raised would be sufficient to 
repay all loans. Sathye (2003) noted that risk also arises from price or market fluctuations, 
when the asset value falls below the level required to satisfy the creditors. This means that 
banks are working under efficient markets line which generally leads to increase lending 
costs. Thus, facilities should be structured in a manner that enables the lender to apply 
control of funds on a frequent basis. Conducting medium or long-term lending––known 
as cash flow lending––might be an alternative option to management of funds and this 
will lead to financial institutions‘ sustainability.  
4.3.3 Cash Flow and Revolving Finance 
This type of lending finances a client‘s medium to long-term needs (5-10 years typically). 
Theoretically, the asset being financed by the facility, such as equipment, is usually 
expected to produce other assets which, when converted to cash through completion of 
the manufacturing or transacting process and sale, will generate sufficient funds to repay 
the loan (Haron & Azmi 2007; Khan & Mirakhor 1990; Shirai 2002). Nevertheless, the 
fixed asset itself is not expected to be converted to cash to repay the loan, which means 
that this type of loan is not self-liquidating. 
Archer and Karim (2002) have defined revolving loan which is a source of money from 
which loans are made for small business development projects. Cash flow finance is 
similar to that of a revolving loan which is made to one person or business and, as 
repayments are made, funds become available for new loans to other businesses. 
Therefore, the fund is often established with capital that does not need to be repaid 
(O'Toole 1996), and borrowers tend to be involved in small projects—typically farmers 
and artisans who have no credit history or access to commercial bank loans. However, the 
main reason for this type of finance in Islamic banking is to provide the initial loans for 
business start-up and expansion. Often, these loans are used to fill a ‗financing gap‘ in a 
business development project. The ultimate goal is for these entrepreneurs to become 
financially independent and eligible for lending loans different from banks (Archer & 
Karim 2002). 
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Hence, Slovin and Young (1990) concluded that the primary concern (risk) in this type of 
lending is the borrower‘s ability to manage asset conversion cycles over several years. 
Furthermore, Warapatr et al (1986), and Archer & Abdel Karim (2006) noted that 
reasonable forecasts of sales growth, and determining the amount of cash left over after 
paying all operating costs to service the debt, are important factors since the money 
revolves from a person or business to another person or business. In addition to the 
borrower‘s current financial condition, the analyst will examine the client‘s record of 
innovation and expansion to determine whether or not the client provides confidence for 
such lending. Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) indicated that sales growth, product 
innovation and marketing success are general indicators of whether successful repayment 
is likely. Thus, the bank usually relies on establishing financial covenants and conditions 
(via the loan agreement) to ensure that it retains some element of control over the 
borrower should the financial condition deteriorate. At this point, it should be emphasised 
that a very large finance literature provides some theoretical evidence of such lending 
application practices.  
Ideally, ‗conventional banks perform two functions: money transfer services, including all 
current account operations, and money lending. The latter provides the major part of the 
bank‘s income while the former enables it to ‗create‘ money and to lend more money than 
it actually possesses‘ (Berry 1993, p. 14). The primary concerns of the bank are the 
security of its capital and the ability of the borrower to pay the interest—not the end use 
of the borrowed funds
52
. In the case of Islamic banks, however, ‗the end use matters 
because the return on their ‗investment‘ (they do not lend) depends on how the profit/loss 
is achieved and computed. Determining the actual profit/loss directly attributable to the 
investment by the bank is still being debated. In Islamic finance, only the financing of 
new enterprises is recognised as amenable to mudaraba type financing‘ (Dhumale & 
Sapcanin 2003, p. 24). All other types of end uses must be financed by loans from 
conventional banks, which would recover their costs and profit from the borrowers.  
The literature separates Islamic banking into four main activities: concessional financing, 
trade financing, participatory mechanisms and benevolent financing. Within these 
activities are various contractual forms that conform fully to the tenets of profit and loss 
sharing (Kahf 1999; Mondher & Siwar 2004 ). The more commonly used profit/loss 
sharing transactions PLS are mudaraba (partnership), musharaka (equity participation), 
and musaqat and muzar‟ah (specific counterparts in Mudaraba contracts). All of these 
loan products appear to include a degree of uncertainty regarding the eventual returns due 
to the entrepreneur and to the Islamic bank. Other lending contracts used in Islamic 
banking include qard hassan (benevolent loan), bai‟mua‟jjal and bai‟salam (sales 
contracts), ijara (leasing), murabaha (cost plus markup), and jo‟alah (service charge)53.  
Up to this point, although there are many types of lending which are applicable to Islamic and 
conventional banks, the Islamic practice shows that there are some differences in the nature of 
lending which are specific to Islamic banks (Kahf 1999; Pervez 1990). Consequently, the salient 
features that distinguishing Islamic financing are:  
1. There is no interest on deposits, but capital is guaranteed. 
2. Lending and investing are treated differently; loans are interest-free but carry a 
service charge, while investing is on a profit-and-loss-sharing (mudaraba) basis.  
                                                 
52
 Note: whether it was intended for establishing a new enterprise, to expand an existing one, to bridge a 
cash flow problem of a running concern, or to be used by a small business, by a sole-owner enterprise, or 
for consumption purposes, etc. was not the prime concern of the bank. 
53
 Details in section 2.2.2  
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3. Value erosion of capital due to inflation is compensated.  
4. The definition of ratios in which profits and losses are shared instead of fixed and pre-
determined mark-up profit rates. 
4.4 Theoretical Underpinning for Lending Decision  
There is no doubt that the empirical mechanism in developed credit markets is actually 
based upon some theoretical bases. These theoretical bases have been widely considered 
among lending decision makers in Islamic and conventional institutions. There is 
substantial literature related to lending decision-making in financial institutions (Allen & 
Peristiani 2007; Anderson 2003; Andrea & Monks 1999; Barucci 2003; Salaman 2002; 
Schwartz 1998; Simon 1959; Weirich 2001; Wright 1984). Although there is some debate 
on the relevance of the efficient markets hypothesis, there is ample evidence to suggest 
that if information for such lending decisions are accessible efficient markets hypothesis 
exists must be perfectly competitive (Christoffersen 2003; Elton 2007; Hakim & Neaime 
2001; Holod & Peek 2007; Laeven & Mundial 1999). In this context, two competing 
theories, namely Decision-making Theory (DMT) and Social Theory (ST) are highlighted 
to form the theoretical basis of contemporary lending practices.  
4.4.1 Decision-making Theory (DMT) and Social Theory (ST) 
Conceptually, Decision-making Theory (DMT) considers the problem of how real or 
ideal decision-makers make, or should make, decisions and how rational decisions can be 
reached (Jennings & Wattam 1994). Furthermore, most of decision-making theory is 
normative or perspective, i.e. it is concerned with identifying the best decision to take, 
assuming an ideal decision-maker is fully informed, able to compute with perfect 
accuracy, and fully rational (White 1969).  
The practical application of the perspective approach (how a person should make a 
decision) is called decision analysis, and is aimed at finding tools and methodologies to 
help individuals make better decisions. The normative approach indicates that rational 
decisions often be made by creating specific hypotheses for testing against actual 
behaviour, whereas, the two theoretical approaches––perspective or normative––are 
closely linked (Cotten 1995; White 1969). Furthermore, within both theoretical 
approaches it is possible to relax the assumptions of perfect information and rationality in 
various ways and produce a series of different prescriptions or predictions about 
behaviour, allowing for further tests of the kind of decision-making that occurs in practice 
(Cotten 1995).    
For modern financial administration, ensuring that decision-making is as rational as 
possible is extremely important. Rational decision-making enables intermediate 
institutions to achieve their objectives in an efficient manner and provides a means of 
establishing working systems of operation control. However, decision-making involves 
more than the choice of some preferred alternative. It also involves what can be described 
as a process (Gore, Murray & Richardson 1992). If the process can be improved, 
appropriate methods can be used and the decision itself will thus be improved (Cotten 
1995). 
An important subset of models of rational lending decision-making is a central concern of 
this research. Is that associated with decision theory? A review of a number of the models 
available demonstrates both: 1) the importance of understanding the methodological 
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stance taken; and 2) the need to relate theory to risk assessment practice. In this regard, 
Gore, Murray and Richardson (1992) classified decision-making theory into three models: 
1) Mintzberg model; 2) Hofer and Schendel model; and 3) Higgins modern model.  
The first model is based on purposeful behavior that concludes with a commitment to do 
something rather than merely to talk about it, and is named the Mintzberg model (Cotten 
1995); and, next, is based on the ideas of limited rationality. This consideration (model) is 
a specified objective and worked with a specific application (Salaman 2002; Schwartz 
1998; Weirich 2001; Wright 1984). Therefore, both considerations (models) encompass 
uncertainty, complexity of decision-making and provide a model for rational decision-
making that takes account of features. This model can be used in a most rational way if 
given constraints on rationality, and excludes implementation planning from a formulated 
strategy (Hofer and Schendel model). 
The third is based on the identification of information system needs which will overcome 
the problems of assimilation that fully rational models would have (Davis 1996). This 
model demonstrates objectives are required for comparing decision-making performance 
(including outside objectives that may account for measuring the model performance). 
Therefore, a gap in performance is considered in the light of forecasts. Higgins, Compeau 
and Huff (1999) argued most processes of using data that are imposed by the top of an 
institution can be easily quantified––the Higgins modern model. Consequently, this 
research uses a modern model of decision-making theory to analyse the rationality of 
lending decision-making with regard to credit risk factor in both conventional and Islamic 
banking systems.   
In contrast, Social theory (ST) is interdisciplinary, drawing ideas from and contributing to 
such disciplines (e.g. economics). More specifically in banking and finance fields, 
primary justification for engaging in the selected analysis method is based on a 
recognition that social problems are obviously subject to considerable value-oriented 
interpretations (Cotten 1995). There are numerous challenges facing decision makers in 
CBs and IBs in the immediate future. In view of customers‘ satisfaction and the changing 
demands and diversity in Islamic society, new attitudes must be developed toward the 
social growth and consideration given to quality of life improvements. It is not a new idea 
that lending decision has considered some ethical aspects. Banks with Islamic law 
understand that economic ethics mostly involve making lending decisions. Initially, 
earlier and classical articles on making lending decisions provided concerns and 
responsibilities of lending decision makers (Jennings & Wattam 1994). A view of 
responsibility can be termed relative, which means that the decision makers accept the 
prevailing ethics of this current and immediate business environment. 
In terms of risk taking behavior, a number of particular risk factors influence the lending 
decision and may act to override the quantitative answer produced by the normal 
computation (Zaman & Movassaghi 2001; Zhu 2003). However, the impact of qualitative 
risk factors on lending decisions cannot be measured with accuracy, but those factors can 
be very important when the decision is made. These include: 
1. Social obligations (responsibilities) against customers and society. 
2. Co-operation among banking institutions themselves. 
3. General regulations and country ideology. 
4.  Society religion and customs. 
5. Maintaining depositors‘ interests and objectives.  
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Since it is understandable that people do not typically behave in rational ways, there is 
also a related area of study which is a positive or descriptive discipline that attempts to 
describe what persons will actually do. Therefore, decision-making can be seen as an 
outcome of a mental process (cognitive process) leading to the selection of a course of 
action among several alternatives (Weirich 2001). Thus, every decision-making process 
produces a final choice.   
With Social Theory, an attempt has been made to examine some of the social and 
religious aspects (beliefs) that face lending decision makers in finance services 
institutions, particularly those working within Islamic law––shari`a. The emphasis has 
been on description, not prescription. In other words, the objective is to describe an 
approach to manage social problems, meanwhile illustrating what decision makers have 
mainly done in responding to Islamic finance requirements that have been placed upon 
them (Abdullah 2003). This approach was conducted in favor of pursuing a normative 
path, which would have involved the actual avocation of specific approaches to problems 
of business and the larger social system and an evaluation of how well institutions have 
Islamically responded to social challenges (Duncan 1973). 
Both Decision-making Theory and Social Theory as distinct disciplines emerged in the 
20
th
 century and were largely equated in finance literature with an attitude of critical 
thinking, based on rationality, logic and objectivity, and the desire for knowledge through 
a posteriori methods of discovery, rather than a priori methods in practices (Simon 1979). 
With this in mind, it is easy to link these theories to deeper seated philosophical 
discussions in this study. Thus, practising both theories with lending models that have 
been used in CBs led to a desire to develop an empirical approach more akin to the 
Islamic banking and Islamic finance practices.   
4.4.1.1 Contribution of the Theories to Risk Assessment 
The institution‘s choice of assessing lending risk in imperfect markets includes 
contracting, maturity matching and refinancing risk. This means financial institutions 
always aim to adopt unambiguous lending procedures to secure the quality of their 
lending portfolio. Conceptually, there are three fundamental issues involved in lending 
risk and capital adequacy: How much risk is present? What is the institution‘s tolerance 
for risk? And how much capital should be held to offset maintain that risk tolerance?  
Empirically, the expected loss (EL) rate can be broken down into three elements and 
analysed separately for each transaction to measure that transaction‘s risk (Berger & 
DeYoung 1996). These elements are:  
1. Probability of default (PD).  
2. Loss, given default (LGD). 
3. Exposure at default (EAD).  
There are several financial models for analysing default risk, such as the Jarrow-Turnbull 
model, Edward Altman‘s Z-score model, or the structural model of default by Robert C. 
Merton (Westgaard & Van-der 2001). However, the term ‗default‘ should be 
distinguished from the terms ‗insolvency‘ and ‗bankruptcy‘. Default essentially means a 
debtor has not paid a debt, whereas insolvency is a legal term meaning that a debtor is 
unable to pay his debts and, finally, bankruptcy is a legal finding that imposes court 
supervision over the financial affairs of those who are insolvent or in default (Olekalns & 
Sibly 1992).  
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In case of default, the PD is then an indication of the likelihood and frequency that a loan 
will acquire default status. LGD measures the impact on the institution from the default. 
LGD is the net result of any recovery the institution has received, either through 
liquidation of collateral or deficiency judgments rendered from foreclosure or bankruptcy 
proceedings, and may be associated with quality of collateral, seniority of claims, and 
many guarantees associated with the loan. EAD is what the institution has at risk when 
the loan enters default status. EAD is usually expressed in monetary terms––e.g. US $––
and is comprised of principal outstanding, unutilised commitment, and any fees or other 
expenses the institution incurs in collecting the default. Finally, both PD and LGD are 
usually expressed in percentage terms. The relationship among PD, LGD, EAD and EL is 
formulated as follows (Berger & DeYoung 1996; Berry, Crum & Waring 1993):  
EADLDGPDEL         (4.5) 
Financial institutions attempt to minimise loss rates at different levels of aggregation 
(individual loans, portfolios of loans) and for selected baskets of loans with different 
profiles representing different types of borrowers and loan characteristics (Berry 1993). In 
this case, PD can be predicted based on the type of borrower, underwriting variables, loan 
size, maturity, payment frequency, and many other variables dependent on either the 
borrower‘s characteristics or external economic factors (Cowling & Westhead 1996). 
Furthermore, some of the simplest elements of Portfolio Theory (PT) are applicable to 
virtually any kind of portfolio. Therefore, ‗the concept of capturing the risk tolerance of 
an investor by documenting how much risk is acceptable for a given return could be, and 
is, applied to a variety of decision analysis problems‘ (Berry & Robertson 2006, p. 178). 
Portfolio Theory, however, uses historical standard divination as a measure of risk and 
returns of loans portfolio.  
In terms of Decision-making Theory, logical decision-making is indeed an important part 
of all professions where specialists apply their knowledge in a given area to making 
informed decisions (Choi & Smith 2002; Rosman & Bedard 1999). At this point, several 
statistical tools and methods are available to organise evidence, assess risks and apply 
them in the decision-making process. The risk of type I and type II errors can be 
quantified in terms of estimated probability, cost, expected value, etc., and rational 
decision-making is thereby improved (Westgaard & Van-der 2001). However, when 
applying rationality-testing methodology, the lending decision will have a chance of 
reaching an erroneous condition (type I or type II). An example of the lending decision 
structure for deciding to lend or not to lend is presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Lending Decision-making and Types of Error Diagnosis 
RATIONAL DESCRIPTION 
ACTUAL CONDITION 
Lend(true) Not lend(false) 
 
DECISION  
Verdict of lend True positive 
False negative i.e. 
lending reported unsafe 
(type II error) 
Verdict of not lend 
False positive i.e. 
lending not detected 
(type I error) 
True negative 
To illustrate, firstly consider specifying that a decision concerning a verdict of lend must 
be made (lend/not lend). In this case, and as shown in Table 4.1, the type I error occurs 
and means the verdict of lend has been made is rejected, when in fact it is true and should 
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not be rejected. This means that the loan application has not approval, when the verdict 
about the application should be approved. Type II error arises when a false verdict of lend 
is fail to reject (accepted) when in fact it is false and should be rejected. As noticed by 
Mehta (1970) and Morsman (1997), lending decisions cannot be made without 
considering lending policy or particular loans‘ characteristics.  
The complements of the probability of both errors (Type I and Type II) indicate/d the 
power or the confidence of making lending decisions. In the case of IB, there are some 
lending decisions that might be subjectively made, such as social insurance decisions in 
Islamic communities Takaful (e.g. lending to poor Muslims). But for Islamic finance 
projects, errors in making a rational lending decision might be lower, owing to Islamic 
rule that has been established in transaction contracts (see section 3.6). In contrast, even 
though the lending decisions have been objectively made in CB, lending decision makers 
suffer from some errors. This means a decision can be made according to available 
information on each loan. Regarding the notion that DMT and ST contribute to formulate 
banks‘ efficiency frameworks empirically, this is discussed in the next section (4.4.1.2). 
4.4.1.2 Contribution of the Theories to Lending Efficiency  
This section provides an explanation of how these theories contribute to improve the 
banks‘ lending efficiency through making rational lending decisions. An improvement in 
efficiency can be defined as the extent to which a decision-making unit (DMU) can 
increase its outputs without increasing its inputs, or reduce its inputs without reducing its 
outputs (Harrington 1987). Fama (1970), and Pastor and Serrano (2006) stated that 
efficiency can be generally classified into three forms: 1) scale efficiency; 2) scope 
efficiency; and 3) x-efficiency
54
. In the case of lending efficiency, scale and scope 
efficiencies refer to the technique of costs reduction which measures the agent‘s success 
in choosing the cost minimising combination of inputs (Fama 1991). In contrast, 
x-efficiency measures whether banks are operating with an appropriate bundle of inputs. 
The x-efficiency has been the focus of recent bank efficiency studies, because it helps 
management to control costs of transactions and use resources to produce output.  
In the finance literature, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that markets are 
‗informationally efficient‘, or that prices on traded assets (stocks, bonds or property) 
already reflect all available information and, therefore, are unbiased in the sense that they 
reflect the collective beliefs of all investors about future prospects (Fama 1970). 
However, securities prices, currency rates, interest rates and dividends fluctuate, thereby 
creating many risks. But, when securities prices fully reflect all information, the market is 
efficient (Fama 1991; Matthews, Murinde & Zhao 2007).  
Accordingly, there are many aspects in which lending and default risk are related to 
efficiency. These include information asymmetry; loans adverse selection; efficient 
market; funds availability; bank‘s communications and relationships—mostly arising 
from finance circumstances. For instance, some of these aspects have been analysed 
significantly by Berger, Rosen and Udell (2007) who found that there is a negative 
relationship between cost efficiency and risk in a failed bank. The reasons include:  
                                                 
54
 X-efficiency comprises technical and allocative efficiencies. Technical efficiency for a given firm is 
defined as the bundle of the input usage of a fully efficient firm producing the same output vector to the 
input usage of the firm under consideration. To be fully efficient, a firm must be both technically and 
allocatively efficient.   
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1. Inefficient banks suffer problems in controlling and assessing their 
internal risk factors; and  
2. Bad loans may arise because of adverse economic circumstances beyond 
the bank‘s control whereby banks have to spend more resources to 
recover the problem loans. 
In this context, a cross-country IB study by Ariff (2008) has revealed similar results that 
show cost efficiency in IBs appears to have steady negative impact with default risk. 
Pastor (2002) has also found that, typically, bad loans can appear due to two different 
internal causes, direct control and management risk, and indirect factors associated with 
bad management.  
4.5 Developing an Appropriate Lending Model  
The finance literature accurately summaries some risk management models, however, an 
assessment of a risky loan is clearly one of the most important topics cross-bank 
worldwide (Lopez & Saidenberg 2000). Examination models of internal and external 
risks are mainly for identifying risks and measuring their impact on capital needs, such as 
lending processes. For measuring lending risk, for instance, risk-based capital standards at 
banking institutions move from qualitative to quantitative measurements. This movement 
in lending risk assessment significantly contributes to lending efficiency in banks 
(Hyndman 1997). However, there is scope for further development in the area of risk 
assessment modeling, especially in the understanding of making rational lending 
decisions. 
4.5.1 Rationalization of the Model  
Consider a lender who extends credit for a fixed time period, say , to risky loan 
applicants as they arrive randomly over time. Suppose that each applicant requests a $1 
loan and, those applicants arrive according to a Poisson process at rate . In addition to 
the uncertainty regarding the number of loan applicants, there is also uncertainty 
regarding the profitability of each potential loan (Megbolugbe 1993). In this regard, let 
  ,1  denote the risk-adjusted rate of return from lending 1 US$ to a given 
applicant. For example, if r is the contractual interest rate––arrangement cost in Islamic 
banking––and, if   ,1 is the probability of default on both principal and interest, 
then  rr  1 .  
As the ‗Islamic loan‘ is a special transaction case, r may be exogenously fixed and, 
therefore, the default risk becomes the sole distinguishing characteristic among applicants 
(Mayer 1985). In conventional transaction cases, applicants may be indistinguishable in 
terms of their default risk, but offer different contractual interest rates. Specifically, Jaffee 
and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have argued that higher contractual 
interest rates or higher arrangement costs induce applicants to undertake riskier projects 
so that   is an increasing function of r. Therefore, they assume that   is unobservable 
and increasing in r. As a result, the lender charges a common interest rate (or arrangement 
cost in Islamic transactions) to all applicants while recognizing that adverse selection or 
incentive effects may lead to declines in the expected risk-adjusted rate of return as r is 
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increased. Then the lender‘s maximum contractual interest rate yields in conventional 
banking or arrangement cost yields in Islamic banking are:    rrrrMax  10  . 
Although financial services characteristics can be expected to influence the lender‘s 
procedure for assessing an applicant, sole concern is with the resulting risk-adjusted rate 
of return  . Therefore, simply assume that the lender can assess the   of each loan 
applicant and, that   varies across the applicant pool according to a probability density 
(or mass) function f(.) with the corresponding distribution function f(.) (Mateut, Bougheas 
& Mizen 2003). Then  F  is the probabilistic rate of applicant arrivals whose 
profitability does not exceed . Thus, the Poisson process of arrivals at rate   describes 
the uncertainty in the quantity of loans demanded, whereas, the probability distribution 
f(.) captures the uncertainty regarding the quality of loan demand (Massoud 2005). 
Without these two uncertainties (quantity and quality of the loans), a bank‘s decision 
problem would be insignificant
55. With these uncertainties, however, the lender‘s decision 
on each applicant should take into account not only the immediate profitability of the 
loan, but also the subsequent loan decisions that will have to be made with uncertainty 
about the future number and quality of applicants (Mateut, Bougheas & Mizen 2003). 
However, the risk of a particular action failing can also be given a probability—the higher 
the probability the greater the risk.  
The analysis of likely courses of action, and the risk involved, is called risk assessment 
(Jennings & Wattam 1994). If a loan applicant arrives at time  Tt ,0 , thus, the lender 
must consider the applicant‘s  , where the cumulative loans already made Lt. This 
affects the lender‘s marginal cost of granting additional loans (Laeven & Majnoni 2005). 
At this point, the bank decides whether to approve or to deny the given application. A 
decision to lend is denoted by 1td , and a negative decision by 0td . Thus, after a 
decision at time t, total loans outstanding become (Lt + dt) and remain at this level until a 
decision is taken on the next applicant arrival. 
4.5.1.1 The Cost of Lending: IB vs. CB Approach 
This study aims to establish that the methodology of measuring financial risks in banks 
can vary between IB and CB systems. Some banks mark risks to market, and others only 
recognize the cost when the default occurs––Basel II (Basel Committee 2006). The 
intermediary‘s lending cost and risk exposure depends on its mode of lending. Its 
exposure to loan demand uncertainty can be minimized by lending unit quantities only as 
needed. By synchronously lending for the same duration , the intermediary operates 
without a cash inventory and thereby maintains a continually duration-matched balance 
sheet (Laeven & Majnoni 2005). Therefore, this kind of intermediary is referred to as a 
conventional bank, even though it sustains default risk. Islamic banking works with a 
similar policy which is free of cost for bank‘s funding and no interest charged on funds 
(deposits) or asset capital.   
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 e.g., if the lender knows that exactly N applicants will arrive over the given planning period [0, T] and, 
that the applicants are characterized by P, ………PN, then the lender could simply rank the applicants 
according to their P is and satisfy the demand of the best L applicants with P‟s exceeding the bank‘s 
marginal cost of borrowing; the remaining (N–L) unprofitable applicants would then be rejected. 
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Alternatively, the intermediary may lend in advance of realising the loan demand and 
then make loans from this inventory as applicants are approved over time. By lending en 
bloc and lending in unit quantities, the intermediary breaks lots, thereby altering the 
divisibility of claims (Kopecky & VanHoose 2006). Since funds are lent at time 0 and 
loans are made at different times over [0, T], the result is a continually duration-
mismatched balance sheet with both cash and  -period loans granted exclusively with  -
period lends. The cash inventory, however, absent in the Islamic banking mode of 
lending, gives rise to the risk of ending the period with excess funds. This additional 
exposure can be interpreted as a form of sharing risk in that unexpectedly low demand 
may necessitate the acceptance of a low (possibly zero) rate of return on surplus funds; 
similarly, an unexpectedly high demand may require additional lending at a high 
(possibly infinite) cost. Thus, in CBs, quantity (demand) uncertainty translates into 
interest rate risk even if the penalty interest rates are known with certainty.  
The intermediary that sustains this added exposure is referred to as conventional banking. 
Some prefer to distinguish between IBs and CBs, on the basis that the former transact on 
behalf of clients, as, for example, a Mudarib (mutual fund manager), whereas the latter 
transact on their own accounts, as in the case of conventional loans (Kumra, Stein & 
Assersohn 2006; Kuran 1995). However, the more general distinction
56
 involves risk 
exposure. Thus, IBs and CBs both sustain default risk, but only the latter maintains a cash 
inventory, implying a (duration and divisibility) mismatched balance sheet with 
consequent interest rate risk (Kishan & Opiela 2006). 
The quality of lending decision-making may deteriorate significantly, but may not be 
recognized (Roy 2005). Let L  denote an upper bound on the intermediary‘s total lending 
over the planning period [0, T]. This limit may be viewed as a capacity constraint on the 
intermediary‘s scale of operation deriving either from a regulatory restriction or from the 
short-term fixity of capital adequacy (Saurina & Trucharte 2004). Thus, both CBs and IBs 
face a limit L  on the total funds lent giving rise to an opportunity cost of lending. 
However, conventional banking lends up to capacity at t=0, whereas Islamic banking 
lends in unit quantities only as loans are approved and funds are needed through time. Let
 .AC and  .BC  denote the ‗cost of lending‘ function for CBs and IBs respectively, and 
assume that IBs marginal cost of lending [    tBtB LCLC 1 ], is strictly positive with no 
decreasing as a result of its growing default risk deriving from the debt-financed loan 
growth tL  over time. Although CBs lending cost may be convex increasing in the size of 
its funds inventory owing to the same default consideration, its lending cost is sustained 
before the lending process commences (Khaledi, Hosseini & Gray 2009).  
Note that, the definition of the capacity constraint L , and the lending cost functions,  .AC  
and  .BC  require that the intermediary‘s lending be carried out within a given time 
interval [0, T]. The fixed planning horizon should be viewed as an analytical convenience 
designed to simplify the definition of costs and of risk exposure (Kakes & Sturm 2002). 
Without a fixed T, lending costs at any time would depend on net loans at that time, 
necessitating the tracking of loan repayments and an explicit inventory carrying cost 
would be required in order to capture the lending risk. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
there are no loan repayments (i.e.,  > T) or discounting in [0, T].    
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 e.g., a CB with a perfectly matched balance sheet is completely hedged and, therefore, restricts itself to 
the provision of search services; it behaves the same as the intermediary transacting on behalf of clients. 
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Finally, for consistency and ease of comparison it is assumed that the lending costs of 
both Islamic and conventional intermediaries are paid at the end of the planning period. 
Thus, CBs sustain a fixed cost  .LC A  of lending an inventory of funds at time t=0 
without additional lending costs as loans are made from this inventory over the time 
interval [0, T], but there is a possibility of excess supply or demand. In contrast, the IBs 
sustain neither a fixed lending cost nor any exposure to excess supply, but they do bear a 
higher marginal lending cost as loans are made. A discussion on the need for lending 
policy is the focus of the next section. 
4.5.1.2 Relevance of Lending Policies 
The lending process is modelled as a sequence of credit decisions taken by an 
intermediary facing uncertainty as to both the quality and quantity of loan demand. Both 
types of intermediaries (IBs/CBs) thereby sustain default risk. However, the IBs and CBs 
have similar loanable funds; this results in additional risk exposure which they view as a 
form of interest rate risk associated with duration mismatching of balance sheet-offs 
(Deshmukh, Greenbaum & Kanatas 1983). Reduction in the risk exposure of a financial 
intermediary may be simultaneously viewed from two different perspectives namely; 
borrowers and lenders. This means both bodies––borrower and lender––might be a main 
source of risk exposure and should be a point of focus in applying lending policies.  
Under the credit culture and regulation concepts in Islam, the purpose of lending is to 
support:  
1. The customer‘s projects plan; and  
2. The poor people named ‗loans for benevolent task‘ (see section 4.3).  
According to the foremost case, Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) lend to their 
customers who need funds for essential plans. However, Jennings and Wattam (1994) 
noted that there were no fixed limits to the short-run amount of credit extended for 
working capital purposes, which often gave borrowers the incentive to over-borrow to 
stockpile inventory or use the funds for other non-productive purposes
57
. 
Further, most regulations in banks are focused more on accounts than on risk. Ahmad and 
Haron (2002) and Allen and Santomero (2001) noted that both credit culture 
understanding and regulations are considered to be very important for banks and provide 
greater investor (depositors) protection. So it is difficult to develop a lending system 
without using a set of rules to improve lending decisions-making procedures. Since 
Peterson and Rajan‘s (1994) study of the implications of the duration of relationships and 
of those resulting from borrowing from single or multiple banks, there have been several 
studies focusing on customers‘ relationships with banks. A study on community bank 
performance in California found that longer relationships generally improve credit 
worthiness, but have the impact on the interest rate charged and the collateral required 
was inconclusive (Zimmerman 1996). 
It is also important to note that duration analysis shows that the likelihood of customers 
substituting multiple relationships to a single one increases with the duration of the single 
relationship, and those customers with higher net worth and more bank debt are more 
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 At the end of April 2003, the Basel Committee on banking supervision released a third consultative paper 
(CP3) containing a proposal for a new accord on bank capital (Basel II). The proposal defines and illustrates 
capital requirements, which it changes according to the riskiness of bank borrowers and have a built-in 
effect of any risk-sensitive prudential regulation.  
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likely to initiate multiple relationships (Cole 1998; Peterson & Rajan 1994; Stein 2005). 
In summary, the improvement in performance appears to explain the reliability of lending 
policy to initiate multiple relationships to protect themselves against default loans risks. 
In particular, a bank‘s strategy most likely impacts on its ability to develop multiple 
relationships with different customers and obtaining flexible policy to deal with default 
risks. 
In the literature ‗default mode‘ and ‗market-to-market‘ are identified as the two main 
approaches to measuring default risks (Berry, Crum & Waring 1993). Typically, ‗the 
default mode focuses directly on the probabilities of loan loss, with recognition of the 
probability default (PD) and the severity of loss given that default has occurred, whereas 
the market-to-market approach attempts to measure how future changes in the credit risk 
characteristics of a loan or a group of loans will affect the loan(s) market value, including 
potential losses in value‘ (Berry, Crum & Waring 1993, p. 12).  
The above discussion highlights the point that banks mostly follow specific rules in order 
to reduce risk associated with lending. Therefore, lending policy is essentially significant 
in that:  
1. It provides the bank with insurance against loan default; and  
2. It ensures that borrowers put in the required effort to ensure loan 
repayments are made.  
Basically, loans processes are used as an approach to protecting banks from exposure to 
risks. That is, more risky borrowers will be charged a high risk premium for a given loan, 
contrasting to risk sharing rule between the lender and the borrower in the case of IB.  
4.6 Effectiveness of Lending Decision-making Policies  
4.6.1  Analysing the Rationality of Lending Decisions  
Decision analysis can be of use in two ways: 1) it can be developed into an analytical 
framework to enable the financial analyst to assess a bank; and 2) it can be applied by the 
individual to his/her own decision process from the strategic decision-making viewpoint 
(Jennings & Wattam 1994). One of the most important reasons for using a case model is 
that it provides the groundwork for a methodology for lending decision analysis. Since 
CBs and IBs differ in their lending cost functions, as mentioned in subsection 4.5.1.1 
their rational lending decisions can be analysed within a single formulation. Let  TLC
denote that the bank‘s lending cost paid at time T, where LT denotes total loans made in 
[0, T]. Then for LLT  :  
The conventional banking lending cost of funds is  TLC =  TA LC    (4.1)  
The Islamic banking lending cost function is given by  TLC =  TB LC    (4.2)  
By assumption of that, the cost of lending function C(.) 
58
is not decreasing and convex. 
Some of the simulations are based on probabilistic models and random or seemingly 
random behaviour is contained. Although they have been associated specifically with 
those models and simulations that have financial outcomes, they can be applied in a much 
wider context (Newbold, Carlson & Thorne 2003). However, a lending policy is a rule , 
that specifies an approve/deny decision on each loan on the basis of information 
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 Which require that the intermediary's lending be carried out within a given time interval, [0, T]. 
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available at the time of the applicant arrival. If an applicant offering a risk-adjusted rate 
of return   arrives at time t and, if the loans outstanding at that time are Lt=L, then
  1,,  Lt corresponds to a loan approval, whereas   0,,  Lt means that the 
application is rejected and the capacity constraint requires   0,,  Lt . 
Meanwhile, let  ,, LtV be the maximum expected net profit from time t until T, given 
that L loans have been made when an applicant with   arrives at time t. Thus, V is the 
rational value function and the bank‘s problem is to determine the rational lending 
policy   that yields V59. Suppose at time t, with Lt=L, an applicant arrives with 
characteristic  . If the bank approves the application (i.e., d=1),   is the expected 
return, whereas rejection (d=0) results in zero immediate return. In either case, 
cumulative loans become (L+d) after the decision and the bank then waits an 
exponentially distributed random time, s~ , until the arrival of the next applicant.  
If the bank employs a rational policy following the next arrival, maximum expected 
profit from then on will be  ~,,~ dLstV  . Therefore, the rational decision on the 
present applicant should maximize current return pd, plus the maximum expected future 
profit      dLtUdLstVE  ,~,,~   from the next applicant forward. 
Consequently, the bank‘s total maximum expected profit from the next applicant 
onward must satisfy, for all   LLTt  ,,0 and   ,1  
     
    dLtUdMaxLtV  ,,,   OR, more explicitly 
           LtULtUMaxLtV ,,1,,,        (4.3) 
where,          tTs
tT
eLCdsdefLstVLtU 



 
 
10
,,,  
It is, therefore, rational to approve the loan application if and, only if, 
      
    LtULtU ,1,         (4.4) 
Note, that        1,,,  LtULtULt       (4.5) 
If the expected opportunity cost of lending to the current applicant is potentially high, 
 ‘s will be presented by future arrivals or by the possibly higher lending costs (for the 
Islamic banking). Thus, equation (4.5) is the usual profit-maximizing condition with 
explicit account of inter-temporal considerations and future uncertainties. The rational 
lending policy   can be expressed in terms of a critical rate of return (or a lending 
standard)  *, so that it is rational to lend to the applicant if and only if the offered 
exceeds  *(t, L). As a special case of Islamic banking, suppose the loan arrangement 
cost should be fixed at r from the beginning and applicants differ in their observable 
default risk . Then,  rr  1 and the rational lending policy establishes a critical 
default risk standard          rLtULtUrLt  1/1,,, . In general, loans are 
made only to applicants whose default risks are less than  Lt, 60. After completing the 
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 For remainder, description of the dynamic programming functional equation is satisfied by V. 
60
  More generally, describing the bank‘s decision in terms of a minimum acceptable 

*, to see how 
banks disparate loan applicants on the basis of risk-adjusted return may be mis/interpreted as ‗lending 
rationing‘. 
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analysis in both banking systems, the decision maker(s) is in better position to assess the 
risk associated with a variety of the applicants (Sincich et al. 1993; Wagner 1969). 
4.6.1.1 Rational Lending Policies  
In order to analyse the form of the rational lending policy  , or equivalently the rational 
lending standards,  *, the following properties of the bank‘s rational value functions V 
and U have to be proved. For expositional simplicity, results are presented in differential 
notation even though the functions involved may not be differentiable. Deshmukh, 
Greenbaum and Kanatas DGK (1983) have built their argument to approve the rationality 
of lending policies on two hypotheses by focusing on three main considerations. 
Hypothesis 1: if the cost of lending function C(.) is convex not decreasing, then the 
rational value functions V(t, L,  ) and U(t, L) are not increasing and complementary in (t, 
L), no decreasing in   and concave in L. That is, for all   LLTt  ,,0  and,
  ,1 , then;   0,, 



LtV
 (monotonicity in  )   
 (4.6) 
 
0
),(
0
,,






t
LtU
LtV


 (monotonicity in t)    (4.7) 
   
   
       1,,,1,0
,1,,,
,,,1,0



ltULtULtULtU
LtVLtV
LtVLtV


 (concavity in L)    
    
     01,,
0,1,,,






LtULtU
t
LtVLtV
t

 (complementarily in (t, L))   
Condition (4.6) states that total expected profits are increasing in the profitability of the 
current customer. The condition (4.7) indicates that the closer the end of the planning 
horizon, the lower is the expected profit from lending, since fewer applicant arrivals and 
decision opportunities remain. According to (4.8) and (4.9) the marginal opportunity cost 
of lending is non-negative and indicating to not decreasing in the funds already lent. 
Committing fewer loans by time t provides the Islamic banking with a lower cost of loans 
(Dhumale & Sapcanin 2003). In addition, both the CB and IB have greater flexibility in 
regard to future loan decisions. Hence, expected total profits from t onwards are 
improved. However,  this marginal advantage is less pronounced for lower values of the 
loans already committed (Dhumale & Sapcanin 2003; Duncan 1973).  
Finally, (4.10) and (4.11) indicate that the marginal advantage of reduced past lending 
declines as the end of the planning period approaches. Future lending opportunities 
depend upon the remaining time as well as the availability (or cost) of loans; as the 
remaining time diminishes, the marginal value of a 1US$ not lent also diminishes. Thus, 
in the long-run it is better to have more time left and less loans committed, although there 
are diminishing benefits to having committed fewer loans and the value of uncommitted 
loans diminishes with the passage of time (Deshmukh, Greenbaum & Kanatas 1982).  
(4.8) and 
(4.9) 
(4.10) and 
(4.11) 
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With this interpretation, Deshmukh, Greenbaum and Kanatas (1983) expected that the 
bank will be more lenient in assessing loan applicants that arrive later in the planning 
period or when fewer loans have been made. This follows immediately form (4.9) and 
(4.11), which imply that the minimum acceptable rate of return,  *(t, L) given by (4.5) 
is decreasing in t and increasing in L. The model of the rational lending policy is abridged 
to the first consideration as follows: the rational lending policy   is of the form   
 
 





 

otherwise
Ltif
Lt
0
,1
,,

    (4.12) 
where 
 *(t, L) given by (4.5)  
There is no increasing in  Tt ,0
 
and, No decreasing in LL    
4.6.1.2 Lending Standards: IBs vs. CBs 
Although the form of the rational lending policy (4.12) above is the same for both CB and 
IB, their lending standards will differ (DeGeorge 1992; Kim & Mahoney 2005). In 
particular, literature shows that IBs will adopt stricter lending standards and hence will 
lend to fewer applicants than CBs. In order to compare the lending policies of the two 
intermediaries, the rational value functions, lending standards and other data for IB and 
CB are distinguished by using superscripts A and B respectively.   
Hypothesis 2: for all   LLTt  ,,0 and,   ,1  
          ,1,,,,1,,,  LtVLtVLtVLtV BBAA   (4.13) 
And          1,,1,,  LtULtULtULtU BBAA   (4.14) 
Thus, the marginal cost of committing funds is deemed lower for Islamic banking than for 
conventional banking (4.12). Consequently, from equation (4.5) has also showed that the 
CBs will adopt a less restrictive lending policy. Thus, lending standards were recognised 
as a second consideration, and the difference in marginal cost of committing funds 
between IB and CB is presented in equation (4.14). For all   LLTt  ,,0  
     LtLt AB ,,          (4.15) 
To compare the volume of loans lent by CB and IB, consider an applicant arriving at time 
t. Since    LtLt AB ,,    , it seems that the IB will be more selective in lending loans 
than the CB. The second consideration provided both banking systems have committed 
the same volume of loans L, by time t. However, since the CB follows a less selective 
policy from the outset, more loans may have been lent by time t. Consequently, at any 
time t, CBs lending standards may in fact be more selective than that of IBs. However, 
this can happen only if the CBs have already made more loans than the IBs (Sharpe 1991; 
Tariq & Dar 2007). Thus, if financial intermediaries seek to reduce their lending risk 
exposure by switching from the conventional banking to the Islamic banking approach of 
operation, aggregate lending will decline. This theoretical analysis provides additional 
rationale to pursue the objectives of this study.  
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4.6.1.3 Banks Approach and Lending Standards 
Short of switching to the IB approach of intermediation, CBs may limit their exposure by 
merely reducing their loanable funds inventory. Alternatively, the lending capacity of 
either type of intermediary may be reduced as a result of a capital loss or because of 
altered regulatory restrictions (Wilson 1983; Zaman & Movassaghi 2001). These changes 
are manifested in terms of a reduced L  increasing the cost of lending. The previous 
analysis permits to conclude the third consideration that a reduction in the bank‘s lending 
capacity or a reduction in the CB loans inventory results in stricter lending standards and 
reduced aggregate lending. Reductions in either CBs inventory or capacity or IBs 
capacity, result in clear increases in the marginal cost of lending (Wilson et al. 1999; Yi-
Hsing, Hsu & Ching-Kai 2007). These increases in lending cost are the basis for stricter 
lending standards and reduced lending. Thus, exogenous capacity reductions have the 
same impact on lending as do CBs adaptation towards the IBs approach of operation. 
4.6.1.4 Relevance of the Lending Decision 
Despite the importance of loan default statistics for risk assessment models and credit 
evaluation models, most academic researchers and practitioners have a strong empirical 
focus. Additionally, efficiency measures, based on outputs and inputs, are usually 
considered a good instrument for analysing the performance of lending. However, it is 
necessary to consider other factors affecting good lending decisions. Pastor (2002) noted 
that several factors distinguished credit risk in the small and wholesale commercial loans 
portfolios. 
As a result of transitions in the financial industry, many different problems are faced by 
IB and CB when making lending decisions. These may occur in several separate but 
interrelated areas. Jennings and Wattam (1994), Altman, Giovanna and Saunders (1998) 
and Gupta (2003) identified some of these problems, such as: 1) problem loans and 
inadequate capital; 2) the absence of a credit culture and a propensity to continue to make 
bad loans; 3) regulation, supervision and moral hazards; 4) deposit insurance; 5) legal 
systems; 6) monetary policies; and 7) payment systems. Besides these problems, there are 
additional issues that need to be considered when making lending decisions in IB such as: 
transaction should be permissible halal, based on mutual agreement (both parties agree) 
gharar and not based on rib'a (Ahmad 2000). Some of these problems, however, need to 
be discussed with particular attention to the banking legislations because legislations 
affect how banks are operating under both IB and CB.  
Berry (1993) indicated that although many corporate lending decisions involve risk 
assessment, often the assessments are not well-documented. Often the decisions are 
infrequent and unique, and data on the actual outcomes of the decisions are not retained. 
However, commercial lending by banks offers an appropriate area for the study of lending 
decision-making because in this case lenders make a set of policies to facilitate the 
decision-making process (Cebenoyan & Strahan 2004; McNamara & Bromiley 1999). 
Therefore, assessing risk and analysing characteristics of such loans are almost critical 
practices for banks.  
Conventional wisdom in banking suggests that banks should demand more collateral from 
riskier borrowers to reduce their risk exposure (Elsas & Krahnen 2000). In contrast, good 
borrowers may provide more collateral indicating lower default risk (Krahnen & Weber 
2001). Hence, Elsas and Krahnen (2000) argued that the relationship between default risk 
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and collateralization should be positive for observable risks, but negative for 
unobservable risk. Accordingly, Degryse and Cayseele (2000) commented that if 
collateral and asset––loan––pricing rates are substitutive devices to lower credit risk, they 
expected a negative relationship between collateral and the interest rates.   
As most of the Islamic banks in the ME are classified as new institutions, the quality of 
making a lending decision in CBs is relatively higher than for IBs in these economies. 
Previous research has indicated that the quality of the lending system is extremely 
undeveloped in those countries. Furthermore, development of the banks‘ lending system 
in these countries has not been empirically investigated (Atta-Mensah & Dib 2008; De 
Graeve, De Jonghe & Vennet 2007). Although more studies investigated the influence of 
the legislative framework on making lending decisions in financial intermediaries in these 
countries, they have not accounted for other factors such as risk factors affecting the 
quality of the lending decision (Badr El-Din 2006). Furthermore, shari‟a based lending is 
open to a number of risk factors and inadequate legislation has received considerable 
attention as primary causes of defaults.  
The lack of precise methods for dealing with default risk creates a number of problems 
when making lending decisions. Smith (1964) noted that: 1) credit decisions were often 
isolated from recovery problems, whereas the feedback from recovery was essential to the 
development of judgement skills in approving loans to the customers; 2) decisions to 
tighten or ease credit conditions are risky and difficult to translate into changes in 
customer screening practices. Thus, developing effective lending policies is needed in 
order to reduce the higher default risk and moral hazard associated with lending to 
borrowers (Cowling & Westhead 1996). 
In summary, many banks have introduced decision rules which are required for loans 
processes over a specified amount. Typically, the final decision must be taken at regional 
or head office level, which implies the use of standardized credit scoring techniques that 
take little account of the personal characteristics of the owner-manager (Hakenes 2004). 
For IB, the basis for making final lending decisions does not appear to comply with 
objective analysis. The following section discusses bad credit management in terms of 
quality and credit process.    
4.7 The (Credit) Lending in Practices 
4.7.1 Loan Growth and Loan Quality  
Both CBs and IBs seek to fill the gap of credit risk (risks of default) knowledge by 
diversifying investments and continuation of credit portfolio to increase the efficiency of 
the operation (Kraft & Jankov 2005). In this case, sequences such as managing and 
measuring risk have to be demonstrated in banks, because it improves and maintains the 
stability. The ‗Capital Structure Requirements‘ (CSR) close of the Basel II 2001 
recommended that banks should have a plan to uncover their requirements by adopting 
suitable methods of measurement and models for quality control to protect themselves 
from associated operational risks, especially loss of capital value.  
In the case of IB, transactions require more trust among their borrowers than CB 
transactions (Zaher & Hassan 2001). If many borrowers are going into business without 
trading experience, they are faced with further problems such as failure to repay loans, 
financial instability and eventual bankruptcy. Thus, financial intermediaries needs to 
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assess applications carefully before making the lending decisions (Rosly & Bakar 2003). 
Due to this expansion, banks experienced a difficult period in most economies in the past 
and many protective policies have been globally developed to improve lending quality, 
including critique of weakness of risk management rules and knowledge of adequate 
procedures for effective lending decision policies. 
In terms of lending quality, credit data may not reflect the quality of individual assets and 
the likelihood of default. In addition, it is extremely difficult to assess individual asset 
quality using aggregate quality data such as the percentage of default rates and ‗past due‘ 
loans (Foglia, Laviola & Marullo 1998). In this context, many clients who buy bank 
assets are surprised that they acquired poor asset quality, even though they conducted a 
due diligence review of the acquired bank prior to the purchase (Glennon & Nigro 2005).  
Thus, the banks evaluate their portfolio credit risks by considering three important 
questions: 1) what are the expected losses in the future? 2) how much is the bank ready to 
tolerate in the losses or provision of loan losses? and 3) what is the historical loss rate on 
loan/s due to delinquencies (aggregate or individual)?
61
 (Sullivan 1987)The response to 
these questions is that banks‘ capability in assessing risks is not available, or dealing with 
losses provision sometimes is ambiguous—in addition to the fact that it is difficult to 
predict future loss (Kwok 2002). Therefore, historical default rates and past due loans 
might understate/overstate future losses, depending on the future economics and 
operational conditions of borrowers (financial circumstances).  
A study on Thailand banks‘ performance in lending has outlined many theoretical factors 
likely to lead to deterioration in the quality of lending (Fujiwara 2003), including: 
1. ‗Increases in lending are easy to measure when compared to calculating losses in 
loans quality which is difficult to evaluate objectively in the short term.  
2. Reforms fractured the credit supervision department, dispersing a separate group 
to work within each division. 
3. People focused on sales [lending service] rather than credit supervision.  
4. The increased lending by a division and the private benefit of a division manager 
are related to one another in a proportional fashion‘. 
Thus, it is evident that the quality in making rational lending decisions is determined by 
how well banks can control existing risk factors. If risk factors are well-controlled the 
task of performing the loan process becomes much easier; this aspect will be addressed 
next. 
4.7.2 The Credit Process  
As discussed previously, there are many variables surrounding lending decisions in banks 
(Anderson 2003). There are process that should be followed in making lending decisions 
in both systems—IB and CB. Also there is a need for clear policies to fill the gap relating 
to default risks management and helping banks to occur/achieve success in making 
rational lending decisions. These conclusions indicate that many defaults are classified as 
common or refer to general lending problems, and many others are specific and refer to 
banks‘ lending policies (Stanton 2002). The purpose of the following discussion is to 
assess lending processes which are involved in a bank‘s performance by evaluating the 
process of making lending decisions.  
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due, as a result of failure in or neglect of duty or obligation.  
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To begin, when banks grant a loan, as mentioned earlier, they take the risk that the 
borrower may not honour his/her debt. To reduce this uncertainty, however, banks have 
created instrumental evaluation methods in order to evaluate the risk more objectively 
(Cowling & Westhead 1996). In their efforts to improve financial efficiency, banks 
modify their work and their management practices so as to facilitate the emergence of a 
bond with lenders and to obtain accumulated social information about them. On the other 
hand, to reduce uncertainty, banks have created methods of evaluation that allow them to 
anticipate the risk of failure. Cowling and Clay (1994) proposed two approaches that are 
usually considered by banks seeking to reduce the risk of failure.  
One is an instrumental approach that seeks to define an objective method of risk 
assessment. The other is a non-instrumental approach in which the subjective perception 
of the borrowers by the financial analyst, and the holding of specific information gathered 
through informal sources, are attributed to the deciding factors in loan decision-making. 
Nevertheless, banks sometimes evaluate loans risks by using a credit scoring method. 
They use historical data and statistical techniques (Mirta & Zekic-Susac 2005). Credit 
scoring tries to isolate the effects of various applicant characteristics in delinquencies and 
defaults (Saunders 1997). Consequently, credit scoring is already allowing large banks to 
expand into small business lending, a market in which they have tended to be less active.  
Scoring is also an important step in making the securitisation of small business loans 
more feasible. Further, Mester (1997) notes that credit scoring has some obvious benefits 
that lead to its increasing use in loan evaluation; for example, greatly reduced time is 
needed in the loan approval process. However, while no scoring model can prevent all 
types of errors, Berger and DeYoung (1996) noticed that a good model should be able to 
accurately predict the average performance of loans made to groups or individuals as long 
as the model is relevant to credit quality.   
The fundamental objective of commercial and customer lending is to make profitable 
loans with minimal risk. Hence, management should target specific industries or markets 
in which lending officers have expertise (Miyajima & Yafeh 2007). Further, to some 
extent, competing goals of loan volume and loan quality must be balanced with the bank‘s 
liquidity requirements, capital constraints, and rate of return objective (Salas & Saurina 
2002). Thus, the credit process relies on each bank‘s systems and controls that allow 
management and credit officers to assess available risks and return trade-offs.  
Figure 4.3: Lending Policy Overview 
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Basically, as Figure (4.3) shows the credit process has three functions: 
1. Business development and credit analyses. 
2. Administration and credit execution. 
3. Credit process review. 
Figure 4.3 shows that each function reflects requirements of the ‗bank‘s loan policy‘ as 
written by the board of directors. A loan policy, therefore, formalises lending guidelines 
that employees follow to conduct bank business
62
 (Berry, Crum & Waring 1993). Thus, 
lending guidelines identify preferred loan qualities and establish procedures for granting, 
documenting and reviewing loans. In the finance literature, the potential differences in 
credit activities management
63
 are identified as follows:  
1. Value driven: value driven focuses on credit quality with strong risk management 
systems and controls (Elsas 2005). Primary emphasis is on banks‘ soundness and 
stability and a consistent market presence. Thus, underwriting is conservative and 
significant loan concentrations are not allowed; a typical outcome is lower current 
profit from loans, with fewer loan losses.   
2. Current–profit driven: current-profit driven focuses on short-term earnings 
(Devriese & Mitchell 2006). Primary emphasis is banks‘ annual profit plan; 
management is often attracted to high-risk and high-return borrowers; and the 
outcome is typically higher profit in good times, followed by lower profit in bad 
times when loan losses increase. 
3. Market-share driven: market-share driven focuses on having the highest market 
share of loans among competitors (Joseph, Shen & Romeijn 2004). Primary 
emphasis is on loan volume and growth with the intent of having the largest 
market share. Thus, underwriting is very frequent and management accepts loan 
concentrations and above-average credit risk; and the outcome is that loan quality 
suffers over time, while profit is modest because loan growth comes from lowest 
market prices which refer to voidness behaviour of taking risks. 
                                                 
62
 In their periodic examinations, regulators evaluate each bank‘s written loan policy to see if existing loans 
conform to management‘s obligations and acceptable guidelines.     
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 Sometimes it is called ‗credit culture understanding‘.  
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In summary, there is a growing literature which has identified the importance of making 
efficient lending decisions in the finance industry by focusing on the misleading aspects 
of making good loans (Jennings & Wattam 1994; Kim, Hwang & Shinn 1995; McNamara 
& Bromiley 1999; White 1969). Section 4.7 highlights the need for corporate-efficient 
lending decision making, and shows how to develop a quality foundation for making 
lending decisions.  
4.8 The Performance of Lending Decisions  
Banks base their decisions to assign a particular rating on the criteria that define each 
loan. ‗These are articulated as standards for a number of specific risk factors such as size, 
type of customers, position of the customer, the reliability of the borrower‘s financial 
statements, the quality of its management elements and transaction structure (collateral), 
and other miscellaneous factors‘ (Morgan & Ashcraft 2003, p. 92) However, the 
probability of default can be managed by lending performance assessment over the loan 
period.  
Basically, Beck, Cull and Jerome (2005) defined performance as having a comprehensive 
meaning which should involve a number of variables of management measurement, and 
evaluation. Within these activities, functions such as managing, measuring, and 
evaluating approaches have increased dramatically during the last decade in the banking 
area. Also, banking institutions‘ performance must be considered in the commercial or 
Islamic banking environment (Archer & Karim 2002; Bashir 2000). Lending performance 
also has to be recognized in the response of gain of scale by optimum technical use of 
inputs to maximizing outputs. This means benefits gained from loans must be equal to or 
greater than the cost of holding the loans. 
In terms of risk measurement, bank loan performance is measured relative to a bank‘s 
current loan stock. Loan rates are still highly significant in predicting loan performance. 
In the case of bad management of transaction, therefore, lending or transaction cost goes 
together with greater risk; this is the ―bad management hypothesis‖, but theoretically 
transaction cost function is negatively correlated with risks management policy (Berger & 
Humphrey 1997). A study by Lane and Quack (2002, p. 11) showed that ‗risks are not 
something objective—existing out there—in the business environment but are instead 
socially constructed by banks themselves‘. Thus, regulations of such banking systems––
IB or CB––are usually modelled by their circumstances with the recognition of 
environmental risk factors involvement.  
It is apparent from the above discussion that lending risk assessment procedures and 
decision making structures are defining features of bank/customer interaction. But it is not 
the case that all banks have the same pattern of assessment in their operations; for 
example, the assessment methods used by Polish banks showed some differences between 
public banks and other types of banks (Feakins 2004). Therefore, focusing on the 
structure of lending decision-making and assessing whether risk factors affect decision 
making behaviour are banks‘ priorities. 
Overall, lending risks assessment decisions are important for the financial institutions––
e.g. financial credit institutions, financial exchange markets––involved with banks as a 
consequence of a high level of risk associated with wrong decisions (Simon 1979). 
Obtaining credit is, however, necessary for the smooth and effective operation of banks. 
In the process of evaluating credit risk factors, if the principal criteria involved in making 
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the decision are not well investigated, default in the payment of the loan may occur. Some 
common characteristics have been considered while assessing lending risks
64
. Thus, the 
relationship between borrowers, and the actions taken by banks at different decision-
making levels, is relatively ignored (Rosman & Bedard 1999).  
Overall, rational lending decisions should be based on in-depth study of several criteria. 
Generally, there are studies (Bessler, Wolfgang & Norsworthy 2002; Deshmukh, 
Greenbaum & Kanatas 1983; Stomper 2005) which noted that bankers reported some 
significant difficulties at both stages of the credit process: firstly, difficulties in 
accumulating the information to evaluate borrowers and their projects and, then, 
difficulties with encouraging borrowers to repay and difficulties with seizing collateral, in 
addition to using legal action in collecting bad debts. 
4.9 Conclusion 
Lending is not just a matter of making the loan and waiting for payment. Loans must be 
monitored and closely supervised to prevent losses. Furthermore, loans are the dominant 
asset of most banks, generate the largest share of operating income and represent the 
bank‘s greatest risk exposure. In this case, various concentrations in lending activities––
lending cultural understanding––carry different risks and returns. Also, many factors can 
lead to loan defaults. A firm‘s specific problems may arise from changing technology, 
labour strikes, shifts in consumer preferences, or bad management, etc. 
In other words, the most commonly securitised loans are those with the most standard 
features: mortgages, government-guaranteed, student loans, small business loans 
sponsored by small business administration, credit cards, and auto loans. Many other 
loans are more difficult to credit score and securitize, such as those designed to meet 
specific business needs. However, misleading information may lead to bad decisions, 
resulting in default of the loan. This means there is a covariance relationship among the 
risk factors, making lending decisions, and performance. 
To conclude, managing lending risks means managing the decision-making process for 
lending, since that is where risk factors are constructed and selected by banks. A loan 
policy, therefore, formalises lending guidelines that employees follow to conduct bank 
business, as well as identifying preferred loan qualities and establishing procedures for 
granting, documenting and reviewing loans. Obviously, because of the difficulty of 
incorporating these lending decisions aspects, many theoretical contributions are related 
to them, for example, risk management and efficiency performance. The following 
chapter is structured to show the empirical methodology used in this study to assess these 
theoretical aspects.  
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repayment, and interest rate. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
5.1 Introduction 
The core aims of this thesis are:  
1. To examine the assessment of risk factors in IB and CB. 
2. To identify what and how risk factors influence the rationality of 
lending decision.  
3. To discover the differences of banking efficiency in lending between 
IB and CB systems.  
In terms of lending policy, Islamic financial institutions are complex entities that have 
both economic and religious-cultural dimensions (Crano & Brewer 2002; McNeill & 
Waldman 1983). However, in order to capture such dimensions and then assess banking 
performance (efficiency), the study must use multiple methods to collect the data and 
several statistical tools to analyse the data. In particular, this study specifically uses 
primary and secondary data (questionnaire/annual reports), which involve different 
units/variables of analysis. This chapter describes the methodology that is used to 
compare how IB and CB deal with assessing risk factors and to determine whether or not 
these factors influence the rationality of lending decision-making in both IBs and CBs. 
The chapter describes the research design and strategy, as well as data collection methods 
that will be followed, to achieve the study objectives identified in chapter one.  
This chapter is organised as follows. The study purpose and the analytical framework are 
described in sections 2 and 3 respectively Sampling selection strategy is illustrated in 
section 4; and section 5 provides a detailed description of the survey instruments used for 
collecting data. Statistical instruments applied for the interpretation and analysis of the 
data are covered in section 6. Finally, section 7 presents conclusions. Figure 5.1 provides 
a visual overview of the structure of this chapter. 
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Figure 5.1: Outline of Chapter 5 Interrelations 
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absent in the literature are investigations into whether risk assessment is adequately 
implemented in IB. Sometimes risks may be due to different factors. Thus, the primary 
purpose of this study is to uncover risk factors––internal/external––which affect a bank‘s 
performance in both systems (CB and IB).  
The managers‘ role in conventional banking is to implement decisions that maximise the 
profitability of their institutions and shareholders‘ wealth. In addition to this role, Islamic 
managers have to comply with rules of Islamic teaching shari`a. In order to achieve these 
aims, managers in both banking systems pursue strategies in several areas such as 
asset/liability management, liquidity management and capital management. A related area 
of strategic decision-making that carries a high potential for affecting banks‘ policy, value 
and safety is risk assessment. In general, recent changes in the banking environment 
(deregulation, specialisation, globalisation and conglomeration) have posed serious risk 
challenges for banks, but have also offered opportunities (Davis & Devinney 1997).  
Theoretically, there are various ways for a well-managed bank to protect against risk. One 
way is through diversification (portfolio diversification, geographic diversification, etc). 
In addition, a bank will have to carry out appropriate asset/liability management practices 
and hedging strategies. However, empirically there are many bankruptcies referred to the 
high authority courts that relate to credit issues and numerous financial liquidation issues 
registered within the financial supervision sector––for example, in Libya all these issues 
have to be recorded in the public control and supervision sector––(Altman 2002; Berry & 
Robertson 2006; Checkley & Dickinson 2000; Laeven & Mundial 1999; Perotti 1993; 
Tunstall 2000). This study attempts to investigate the reasons behind these issues within a 
particular discussion of risk factors that potentially influence the rationality of lending 
decision-making policy in such banking systems. This focus will offer a potentially 
powerful tool for clarifying how different risk factors influence the rationality of lending 
decision in both systems (IB and CB). 
Most Islamic banks in the ME are classified as new institutions and the quality of making 
a lending decision in CBs is relatively higher than for IBs in these economies. According 
to the theory of decision-making, making rational lending decisions in banking has been 
considered a difficult task to achieve. Major errors can typically arise in decision-making 
because the original question has been incorrectly formed. In particular, in lending 
decision making, Goodwin and Wright (2004) argue that decisions can be formulated in 
ways which fail to consider fundamental changes that have occurred in a credit 
environment. Rational lending decision-making policy must be linked with lower 
transaction costs. Additionally, this study attempts to identify differences in ‗lending 
efficiency‘ between IB and CB systems. This focus will offer a potentially powerful tool 
for clarifying how risk factors assessment contributes to making rational lending 
decisions in both systems of IB and CB, and ultimately improve banks‘ overall 
performance.  
5.3 The Analytical Framework of the Study 
5.3.1 Methodology Structure–Combined Method   
The choice of research methodology depends upon the analytical depth of the research 
problem and the time span of the research. Some of the research methods are difficult to 
implement in business/social research as a consequence of a natural setting of research 
problems, period of study, and control of confounding variables – if any (Saunders, M, 
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Lewis & Thornhill 2006). Conversely, others, such as the survey method, can be a 
powerful and effective tool for collecting business and social data, especially if applied to 
identifying or analysing matters such as attitude, behaviour, characteristics (McNeill & 
Chapman 2005). For this research, data collection is performed in two ways: 1) a 
questionnaire survey (primary data); and 2) collection/extraction from annual reports 
(secondary or archival data).  
Lending efficiency performance is the extent to which a banking system appears more 
efficient in terms of making successful lending decisions. This study has adopted a 
number of theories to establish a rigorous theoretical basis for the study model and 
framework (see sections 2.4 and 4.4). Accordingly, two methods are adopted to undertake 
data collection. A combination of annual reports and questionnaire surveys were used as 
the two main sources of data collection, as they were considered the most suitable for this 
research. The research method is depicted in Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.2: A Combined Approach to the Research Method and Analysis 
 
Source: developed by the author for this study, 2008. 
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Given the objectives and purpose of this research, a methodology was structured with two 
parts: 
1. Method one used primary data—an exploratory questionnaire survey—to 
assess the difference in risk taking behaviour and making rational lending 
decisions between IB and CB (H1 and H2).  
2. Method two utilised secondary data—annual reports—to assess the 
difference in efficiency performance in lending between IB and CB (H3).  
The study adopted the pooled approach (quantitative) by emailing and handing surveys to 
the sample banks operating in five countries in the ME region and by combining this with 
data from annual reports for five years (from 2002 to 2006) for the same sample banks. In 
general, the approach used in this study was data triangulation through utilising some 
close-ended questions provided in the questionnaire, supplemented by data gathered from 
financial reports (Groves et al. 2009). The usage of data triangulation had the advantage 
of overcoming some of the potential validity problems: ‗construct validity, internal 
validity and external validity‘ (Forza 2002; Rourke & Anderson 2004). 
Combining two data sources may differentiate this study from the others. For example, 
similar studies by Batchelor (2005), Hassan and Bashir (2003) and Yu and Neus (2005) 
did not adopt multiple tools to collect the data but, rather, used a bank scope database 
published by the International Business Companies Association (IBCA). The reason for 
selecting this method—combined method—was to avoid issues relating to confidentiality 
or accessibility of some data that might be appropriate to describe the actual operation of 
IBs and CBs. A combined-method avoids implicit selectivity bias in favour of banks that 
may not be representative of the actual bank population operating in the ME region. Yield 
bias and inaccurate results in country-specific, and even cross-country specific studies 
that serve to obscure heterogeneity across banks, have been controlled.   
5.3.2 Hypotheses and Testing Design 
The literature survey in prior chapters provides a sound theoretical basis for designing 
these hypotheses. In this study, hypotheses were formulated by applying logical reasoning 
to findings of prior studies (Batchelor 2005; Crouhy, Galai & Mark 2000; Jacobson & 
Roszbach 2003). For the purpose of empirical tests, the risk assessment, the rationality of 
lending decision-making relationship and the efficiency of lending decision making are 
elaborated into seven hypotheses––grouped under three main hypotheses––as follows: 
5.3.2.1 First Hypothesis 
The profile of risk factors (transaction risk, business risk, treasury risk, governance risk 
and systematic risk) in CB and IB is defined using (parametric) factor analysis and 
controls for the major––internal or external––risk factors. These risk factors are assessed 
by accounting for potential risks identified in the banking literature (Cebenoyan & 
Strahan 2004; Froot & Stein 1998). In Islamic and conventional banking, there are 
significant and different types of risk (see section 3.4). 24 risk segments are considered in 
this research, and they are used to explain how risk assessment has been performed in the 
process of rational lending decision making. Thus, principle component analysis and 
independent samples t-test are utilised to examine the first research question––How do 
Conventional banks and Islamic banks determine and assess risk factors? (What factors 
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are they? How are they measured? What is the relative importance of each factor in 
lending decisions?––and to test the hypotheses that derive from this question:  
H1a:  There is no difference in factors considered in credit risk assessment and 
lending decision in CB and IB systems. 
H1b: There is no difference in measurement approaches used for such risk factors 
in CB and IB systems. 
H1c: There is no relationship between risk factors and default risks portfolio in CB 
and IB systems.  
5.3.2.2 Second Hypothesis 
Further investigation of risk factors assessment in CBs and IBs was undertaken. The 
study examines whether these factors have a different impact on the rationality of lending 
decision making in CB vis-à-vis IB. In addition, which risk factors have significantly 
influenced the rationality of lending decision performance will be identified at this stage. 
Thus, the second hypothesis was formulated to examine the second study question––How 
do the risk factors influence the rationality of lending decisions policies in CB and IB 
systems?––and the hypotheses that derive from that question: 
H2a:  There is no difference in factors considered in credit risk which influence 
the rationality of lending decision in CB and IB systems. 
H2b:  There is no difference in measurement approaches used for such risk factors 
that influence the rationality of lending decision in CB and IB systems. 
H2c: There is no relationship between risk factors and default risks portfolio 
which influence the rationality of lending decision in CB and IB systems. 
‗Rational decision-making‘ simply means a decision, which may turn out to be good or 
bad, made on the basis of criteria rather than in an ad hoc way
65
. Accordingly, the 
rationality of lending decision-making is considered as good/bad loans (1, 0), and 
measured in terms of: 1) loans allocation policy; 2) loans granted policy; and 3) risk factors 
measurement. Three basic regression models are formed to test H2a, as follows: 
M1:
 ijijijijijijij
SRGRTyRBRTRapDM   54321)(  (5.1) 
M2[a,b]: ijijijijijijij SRGRTyRBRTRgpDM   54321)(  
(5.2)
 
M3: 
ijijijijijijij SRGRTyRBRTRraDM   54321)(  (5.3) 
where: 
Dependent variables: 
ijapDM )( : Rational decision-making in terms of loans allocation policy of bank i and loan j. 
ijgpDM )( : Rational decision-making in terms of loans granted policy of bank i and loan j, 
with considering:  a) Risk portfolio assessment, and  
  b) Lending portfolio management.  
ijraDM )( : Rational decision-making in terms of risk factors measurement of bank i and loan j. 
Independent variables: 
ijTR : Segments of transaction risk (single name single transaction risk, products tenor plan risk, 
mark-up risk, foreign exchange risk, balance sheet risk, credit risk (grading risk). 
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ijBR : Segments of business risk (solvency risk, displaced commercial risk, withdrawal risk, 
trading activity risk) 
ijTyR : Segments of treasury risk (hedging risk, asset and liability management risk (ALM), 
liquidity risk, credit skill and training risk) 
ijGR : Segments of governance risk (business environment risk, transparency risk, legal risk, 
operational risk, event, natural disaster risk, fiduciary risk) 
ijSR : Segments of systematic risk (shift in regulation (regulatory risk), technology/systems 
exposure, payment/settlement risk, institutional risk, and fraud / compliance risk) 
i : Variables‘ coefficients  
ijand : Constant and unpredictable variances in the model (residuals)  
The first model M1 is developed to examine risk factors which may influence the 
rationality of lending decision-making in terms of ‗considered issues in loan allocation 
procedures‘. The rationality of lending decision-making DM (ap)ij as a dependent variable 
and five risk factors considered as independent variables may explain the rationality of 
lending decision-making in terms of rational policies of lending policies in IB and CB. 
This model allows the determination of what risk factors may significantly influence the 
rationality of lending policies in both IB and CB.   
The second model is modelled into two phases, M2a and M2b. In terms of ‗loan 
authorisation policy‘, the first phase explains policies of making rational lending 
decisions by focusing on issues that can be considered in risk portfolio assessment, and 
the second model examines factors influencing the rationality in lending decisions and 
considers issues which can be referred to lending portfolio management. The model 
allows the determination of what risk factors can significantly influence the rationality of 
lending decisions in terms of rational policies of granted loans in IB and CB, taking into 
account: a) risk portfolio assessment (M2a); and b) lending portfolio management (M2b).  
The third model M3 explains the importance of measuring risk factors. If measuring risks 
contributes to improvements in lending decision-making policies, the rationality of 
lending decision-making can be dependent upon how and when those risks are measured. 
Therefore, this model explains how this function––risks measurement––affects the 
rationality of lending decision, and what risk factors need to be considered in IB and CB.  
The study also examines the matter of risk assessment according to the objective of risk 
measurement approaches. The main objective describes whether conventional and 
Islamic banks apply appropriate approaches to measuring risk. The study obtains three 
common models (internal rating or scoring model, value and risk model, asset pricing and 
beta model) which are commonly used to perform risk measurements in the banking 
industry (Basel Committee 2006; Bessis 2001; Fowler 2002; Van Greuning, Hennie & 
Brajovic 2003). To examine whether models of risk measurements and the rationality of 
lending decision making relationship is an important element, three regression models 
(M4, M5[a, b] and M6) are expressed to test H2b, as follows:  
M4: ijijijijij BAPVaRSAPapDM   //)( 321   (5.4) 
M5[a,b]: 
ijijijijij BAPVaRSAPgpDM   //)( 321   (5.5) 
M6: 
ijijijijij BAPVaRSAPraDM   //)( 321   (5.6) 
where: 
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Dependent variables: 
ijapDM )( : Rational decision-making in terms of loans allocation policy of bank i and loan j. 
ijgpDM )( : Rational decision-making in terms of loans granted policy of bank i and loan j, 
with considering:  a) Risk portfolio assessment, and  
b) Lending portfolio management.  
ijraDM )( : Rational decision-making in terms of risk factors measurement of bank i and loan j. 
Independent variables: 
ijSAP / : Areas of internal rating or scoring model applications (transaction risk, business risk, 
treasury risk, governance risk and systematic risk). 
ijVaR : Areas of value and risk model applications (transaction risk, business risk, treasury risk, 
governance risk and systematic risk)    
ijij
BAP / : Areas of asset pricing and beta model application (transaction risk, business risk, 
treasury risk, governance risk and systematic risk) 
i : Variables‘ coefficients  
ijand : Constant and unpredictable variances in the model (residuals)  
The relationship between risk factors which appear to have an actual influence on lending 
decision-making policy and the quality of lending decision making is examined. This is 
the test of H2c. For this stage, only significant items (risk factors) in M1, M2a, M2b and 
M3 are examined in order to determine whether the relationship between these types of 
risk and the rationality of lending decision elements is significant. The examination of the 
(linear) relationship between risk factors and lending decision variables is tested by using 
‗Pearson correlation-2-tailed‘ technique to explain direction of correlation (positive 
/negative) and the significance relations among them.  
Overall, these hypotheses (H1 and H2) are tested with data collected from a survey. H2a 
test outcomes and H2b test outcomes are treated as inputs data to perform tests of the 
H2c. In general, analysis of the hypotheses is performed in three main steps using 
principal component analysis (PCA), Pearson correlation coefficients, independent 
samples t-test and regression (details of which are provided in section 6.4.3). 
5.3.2.3 Third Hypothesis 
The third research question––Is there a difference in credit department efficiency 
performance between the two banking groups?––is a logical final step in the analysis. A 
hypothesis has been constructed to examine whether there are significant differences 
between CB and IB systems in efficiency performance in the lending field. The sound 
assessment of risks increases the opportunity of making rational lending decisions and 
will contribute to an improvement of banking efficiency, thus the subsidiary hypothesis is 
written in testable forms as follows:   
H3: There is no difference in efficiency performance in the credit field between 
CB and IB systems. 
This hypothesis will be tested with data collected from the questionnaire and annual 
reports data. To test this hypothesis, three input variables (total deposits, operation costs 
and interest/non-interest expenditure) and six output variables (profitability ratios 
(ROE/ROA), revenues, loans/ advances, risk weighted assets and annual average increase 
in total assets) have been specified to develop a specific model for this study (details in 
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section 7.4.3). Analysis of the hypothesis is performed in two main steps using DEA and 
Tobit regression. For simplicity, examination and discussion of this hypothesis is 
provided in a separate chapter (Chapter 7).  
5.4 Sampling Selection Strategy 
5.4.1 Target Population 
A sample is a selection from a wider population from which it is hoped the results found 
in the sample can be generalised (McNeill & Chapman 2005). However, selecting a 
sample which might produce suitable data by applying an appropriate instrument is an 
additional challenge. The first step in the sampling process is to define the survey 
population. This might be the entire population of the banking industry in a particular 
country or region, but it is more likely to be a sub-set of that population. For this study, 
the target population is two different banking systems: CB and IB in the ME region. 
Consequently, the banks‘ population was selected using the following criteria:  
1. An experienced credit activity for a long period of time (at least 5 years 
to satisfy the analysis requirement). 
2. It has provided different types of lending activities (transactions).  
3. It has, as a minimum, credit and risk consideration centres.  
4. Potentially, varying sized banks in terms of ‗the total assets‘. 
5. Countries located in ME and selected based on ‗per capita‘ index 
measurement––they are same or almost similar level of economy growth. 
Many surveys are concerned not with the population as a whole, but with small groups 
within it. Thereby, the study moves from defining the survey population to sampling it, 
and drawing upon a variety of theoretical concepts required for sampling design (Davies 
& Kempnich 1994). Thus, to assess the hypothesised relationships outlined in section 
5.3.2 above, an initial sample was drawn from the banking industry operating in the ME 
region, as shown in Appendix E. This is the focus of the next discussion.    
5.4.2 The Sample Chosen 
Firstly, to identify the participants—banks—to be investigated, the internet provided the 
basis of selection, as well as websites for those banks that could be easily accessed. The 
banks are selected randomly from the database of identified population of Islamic and 
non-Islamic financial institutions. However, as a result of the researcher contacting some 
banks asking for their participation in this research, the banks nominated a person as their 
best representative who could also provide additional information useful to the study.  
Two focus groups of banks––IBs and CBs––were formed for participation in this survey. 
According to Neuman (2006), the sample size is determined by the size of population and 
statistically acceptable if it at least consists of 20% from the whole population. Thereby, it 
is suggested that for the moderately large population of CBs operating in the ME, a 
sampling of 20% of the main banks consisting of 96 CBs distributed in different parts of 
Libya, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Jordan is representative. A sampling of 
at least 24 banks—25%—should be permissible66. However, the number of Islamic banks 
is very low, with approximately 240 IBs around the world and their capital portfolio is a 
                                                 
66
 Sample size % : - Conventional banks: (24/96) %  = 25 %,             - Islamic banks: (24/32) %  = 75% 
    - Total sample size: (48/128) % = 37.5% 
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combination of many Islamic economies‘ contributions––only 32 IBs operating in ME 
region (Nick 2005). The participation of the largest/medium/small 24 Islamic banks—
75%—from Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Jordan should be suitable for 
gathering enough data by using existing contents observation and questionnaire survey
67
.  
Overall, then, the study sample consisted of 48 banks operating in the ME region; that is, 
24 Islamic banks and 24 conventional banks. These banks are chosen randomly from the 
IB and CB ME region populations respectively, and it is assumed that the documentation 
of these banks has ample data suitable to accommodate robust statistical analysis. With no 
expected deviations among banks‘ capacity––homogeneity––within the banking industry, 
the 48 banks in the sample were selected by utilising the same sampling criteria (such as 
selecting the sample and sampling error).   
5.4.3 Sampling Error 
A random sample tends to be representative of the whole population (Zikmund 2003). 
Cooper and Schindler (1998), and Dillman, Sinclair and Clark (1993) expressed the view 
that researchers conducting surveys should take necessary steps to minimise four potential 
sources of error: sampling error, non-coverage error, non-response error, and 
measurement error
68
. Groves (2005) argues that sampling error is the degree to which the 
selected sample does not represent the general population and is caused by exclusion of 
certain members of the population from the sample. Thereby, he suggested increasing the 
sample size to decrease sampling error when random sampling is used. This study 
encompassed banks operating in five countries located in the ME region. Therefore, 
according to Groves (2005), sampling error should be minimised in this study because: 1) 
The sample of IB and CB are selected randomly; and 2) A normality assumption of the 
data distribution will be statistically verified.  
5.5 Data Collection (Research Instruments) Methods 
5.5.1 Primary Data Method—Structured Questionnaire  
Based on prior research in the finance field, particularly explanatory and descriptive 
studies (Ahmad & Haron 2002; Bashir 2000; Bourke 1987; Carling & Lundberg 2002; 
Elsas 2005; Kumra, Stein & Assersohn 2006), a questionnaire was designed to collect the 
empirical data. A pilot study was undertaken to ensure that there were no problems 
associated in completing the survey instrument. Further discussion on this instrument is 
presented below. 
5.5.1.1 Designing the Survey Instrument 
Though items in this study‘s questionnaire were mostly adopted from prior research, 
particular attention was given to content validity, reliability and formatting of the items in 
order to minimise the chance of misleading and inaccurate recording of response. Further 
emphasis was given to the original items and the items that were used in most studies. 
From the extant literature on IB and CB, economies‘ financial systems, and social 
                                                 
67
 Otherwise, in terms of reliability and accuracy, involvement of more than the selected banks may be 
necessary in order to achieve the minimum participation requirement for this study.  
68
 Further information about these errors is provided in many sources, e.g. Groves, RM 2005, Survey Errors 
and Survey Costs, Wiley-Interscience, New York.  
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research, Zikmund (2003), Seale (2004) and Leedy and Ormrod (2005) noted that most 
descriptive and explanatory studies had used a questionnaire to collect information from 
participants. Therefore, for this study, instructions were provided on the front page of the 
questionnaire, as well as in a covering letter, explaining the study purpose, participants‘ 
rights, and who should participate. The questionnaire consisted of five parts: participants‘ 
characteristics, risk assessment, loan portfolio, rationalising lending decision-making and 
demographic questions respectively. The final draft of the questionnaire applied is 
presented in Appendix F. 
5.5.1.1.1 Ordering Questions in the Questionnaire 
The order in which questions are asked can affect the response rate, as well as the overall 
data collection activity and the occurrence of adjusting answers to succeeding questions 
based on the answer of the previous questions (Bradburn, Sudman & Wansink 2004). 
According to Brace (2004) choosing the first question in a questionnaire is also more 
important than any other items, since it influences the destiny of the questionnaire—either 
to the mail box, or to the garbage bin. Therefore, success in understanding and answering 
the first question motivates respondents to continue. In this study, the questionnaire was 
designed with consideration of these issues; it included an easy, short question first. Bank 
representatives were asked to answer the questions from their perspective within the 
organisation. Typically, such surveys have received poor response rates due to the lack of 
connectedness between the objectives of the survey and the understanding of respondents 
(Cavana, Sekaran & Delahaye 2001).    
5.5.1.1.2 Pilot Survey (Pre-testing) 
Prior to primary testing of the survey, it was considered essential to validate the survey 
instrument through pre-testing in order to identify any ambiguous questions, problems in 
understanding the questions, threatening or embarrassing questions, or suggestions, if 
any, for revision of the questionnaire (Bolton 1993; Van Teijlingen & Hundley 2001). In 
other words, to ensure that Likert and Stapel scales of measurements were adopted and 
developed appropriately to the study context and objectives, pre-testing was considered 
essential. Accordingly, 18 banking experts, academic staff in an accounting and finance 
school, and fellow Masters/PhD research students were selected for the survey 
instrument‘s examination. The draft questionnaire, along with the covering letter, was 
distributed to each participant. Further, each respondent was timed so that the time 
requirement for answering the questionnaire was estimated. Respondents were then 
interviewed to identify issues relating to the survey instrument. Appendix H provides a 
summary of changes made after the pilot survey. The table in Appendix H, shows the 
pilot study of the questionnaire elicited valuable comments from respondents.    
5.5.1.2 Survey Items: Definition and Measurement 
This section explains the measurement of the study instruments, and describes the 
variables used in the study. As indicated above, the study instruments—the study 
constructs which existed in the survey—are divided into five (5) parts, each part 
addressing items of measurements used in this study, namely: 1) bank characteristics data; 
2) risk factors—assessment and measurement; 3) lending portfolio—management and 
control; 4) rationalisation of lending decision-making; and 5) information about the 
participants (demographic data). These parts are described as follows: 
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1. Bank Characteristics Data 
Previous research identified different types of items which can be measured (Coleman et 
al. 2002; Saunders & Cornett 2006; Terry, Hunt & Hutcheson 2000). Accordingly, the 
descriptive statistics are exhibited in Table 5.1. It is seen from Table 5.1 that banks were 
varied in terms of: status, size, obligation and innovations. These are statistically tested in 
order to uncover differences between IBs and CBs characteristics. 
Table 5.1: Classification of Bank Characteristics 
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
Feature Frequency Percent Feature Frequency Percent 
Bank Status (Classification) - multiple choice ( yes, frequency and percent) 
Conventional  86 100.0 Conventional  00 0.00 
Local 19 22.1 Local 9 12.3 
Islamic 00 0.00 Islamic 73 100.0 
Private 6 7.0 Private 10 13.7 
International 14 16.3 International 6 8.2 
Commercial 86 100.0 Commercial 00 0.00 
Public 13 15.1 Public 5 6.8 
Conventional 38 44.2 Islamic 46 63.0 
Conventional + Other 48 55.8 Islamic + Other 27 37.0 
Bank Size - multiple choice ( yes, frequency and percent) 
Less than 200 million US $ 9 10.5 Less than 200 million US $ 8 11.0 
200-490 million US $ 25 29.1 200-490 million US $ 24 32.9 
500-749 million US $ 39 45.3 500-749 million US $ 34 46.6 
750 million US $ and over 13 15.1 750 million US $ and over 7 9.6 
Bank Activity - multiple choice ( yes, frequency and percent) 
Loans granting 85 98.8 Loans granting 72 98.6 
Deposits accepting 84 97.7 Deposits accepting 72 98.6 
Retirement products 50 58.1 Retirement products 51 69.9 
Insurance securities 77 89.5 Insurance securities 58 79.5 
Investment banking 82 95.3 Investment banking 73 100.0 
Others 8 9.3 Others 15 20.5 
Bank Obligation - multiple choice ( yes, frequency and percent) 
Religious affiliation  86 0.00 Religious affiliation  72 98.6 
Customer satisfaction 80 93.0 Customer satisfaction 71 97.3 
Securing clients‘ assets 83 96.5 Securing clients‘ assets 71 97.3 
Corporate governance 83 96.5 Corporate governance 71 97.3 
Financial development 
(shari`a) 
86 0.00 
Financial development 
(shari`a) 
72 98.6 
In order to highlight unapproved loan applications, descriptive statistics on lending 
portfolios in both banking groups are exhibited in Table 5.2. These statistics show that the 
mean of unsuccessful loans in CBs and IBs (8.46 and 7.50 lending applications 
respectively) are small compared with the mean of successful lending applications (44.85 
and 37.22 lending applications respectively), and the mean of unapproved applications 
(63.65 and 56.29 lending applications respectively).   
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics on Lending Portfolio Activity 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
No. of successful loans  44.85 40.00 15.367 37.22 35.00 13.261 
No. of unsuccessful loans 8.46 8.34 5.089 7.50 6.00 4.787 
No of Applications Approved 53.33 50.00 18.951 44.77 42.00 16.480 
No. of applications unapproved 63.65 60.40 17.317 56.29 55.00 18.469 
*Note: These statistics indicate the number of lending applications that have been requested yearly over the 
sample.  
 
2. Risk Factors: Assessment and Measurement 
In order to provide an accurate answer to part of the research problem, the survey was 
designed to collect data about the risk factors that might influence banks‘ performance. 
This data was then used to test H1a and H1b (details in section 5.3.2.1). Santomero 
(1997), Jimenez and Saurina (2003) and Morgan and Ashcraft (2003) reported some risks 
that were related to specific activities and it can be presented as follows: transaction risks, 
business risks, treasury risks, governance risks and systemic risks. In reality, before 
assessing the risks, it is necessary to understand the classifications and the characteristics 
of such risks and to measure these types of risks. The relative sub-classes of such risks 
and risks‘ feasibility items are highlighted to explain how banks deal with risks and how 
they manage and measure it, and the relevant descriptive statistics are presented in 
Appendix G.  
3. Lending Portfolio: Management and Control 
The second major focus of the research problem investigates whether there are significant 
relationships between risks and lending portfolio performance in the banking industry. 
Analysis in this part shows that risks portfolio and lending portfolio performance are 
significantly correlated, with 77.9 % of the CB respondents with a median of 2.00 are 
chosen ‗agree‘ and ‗completely agree‘ options. This implies that risks and the lending 
portfolio are correlated. In contrast, responses of ‗agree‘ and ‗completely agree‘ to the 
survey item that risks and the lending portfolio are correlated are chosen by 85% of IB 
respondents with a median of 1.00.  
The descriptive statistics on lending portfolio performance in CBs and IBs are presented 
in appendix G. In general, in terms of portfolio diversity, analysis shows that Islamic and 
conventional banks have held lending portfolios which are differently structured. Abdalla 
(1997) reports that IB instruments are extremely different from CB ones; therefore, 
controlling transaction processes might be different as well. Furthermore, this research 
seeks to uncover the similarities and differences between IBs and CBs in lending policy. 
Therefore, this research has investigated banking polices used to demonstrate the 
structure of lending portfolios. Descriptive indicators about relevant items used in this 
part are presented in Appendix G. In addition to the risks items highlighted in point 2, 
these items are added to test H1c.   
4. Rationality of Lending Decision-making  
The third part of the research problem investigates credit policies applied to these banks, 
with a particular focus on the efficiency of making rational lending decisions. The term 
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‗rationality‘ is not a physical thing that can be touched (quantity) but, rather, an intangible 
thing (quality). It means the feasibility of risks that may impact the efficiency of lending 
decision-making might be challenged by both IB and CB systems (Jericevic 2002; Kraft 
& Tirtiroglu 1998; Laeven & Mundial 1999; Pastor 2002). Even though the data collected 
in this phase covers policies in efficient lending decision-making, credit culture, lending 
standards, lending policies and controlling/managing risks were also matters of concern 
(in terms of allocated and granted loans considerations and models used for risk 
measurement). Appendix G provides descriptive statistics on the items used for 
measuring the rationality of lending decision-making. Thus, the study measurements in 
this part were used to test H2a, H2b, and H2c and details are provided in section 5.3.2.2. 
5. Information about the Participant (Demographic Data)  
This part includes characteristics of the respondent—information such as age, education 
level, experience in job. A review of the literature in the relevant field shows that similar 
demographic variables have been used by different researchers. What is significant to the 
findings is respondents who regularly/often participation in making lending decisions are 
72% in CB and 81% in IB. Descriptive statistics of respondents are provided in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3: The Respondent’s Description 
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
Feature Frequency Percent Feature Frequency Percent 
Participants’ age 
Less than 30 4 4.7 Less than 30 1 1.4 
30-44 49 57.0 30-44 40 54.8 
45-59 31 36.0 45-59 30 41.1 
60 and over 2 2.3 60 and over 2 2.7 
Participants’ qualification level 
Primary School 1 1.2 Primary School – – 
Secondary School 1 1.2 Secondary School 4 5.5 
Associate Degree 14 16.3 Associate Degree 9 12.3 
Undergraduate Degree 45 52.3 Undergraduate Degree 40 54.8 
Postgraduate Degree 25 29.1 Postgraduate Degree 20 27.4 
Experience in banking and finance 
Less than 5 years 8 9.3 Less than 5 4 5.5 
5-9 40 46.5 5-9 42 57.5 
10-14 30 34.9 10-14 24 32.9 
More than 14 8 9.3 More than 14 3 4.1 
Participation in decision-making 
Regularly Invited 28 32.6 Regularly Invited 26 35.6 
Often 34 39.5 Often 33 45.2 
Seldom 15 17.4 Seldom 14 19.2 
Never Invited 9 10.5 Never Invited – – 
 
5.5.1.3 Survey Distribution 
This research was undertaken with a maximum distribution of 240 survey booklets among 
the sample––IB and CB––in five countries, with five survey booklets to be distributed to 
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each bank [(24 IBs + 24 CBs) x 5 = 240]. Likewise, the survey focused on five decision-
makers within the organisation who were classified in the survey instrument as follows: 
1. Executive manager. 
2. Property board member (for CB), or Islamic board member (for IB). 
3. Risk management manger. 
4. Credit department manager.  
5. Treasurer/financial department manager. 
Further, for this research, an email survey was conducted as a result of travelling 
limitations which restricted the researcher from entering several countries where some 
participants were located. Therefore, due to an inability to deliver the survey personally, 
approximately 130 survey booklets were emailed––five (5) booklets for such banks. 
Taking into consideration the time limitation for conducting the study, it was assumed the 
data obtained using this distribution technique to be acceptable for statistical testing. 
Table 5.7 presents the statistics of the survey distribution and the banks‘ sample. 
Table 5.4: Distribution of the Banks’ Sample and the Survey  
The Country 
Population Banks’ sample Distributed surveys 
IBs CBs IBs CBs By email By hand Total 
Libya None 19 - 7 - 35 35 
Bahrain 13 19 11 5 80 - 80 
Qatar 6 6 4 2 30 - 30 
United Arab Emirates 9 33 6 5 - 55 55 
Jordan 4 19 3 5 20 20 40 
Total 32 96 24 24 130 110 240 
 
5.5.1.4 Response Rate  
From the first round questionnaires distributed to the 240 participants (five participants in 
each bank), a total of 159 surveys were returned with mostly completed information. Of 
the 240 surveys distributed, manually handled and online responses were received within 
two months. Of these responses, 70 were from the survey distributed manually with a 
response rate of (63.63%)
69
. At this point, as potential participants expressed a preference 
for participating in the study by using an email survey rather than a postal survey, a total 
of 92 were returned online with a response rate of (70.76%)
70
; 89 were returned after 
completion, and three (3) surveys were returned blank. Thus, three (3) surveys (0.018%)
71
 
have been excluded from analysis of the total surveys returned. The response rate from 
the first round survey was an acceptable (66.25%)
72
; according to Dillman, Sinclair and 
Clark (1993) a response rate of at least 20% was deemed usable.  
5.5.1.4.1 Ethical Clearance Approval 
The main purpose of research ethics is to protect interviewers and respondents from harm 
or adverse consequences that may result from the research activities (Hays, Murphy & 
Sinclair 2003). Since this study sought to collect data from individuals/institutions, prior 
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 Handling survey response rate: 70/110 = 63.63 % 
70
 Online survey response rate: 92/130 = 70.76 % 
71
 Blank survey response: 3/162  = 0.018 % 
72
 -  Response rate of CBs: (86/120) % = 71.66 % -  Response rate of  IBs: (73/120) % = 60.83 % 
  - Total  response rate of CBs and IBs: (159/240) % = 66.25 % 
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approval was required from the University of Southern Queensland Ethics Committee. An 
application—along with both versions (English and Arabic) of the questionnaire—was 
forwarded for ethical clearance approval. Approval for conducting the survey was 
received from the Postgraduate Students and Research Ethics Officer, reference number 
(H07STU710)
73
.      
5.5.2 Secondary Data Method—Annual Reports  
Sometimes, a researcher can use data from previous studies as the basis for new research 
(Best 1999). Cowton (1998) explains that secondary data might be official statistics 
(statistics collected by agencies and governments), such as a full survey conducted on the 
whole population. These statistics are most readily available to researchers. For example, 
trade unions will usually have statistical data about the industries in which their members 
are working. Developments in data storing techniques, and improvements in preparing 
secondary data methods and saving data have considerably assisted researchers to access 
archived data much more easily.  
Typically, studies with similar purposes have found that content observation is a key to 
obtaining good survey results (Zikmund 2003). Furthermore, an annual report survey—
secondary data—particularly focuses on specific aspects of behaviour. However, this 
behaviour is considered quantitative in some way (Leedy & Ormrod 2005). According to 
sub-question.3 of this study and theoretical constructs used, the texts (financial reports) 
that will be examined need to be carefully identified. Additionally, specifying units of 
analysis followed by data collection technique must be considered in the former stage of 
developing research ideas. Therefore, the study adopts this strategy as a principal target 
for collecting the secondary data used for the analysis in this part. 
5.5.2.1 Data Sources  
Secondary sources are basically sources of data that have been collected by others, and 
not specifically for the research question at hand (Best 1999; McNeill & Chapman 2005). 
Nevertheless, McNeill and Chapman (2005) have outlined many sources of secondary 
data that include government and regulatory agencies documents, public reports of 
companies, items in the press and other media, published academic research, and internal 
documents produced by organisations. Likewise, research methods such as contents 
analysis—annual reports—used in dealing with secondary data are often more easily 
amenable to replication and to validity and reliability checks than some methods used to 
collect primary data in business settings (Cooper & Schindler 1998). Further, Harris 
(2001) suggests that the use of secondary data––particularly the data obtained from 
financial statements––forces the researcher to think more closely about the theoretical 
aims and substantive issues of the study. Secondary data can also be used to provide 
‗triangulation‘, increasing the credibility of research findings using primary data (Cowton 
1998).  
Therefore, to ensure reliability, consistency, and comparability of the results, the data 
were obtained from individual CBs‘ and IBs‘ annual reports, published in accordance 
with General Accounting Acceptance Principles (GAAP)
74
, in addition to other financial 
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 A copy of the ethical clearance approval is provided in Appendix I. 
74
 ME countries are still suffering from the adoption of a national uniform set of accounting standards; they 
follow the international financial accounting standards, and the international standards of auditing.  
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information (public/private) published by the local markets in these countries (Libya, 
Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates and Jordan).  
5.5.2.2 Data Period Chosen  
As mentioned above, the sample used for this study comprises 24 IBs and 24 CBs that 
operate in the ME region. The study covers the time period between 2002 and 2006 in 
order to capture rapid changes within the ME banking industry that might have occurred 
in both IBs and CBs systems, in particular changes that occurred in the capital adequacy 
requirement or lending policy following the onset of the economic crisis in the ME 
region. Typically, this crisis hit Islamic economies after September 11, 2001 and led to 
deterioration in financial institutions due to a decrease in international investment in 
Islamic economies. It is anticipated that selecting these five financial year-periods 
particularly will improve the interpretation of the research findings significantly once the 
data have been analysed.  
5.5.2.3 A Note on Exchange Rates 
In this study, because of the diversity of banks‘ location and the differences in currency 
power/name in the selected countries sample, currencies of these countries have been 
converted into USA dollars to obtain comparable data sets for the research. Basically, 
justifications of data are made to avoid systematic bias produced by random errors of 
measurement or by misspecification in the model underlying the analysis. For this study, 
uniformity in the use of different currencies is essential for comparative matters and for 
reliability as well, as Table 5.5 suggests. 
Table 5.5: Equivalence of Exchange Rate for the Sample 
Country Currency Name Exchange Rate ($ US)* 
1 Libya Libyan Dinars 1.139 
2 Qatar Qatar Rials 0.275 
3 Bahrain Bahraini Dinars 2.656 
4 United Arab Emirates UAE Dirham 0.272 
5 Jordan Jordanian Dinars 1.411 
*The $US exchange rates have been estimated over the data period of time (1999–2006) 
according to (http://www.ozforex.com.au) database by using a weighted average. 
There is another reason relating to treatment and consistency over the entire period of 
data coverage. The annual reports for the sample banks have been surveyed, and the way 
in which these reports have been prepared has also been considered. This study is 
committed to analysing annual reports data in order to ensure that conclusions drawn 
from primary data are as unbiased as possible. It also seeks to develop a single manner to 
evaluate the data. Generally, the following accounting standards, as well as aspects 
mostly focused on by external auditors, have been considered in this research:  
1. Interest revenue and expenses are calculated according to the monetary accrual 
principle. The received and paid commissions (or Zakat in IB) are also recorded in 
this segment––revenue and expenses––in the income report. 
2. Depreciation of fixed assets is disclosed with their total cost value. Payments are 
also calculated on the basis of the straight line method according to taxation law; 
therefore, this segment––depreciation––has been carefully estimated. 
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3. In terms of loans volume, loans were calculated as annual figures or values (loans 
volume), to assure the reliability of statistical analysis. 
4. All investments are recorded in the sample banks at their cost values. 
5. All foreign exchanges transactions are converted into US dollars according to the 
exchange rate in force as published by the central banks in surveyed countries: 
Libya, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates and Jordan. 
Overall, according to Newbold, Carlson and Thorne (2003), the difficulties of using data 
without estimation might be: 1) location and authority for its release; 2) insufficient 
documentation; 3) inappropriate aggregation; and 4) delays and refusals to data requests. 
By focusing on the contribution of sufficient documentation, issues also arise regarding 
the reliability of standards used by documentation staff, that is, of those who prepare the 
annual reports. Spathis, Doumpos and Zopounidis (2002) have argued that most financial 
boards were required to publish large amounts of information that technically comply 
with generally accepted concepts/principles, whereas most researchers require a narrower 
focus to ensure data accuracy. Additionally, offering guidelines for describing 
information interchange formats in advance seems highly useful for technical processing 
with providing a uniform checklist glossary for the data use. Thus, it becomes essential to 
build sets of data files which contain the lowest level of data collecting errors.  
Although many business studies will not use the data collected by content analysis to 
construct precise conclusions, a number of steps can be taken ‗to provide evidence that 
systematic and spurious errors occur infrequently‘ (Janis 1965, p. 81) in (Harris 2001, p. 
194). An explicit procedure for content analysis, like other research instruments, is said to 
have validity of measurement in what it purports to measure; and has reliability if it gives 
the same result consistently. To conclude, the technique used in this study was data 
triangulation through utilising some close-ended questions provided in the questionnaire, 
supplemented by data gathered from financial reports. This study therefore generates a 
framework to triangulate data that helps to draw reliable conclusions and improves the 
study validities (construct, internal and external).  
5.6 Data Interpretation and Analysis  
Statistical instruments have been used to test the study hypotheses and make a statement 
about the statistical validity of the results (Newbold, Carlson & Thorne 2003). Both 
parametric and non-parametric mathematical programming approaches use all the 
information contained in the data. Sheskin (2004) argued that the parametric approach 
required the imposition of a specific functional form (e.g. regression equation), while a 
non-parametric approach does not require any assumption about the functional form. 
According to the nature of the study questions and its purpose, the information obtained 
from two different groups of banks (24 IBs and 24 CBs), was analysed using two 
statistical instruments: 
1. Parametric statistical technique: this technique has been used to analyse 
primary data collected by using a questionnaire survey.  
2. Non-parametric/econometric statistical technique: secondary data used 
in this study have been analysed using econometric technique. 
In brief, statistical procedures––parametric and non-parametric––that have been utilised 
to analyse the data are highlighted as follows. 
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5.6.1 Pre-statistical Procedures 
Because some questionnaires were distributed online (emailed), and some annual report 
data were directly uploaded, the information can be downloaded directly into a database 
sheet once it has been submitted. This produces some advantages, such as reduced time 
cost and coding error. It also automates the coding process, improves efficiency and 
removes the possibility of human coding error. The researcher also made efforts to check 
errors which might be involved by ensuring that data were transformed correctly to the 
spreadsheets, and by performing a random check of five percent of the entered surveys 
(Laeven & Majnoni 2005; Leedy & Ormrod 2005). 
5.6.2 Descriptive Statistical Procedures  
The study has used descriptive statistical procedures to present a picture of the specific 
details of assumed relationships. During the descriptive statistics process, outliers—
abnormality—that could influence the analysis and interpretation of the results were 
investigated (Davis 2000). If identified, profiles on each outlier observation were 
generated. The reason for this was to see if outliers for individual variables may impact 
on the overall research model; the outliers was retained until sufficient evidence was 
found to prove that it did not provide an accurate representation of the target population. 
In addition, each statistical user makes assumptions about the nature of the data, such as 
its normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity (Anderson, Sweeney & Williams 2005). 
Therefore, if a normal distribution is not observed, data transformation needs to be carried 
out, if possible, because the assumption is a prerequisite for the parametric inferential 
statistical technique used in this study. Further, assumptions on sampling adequacy and 
reliability for establishing factor analysis have been investigated. In this context, a 
normality test was performed by observing normal probability plots and histograms or, to 
be more accurate, the skewness and kurtosis value was obtained.    
5.6.3 Inferential Statistical Procedures 
5.6.3.1 Factor Analysis (FA) 
This study has two major constructs: risk factors assessment and the rationality of lending 
decisions. Both constructs are multidimensional and they include multi-variables that 
incorporate multiple items of assessment for each variable. Therefore, multivariate 
analysis (MA) has been used for this study in accordance with Levine et al (2005), who 
stated that MA is more appropriate for assessing the direction and strength of 
relationships between independent and dependent variables. To accomplish factor 
analysis, a principal component (PC) technique was used to analyse the significance of 
relationships among independent and dependent variables (Newbold, Carlson & Thorne 
2003). Consequently, the factor scores derived from the PC were used as input values for 
the multiple regression analysis (MR). The MR model was applied to measure the 
association between the study variables which are measured by interval scales. In this 
part, analysis has been taken to test the main hypotheses H1 (H1a, H1b and H1c) and H2 
(H2a, H2b and H2c). 
5.6.3.2 Efficiency & Performance Analysis (EPA) 
Finally, in order to measure a gain efficiency scale for each decision making unit (DMU) 
relative to the other DMUs in the sample banks and test the hypothesis H3, the data 
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envelopment analysis (DEA) technique has been used (details in Appendix O). As 
mentioned, data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to analyse banking performance 
(frontier efficiency) and the quality of lending decision-making
75
. The orientation of DEA 
on deriving the best-practice frontier and optimising returns to scale of decision making 
units (gain efficiency scale) affords new ways of organising and analysing data and can 
result in new managerial and theoretical insights. ‗Regression models require the 
dependent variable to be observed on a continuous and unrestricted scale‘ (Vogelvang 
2005, p. 126). It is quite common, however, for this condition to be violated, resulting in a 
non-continuous or a limited dependent variable (Manual 2002; Vogelvang 2005). Manual 
(2002, p. 405) considered that ‗[a]n analyst will distinguish between three types of these 
variables: 1) qualitative (observed on a discrete or ordinal scale); 2) censored or truncated, 
and 3) integer valued‘.  
Once the efficiency scores have been estimated using DEA, the statistical technique of 
non-linear Tobit econometric modelling is used to represent relevant factors in the 
decision process and, further, determine to what extent each factor affects the outcome
76
. 
To perform this analysis, E-View‘s econometric software has been utilised. At this stage, 
the hypothesis 3––H3––of the study can be tested. Using this model yielded a number of 
advantages regarding the estimation technique for maximum likelihood (ML) binary 
Tobit model, as well as descriptive statistics/information on the number of iterations 
required for convergence, and estimation of the coefficient covariance matrix, mean and 
standard deviation of the dependent variable, standard error of the regression and sum of 
the squared residuals (Papke & Wooldridge 1996). 
5.7 Conclusion  
This chapter highlights the main purposes of the study and outlines the appropriate 
approach that has been conducted to achieve the hypothesised objectives and to answer 
the research questions by testing relative hypotheses. This chapter explains the data 
collection strategy. The study conducted two focus groups as a sample of research within 
IBs and CBs operating in the ME region; and the use of the survey technique, including 
annual reports observation to collect data, provided a good basis for triangulation data 
analysis. This chapter describes aspects that should be considered to ensure occurrence of 
different types of validities. For this study, to some degree, several applications 
concerning validity were established to ensure that the meanings of the constructs in this 
study are correctly captured, for instance: 1) the draft questionnaire was pre-tested in 
order to improve face and content validities; 2) principal component factor analysis was 
performed in order to ensure construct validity; and 3) appropriate statistical analysis by 
employing three software packages SPSS, DEA and E.View‘s, in order to draw valid 
statistical conclusions. To conclude, once the constructs, their relationships and their 
boundary conditions were articulated, the propositions that specify the relationships 
among the constructs were translated into hypotheses and related empirical indicators 
(empirical level). These aspects will be covered in the following chapters.   
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 About 240 decision-making units in conventional banks and 240 decision-making units in Islamic banks 
were considered in this study. 
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 Estimation models for several qualitative and limited dependent variable models have been discussed in 
Manual (2002) by using E.Views, which provides estimation routines for binary or ordered (Probit, Logit, 
and Gompit), censored or truncated (Tobit, etc.), and integer valued (count data) model. For further 
explanation see, Johnston, J 1997, Econometric methods, McGraw-Hill, New York.. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX  
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT 
AND LENDING MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP: 
COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATIONS AND 
RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction    
This chapter presents quantitative results of analysis undertaken on data gathered via a 
survey questionnaire. Two research hypotheses that relate to the assessment of risk 
factors and their relationship with the lending portfolio performance in two different 
banking systems—CBs and IBs—are tested. The chapter also includes further discussion 
on the relative importance of evaluating such factors in relation to the lending portfolio. 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to present findings and discussion focusing on how 
IBs and CBs are different in terms of risk factors assessment—risk taking behaviour—
and how these factors influence the rationality of lending decision making. To enhance 
the analysis, several procedures which might be a focus for similar future studies have 
been adopted in this study. Thereby, assumptions of the statistical instruments used in this 
study, such as normality and reliability, were carefully assessed.    
The chapter is divided into five sections as follows: the introductory section is followed 
by section 2 which provides information regarding the research design and analysis. 
Section 3 outlines the factor analysis model for evaluating the assumptions, assessing the 
reliability, and determining the principal component factors which were conducted to 
analyse the study variables. This is followed by section 4 which discusses the findings 
and provides detailed conclusions for test hypotheses H1 (H1a, H1b & H1c) and H2 (H2a, 
H2b & H2c). Finally, section 5 concludes the chapter with an overall assessment of the 
results. Figure 6.1 depicts a detailed outline of Chapter 6.  
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Figure 6.1: Outline of Chapter 6 and Interrelations 
 
6.2 Developing the Analysis Design  
6.2.1 Data Layout   
The CB‘s data was analysed and compared with data obtained from IBs, thereby, all CBs 
were combined into one group of data to represent the CB system in the ME region. 
Further, a similar structure was employed on the IB system and the analysis procedures 
were the same as those above. The purpose of this arrangement was to make the 
circumstance of comparing these banking systems similar in the five geographical 
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locations
77
. Accordingly, the study examines whether policies and roles of lending 
decision-making used in IBs and CBs are different and the possible relationship between 
these policies and risk factors assessment. However, for the purpose of this study, the 
comparative information––primary data––of default risks portfolio and management/ 
measurement approaches are obtained by a questionnaire survey originally prepared in 
English, with Arabic language supplements. 
Although economic models are often based on continuous response and explanatory 
variables, both categorical and numerical data are used in empirical economic research. In 
recent years, econometric literature has focused on the development of limited dependent 
(e.g. categorical) variable models (Cummins & Gullone 2000; Dunn & Va 1992; Weng 
2004). These models address a wide range of economic and empirical issues such as 
selection bias and unobserved population heterogeneity. In this context, Weng (2004) has 
stated that most empirical research on the effects of response categories on the reliability 
of Likert-type rating scales has focused on internal consistency reliability. In conducting 
empirical policy research, economists focus on model specification issues. These include 
variables that need to be measured by survey or secondary data sources to estimate 
categorical and numerical parameters and test hypotheses about policy effects. 
A very common question is whether it is legitimate to use Likert scale data in parametric 
statistical procedures that require interval data, such as linear regression and factor 
analysis. Running a regression by using Likert scale is somewhat controversial. Some 
statisticians have commented that ordered categories applied to parametric statistical 
regression is invalid, and only non-parametric instruments should be used (Jamieson 
2004). In contrast, while technically the Likert scale item is ordered, using it in parametric 
test is valid if assumptions about using the technique are met (Lozano, García-Cueto & 
Muñiz 2008; Lubke & Muthén 2004). Ideally, it is not a question of the right and wrong 
way to analyse data from Likert scale items: the question is more directed to answering 
the research questions meaningfully. Statistical procedures that meaningfully answer the 
research questions, maintain the richness of data, and are not subject to scaling debates 
should be the methods of choice in analysing Likert scale items.  
Consequently, the following aspects have to be considered when regression has been 
taken:  
- Understand the difference between Likert scale type item and a Likert scale. 
- Proceed with caution. (Sufficient justification) 
- Five items of scale or more must be treated with an underlying concept that the scale 
be continuous (normality, equal variance of residual, etc. should be met).   
- Run equivalent non-parametric test when possible; if the same result is achieved, 
conclusions can be confidently reported.   
6.2.2 Hypotheses Test Layout 
In this study, the sampling distribution of the t-test can be approximated by the normal 
distribution when both (n1= CB) and (n2= IB) are large. Since the number of samples in 
this study––n1= 86 and n2= 73––meets this condition, the standard normal probability 
distribution table can be used for testing the hypotheses. The hypotheses testing 
procedure for examining whether the risk factors assessment (management/ 
measurement/control) and their effects on making rational lending decisions (H1a, H1b, 
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 All CBs and IBs which contributed to this study are located in five Middle Eastern countries, namely, 
Libya, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar and United Arab Emirates (more details are available in section 5.6.2.2). 
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H2a and H2b) of two groups of banks from different banking system is alike or different 
is presented as:  
  Null hypothesis   21:0  H  
  Alternative hypothesis 21:1  H  
where  
α = 0.01 or 0.05 level of significance for testing these hypotheses, and 
along a certain degree of freedom (df).   
Null hypothesis assumes that there is no difference between the two systems, which 
means the CB and IB populations have the same means in such risk factors. An 
alternative hypothesis, on the other hand, assumes there is a difference between groups, 
which means the population has different means of such risk factors. Using a two-tailed 
test, the acceptance region of the ‗t statistic value‘ is determined at the 0.01 or 0.05 level 
of significance. If ‗P-value‘ is noticed within the acceptance level of significant, the 
samples are assumed normally distributed. When t-test ‗calculated value‘ lies outside the 
acceptance region; the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.  
However, testing the H1c and H2c is demonstrated by using correlation coefficient 
technique to examine the relationship between risk factors and default risk portfolio or 
lending portfolio policy. At this point, the study measures the relevant factors
78
 in the 
expectation that it will show a positive/negative association. Despite this strategy, it does 
not yield the strong evidence for causation that true experiment would yield; however, an 
association would at least be consistent with the researcher‘s view that risks factors 
assessment associated positively/negatively with lending portfolio policy, and might be 
different in CBs and IBs.  
Accordingly, the Pearson correlation is a measure of a supposed linear relationship 
between such risk factors and lending portfolio policy. But, the supposition of linearity 
must always be confirmed by inspection of the scatter plots (Newbold, Carlson & Thorne 
2003; Ruppert 2004). Therefore, by definition, the value of r can vary only within the 
range from -1 to +1, inclusive ( 11  r ). Thus, to test the null hypothesis of (H1c 
and H2c) that if the correlation equal to zero is made with the statistic t<0.01 and < 0.05, 
the hypothesis of no relationship is accepted. However, if H0 is not true, one can say 
nothing whatsoever about the relationship between the two variables.  
6.3 Factor Analysis Applications 
6.3.1 Underlying Assumptions   
Discussion here focuses on the important statistical problem of making inferences about a 
population, based on results from a sample. However, by using the central limit theorem 
researchers have a rationale for applying the statistical analysis to a wide range of 
applications in different fields (Newbold, Carlson & Thorne 2003). As indicated by 
Newbold, Carlson and Thorne (2003), the inferences about the population might be 
considered as means, proportions and variances. This study seeks high-quality results 
from which analysis has been conducted. Thus, the evaluation of the sample‘s 
assumptions is important for many reasons, including: 
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have been examined independently.  As well as the examinations, factors were extracted by PCA.   
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1. It avoids potential significant effects which may be relative to the sample 
size, sample distribution and correlation among the study variables.  
2. It mitigates a potential bias in the results towards those banks that performed 
best in assessment of risks or displayed significantly less engagement to the 
risk assessment. 
3. It satisfies the postulates of the statistical techniques used in this study for 
data analysis such as normality, linearity and homoscedasticity and reliability.  
6.3.1.1 Normality  
The assumption of normality is a prerequisite for many inferential statistical techniques. 
According to Levine et al. (2005), there are a number of different ways to explore this 
assumption graphically, for instance, shape of histogram, stem-and-leaf plot, box plot, 
etc., and to provide information about the variable and frequency of cases‘ distribution, 
and the distribution of scores (i.e. a number of cases that fall into a particular interval). 
Therefore, to determine whether a distribution is normal, the median value should be 
positioned in the centre of the shape or the cases should fall more or less in a straight line 
in the case of normal probability plots. In this study, normality tests indicated that the 
majority of study variables were normally distributed.   
More often, distributions are skewed and display varying degrees of kurtosis. However, 
when skewness and kurtosis are extreme, transformation of the variable is an option 
(Myers & Well 2003). Transformation of variables––called computing in SSPS––is used 
to obtain composite scores for items in one scale. In this study, few variables are 
transformed to be normally distributed, and missing values also have been computed to 
avoid the problem of missing observations. Therefore, all missing values replaced with 
estimates were computed with a common method—the mean of the item distribution79.  
6.3.1.2 Linearity and Homoscedasticity  
Newbold, Carlson and Thorne (2003) defined linearity, and advocated that the 
relationship between the two variables must be linear. Homoscedasticity typically means 
the variability in scores for one variable is roughly the same as all values of the other 
variable. Coakes and Steed (2005) argued that homoscedasticity is concerned with how 
the scores cluster uniformly on the regression line. However, when statistically 
considered, linearity and homoscedasticity describe the relationships between variables. 
Because the tendency to inconsistency cluster around the regression line is not marked in 
this study analysis, the researcher is able to say that the assumption of linearity and 
homoscedasticity are not violated
80
.   
6.3.2 Reliability Test    
Reliability can be assessed by a number of different coefficients. However, one of the 
most commonly used is Cronbach's Alpha, which is based on the average correlation of 
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 There are several methods to compute missing values or observations; see, Raaijmakers, QAW 1999, 
'Effectiveness of different missing data treatments in surveys with Likert-type data: Introducing the 
relative mean substitution approach', Educational and Psychological Measurement, vol. 59, no. 5, p. 725. 
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 This correlation may be performed between dichotomous or categorical variables (Phi coefficient) or 
between a continuous and a categorical variable (Point-biserial correlation). The second case is concerned 
in this study. For more information see, Coakes, SJ & Steed, LG 2003, SPSS analysis without anguish: 
Version 13.0 for windows, John Wiley, Sydney. Page 64) 
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items within a test if the items are standardised
81
 (Rourke & Anderson 2004). Cronbach's 
Alpha is typically employed in this study because it can be interpreted as a correlation 
coefficient, plus it ranges in value from 0 to 1. Thus, a reliability test for the study 
variables is performed in following three areas.  
6.3.2.1 Risk Portfolio Variables 
Literature in this field showed that a higher Cronbach's Alpha coefficient indicates higher 
reliability statistically (Kinnear & Gray 2008). According to Table 6.1, Cronbach‘s Alpha 
coefficient output shows that the correlation among the items in such risk portfolio 
variables was significantly correlated with range 0.63, 0.59 as lowest coefficients, and 
0.87, 0.91 as highest coefficients in both CB and IB samples respectively. This means 
that the overall measurement of the items scale indicates the reliability level of the data 
after removing items that showed the lowest correlation coefficient. Thus, deletion of 
these items is a technique that has been used for improving the overall reliability 
coefficient in this study.  
In contrast, examining the characteristics of a scale requires considering each item 
individually—the overall scale and the relationship between the individual items and the 
overall scale.  
Table 6.1: Risk Portfolio Variables 
Variables 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Reliability Statistics Scale Statistics Reliability Statistics Scale Statistics 
N of 
Items 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
N of 
Items 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
A. Risks Portfolio 
Risks Profile 5 .78 17.68 3.839 5 .80 17.64 4.228 
Transaction Risks 5 .70 10.50 3.112 5 .73 10.47 2.938 
Business Risks  4 .76 7.03 2.505 3 .74 5.17 1.730 
Treasury Risks  4 .77 6.31 2.490 3 .59 4.39 1.356 
Governance Risks  6 .64 11.00 3.152 3 .65 5.01 1.774 
Systematic Risks  4 .83 7.95 2.740 4 .76 7.66 2.193 
Risk Visibility 5 .83 12.15 3.860 5 .91 12.72 4.456 
IR&S Model 4 .63 8.98 2.876 3 .74 6.78 2.564 
VaR Model 5 .70 11.54 2.776 4 .70 8.36 1.877 
AP&B Model 4 .87 10.94 3.805 4 .80 10.51 3.276 
Risk Models in Practice 5 .84 5.43 1.101 5 .91 5.48 1.251 
Note: IR&S: Internal rats and Scoring Model.  VaR: Value at Risk Model.  AP&B: Asset Pricing and Beta Model 
 
6.3.2.2 Lending Portfolio Variables 
An examination of the lending portfolio items in Table 6.2 indicates that the reliability 
coefficient of overall scale is mostly above the acceptable level (Cronbach's Alpha 0.50).  
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 A researcher should consider that if the items is not standardised, Cronbach‘s Alpha is based on the 
average covariance among the items 
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Table 6.2: Lending Portfolio Variables 
Variables 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Reliability Statistics Scale Statistics Reliability Statistics Scale Statistics 
N of 
Items 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
N of 
Items 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
B. Lending Portfolio 
Portfolio Diversification 4 .58 8.05 2.283 3 .52 6.33 2.019 
Lending Profile 6 .48 21.98 4.975 4 .86 18.16 5.993 
Portfolio Management 6 .70 23.85 3.859 5 .61 20.60 3.039 
Portfolio Quality Control 6 .77 10.22 2.821 5 .52 9.33 2.254 
However, the reliability coefficient of lending profile items in the CB sample was 0.48, 
which, although lower than 0.50, still shows significant correlation. In contrast, the 
overall reliability coefficient for the same variable was significantly higher in the IB 
sample, 0.86, with consistency of four items only. In general, those alpha coefficients 
were significant enough to support the reliability test. 
6.3.2.3 Rational Decision-making Variables 
As noted from Table 6.3, the number of items varies between both samples and that 
indicates the items to be excluded in seeking improvement in the model. Typically, Table 
6.3 indicates that the overall reliability coefficient of rationalising decision making 
variables were mostly above the acceptable level in both samples, except for lending 
decision when considering lending portfolio characteristics and, at almost 0.47, is 
substantially lower than 0.50 (acceptable level) but still considerably correlated. Thus, 
inspection of the Cronbach's Alpha coefficient column reveals that deletion of some items 
increase the reliability margin in both samples.  
Table 6.3: Rational Decision-making Variables 
Variables 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Reliability Statistics Scale Statistics Reliability Statistics Scale Statistics 
N of 
Items 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
N of 
Items 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
C. Rational Decision Masking   
Loan Allocation 9 .79 16.23 4.388 12 .73 23.51 5.676 
Consider Risks Portfolio*  8 .85 32.75 4.707 5 .61 21.29 2.234 
Consider Lending Portfolio  5 .57 11.71 2.456 3 .47 6.72 1.960 
Decision Makers Focus 4 .78 7.82 2.780 6 .77 12.20 3.594 
 
6.3.3 Principal Component Analysis  
6.3.3.1 Preliminary Tests 
This analysis determines the appropriateness of the factor analytic mode. Therefore, ‗the 
Bartlett's test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy are both tests that can be used to determine the factorability of the matrix as a 
whole. Accordingly, if the Bartlett's Test of sphericity is large and significant, and if the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure is greater than 0.50, then factorability is assumed‘ (Field 
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2005, p. 561). Additionally, Field (2005) indicates that the anti-image correlation matrix 
can also be used to assess the sampling adequacy of each variable
82
. Factor analysis 
preliminary test is performed by considering variables relevant to three areas: risk 
portfolio, lending portfolio and rational decision making. This test is presented as 
follows: 
6.3.3.1.1 Risks Portfolio 
It can be seen from Table 6.4 that the Bartlett's test of sphericity for such variables in 
both samples is significant and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 
mostly arranged above the acceptable level 0.50, and this indicates the sampling accuracy 
for factoring models. In contrast, the KMO test also shows that variables such as internal 
rating model (IR&S model) 0.49, and value at risk model (VaR model) 0.46 in the CB 
sample were under the acceptable level of sampling adequacy, which indicates the 
sample‘s unwillingness to present a good factoring model for these variables. However, 
in terms of validity, Cronbach‘s Alpha coefficients of these variables were highly 
correlated (0.628 and 0.703 respectively). In this regard, risks portfolio variables in both 
IB and CB samples are adequate for applying parametric tests such as factor analysis, and 
adequate results might be expected.  
Table 6.4: Risk Portfolio Factors Accuracy 
Variables 
 
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
Sampling 
Adequacy 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Sampling 
Adequacy 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
A. Risks Portfolio 
Risks Profile .79 149.62 10.00 .000 .70 139.08 10.00 .000 
Transaction Risks .75 95.49 15.00 .000 .75 117.32 10.00 .000 
Business Risks  .66 74.92 6.00 .000 .64 62.17 6.00 .000 
Treasury Risks  .73 84.96 6.00 .000 .53 35.96 6.00 .000 
Governance Risks  .54 89.58 15.00 .000 .52 93.48 15.00 .000 
Systematic Risks  .73 143.35 10.00 .000 .67 37.06 10.00 .000 
Risk Visibility .71 141.46 6.00 .000 .73 281.11 10.00 .000 
IR&S Model .49 63.02 6.00 .000 .67 57.20 3.00 .000 
VaR Model .46 45.91 10.00 .000 .54 40.99 6.00 .000 
AP&B Model .76 180.06 6.00 .000 .65 98.55 6.00 .000 
Risk Models in Prectice .65 315.85 10.00 .000 .70 414.94 10.00 .000 
Note: IR&S: Internal rats and Scoring Model.  VaR: Value at Risk Model.  AP&B: Asset Pricing and Beta Model. 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) used to test the sampling adequacy which statistically at least must be equal or 
more than 0.50. 
6.3.3.1.2 Lending Portfolio  
Table 6.5 indicates that the factoring model is fairly appropriate for lending portfolio 
variables. However, in the IB sample, by considering the portfolio quality control 
variable of 0.47, factoring analysis seems fairly adequate to account for all items used for 
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 The measures of sampling adequacy are displayed on the diagonal of the anti-image correlation matrix. 
Therefore, variables with a measure of sampling accuracy that fall below the acceptable level (0.50) should 
be excluded from the analysis.   
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measuring lending portfolio risks. Table 6.5 also indicates that coefficients of the 
Bartlett‘s test of sphericity appeared highly significant for the different variables.     
Table 6.5: Lending Portfolio Factors Accuracy 
Variables 
 
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
Sampling 
Adequacy 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Sampling 
Adequacy 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
B. Lending Portfolio  
Portfolio Diversification .54 19.38 3.00 .000 .55 12.45 3.00 .006 
Lending Profile .53 39.60 15.00 .001 .54 46.30 10.00 .000 
Portfolio Management .76 94.34 15.00 .000 .53 56.35 15.00 .000 
Portfolio Quality Control .70 138.08 28.00 .000 .47 39.70 15.00 .001 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) used to test the sampling adequacy which statistically at least must be equal or 
more than 0.50.  
6.3.3.1.3 Rational Decision-making 
Table 6.6 indicates that KMO coefficients of the rational decision-making variables were 
mostly high correlated, and above 0.50. In addition, Table 6.6 shows the coefficient of the 
lending authorisation with considering lending portfolio issues was smallest at 0.48, but 
still significant. However, the Bartlett's test of sphericity coefficient was significant and 
followed a similar pattern in both CB and IB samples. Thus, this means these coefficients 
were significant enough to support the sampling adequacy. In brief, all variables used in 
this study have been tested to explore their validity in terms of conducting component 
factor analysis. Therefore, the above discussion indicates that the sampling adequacy for 
nearly all variables in both banks‘ samples has been assumed, and it is appropriate to 
proceed with factor analysis. 
Table 6.6: Rational Decision-making Factors Accuracy 
Variables 
 
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
Sampling 
Adequacy 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Sampling 
Adequacy 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
df Sig. 
C. Rational Decision Making   
Loan Allocation .73 177.57 36.00 .000 .59 195.74 66.00 .000 
Consider Risks Portfolio*  .76 161.26 21.00 .000 .50 48.00 21.00 .001 
Consider Lending Portfolio  .48 64.04 36.00 .003 .54 20.96 15.00 .138 
Decision Makers Focus .75 76.75 6.00 .000 .73 115.62 15.00 .000 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) used to test the sampling adequacy which statistically at least must be equal or 
more than 0.50. 
6.3.3.2 Confirmatory Tests 
To complete testing processes of the factor model, a technical transformation from 
exploratory to confirmatory analysis was conducted. Factor analysis is assumed to 
represent an underlying or latent variable, in terms of which correlations in ‗R-matrix are 
accounted for‘, both mathematically and theoretically (Coakes & Steed 2003; Field 
2005). The number of factors, therefore, to be interpreted largely depends on the 
underlying purpose of the analysis. This means variables with low squared multiple 
correlation with all other variables, and low correlations with important factors—outliers 
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among the variables—were removed from this study analysis. In this study, the purpose 
was to make the pattern of loadings easier to interpret risk portfolio variables, therefore, 
the factors are rotated to maximise the loadings of the variables on some of the factors, 
reduce them on others, and to achieve a simple structure in general. Consequently, the 
most common method of rotation is varimax, which maintains independence among the 
mathematical factors (Coakes & Steed 2005). 
6.3.3.2.1 Profile of Risk Portfolio Factors  
Table 6.7 discusses the number of factors that have been extracted with use of principal 
component method. The table shows also the underlying variables that will be used for 
further explanations in this study. As seen from Table 6.7, the pattern of loading the 
variables varies within both CB and IB samples. Therefore, some differences have been 
noted in terms of number of factors and the name of these factors. For example, 
transaction risk classification was loaded into two factors in CB, whilst it was loaded into 
one factor in IB. Thus, as literature in the finance field suggests (Bashir 2000; Cowling & 
Clay 1994; Crook, Edelman & Thomas 2007), there are some difficulties in risk 
assessment, but the factor technique offers reasonable pattern and has been utilised into 
this analysis which made the interpretation less difficult. 
Table 6.7: Risk Portfolio Factors Extracted 
Variables 
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
N of 
factors 
Factor‘s Name 
N of 
factors 
Factor‘s Name 
Risk Profile 1 Internal & External Risks  1 Internal & External Risks  
Transaction Risks 2 
Applicable TR  
Less-applicable TR 
1 Applicable TR  
Business Risks 1 Applicable BR 1 Applicable BR 
Treasury Risks 1 Applicable TyR 1 Applicable TyR 
Governance Risks 2 
Applicable GR 
Less-applicable GR 
2 
Applicable GR 
Less-applicable GR 
Systematic Risks 1 Applicable SR 1 Applicable SR 
Risks Visibility 1 
Internal & External Risk 
Visibility  
1 
Internal & External Risk 
Visibility  
IR&S Model 2 
Appropriate IR&S Model 
Less-appropriate IR&S Model 
1 Appropriate IR&S Model 
VaR Model 2 
Appropriate VaR Model 
Less-appropriate VaR Model 
1 Appropriate VaR Model 
AP&B Model 1 Appropriate IR&S model 1 Appropriate IR&S Model 
Risk Models in Practice 2 
Available Special Model 
Unavailable Special Model 
1 Available Special Model 
Note: TR: Transaction Risks.  GR: Governance Risks.  TyR: treasury Risks.  SR: Systematic Risks.  IR&S: 
Internal rats and Scoring Model.  VaR: Value at Risk Model.  AP&B: Asset Pricing and Beta Model. 
Extraction method: principal component analysis.  Components of each factor are presented in Appendix J. 
6.3.3.2.2 Profile of Lending Portfolio Factors  
Table 6.8 presents the lending portfolio factors that have been extracted in such variables. 
As indicated in this table, new factors––loading factors––in CBs and IBs become easier 
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to interpret, taking the study design and objectives into account. Studies by Dhumale and 
Sapcanin (2003), El-Hawary, Grais and Iqbal (2004), Elsas (2005), and Glennon and 
Nigro (2005) assisted the researcher to elaborate the extracted factors. Thus, in terms of 
validity, the interpretation of lending portfolio factors will be principally supported with 
relevant context and literature, and matched to the wide applications in the finance field.   
Table 6.8: Lending Portfolio Factors Extracted 
Variables 
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
N of 
factors 
Factor‘s Name 
N of 
factors 
Factor‘s Name 
Portfolio Diversification 1 Portfolio Diversification 1 Portfolio Diversification 
Lending Profile 2 
Direct Lend 
Indirect Lend 
2 
Direct Lend 
Indirect Lend 
Portfolio Management 1 
Lending Productivity & 
Performance 
2 
Lending Productivity 
Lending Performance 
Portfolio Quality Control 2 
Lending Efficiency 
Capital Adequacy 
2 
Lending Efficiency 
Capital Adequacy 
Note: Extraction method: principal component analysis.  
Components of such factor are presented in Appendix J. 
6.3.3.2.3 Profile of Rational Decision-making Factors  
Table 6.9 indicates that the rational decision making variables in CB sample have been 
differently extracted and loaded from the IB sample. However, factor analysis usage 
offered some similarities of loading rationalising decision making factors which, in turn, 
made the discussion much clearer and relevant to interpreting these factors.  
Table 6.9: Rational Decision-making Factors Extracted 
Variables 
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
N of 
factors 
Factor‘s Name 
N of 
factors 
Factor‘s Name 
Loan Allocation 3 
Characters Considerations 
External Considerations 
Internal Considerations  
4 
Characters Considerations 
External Considerations 
Internal Considerations  
Religious Affiliation  
Consider Risks Portfolio  2 
Information Asymmetry 
Risk Exposure Control   
3 
Information Asymmetry 
Risk Exposure Control   
Lending discipline  
Consider Lending Portfolio  4 
Borrowers Considerations 
Shareholders & Investors    
Considerations 
Lenders Considerations 
Location Consideration 
2 
Lenders Considerations  
Shari`a  Considerations 
 
Decision Makers Focus 1 
Lending Decision-makers 
Focus  
1 
Lending Decision-makers 
Focus  
Note: Extraction method: principal component analysis. 
Components of such factor are presented in Appendix J. 
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6.4 Discussion and Overall Results 
6.4.1 Highlights of Banks’ and Participants’ Characteristics    
Tests across the sample were undertaken to identify significant differences between the 
two independent samples. Specifically, the t-test was used to test association in two-way 
contingency data (Newbold, Carlson & Thorne 2003). Pearson correlation coefficient was 
used to measure association between the variables in this study. Table 6.10 shows 
whether the characteristics of the respondents of the two groups vary in the corresponding 
survey. Therefore, the two banking groups were found to be similar in terms of 
respondents‘ age (p = 0.336>0.05, t =0.964), education (p = 0.819>0.05, t = -0.230), and 
period of experiences (p =0.456>0.05, t = -0.748) in the finance field.  
Table 6.10: Respondent Characteristics 
feather 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Participants Age .003 .958 .964 157 .336 .09 .095 
Participants Qualification 
Level 
.029 .866 -.230 157 .819 -.03 .125 
Job Experience 4.210 .042 -.748 157 .456 -.09 .115 
Decision-making Participation 2.726 .101 -1.622 157 .107 -.22 .137 
Note: The equality of variance between the means of two samples not assumed if F value is significant 
(<0.05), and it is assumed if F value is not significant (>0.05).  
At this point, it appeared that, irrespective of the banking system, the respondents‘ 
responses are fairly similar, suggesting that any potential differences are not likely to be 
due to respondent characteristics. The respondents from both CBs and IBs indicated that 
they have a similar pattern of involvement in decision-making in their institutions. From 
Table 6.10 it can be seen that the test results showed an insignificant difference between 
both banking systems in terms of decision-making participation (p=0.107>0.05, t= -
1.622).  
Table 6.11: Banking Lending Activities 
feather 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
No of Successful Loans  3.042 .083 -3.324 157 .001 -7.64 2.298 
No of Unsuccessful Loans .315 .576 -1.218 157 .225 -.96 .788 
No of Applications Approved 
(Good + Poor Loans) 
2.742 .100 -3.011 157 .003 -8.56 2.842 
No of Applications 
Unapproved 
.352 .554 -2.591 157 .010 -7.36 2.841 
Note: The equality of variance between the means of two samples not assumed if F value is significant 
(<0.05), and it is assumed if F value is not significant (>0.05).  
Table 6.11 indicates that the number of loan applications approved by both CBs and IBs–
–good loans and bad loans––are significantly different (p =0.003<0.01, t = -3.324). Also, 
Chapter Six            Investigations of the Risk Assessment and Lending 
           Management Relationship: Comparative Interpretation and Results 
129 
 
there is a considerable difference between these banking systems in terms of unapproved 
loan applications (p =0.010<0.05, t = -2.591). However, the number of applications 
approved and classified with ‗bad loans‘ is almost similar. This suggests that the Islamic 
banking and conventional banking systems work with different capacity and mostly refers 
to the system obligations and boundaries of their activities (Zaman & Movassaghi 2002) 
This finding is supported by Zaher and Hassan (2001) who found that there has been 
large-scale growth in Islamic finance and banking in Muslim countries and around the 
world during the last twenty years. However, a complete Islamic financial system, with 
its identifiable instruments and markets, is still very much at an early stage of evolution. 
In addition, many problems and challenges relating to Islamic instruments, financial 
markets, and regulations need be addressed and resolved.  
Typically, Table 6.12 shows that there were some significance differences between IBs 
and CBs in terms of banks‘ obligations, especially in shari`a compliant banks 
(p=0.000<0.01, t =54.610) and social and financial development in the way of shari`a 
teaching (p =0.000<0.01, t =54.610) aspects. Therefore, El-Gamal (2006) believes that 
regulations and prohibitions of interest payments (rib`a) impose some additional 
restrictions on the IBs––non-interest-based––which, in turn, affects their lending 
performance.  
Table 6.12: Banks’ Obligations 
feather 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Religious affiliation  .054 .817 54.610 157 .000 .97 .018 
Customer needs & satisfaction 6.181 .014 1.258 146.686 .210 .04 .034 
securing clients‘ assets .288 .592 .268 157 .789 .01 .028 
Corporate governance .288 .592 .268 157 .789 .01 .028 
Social & financial development 
in the way of shari`a teaching 
.054 .817 54.610 157 .000 .98 .018 
Note: The equality of variance between the means of two samples not assumed if F value is significant 
(<0.05), and it is assumed if F value is not significant (>0.05).  
Table 6.13 compares the size of IBs and CBs and shows that no significant difference 
exists between both banking systems (p =0.443>0.01, t =0.769). Therefore, the size of IBs 
is relatively similar to the size of CBs in terms of total assets. Likewise, this result is 
consistent with findings of a study in Iran and Pakistan by Khan and Mirakhor (1990) 
which showed that more than 45% of the financial industry institutions in these countries 
have attempted to establish Islamic finance institutions side-by-side with traditional 
institutions.  
Table 6.13: Banking Size 
feather 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Banks Size' total assets .122 .727 -.769 157 .443 -.10 .134 
Note: The equality of variance between the means of two samples not assumed if F value is significant 
(<0.05), and it is assumed if F value is not significant (>0.05).  
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However, in terms of competition, (Casu, Girardone & Molyneux 2006) found that banks 
reformed themselves in order to be competitive in global activities or services. With the 
compression of both banking systems, they also found the growth rate of IBs has 
outpaced the CBs in Islamic countries. Accordingly, this study‘s results reveal that no 
considerable difference was found in the proportion of unsuccessful granted loans 
between IB and CB systems (p = 0.223 > 0.05, t = -1.218)—see Table 6.11. 
Table 6.14 tests the reference of activities that have been conducted by both banking 
systems. Therefore, activities such as investment banking (p =0.045<0.05, t = 2.036) and 
some other activities
83
 (p =0.050<0.50, t =1.970) seem to be considerably different, which 
explains the variety of banking transaction instruments and the pattern of dealing with 
them in such banking systems. Furthermore, Table 6.14 also highlights that in recent 
times both IBs and CBs have similarly experienced substantially different activities. 
These findings are consistent with Archer and Karim (2002) who found that there is 
notable convergence of Islamic finance to conventional positions, both in business and 
academia. The results also support the findings of Wilson et al. (1999), who examined the 
‗current‘ position of financing by various sectors in the UK, and refers to the variations 
between CBs and IBs and the banks‘ size and experiences, but not the volume of 
activities that have been conducted. 
Table 6.14: Banks’ Activities 
feather 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Loans granting .054 .817 -.116 157 .908 -.00 .018 
Deposits accepting .775 .380 .439 157 .661 .01 .022 
Retirement products 8.967 .003 1.541 155 .125 .12 .076 
Insurance securities 13.079 .000 -1.737 132 .085 -.11 .058 
Investment banking 15.544 .000 2.036 85 .045 .05 .022 
Others 17.257 .000 1.970 128 .050 .11 .057 
Note: The equality of variance between the means of two samples not assumed if F value is significant 
(<0.05), and it is assumed if F value is not significant (>0.05).  
In terms of banking category, Table 6.15 documents the models of banking systems the 
banks have engaged in (e.g. local/international or public/private). Of major note from this 
table is the required adoption by both banking systems of the universal banking model. 
However, the trend towards universality has been explained by Casu, Girardone and 
Molyneux (2006, p. 53) as follows: 
1. To extend the scope of economies by additionally offering cross-selling 
opportunities for the banks. 
2. To meet banks‘ obligations as a result of converting into ‗full services‘ 
financial institutions.  
3. To minimise risks exposure (risk diversification). 
Table 6.15 highlights that the public banks category is somewhat different (p =093<0.10, 
t = -1.689). The ideology behind this is that, mostly, IBs operate with an additional body 
such as a shari`a board and, therefore, their organisational structure cannot be fully 
corporate—as is the case in non-Islamic microfinance institutions. 
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 For example, IBs provide indirect loans for social reasons such as commodities transaction––
Mukayadah––and engagement of finance insurance securities (p=0.085<0.10, t= -1.737) 
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Table 6.15: Banks’ Categories 
feather 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Local 11.184 .001 -1.644 156 .102 -.10 .059 
Private 8.121 .005 1.371 130 .173 .07 .049 
International 10.007 .002 -1.565 154 .120 -.08 .051 
Public 11.673 .001 -1.689 152 .093 -.08 .049 
Note: The equality of variance between the means of two samples not assumed if F value is significant 
(<0.05), and it is assumed if F value is not significant (>0.05).  
As mentioned previously in section 6.2.2, the hypotheses 1 and 2 for this research are 
discussed in light of the survey findings. Hypotheses 1 and 2––H1 (H1a, H1b and H1c) 
and H2 (H2a, H2b and H2c)––are tested and discussed in the following two main parts. 
Each part is outlined in a sense of the first and second research questions, and provides 
analysis of the three sub-hypothesis using independent samples t-test, Pearson correlation 
coefficients and regression. The independent samples t-test was used to test the 
differentiation among the risk factors between both CB and IB systems. Pearson 
correlation coefficients and regression were used to indicate risk factors and rational 
lending decision relationships. The analysis has been provided as follows. 
6.4.2 Comparative Risk Assessment Mechanism between IB and 
CB 
6.4.2.1 Are Risk Factor Schemes in IB and CB the Same? (H1a) 
Table 6.16 shows percentages of applicable rate of credit (grading) risk; products tenor 
plan risk; mark-up risk; foreign exchange risk; balance sheet risk; and single name/single 
transaction risk to transaction risks factor in CBs and IBs. In general, the respondents 
from CBs and IBs have mostly followed the same pattern to appoint, following risks 
applicability in terms of transaction risks factor.  
Table 6.16: Percentage of Transaction Risks Classification 
feather 
Very 
Applicable % 
Applicable % Neutral % Inapplicable % 
Very 
Inapplicable % 
Credit risk ( grading risk) 
CB 70.9 24.4 2.3 2.3 0.00 
IB 54.8 35.6 9.6 0.00 0.00 
Products tenor plan risk 
CB 33.7 33.7 24.4 7.0 1.2 
IB 20.5 52.1 19.2 8.2 0.00 
Mark-up risk 
CB 38.4 41.9 15.1 4.7 0.00 
IB 37.0 56.2 6.8 0.00 0.00 
Foreign exchange risk 
CB 58.1 27.9 9.3 2.3 2.3 
IB 43.8 46.6 9.6 0.00 0.00 
Balance sheet risk 
CB 24.4 37.2 31.4 4.7 2.3 
IB 21.9 46.6 26.0 5.5 0.00 
Single name single 
transaction risk 
CB 17.4 22.1 36.0 18.6 5.8 
IB 17.8 16.4 34.2 26.0 5.5 
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As can be seen, the respondents from the CBs have indicated that credit risk is very 
applicable at 70.9%, contrasting to IB participants who believe that foreign exchange risk 
is very applicable at 58.1%. Additionally, Table 6.16 shows also that the majority of 
respondents‘ choices appeared in the range of very applicable and applicable in both 
banking systems. However, single name and single transaction risk seems moderate––
neutral––in IB respondents‘ view.  
Table 6.17 shows that trading activity risk; displaced commercial risk; withdrawal risk; 
and solvency risk are mostly applicable to the business risks factor in both banking 
systems. It seems also the applicable rate of these risks to business risks factor is a 
common factor. In contrast, very few participants from CBs have indicated these risks are 
not applicable to the business risks factor. This means 2.3%, consisting of the minority 
choice and it is neglected in the discussion. 
Table 6.17: Percentage of Business Risks Classification 
feather 
Very 
Applicable % 
Applicable % Neutral % Inapplicable % 
Very 
Inapplicable % 
Trading activity risk 
CB 36.0 47.7 12.8 3.5 0.00 
IB 31.5 56.2 12.3 0.00 0.00 
Displaced commercial risk 
CB 43.0 37.2 18.6 1.2 0.00 
IB 31.5 53.4 15.1 0.00 0.00 
Withdrawal risk 
CB 45.3 39.5 7.0 5.8 2.3 
IB 43.8 46.6 9.6 0.00 0.00 
Solvency risk 
CB 47.7 41.9 3.5 7.0 0.00 
IB 42.5 50.7 6.8 0.00 0.00 
Table 6.18 contains the percentages of governance risks classification held by the 
respondents from both CB and IB systems. Typically, participants from both banking 
systems indicated that event, natural disaster risk and business environment risk are less 
applicable to the governance risks factor than transparency risk, legal risk, operational 
risk and fiduciary risk. However, a small number of participants––mostly from CBs 
rather than IBs––regarded these risks as inapplicable to this risk factor. 
Table 6.18: Percentage of Governance Risks Classification 
feather 
Very 
Applicable % 
Applicable % Neutral % Inapplicable % 
Very 
Inapplicable % 
Fiduciary risk 
CB 48.8 33.7 16.3 1.2 0.00 
IB 39.7 38.4 21.9 0.00 0.00 
Transparency risk 
CB 53.5 31.4 11.6 3.5 0.00 
IB 46.6 42.5 11.0 0.00 0.00 
Legal risk 
CB 67.4 20.9 9.3 2.3 0.00 
IB 58.9 31.5 9.6 0.00 0.00 
Operational risk 
CB 52.3 30.2 15.1 2.3 0.00 
IB 50.7 39.7 9.6 0.00 0.00 
Event, natural disaster risk 
CB 26.7 33.7 31.4 8.1 0.00 
IB 13.7 37.0 35.6 13.7 0.00 
Business environment risk 
CB 31.4 32.6 26.7 4.6 4.7 
IB 19.2 46.6 27.4 6.8 0.00 
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However, Table 6.19 demonstrates that credit skill and training risk, asset/liability 
management (ALM) risk, liquidity and hedging risk were regarded as highly applicable to 
treasury risks factor by participants from both CB and IB systems, thereby that aspect of 
liquidity risk is almost the highest in both systems (67.4% in CB and 65.8% in IB). 
Accordingly, Table 6.19 shows also negligible choices in inapplicable and very 
inapplicable columns. 
Table 6.19: Percentage of Treasury Risks Classification 
feather 
Very 
Applicable % 
Applicable % Neutral % Inapplicable % 
Very 
Inapplicable % 
Credit skill and training risk 
CB 46.5 36.0 11.6 4.7 1.2 
IB 39.7 50.7 9.6 0.00 0.00 
Asset & liability management 
risk (ALM) 
CB 65.1 26.7 4.7 2.3 1.2 
IB 65.8 34.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Liquidity risk 
CB 67.4 24.4 4.7 1.2 2.3 
IB 65.8 27.4 6.8 0.00 0.00 
Hedging risk 
CB 46.5 33.7 14.0 5.8 0.00 
IB 52.1 38.4 9.6 0.00 0.00 
Table 6.20 shows that the respondents from CBs and IB believe shifts in regulation 
(regulatory) risk, technology/systems exposure risk, payment/settlement risk, institutional 
risk and fraud/compliance risk were mostly applicable to systemic risk factors. However, 
a possible reason for moderating institutional risk in IBs, 35.6%, is that the IB system still 
operates without an organisational body to take the responsibility for act regulations that 
might be necessary to this industry. A study by Kuran (2004) found that Muslim rulers 
made no attempt to supply a corporate form of organization themselves, because 
they saw no commercial or financial benefits and the findings by these 
researchers support this study. Therefore, the absence of Islamic reserve banks, unlike 
conventional reserve banks, results in a lack of awareness by IBs about this risk.  
Table 6.20: Percentage of Systemic Risks Classification 
feather 
Very 
Applicable % 
Applicable % Neutral % Inapplicable % 
Very 
Inapplicable % 
Fraud/ compliance risk 
CB 38.4 43.0 15.1 3.5 0.00 
IB 23.3 34.2 8.2 11.0 23.3 
Technology/systems exposure 
CB 34.9 44.2 18.6 2.3 0.00 
IB 20.5 35.6 28.8 15.1 0.00 
Payment/settlement risk 
CB 27.9 45.3 23.3 3.5 0.00 
IB 19.2 34.2 21.9 24.7 0.00 
Institutional risk 
CB 30.2 44.2 22.1 3.5 0.00 
IB 17.8 37.0 35.6 9.6 0.00 
Shift in regulation (regulatory 
risk ) 
CB 30.2 46.5 12.8 9.3 1.2 
IB 20.5 50.7 13.7 15.1 0.00 
As discussed above, risks are classified differently in CB and IB systems. In other words, 
the conclusion of the variance of risk factor components between CB and IB is that it 
may be somewhat acceptable. However, even the participants from CB and IB systems 
attempt to indicate the rate of risks applicability to specific risks factors, and their 
capability in considering and identifying these factors.  
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Table 6.21 shows the percentages of CB and IB capability in evaluating such risks 
factors. In general, Table 6.21 shows that all risks factors are difficult to evaluate, and 
very difficult in both CB and IB systems. In fact, these results are consistent with a study 
by Greuning and Brajovic (2003) which strongly indicated that evaluating risks is a 
contemporary challenge in the entire banking industry. Transaction, business, treasury, 
governance and systemic risks are used here as a risks factors index to examine whether 
CBs and IBs deal with risks similarly.  
Table 6.21: Percentage of Internal/External Risks Evaluation 
feather 
Very 
Easy % 
Easy % Neutral % Difficult % 
Very 
Difficult % 
Transaction Risks Factor 
CB 7.0 17.4 33.7 18.6 23.3 
IB 13.7 16.4 24.7 21.9 23.3 
Business Risks Factor 
CB 1.2 8.1 20.9 44.2 25.6 
IB 1.4 9.6 23.3 38.4 27.4 
Treasury Risks Factor 
CB 1.2 9.3 26.7 43.0 19.8 
IB 0.00 9.6 21.9 46.6 21.9 
Governance Risks Factor 
CB 0.00 8.1 36.0 34.9 20.9 
IB 0.00 13.7 31.5 34.2 20.5 
Systemic Risks Factor 
CB 8.1 17.4 36.0 23.3 15.1 
IB 4.1 15.1 35.6 19.2 26.0 
Table 6.22 reports on the results of the parametric test for the means of risks factors 
assessment in CBs and IBs. Independent sample t-test results show no significant 
differences among means for conventional and Islamic banking systems across all risks 
factors index.  
Table 6.22: T-test for Risk Factors Evaluation 
feather 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Transaction Risks 
Evaluation 
1.401 .238 -.445 157 .657 -.49 .31 
Business Risks Evaluation .682 .410 -.264 157 .792 -.34 .26 
Treasury Risks Evaluation .480 .489 .680 157 .497 -.19 .39 
Governance Risks 
Evaluation 
.697 .405 -.470 157 .639 -.36 .22 
Systemic Risks Evaluation .521 .472 1.539 157 .126 -.07991 .64 
Note: The equality of variance between the means of two samples not assumed if F value is significant 
(<0.05), and it is assumed if F value is not significant (>0.05).  
As shown in Table 6.22, the p values under 0.01 and 0.05 significant levels obtained for 
all risks factors are not significant, which means the equality of variance between the 
means of such risk factors has been assumed. As indicated in Table 6.22 (2-tailed), t-test 
values show no evidence that banks with Islamic law perform differently to banks 
without Islamic law in terms of risks factors assessment. Here the null hypothesis––H1a–
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–for all factors cannot be rejected. Thus, for CB and IB systems, there is no difference 
in performing risk factors assessment.  
Many studies have considered the trend and importance of evaluation risks in different 
banking areas (Gardner 1997; How, Abdul Karim & Verhoeven 2005; Lehar 2005; 
Simpson, Evans & De Mello 2002; Uyemura & Van Deventer 1993), but no study has 
examined the variance evaluation trends between CB and IB systems. Furthermore, for 
instance, Froot and Stein (1998) found that at bank-level risk management considerations 
should be a factor in the pricing of those risks that cannot be easily hedged—which 
means banks attempt to maximise a well-founded concern with risk management.  
6.4.2.2 Are Approaches to Measuring Risk Factors between IB and CB 
the Same? (H1b) 
The risks measures were computed in order to determine and examine risks in banks.  CB 
and IB systems engage in different approaches to measure risks. Consequently, banks 
have developed different risks models and approaches to quantify and measure risk 
(Jacobson & Roszbach 2003; Lehar 2005; Roy 2005; Saunders & Allen 2002; Thomas 
2000; Van Greuning & Brajovic 2003). In this study, three commonly recognised risks 
models are used in the banking industry (both CB and IB systems) to investigate banks‘ 
capability for handling such risk factors, namely:  
1. Internal rating and scoring model. 
2. Value and risk model.  
3. Beta and assets pricing model. 
While these models are commonly referred to in the literature, the tracking error and 
computing difficulty are also considered, which increases the banks‘ capability to 
discover risks and determine their exposure on activities. Therefore, Table 6.23 
demonstrates that participants from both CBs and IBs consider an internal rating and 
scoring model as very appropriate to measure transaction risk factor—55.8% and 39.7% 
respectively. From CB respondents, 41.9% give the model high appropriate value to 
measure business risks factor; atypical, 38.4% of IB respondents consider this model to 
be appropriate. Table 6.23 also shows that the model is almost moderate in measuring 
treasury risks factors (CB=31.4%, IB=43.8%) and governance risks factors (CB=36.0%, 
IB=31.5%) in both banking systems.   
Table 6.23: Percentage of Internal Rating / Scoring Model Application 
feather 
Very 
Appropriate  % 
Appropriate  % Uncertain % Inappropriate % 
Very 
Inappropriate  % 
Transaction Risks 
CB 55.8 25.6 14.0 4.7 0.00 
IB 39.7 23.3 13.7 17.8 5.5 
Business Risks 
CB 41.9 29.1 24.4 4.7 0.00 
IB 26.0 38.4 31.5 4.1 0.00 
Treasury Risks 
CB 12.8 37.2 31.4 15.1 3.5 
IB 8.2 41.1 43.8 6.8 0.00 
Governance Risks 
CB 15.1 25.6 36.0 16.3 7.0 
IB 13.7 19.2 31.5 15.1 20.5 
Systemic Risks 
CB 9.3 7.0 22.1 36.0 25.6 
IB 21.9 16.4 20.5 27.4 13.7 
Chapter Six            Investigations of the Risk Assessment and Lending 
           Management Relationship: Comparative Interpretation and Results 
136 
 
However, according to respondents in both CB and IB systems, this model may not be 
suitable to measure systemic risks factor. CB and IB participants followed the same 
pattern in terms of suitability of applying value and risks––VaR––model to measure the 
majority of risks factors. Table 6.24 shows that the VaR model is appropriate to measure 
transaction and business risks factors: 54.7%, and 57.0% in IB and CB respectively. 
Similarly, 46.6% of the IB participants indicate the appropriateness of the VaR model to 
measure transaction and business risks factors. Furthermore, for the CB and IB systems, 
participants indicate that the VaR model is also appropriate for measuring treasury risk 
factor (64.0%, 56.2%) and governance risks factor (54.7%, 63.0%). For the systematic 
risks factors, 36.0% of the CB participants consider the VaR model somewhat 
inappropriate, in contrast to 53.4% of IB participants who confirm the model‘s suitability. 
Table 6.24: Percentage of VaR Model Application 
feather 
Very 
Appropriate  % 
Appropriate  % Uncertain % Inappropriate % 
Very 
Inappropriate  % 
Transaction Risks 
CB 15.1 54.7 26.7 2.3 1.2 
IB 13.7 46.6 13.7 15.1 11.0 
Business Risks 
CB 23.3 57.0 18.6 1.2 0.00 
IB 21.9 46.6 13.7 17.8 0.00 
Treasury Risks 
CB 10.5 64.0 22.1 1.2 2.3 
IB 6.8 56.2 16.4 20.5 0.00 
Governance Risks 
CB 12.8 54.7 26.7 2.3 3.5 
IB 8.2 63.0 26.0 2.7 0.00 
Systemic Risks 
CB 7.0 30.2 36.0 15.1 11.6 
IB 8.2 53.4 26.0 12.3 0.00 
Table 6.25 shows that using a beta/assets pricing model has been moderated by both CB 
and IB participants to measure transaction (40.7%, 41.1%), business (46.5%, 46.6%) and 
treasury (40.7%, 35.6%) risks factors. Implementation of these results indicates 
developing a beta model and assets pricing model is required to assess risk factors and 
consolidated risk management techniques.  
Table 6.25: Percentage of Beta & Assets Pricing Model Application 
feather 
Very 
Appropriate  % 
Appropriate  % Uncertain % Inappropriate % 
Very 
Inappropriate  % 
Transaction Risks 
CB 14.0 15.1 40.7 22.1 8.1 
IB 9.6 31.5 41.1 17.8 0.00 
Business Risks 
CB 14.0 15.1 46.5 16.3 8.1 
IB 8.2 30.1 46.6 15.1 0.00 
Treasury Risks 
CB 11.6 20.9 40.7 17.4 9.3 
IB 12.3 35.6 35.6 16.4 0.00 
Governance Risks 
CB 23.3 43.0 25.6 3.5 4.7 
IB 24.7 43.8 23.3 8.2 0.00 
Systemic Risks 
CB 68.6 22.1 2.3 2.3 4.7 
IB 47.9 31.5 20.5 0.00 0.00 
Nevertheless, Table 6.25 exhibits that the respondents from both banking systems 
consider the model is an appropriate one to measure governance risks factors 
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(CB=43.0%, IB=43.8%) and is highly appropriate for measuring systematic risks factor 
(CB=68.6%, IB=47.7%). In terms of risks factor assessment, however, both CB and IB 
systems were rigorously investigated as to whether they apply specific models to measure 
such risks factors or not.  
Table 6.26 exhibits that neither banks with Islamic compliance nor banks without Islamic 
compliance have applied specific models to measure such articulated risk factors. Even 
though a small number of the participants selected ‗yes‘, they did not specify which 
models have been actually used. However, the result is consistent with the findings of 
Cumming and Hirtle (2005) who reported that, in recent years, financial institutions and 
their supervisors have placed increased emphasis on the importance of measuring and 
managing risk on a firm-wide basis as a coordinated process.  
Table 6.26: Percentage of Specific Risks Model Applied 
feather Yes % No % 
Specific Models Applied for Transaction Risks Measurement 
CB 11.6 88.4 
IB 11.0 89.0 
Specific Models Applied for Business Risks Measurement 
CB 11.6 88.4 
IB 9.6 90.4 
Specific Models Applied for Treasury Risks Measurement 
CB 4.7 95.3 
IB 9.6 90.4 
Specific Models Applied for Governance Risks Measurement 
CB 7.0 93.0 
IB 9.6 90.4 
Specific Models Applied for Systemic Risks Measurement 
CB 12.8 87.2 
IB 11.0 89.0 
Therefore, the above discussion indicates that banks are often following a similar pattern 
in terms of their approach to measuring risk factors. Table 6.27 exhibits the results of t-
test for measuring risk factors approaches that have been extensively used in CB and IB 
systems. Principally, no significant difference is found between Islamic-based banks and 
non Islamic-based banks on the subjects of transaction, business, treasury, governance 
and systematic risk factors (p values are > 0.05 significant level in such risk factors).  
Table 6.27: T-test for Approaches to Measuring Risk Factors 
feather 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Specific Models Actually Applied for Measuring 
Transaction Risks  .070 .792 -.132 157 .895 -.11 .09 
Business Risks  .685 .409 -.412 157 .681 -.12 .08 
Treasury Risks 6.115 .014 1.189 128 .237 -.033 .13 
Governance Risks  1.425 .234 .596 157 .552 -.06 .11 
Systemic Risks  .501 .480 -.353 157 .725 -.12 .08 
Note: The equality of variance between the means of two samples not assumed if F value is significant 
(<0.05), and it is assumed if F value is not significant (>0.05).  
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Thus, the results displayed in Table 6.27 support hypothesis H1b and confirm that the 
incentive of quantifying risk models designed by researchers and practitioners in the 
finance fields for the agent principals is beneficial to control risk exposure. Therefore, the 
hypotheses that there is no difference in approaches to risk factors measurement between 
IB and CB––H1b––cannot be rejected.  
Although the benefits of this type of risk measurement are widely acknowledged, few—if 
any—financial firms have fully-developed systems in place today, suggesting that 
significant obstacles have led them to measure risks in a more segmented fashion. This 
finding is consistent with the results of a study by Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) which 
found that banks that improve their ability to measure risks may operate with greater 
leverage and may lend more of their assets to risky borrowers. 
6.4.2.3 Is Risk Factors Assessment Important for IB and CB? (H1c) 
Pyle (1997) concluded that recent financial disasters in financial and non-financial 
organisations and in governmental agencies point to the need for various forms of risk 
measurement. Further, Lehar (2005) found that banks and other financial institutions need 
to meet forthcoming regulatory requirements for risk measurement and capital.  
Typically, all these findings harmonise with the study objectives. However, the set of 
these risk factors––internal and external––are used here to examine the degree of risk 
visibility in CB and IB systems. Accordingly, the response to whether CB and IB systems 
are able to recognise the risk factors that may frequently involve every single act 
indicates the banks‘ considerations towards managing and controlling these risk factors.  
Table 6.28, therefore, exhibits that CBs and IBs often are able to determine the different 
types of risk factors.  
Table 6.28: Percentage of Internal/External Risks Visibility 
feather Always % Often % Occasionally  % Rarely % Never % 
Transaction Risks 
CB 14.0 38.4 27.9 12.8 7.0 
IB 15.1 24.7 30.1 24.7 5.5 
Business Risks 
CB 7.0 38.4 37.2 11.6 5.8 
IB 12.3 30.1 28.8 24.7 4.1 
Treasury Risks 
CB 7.0 46.5 31.4 10.5 4.7 
IB 8.2 35.6 38.4 17.8 0.00 
Governance Risks 
CB 12.8 41.9 33.7 4.7 7.0 
IB 17.8 35.6 31.5 15.1 0.00 
Systemic Risks 
CB 32.6 32.6 20.9 10.5 3.5 
IB 26.0 31.5 30.1 12.3 0.00 
The study survey asked respondents from both CB and IB systems to indicate the 
relationship between risk factors quality and lending portfolio quality. In the CB system, 
the results of Table 6.29 show that 77.9% of the respondents consider the relationship 
between risk factors and lending portfolio is strongly negative and negative (50.0% + 
27.9%); conversely, 84.9% of the respondents from the IB system reported that the 
relationship is strongly negative and negative (46.6% + 38.3%). Certainly, these results 
may not be similarly applicable for all types of risk factors, but provide general 
magnitude of the relationship in both banking systems.  
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Table 6.29: Percentage of Credit Portfolio Quality and Risks Portfolio Relationship 
feather 
Strongly 
positive % 
Positive  % Neutral % Negative  % 
Strongly 
negative % 
The Relationship Between Lending 
Portfolio & Risk Factors Portfolio 
CB 0.00 3.5 18.6 27.9 50.0 
IB 0.00 0.00 15.1 38.3 46.6 
Generally, there is no universally accepted criterion for establishing the magnitude of a 
risk factors value necessary to identify the quality of a lending portfolio. However, the 
quality of lending portfolio––quality control––should be administrated as much as the 
quantity risks factors. Bansal et al. (1991) investigated how changes in the evaluation 
strategies supporting these tasks have led to improvements in the control of risks and in 
the design of products which involve risk factors. Therefore, the theoretical relationship 
between risk quantity and portfolio quality is depicted in Figure 6.2.        
Figure 6.2: Theoretical Relationship between Risk Quantity and Portfolio Quality 
 
The following discussion attempts to focus narrowly on the relationship of such risk 
factors within the lending portfolio quality. Specifically, Table 6.30 shows the summary 
of the Pearson correlation coefficients which were used to test the linear relations 
between such risk factors (transaction; business; treasury; governance; and systemic) and 
the factors of lending portfolio quality that include: 1) lending portfolio diversification; 2) 
lending types-secured/direct loan; 3) lending types-unsecured/indirect loan; 4) managing 
risks of lending portfolio-productivity and performance; 5) measuring risks of lending 
portfolio efficiency; and 6) measuring risks of lending portfolio capital adequacy. The 
correlation coefficients matrices summarised in Table 6.30 are fully presented in 
Appendix K.  
Firstly: Transaction Risk Factor  
Table 6.30 exhibits correlation coefficients matrices. Accordingly, the results of 
correlation coefficient r show that transaction risk factor in the CB system has been 
significantly and positively correlated with unsecured loan factor (p = 0.007<0.01, r = -
0.288), and fairly positively correlated with lending productivity and performance factor 
(r = 0.158). In contrast, the IB system is different from the CB system,  Table 6.30 shows 
the transaction risk factor and lending portfolio diversification relationship which was 
somewhat lower and negative (r = - 0.119), however, there is a significant negative 
relationship between this risk factor and measuring capital adequacy factor (p = 
0.011<0.05, r = - 0.298). 
Source: developed by the author, 2008 
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Table 6.30: Summary of Pearson Correlation Coefficients Test - CB & IB 
RP / LP 
CB IB 
TR BR TyR GR SR TR BR TyR GR SR 
LPD .068 -.139 -.032 .156 .069 -.119 -.139 -.168 -.115 -.102 
DLT -.087 .216*** .154 .213** .146 .068 .216*** .082 .143 .146 
ILT .288* .276** .040 -.076 .070 .097 .276** .217*** .192 .133 
LPerM 
.158 .040 .206*** .235** -.153 
.041 .040 .013 -.133 -.118 
LProM -.083 -.137 -.130 -.106 -.239** 
LPE -.031 -.137 -.041 .227** .237** .012 -.009 .031 -.009 .112 
CA -.039 -.051 .018 .150 .055 -.298** -.051 -.038 -.142 .011 
Note: PC analysis was mainly used to identify underlying factors which, in turn, was the basis for this 
analysis step.  Managing risks of lending portfolio in CB system has been loaded in one factor. 
 TR: Transaction Risks. BR: Business Risks. TyR: Treasury Risks. GR: Governance Risks SR: Systemic 
Risks Factor.  
 LPD: Lending Portfolio Diversification Factor. DLT: Lending Types Factor (Direct loan). ILT: 
Lending Types Factor (Indirect loan). LPerM: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending 
performance). LProM: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending productivity). CA: 
Measuring Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Capital Adequacy). LPE: Measuring Risks of Lending 
Portfolio Factor (lending efficiency). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0. 01 level (2-tailed), n: CB=86 and IB=73. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0. 05 level (2-tailed), n: CB=86 and IB=73. 
***.Correlation is significant at the 0. 10 level (2-tailed), n: CB=86 and IB=73. 
 
Secondly: Business Risk Factor  
From Table 6.30 it can be seen that only lending productivity and performance 
management factor correlated significantly and positively with business risk factor in the 
CB system (p = 0.011<0.05, r = 0.272); conversely, the IB system coefficients present a 
significant and positive relationship between business risk factor and unsecured loan 
factor ( p = 0.018<0.05, r = 0.267). Furthermore, in the CB system, and as Table 6.30 
shows, lending portfolio diversification, secured loan and unsecured loan factors 
somewhat positively correlated with business risk factor (r = 0.183, 0.205 and 0.152 
respectively). In the IB system, however, the business risk factor fairly correlates 
negatively with lending portfolio diversification and lending productivity factors (r = -
0.139 and 0.1370 respectively), and fairly correlates positively with the direct loan factor 
(r = 0.216).     
Thirdly: Treasury Risk Factor  
Table 6.30 also indicates that there is no significant relationship (p>0.05) between 
treasury risk factor and the lending portfolio quality factor correlation in both banking 
systems. Typically, in the CB system, secured loan factor, as well as lending productivity 
and performance factor, positively correlated with the treasury risk factor. Within the IB 
system, however, indirect loan factor positively correlated with treasury risk factor (r = 
0.217). Nevertheless, as Table 6.30 indicates, there exists a somewhat negative 
correlation between this risk factor and lending portfolio diversification factor (r = - 
0.168) and lending productivity factor (r = -0.130).  
Fourthly: Governance Risk Factor  
In regard to this aspect, the relationship between governance risk factor and the quality of 
lending portfolio factors seems similar in both CB and IB systems, where the correlation 
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is fairly significant with almost all lending portfolio factors. Therefore, in the CB system, 
the governance risk factor correlated significantly with secured loan factor (p = 
0.049<0.05, r = 0.213), lending productivity and performance factor (p = 0.030<0.05, r = 
0.235), and pending efficiency factor (p = 0.036<0.05, r = 0.227). However, lower 
correlations appeared between this risk factor and capital adequacy factor (r = 0.150), and 
lending portfolio diversification factor (r = 0.156). In contrast, the governance risk factor 
fairly correlated with almost all lending portfolio quality factors in the IB system. This 
risk factor correlates with lending portfolio diversification factor negatively (r = -0.115); 
direct loan factor positively (r = 0.143); indirect loan factor positively (r = 0.192); 
lending performance factor negatively (r = -0.133); lending productivity factor negatively 
(r= -0.106); and capital adequacy factor negatively (r = -0.142).  
Finally: Systemic Risk Factor  
From Table 6.30, it can be seen that within the CB system there is a considerable positive 
relationship between systemic risk factor and lending efficiency measurement factor (p = 
0.028<0.05, r = 0.237), and this risk factor fairly correlated with secured loan factor (r = 
0.146), and lending productivity and performance factor (r = -0.153). In contrast, in the 
IB system, systemic risk factor significantly and negatively correlated with lending 
productivity factor (p = 0.042<0.05, r = -0.239).  Further, a lower negative correlation is 
found between the systemic risk factor and lending portfolio diversification factor (r = -
0.102), and lending performance factor (r = -0.118); contrasting to direct and indirect 
lending factors which have been positively correlated to this risk factor (r = 0.146 and r = 
0.133) respectively. 
Overall, the results showed the correlation coefficient at all the significant levels of 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10. However, the conclusions are drawn from test of significant levels of 0.01 
and 0.05 only. Discussion above asserts that there are both somewhat positive/negative 
relationships between risk factors and the quality of lending portfolio factors. These 
results are consistent with Bansal et al.‘s (1991) finding that in both banking systems––
CB and IB––regulators are actively formulating strategies to control risk factors, thereby 
suggesting that although new technologies create significant opportunities to improve 
global and departmental risk management, the cost function for risk management 
strategies should be considered. These results also are consistent with the findings of 
many other researchers who have used the relationship techniques to examine the 
relations of different orientation in their studies (Abdullah 2003; Batchelor 2005; 
Jericevic 2002; Podder 2005). Thus, for the CB and IB systems, the results contradict the 
expectation stated in the null hypothesis––H1c––no relationship between risks factors 
and lending portfolio quality factors, and H1c cannot be accepted.  
Table 6.31: T-test for Lending Portfolio and Risk Factors Portfolio Relationship 
feather 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Lending Portfolio & Risk 
factors Portfolio Relationship 
1.204 .274 -.106 157 .916 -.25 .23 
Note: The equality of variance between the means of two samples not assumed if F value is significant 
(<0.05), and it is assumed if F value is not significant (>0.05).  
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To this end, an additional contribution from this study is defining whether CB and IB 
systems vary in terms of recognising the relationship between risks and lending portfolio 
factors. Table 6.31 of t-test examines this difference, and the results show no evidence 
that CB and IB systems are different when considering the relationship between these two 
factors (p = .916>0.05, r = -0.106).  
6.4.2.4 Summary of H1 - Test Results 
The above analysis of hypothesis1 (H1a, H1b and H1c) indicates those counterparts of 
Islamic and non-Islamic banking systems operating in the ME region are more efficient in 
risks factors assessment. Further, the CB and IB systems are fairly equal in their 
approach, and there is evidence that all risk factors implicitly affect the quality of lending 
portfolio performance. In part, the study has analysed CB and IB systems independently, 
and then compared them. Accordingly, the results of testing the H1 indicate that 
differentiation between both banking groups was somewhat significant. Finally, the test 
results are summarised and shown in Table 6.32.   
Table 6.32: Test Results for the Hypothesis-1 
Feature Content of the Hypotheses Test results 
H1a 
There is no difference in factors considered in credit risk 
assessment and lending decision in CB and IB systems. 
Supported 
H1b 
There is no difference in measurement approaches used for 
such risk factors in CB and IB systems. 
Supported 
H1c 
There is no relationship between risk factors and default 
risks portfolio in CB and IB systems. 
Unsupported 
 
6.4.3 The Influence of Risk Factors on Lending Decision-making 
The association between risk factors and the rationality of lending decision-making is 
measured using linear regression models. Separate pooled regressions are conducted on 
each of the three models mentioned in section 6.2 above. A positive/negative response 
coefficient is expected according to previous risk and lending portfolio studies (Allen, 
DeLong & Sauners 2004; Andrea & Monks 1999; Bessis 2001), as well as determinants 
of lending portfolio returns and the lending structure studies (Armstrong & Ashworth 
2000; Bashir 1983; Berry 1993; Cardozo & Smith Jr 1983).  
In general, underlying factors identified by factor analysis (Principal Component PC) 
were mainly used as the basis for the following analysis steps. As noted earlier, the 
examination of these three regression models are performed to test the second hypothesis 
of the study and discussed in two significance levels ‗**‘ 5% and ‗***‘ 1%, and the 
discussions are presented as follows.   
6.4.3.1 Risk Factors Influence the Rationality of Lending Decision-
making in IB and CB - H2a 
Generally, rational decision making for allocating loans is affected by risk factors 
assessment and the rational lending decision cannot be economically performed without 
considering different types of risk factors. Model M1 indicates that rational lending 
decision making for allocating a loan can be performed by considering: loan characters 
CC; religious affiliations RA; and bank‘s external and internal circumstances EC & IC.  
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Table 6.33: M1: Consideration Issues in Loans Allocation Policy 
feather IB CB 
CC EC IC RA CC EC IC 
TR: 1 
TR: 2 
.168 
- 
.601 
- 
.398 
- 
1.124 
- 
.957 
-.678 
2.105** 
.211 
-1.766* 
-.945 
BR .947 .482 1.045 .682 -.545 1.331 .979 
TyR -.278 -.599 -.987 -.684 .198 -.838 3.364*** 
GR: 1 
GR: 2 
GR: 3 
.558 
-.337 
1.436 
-.296 
-1.487 
.330 
-.641 
1.654 
.034 
-2.171* 
1.668 
-.748 
.886 
-2.499** 
- 
.113 
-1.381 
- 
.661 
1.894* 
- 
SR .667 -.920 -1.773* -.757 1.311 -1.511 .849 
F-value 1.467 .613 1.373 1.885* 1.769 1.884* 5.646*** 
R square .136 .062 .129 .169 .137 .145 .336 
Residual 62.178 67.543 62.728 59.853 73.352 72.706 56.415 
CC: loan‘s characters. RA: religious affiliations. EC& IC: external & internal circumstances. TR: 1 & 2 
highly & low applicable transaction risks. BR: applicable business risks. TyR: applicable treasury risks. 
GR: 1, 2 & 3 high, medium & low applicable governance risks. SR: applicable systematic risks.  
Note: * indicates significance under 0.1 confidence level, ** indicates significance under 0.05 confidence 
level, and *** indicates significance under 0.01confidence level. Only ‗**‘ and ‗***‘ are discussed. 
For the CB, out of the seven entries of risk factors
84
, transaction risk.1 (TR:1) influences 
the rationality of lending decision making with a significant relation to banks‘ external 
circumstances (t = 2.105<0.05) as shown in Table 6.33; while banks‘ internal 
circumstances are significantly related to treasury risk (TyR) (t =3.364<0.01). The 
rationality of lending decision making is influenced by governance risk.2 (GR:2) because 
their relation with loan characters (CC) is significant (t = -2.499<0.05). In contrast, in IB, 
Table 6.33 shows that there are no risk factors which significantly influence the 
rationality of landing decision making in terms of allocative loans policy.  
Table 6.34: M2a: Loan Authorisation Policy (risk portfolio consideration issues)  
feather IB CB 
IA REC LD IA REC 
TR: 1 
TR: 2 
.150 
- 
-1.145 
- 
.029 
- 
-.474 
.285 
-2.581** 
-.718 
BR -.999 -.403 -.795 .723 .585 
TyR .383 .010 .838 -2.895*** -1.863* 
GR: 1 
GR: 2 
GR: 3 
-.645 
-2.294** 
-1.634 
.224 
1.630 
-2.156** 
.796 
-.187 
-1.063 
.084 
-.023 
- 
-.683 
2.397** 
- 
SR 1.729* .985 -.636 -.128 -.617 
F-value 1.760 1.417 .604 1.779 4.077*** 
R square .159 .132 .061 .138 .268 
Residual 60.528 62.466 67.606 73.298 62.230 
IA: information asymmetry. REC: risk exposure control. LD: lending disciplines. TR: 1 & 2 highly & low 
applicable transaction risks. BR: applicable business risks. TyR: applicable treasury risks. GR: 1, 2 & 3 
high, medium & low applicable governance risks. SR: applicable systematic risks.  
Note: * indicates significance under 0.1 confidence level, ** indicates significance under 0.05 confidence 
level, and *** indicates significance under 0.01confidence level. Only ‗**‘ and ‗***‘ are discussed. 
In terms of making rational decisions in authorising loans stage (model M2a), some 
variables are referred to risk portfolios management (such as: information asymmetry 
                                                 
84
 There are some different types of risk loaded under such risk factors that are used in this analysis by 
utilising principal component technique. For more details see Appendix L.  
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(IA); risk exposure control (REC); and lending disciplines (LD) and have to be 
considered—as shown in Table 6.34. Table 6.34 shows that the rational decision of 
authorising loans in IB is influenced by governance risk.2 (GR:2) and governance risk.3 
(GR:3) t = -2.294<0.05 and t = -2.156<0.05 respectively, which are significantly related 
to information asymmetry and risk exposure control respectively. 
Table 6.34, also shows that the rational lending decision-making in the CB system 
appears affected by treasury risk (TyR) which is significantly related to information 
asymmetry factor (t = -2.895<0.01), as well as being affected by transaction risk.1 (TR:1) 
( t =-2.581<0.05) and governance risk.2 (GR:2) (t = 2.397<0.05)—which are significantly 
correlated with risk exposure control. Furthermore, rational lending decision in 
authorising loans stage can be performed by considering factors related to lending 
portfolio (model M2b), such as: lenders characteristics (LeC); shari`a compliance (SC); 
borrowers characteristics (BC); shareholders and investors (S&IC); and location of both 
borrowers and lenders (LoC).   
Table 6.35 shows that the rationality of lending decision making in the IB system is 
influenced by governance risk.2 (GR:2) which is significantly related to shari`a 
compliance (t = -2.110<0.05), and governance risk.3 (GR:3), in turn, is also significantly 
related to lenders‘ characteristics (t = -3.303<0.01). However, the policy of making 
rational lending decisions in CB is influenced by governance risk.2 (GR:2) which is 
significantly correlated with lenders‘ characteristics (t = 2.410<0.05), and location 
characteristics of borrowers and lenders (t = 2.419<0.05). Also, governance risk.1 (GR:1) 
is significantly related to shareholders and investors (t = 2.128<0.05). Systematic risk 
influences the rationality of lending decision in both IB and CB systems. In IB, it is 
significantly related to the lenders‘ characteristics (t = 1.956<0.05), whilst in CB it is 
significantly related to shareholders‘ and investors‘ considerations (t = -2.495<0.05).  
Table 6.35: M2b: Loan Authorisation Policy (lending portfolio consideration issues) 
feather IB CB 
LeC SC BC S&IC LeC LoC 
TR: 1 
TR: 2 
1.093 
- 
1.130 
- 
-1.179 
-1.725* 
-.489 
1.076 
.908 
-.330 
-.943 
-.888 
BR -.120 -.387 1.402 -1.465 -1.139 -.696 
TyR .480 -.740 .546 -.745 .594 -.718 
GR: 1 
GR: 2 
GR: 3 
-.852 
.451 
-3.303*** 
-1.186 
-2.110** 
-1.398 
.754 
1.773* 
- 
2.128** 
-1.345 
- 
.247 
2.410** 
- 
.202 
2.419** 
- 
SR 1.956** 1.681* -.085 -2.495** -1.404 -1.142 
F-value 1.925* 1.687 1.223 3.512*** 1.817* 2.295** 
R square .172 .154 .099 .240 .140 .171 
Residual 59.638 60.933 76.592 64.628 73.084 70.484 
LeC: lender‘s characteristics. SC: shari‟a compliance. BC: borrower‘s characteristics. S&IC: shareholders 
& investors characteristics. LoC: location characteristics. TR: 1 & 2 highly & low applicable transaction 
risks. BR: applicable business risks. TyR: applicable treasury risks. GR: 1, 2 & 3 high, medium & low 
applicable governance risks. SR: applicable systematic risks.  
Note: * indicates significance under 0.1 confidence level, ** indicates significance under 0.05 confidence 
level, and *** indicates significance under 0.01confidence level. Only ‗**‘ and ‗***‘ are discussed. 
Table 6.36 shows that making rational lending decisions whilst considering risk factors 
measurements (model M3) is significantly impacted by treasury risk (TyR) (t = 
2.391<0.05) in CB, while performing rational lending decisions in IB is significantly 
impacted by governance risk.1 (GR:1) (t = 2.207<0.05). 
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Table 6.36: M3: Consideration Issues in DM and Measurement of Risk Factors 
 feather IB CB 
D/R D/R 
TR: 1 
TR: 2 
-.468 
- 
.342 
.074 
BR -.427 -1.362 
TyR -.501 2.391** 
GR: 1 
GR: 2 
GR: 3 
2.207** 
.189 
1.324 
1.349 
-.751 
- 
SR .254 .208 
F-value 1.303 1.858* 
R square .123 .143 
Residual 63.142 72.850 
D/R: making lending decision whilst considering risk factors measurements. TR: 1 & 2 highly & low 
applicable transaction risks. BR: applicable business risks. TyR: applicable treasury risks. GR: 1, 2 & 3 
high, medium & low applicable governance risks. SR: applicable systematic risks.  
Note: * indicates significance under 0.1 confidence level, ** indicates significance under 0.05 confidence 
level, and *** indicates significance under 0.01confidence level. Only ‗**‘ and ‗***‘ are discussed. 
To this end, loan allocations and authorisation are not mitigated policies. These policies 
comprise different aspects that have to be considered by lending decision makers.  
Through the analysis in M1, M2a and M2b, issues which might be affecting the 
rationality of lending decisions policies have been examined. For the IB and CB, the 
summary of results from these models suggest that risk factors influencing the rationality 
of lending decisions are somewhat varied in these banking systems. Thus, tests provide 
evidence that risk factors influence the rationality of lending decision and they are 
different between IB and CB, and H2a cannot be rejected.  
6.4.3.2 Rational Lending Decision and Risk Measurement Approaches 
in IB and CB - H2b 
A large number of risk measurement models/approaches are performed to meet the 
variation in risk factors in the financial and banking industry. Among them, three 
common approaches, namely, internal rate or scoring model IR/S, value and risk model 
VaR, and asset pricing and beta model AP/B are widely used in banking institutions
85
 
(Cebenoyan & Strahan 2004; Claessens & Embrechts 2003). These models were 
examined to explain whether they influence the rationality of lending decision making in 
IB and CB differently in terms of loans allocation stage and loans authorisation stage. 
The same dependent variables of making rational lending decisions that was used in M1, 
M2a, M2b and M3 above are also regressed to IR/S:1 and IR/S:2; VaR:1 and VaR:2; and 
AP/B models of measuring risk factors. These are formulated as M4, M5[a, b] and M6 
regression model (see section 6.2.3 above).  
For IB, Table 6.37 shows that the use of value and risk.1 (VaR:1) model of measuring risk 
factors influence the rationality of lending decisions at the loan allocation stage (model 
M4), which is significantly correlated with banks‘ external circumstances (t = 
2.269<0.05). There is also a significant relationship between banks‘ internal 
circumstances and the use of internal rate or scoring.1 (IR/S:1) model of measuring risk 
factors (t = 4.341<0.01) and the use of asset pricing and beta (AP/B) model of measuring 
                                                 
85
 Principal component factor analysis has been applied and indicates that the use of these models to 
measure risk factors are varied from risk factor to other and also varied from one banking system to another.  
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risk factors  (t =2.813<0.01), which indicates these models have influenced the rationality 
of lending decisions significantly. In contrast to IB, the use of internal rate or scoring.1 
(IR/S:2) model of measuring risk factors in CB, and value and risk.2 (VaR:2) model of 
measuring risk factors influence lending decisions, and they are significant with the 
loan‘s characteristics variable t = -2.540<0.05 and 4.282<0.01 respectively. However, the 
use of value and risk.1 (VaR:1) model of measuring risk factors in CB is significant with 
banks‘ internal circumstances.  
Table 6.37: M4: Consideration Issues in Loans Allocation Policy 
feather IB CB 
CC EC IC RA CC EC IC 
IR/S: 1 
IR/S: 2 
1.361 
- 
-.098 
- 
4.341*** 
- 
-.966 
- 
-.081 
-2.540** 
1.623 
1.421 
.689 
-.834 
VaR: 1 
VaR: 2 
.607 
.775 
2.269** 
.298 
1.219 
-1.246 
2.759 
.089* 
1.625 
4.282*** 
-.238 
1.628 
2.628** 
.177 
AP/B -.548 -.053 2.813*** -.091* 1.389 .117 -1.134 
F-value .977 1.382 5.348*** 2.520** 5.285*** 2.337** 2.375** 
R square .054 .075 .239 .129 .248 .127 .129 
Residual 68.085 66.586 54.770 62.706 63.896 74.167 74.014 
CC: loan‘s characters. RA: religious affiliations. EC& IC: external & internal circumstances. IR/S: 1&2 
highly appropriate & loss appropriate internal rates & scoring model. VaR: 1&2 highly appropriate & loss 
appropriate value at risk model. AP/B highly appropriate & loss appropriate asset pricing and beta model. 
Note: * indicates significance under 0.1 confidence level, ** indicates significance under 0.05 confidence 
level, and *** indicates significance under 0.01confidence level. Only ‗**‘ and ‗***‘ are discussed. 
Table 6.38 shows that loans authorisation policy (model M5a, b) in IB is seemingly not 
affected by the use of risk measurement approaches, which are not significantly related 
with recognition of information asymmetry, risk exposure control and lending disciplines. 
However, in CB, the use of internal rate or scoring.1 (IR/S:1) model of measuring risk 
factors and value and risk.2 (VaR:2) model of measuring risk factors are significantly 
related with information asymmetry variable at the loan authorisation stage. This 
indicates that the optimality of lending decisions has been influenced by these two 
models.    
Table 6.38: M5a: Loan Authorisation Policy (risk portfolio consideration issues) 
feather IB CB 
IA REC LD IA REC 
IR/S: 1 
IR/S: 2 
-.484 
- 
.893 
- 
.771 
- 
-2.748*** 
1.760* 
-1.250 
1.969* 
VaR: 1 
VaR: 2 
1.209 
.567 
-1.152 
-.659 
-.879 
-.055 
.441 
-2.576** 
-.412 
1.025 
AP/B -.491 1.374 1.132 -1.830* -.666 
F-value .555 .941 .604 4.276*** 1.669 
R square .032 .052 .034 .211 .094 
Residual 69.722 68.223 69.531 67.076 76.970 
IA: information asymmetry. REC: risk exposure control. LD: lending disciplines. IR/S: 1&2 highly 
appropriate & loss appropriate internal rates & scoring model. VaR: 1&2 highly appropriate & loss 
appropriate value at risk model. AP/B highly appropriate & loss appropriate asset pricing and beta model.  
Note: * indicates significance under 0.1 confidence level, ** indicates significance under 0.05 confidence 
level, and *** indicates significance under 0.01confidence level. Only ‗**‘ and ‗***‘ are discussed. 
With a recognition of shari`a compliance variable in Table 6.39, statistics suggest that 
loan authorisation policy in IB is influenced by the use of value and risk.1 (VaR:1) model 
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of measuring risk factors (t = -1.948<0.05), value and risk.2 (VaR:2) model of measuring 
risk factors (t = -3.046<0.01) and asset pricing and beta (AP/B) model of measuring risk 
factors (t = 3.340<0.01).  
Table 6.39: M5b: Loan Authorisation Policy (lending portfolio consideration issues) 
feather IB CB 
LeC SC BC S&IC LeC LoC 
IR/S: 1 
IR/S: 2 
.282 
- 
.557 
- 
-1.311 
-.589 
-1.588 
2.234** 
-.433 
-1.861* 
-2.312** 
-.436 
VaR: 1 
VaR: 2 
1.268 
.300 
-1.948** 
-3.046*** 
2.758*** 
1.566 
-1.367 
.635 
1.001 
.707 
-.002 
.056 
AP/B -.444 3.340*** 2.088** 1.969* -.577 .995 
F-value .477 5.372*** 4.019*** 4.160*** .927 1.945* 
R square .027 .240 .201 .206 .055 .108 
Residual 70.035 54.711 67.937 67.461 80.347 75.788 
LeC: lender‘s characteristics. SC: shari`a compliance. BC: borrower‘s characteristics. S&IC: shareholders 
& investors characteristics. LoC: location characteristics. IR/S: 1&2 highly appropriate & loss appropriate 
internal rates & scoring model. VaR: 1&2 highly appropriate & loss appropriate value at risk model. AP/B 
highly appropriate & loss appropriate asset pricing and beta model.  
Note: * indicates significance under 0.1 confidence level, ** indicates significance under 0.05 confidence 
level, and *** indicates significance under 0.01confidence level. Only ‗**‘ and ‗***‘ are discussed. 
In contrast, loan authorisation policy in CB is influenced by the use of internal rate or 
scoring.1 (IR/S:1) model of measuring risk factors which is significantly correlated to 
borrowers‘ and lenders‘ location (t = -2.312<0.05), but the use of internal rate or scoring.2 
(IR/S:2) model of measuring risk factors is significantly associated with shareholders‘ and 
investors‘ considerations (t = 2.234<0.05). Furthermore, the use of value and risk.1 
(VaR:1) model in CB of measuring risk factors and asset pricing and beta (AP/B) model of 
measuring risk factors are influencing authorisation policies and significantly correlated 
with borrowers‘ consideration t = 2.758<0.01 and t = 2.088<0.05 respectively.  
Table 6.40: M6: Consideration Issues in DM and Measurement of Risk Factors 
feather IB CB 
D/R D/R 
IR/S: 1 
IR/S: 2 
2.120** 
- 
.585 
.373 
VaR: 1 
VaR: 2 
1.038 
-1.504 
2.282** 
2.618** 
AP/B -1.246 -3.810*** 
F-value 2.718** 6.128*** 
R square .138 .277 
Residual 62.075 61.461 
D/R: making lending decision whilst considering risk factors measurements. IR/S: 1&2 highly appropriate 
& loss appropriate internal rates & scoring model. VaR: 1&2 highly appropriate & loss appropriate value at 
risk model. AP/B highly appropriate & loss appropriate asset pricing and beta model.  
Note: * indicates significance under 0.1 confidence level, ** indicates significance under 0.05 confidence 
level, and *** indicates significance under 0.01confidence level. Only ‗**‘ and ‗***‘ are discussed. 
Discussion above focuses on whether the use of different approaches to measure different 
risk factors influence the rationality of lending decision making (models M4 and M5a,b). 
At this point, the rationality of lending decision making was regressed with the 
importance of measuring risk factors as formulated in model M6. Consequently, Table 
6.40 shows that IB has given high consideration to the importance of using internal rate 
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or scoring.1 (IR/S:1) model (t = 2.120<0.05) of measuring risk factors. However, in CB, 
high importance was given to value and risk.1 (VaR:1), value and risk.2 (VaR:2) and asset 
pricing and beta (AP/B) models of measuring risk factors  t = 2.282<0.05, t = 2.618<0.01, 
t = -3.810<0.01 respectively. Not surprisingly, results in this part are consistent with the 
results from M1, M2a, M2b and M3 above.  
The previous three regression models M4, M5[a, b], and M6 mainly examined the 
relationships between the rationality of lending decision variables and models/approaches 
of risk measurement. High attention was given to the loading of principal component 
analysis for risk measurement models in IB and CB. By the use of these components of 
risk measurement models, results from two different sets––IB and CB––suggest that IB 
use different models to measure different types of risk similar to CB, but they did not 
follow the same pattern. Also, the rationality of lending decisions is impacted by some 
models usage being different to that used in CB. Overall, findings from this examination 
provide evidence that null H2b cannot be rejected, and it is accepted.   
6.4.3.3 Rational Lending Decision and Risk Factors Relationship in IB 
and CB - H2c 
The discussion above highlights the risk factors that influence the rationality of lending 
decision making at the allocation and authorisation stages. These factors vary between IB 
and CB and have been described in detail in Appendix M. To examine relationships 
between these risk factors and the rationality of lending decision making, Pearson 
correlation test ( r ) was conducted. At the beginning, the researcher assumes that all 
relationships between all the rationality of lending decision making, and these risk factors 
can be significant and similar in both IB and CB systems. Now, despite the fact the 
rationality of lending decision making in each banking system has been influenced by 
different risk factors, the correlation between them is not clearly formed. Correlation 
matrixes for all risk factors which had marked significant relationships with the 
rationality of lending decision making are provided in Appendix N.  
Table 6.41 provides a summary of the risk factor relationships that have been marked as 
influencing the rationality of lending decision making in IB and CB separately. For CB, 
the relationship between transaction risk.1 (TR:1) factor is highly correlated with risk 
exposure control REC only, and negatively significant (r = -.376<0.01). However, treasury 
risk (TyR) factor is positively significantly correlated with banks‘ internal considerations 
(IC) (r = .520<0.01) and the importance of measuring risk (D/R) (r = .321<0.01), while 
negatively significantly correlated with information asymmetry IA (r = -.353<0.01). 
Governance risk.2 (GR:2) factor is negatively significantly correlated with loan‘s 
characters CC (r = -.217<0.05), and positively significantly correlated with lenders‘ 
consideration LeC (r = .268<0.05). Finally, systematic risk (SR) factor is negatively 
significantly correlated with shareholders and investors S&IC (r = -.361<0.01).  
In contrast to CB, for IB the relationship of governance risk.2 (GR:2) factor between 
information asymmetry IA and shari`a compliance SC is a significant and negative r = -
.283<0.05 and r = -.256<0.05 respectively. However, governance risk.3 (GR:3) factor is 
negatively significantly correlated with risk exposure control REC and with lenders‘ 
considerations LeC r = -.243<0.05 and r = -.285<0.05 respectively. Overall, results 
suggest that even though risk factors are influenced, the rationality of lending decision is 
somewhat not significantly correlated with the rationality variables. 
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Table 6.41: Summary of Pearson Correlations  
Feather 
IB CB 
GR1 GR2 GR3 SR TR1 TrY GR1 GR2 SR 
M1 
CC        -.217*  
EC     .202     
IC      .520**    
RA          
M2a 
IA  -.283* -.086   -.353**    
REC  .175 -.243*  -.376**   .087  
LD          
M2b 
LeC  .106 -.285* .055    .268*  
SC  -.256* -.044       
BC          
S&IC       -.036  -.361** 
LoC        .158  
M3 D/R .256*     .321**    
M1: CC: loan‘s characters. RA: religious affiliations. EC& IC: external & internal circumstances.  
M2a: IA: information asymmetry. REC: risk exposure control. LD: lending disciplines/R: making lending 
decision whilst considering risk factors measurements.  
M2b: LeC: lender‘s characteristics. SC: shari`a compliance. BC: borrower‘s characteristics. S&IC: 
shareholders & investors characteristics. LoC: location characteristics.  
TR: 1 highly applicable transaction risks. TyR: applicable treasury risks. GR: 1, 2 & 3 high, medium & low  
        applicable governance risks. SR: applicable systematic risks.  
Note:  *.Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. **.Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. (2-tailed). 
Overall, the summary of results from Pearson correlation coefficients show no consistent 
associations among risk factors and the rationality of lending decision making factors in 
both IB and CB. Relationships between the rationality of lending decision were marked 
negative with some risk factors risk factors and positive with others. Thus, for the CB and 
IB systems, the results contradict the expectation stated in the null hypothesis––H2c––no 
relationship between risks factors and the rationality of lending decision making and H2c 
cannot be accepted.   
6.4.3.4 Summary of H2 - Test Results 
The analysis made above was mainly for the purpose of making a statistical decision on 
the second research––H2. A comparison between IB and CB systems has been obtained 
in order to determine what risk factors have affected the rationality of lending decisions. 
Accordingly, results of testing H2 are summarised in Table 6.42.     
Table 6.42: Test Results for the Hypothesis-2 
Feature Content of the Hypotheses Test results 
H2a 
There is no difference in factors considered in credit risk which 
influence the rationality of lending decisions in CB and IB 
systems. 
Supported  
H2b 
There is no difference in measurement approaches used for such 
risk factors that influence the rationality of lending decisions in 
CB and IB systems. 
Supported 
H2c 
There is no relationship between risk factors and default risks 
portfolio which influence the rationality of lending decisions in 
CB and IB systems. 
Unsupported 
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6.5 Conclusion  
In summary, the analysis was undertaken using primary data for two different samples of 
CB and IB. This chapter provides the description of an assessment of the risk factors and 
their relationship with the lending portfolio performance. Furthermore, the analysis in this 
chapter determines what risk factors influence the rationality of lending decisions and 
whether they differ between IB and CB. To this extent, all variables considered in this 
study seem reliable, due to the Cranach‘s Alpha, which is based on the average 
correlation items within the reliability test. Thereby, the test indicates that the overall 
scale measurement after removing items that signed lowest correlation coefficient support 
the reliability of the data and the Bartlett's test of sphericity is large and significant 
(>0.05) for most variables, and then the factorability is assumed. Accordingly, factor 
analysis presented some underlying or latent variables used for this study in both CB and 
IB systems. Typically, to make the pattern of loadings easier to interpret risk and lending 
portfolio variables, the factors are rotated to maximise the loadings of the variables on 
some of the factors and reduce them on others to achieve a simple structure in general.  
Independent samples t-test and Pearson correlation statistical instruments are used to 
examine the hypothesis 1. The results provide evidence that hypotheses H1a and H1b can 
be supported; conversely H1c, which lacks statistical support is thus rejected. In addition, 
linear regression by formulating the rationality of lending decision making policies as 
dependent variables and profile of risk factors as independent variables is conducted for 
each of the banking system separately. The results as presented in M1, M2[a, b] and M3, 
indicate that some positive/negative response coefficients are significant which suggests 
that, to some extent, there is a relationship between risk factors assessment and rationality 
of lending decision making in IB and CB. In order to achieve the entire analysis, a further 
investigation into rationalising lending decisions––efficiency––will be the focus of 
Chapter 7. 
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN  
ENSURING THE RATIONALITY LEVELS OF 
LENDING DECISION MAKING: COMPARATIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS AND RESULTS    
7.1 Introduction 
Typically, literature explains that decision-making in banks consists of rational 
combinations of different securities in terms of their weightings into portfolios that 
minimise portfolio risk for each level of expected portfolio return, typically known as an 
efficient frontier (Cooper, Seiford & Tone 2000). When referring to this concise 
statement, perceptions of those financial instruments and the financial environment 
affects the banks‘ performance and, in an IB system, might not be ideal. However, the 
aim of this chapter is to provide potential evidence in relation to the rationality of lending 
decision making by adopting an efficiency model. The findings reported in this chapter 
also attempt to bridge the gap between Islamic and non-Islamic financial circles by 
extending bankers‘ knowledge. Therefore, through utilising bank level data, the study 
examines the efficiency indicators of CBs and IBs in the Middle East during the period 
2001-2006. Additionally, an analysis of the results will subsequently present the probable 
similarities and differences between these two diverse banking systems.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the relationship between 
economic efficiency measures and rationality of lending decision making. It outlines the 
components of total efficiency, and allocative and a scope efficiency. Following this, 
section 3 provides a computing framework within data envelopment analysis DEA. The 
parameters of CB and IB systems under intermediation approach are outlined in section 4, 
while section 5 discusses the findings and detailed conclusions. Finally, section 6 
provides a summary of the chapter. Figure 7.1 provides a detailed outline of Chapter 7. 
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Figure 7.1: Outline of Chapter 7 Interrelations 
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7.2 Economic Efficiency Measures  
All business operations/processes involve transformation-adding value and changes to 
materials and turning them into goods and services that customers want. materials, energy 
and machines; and outputs consisting of finished products, services, customer satisfaction 
and other outcomes (Amirteimoori & Shafiei 2006; Berger & Humphrey 1997). Since the 
production technology of the fully efficiency firm in a banking industry is not known, it 
must be estimated from observations in practice. Of the available methods in the 
efficiency literature, in this study, the optimisation of the performance of each production 
unit––gain of bank scale––non-parametric approach has been conducted. Hence, to 
measure the efficiency of Islamic banks and conventional banks, data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) has been employed which allows to estimate and report returns to scale 
for all banks according to various size measures.  
Consequently, of this analysis three objectives could be achieved by this analysis, and that 
are:  
1. To investigate the overall (economic), technical and pure technical, and scale 
efficiencies of Islamic banks and compare it with the conventional banks 
from the Middle East region; 
2. To investigate whether Islamic banks and conventional banks are different in 
terms of efficiency performance; and  
3. To investigate factors may impact banking efficiency and factors contribute 
to optimisation of banks performance.  
In banks, managers are often interested in evaluating how efficiently various processes 
operate with respect to multiple inputs and outputs. Strategically, since banks should have 
sufficient resources to bear losses incurred from bad loans or from other similar adversity, 
they should also have generated sufficient performance for their equity to increase in 
value in order to attract new shareholders (Casu, Girardone & Molyneux 2004; Derban, 
Binner & Mullineux 2005). However, eliminating or improving inefficient operations 
decreases the cost of inputs and increases productivity. Typically, performance evaluation 
and benchmarking mode help business operations/processes to become more productive. 
Aly et al. (1990) assert that performance evaluation positively forces any business unit to 
constantly evolve and improve in order to survive and prosper in a business environment 
facing global competition. At this point, it is important to initiate efficiency literature by 
highlighting components of total factor economic efficiency follows by how these 
efficiencies can be allocated and computed. 
7.2.1 The Components of Total Factor Economic Efficiency  
Single-measure based gap analysis is often used as a fundamental method in performance 
evaluation and benchmarking. However, the use of a single measure ignores any 
interactions, substitutions or tradeoffs among various performance measures. Färe, 
Grosskopf and Li (1992) argued that each business operation or process has specific 
performance measures with tradeoffs. In order to comprehend these tasks within 
computing overall efficiency, it is necessary to understand the related efficiency 
components. Thus, three efficiency components under productivity changes in CB and IB 
systems have been considered in scale, technical and pure technical efficiencies.  
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7.2.1.1 Scale Efficiency   
By making the efficiency measurement more sophisticated, the range of topics it can 
explore is increased—particularly in increasing the decomposition of the technical 
efficiency score into components resulting from the scale operations or efficiency; surplus 
inputs which cannot be disposed of; and a residual or pure technical efficiency. The 
concept of scale efficiency was first introduced by Farrell (1957)—a concept which can 
be simply defined as the relationship between a bank‘s per unit average production cost, 
and volume. Thus, a bank is considered to have economies of scale when the increase in 
outputs is accompanied by a lower unit cost of production. Accordingly, the attention 
shifts from the average practice performance of banks to benchmarking of individual 
banks against best practice bank performance and becomes a focus of this efficiency.  
Scale efficiency has been defined by Ray (2004, p. 35) as ‗the extent to which an 
organisation can take advantage of returns to scale by altering its size towards optimal 
scale—which is defined as the region in which there are constant returns to scale [CRS] in 
the relationship between outputs and inputs‘. Therefore, return to scale exhibits the 
relationship between output and input, and these returns can be constant, increasing, or 
decreasing, depending on whether output increases in proportion to more than or less than 
input respectively. Similarly, this applies in the case of multiple inputs and outputs, which 
means here that outputs change when there is an equi-proportionate change in all inputs.  
7.2.1.2 Technical Efficiency  
Conversion of physical inputs such as labour services and raw materials or semi-finished 
foods into outputs is known as a technical operation. However, technical efficiency is 
determined by the difference between the observed ratios of compound operations 
achieved by best practice. Zhu (2003) explains that technical efficiency can be expressed 
as the potential to increase quantities of outputs from given quantities of inputs, or the 
potential to reduce the quantities of inputs used in producing given quantities of outputs.  
Studies in the banking and finance field have attempted to examine the x-efficiency, 
which was popularised by Leibenstein (1966), and refers to deviations from the cost-
efficiency frontier that depict the lowest production cost for a given level of output (Casu, 
Girardone & Molyneux 2004; Cooper, Seiford & Tone 2005; Greene 2008). Conversely, 
scale and scope efficiency focuses on collective bank performance; x-efficiency relates to 
individual bank differences in efficiency. X-efficiency stems from technical efficiency 
which gauges the degree of friction in the production process, and ‗allocative efficiency‘ 
measures the levels of various inputs. Thus, these two are neither scale nor scope 
dependent and, thus, x -efficiency is a measure of how well management is aligning 
technology, human resources management and other resources to produce a given level of 
output (Avkiran 2000).  
7.2.1.3 Pure Technical Efficiency   
Since the CB and IB systems were burdened by default risks or portfolios of bad loans 
from the policy of a decision making, they might be expected to be inefficient and 
unprofitable. Both banking systems should rapidly overtake the single-measure based gap 
analysis which is often used as a fundamental method in performance evaluation (Chen 
2005). In general, literature on banking efficiency distinguishes economic efficiency 
pure-technical and allocative efficiency. Consequently, the ability to assess efficiency in 
banking systems is a focus of performance measurement. However, Berger and 
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Humphrey (1992) argue that this type of measurement is considerably affected by the size 
of operations (scale efficiency) and by managerial practices (non-scale technical 
efficiency). In other words, while efficiency has been a major consideration by the banks, 
pure technical efficiency has occurred where there is not an over-employment (inadequate 
use) of inputs to produce given outputs.   
7.2.2 Allocation and Scope Efficiency   
The topic of efficiency has attracted a growing focus from researchers, with findings 
suggesting that the average bank has levels of efficiency that considerably outweigh 
inefficiency deriving from scale and scope sources. Spurring this interest, however, is the 
existence of different approaches to efficiency measurement and a significant difference 
in the degree of efficiency being reported. Thus, in terms of the superior management of 
resources, the research literature has narrowed this to cover the two well-known economic 
concepts of technical and allocative efficiency.  
Related literature has examined the structure of debt contract terms, focusing on corporate 
governance structure and how transaction cost economies, agency problems, asymmetric 
information and credit quality affect the corporation‘s contract terms (see: Charnes, 
Cooper & Rhodes 1979; Leibenstein 1966; Sengupta 1995; Zhu 2003). In relation to bank 
loan contract terms, researchers have also considered the effect of the strength of 
borrowers‘ relationships––principal agency problem––in the setting of these terms (see: 
Aly et al. 1990; Hakim, Neaime & Colton 2005; Huang & Wang 2001; Rosly & Bakar 
2003). With rational lending decision making characteristics such as monitoring 
capability, lending reputation, capital efficiency and adequacy influencing the scale and 
scope of efficiency reaction to the bank loan instruments, it is not surprising that 
empirical studies of the determinants of approving loans have generally neglected lender 
characteristics.  
Several studies of lending performance in CBs and IBs have controlled for bank size, and 
a study by Batchelor (2005) investigated how changes in banking systems affect the 
banking performance in general. Batchelor‘s (2005) study findings are consistent with the 
‗allocative efficiency‘ concept which occurs when a better mix of inputs would produce 
the same output at lower cost. Generally, pure technical efficiency model measures the 
relative low performance of banks‘ decision making units on the basis of the observed 
operating practices in a set of sample banks. If the use of both the input and the output are 
high gain of the efficiency scale, the banks are considered efficient. In turn, the efficiency 
of making rational lending decisions in these banks sets can be evaluated under the 
different types of efficiencies.   
Figure 7.2: Bank Cost and Scope Efficiency 
 
Y 
AC (Y1, Y2) 
AC (Y1) + AC (Y2) 
A 
B 
Cost 
Products 
Source: (Huang & Wang 2004) 
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Economies of scope exist when joint production of two or more products is less costly 
than the combined cost of production of these products by specialist banks. Scope 
efficiency is illustrated in Figure 7.2 in a manner of analysis similar to that used to 
demonstrate scale efficiency (Huang & Wang 2004). From Figure 7.2 it can be seen that 
the combined average cost of producing outputs y1 and y2 separately is given by AC(y1) 
+ AC(y2), which is greater than the average cost of joint plant production AC(y1, y2). 
The degree of cost saving from joint production is given by AB/AY.  
The basis for economies of scope lies in the potential to use common production facilities 
for multiple products. A simple historical example of economies of scope occurred in 
Australia for many years with major banks operating legally separate trading and savings 
banks jointly by means of common staff and branch facilities until the distinction was 
formally removed in 1989 (Anderson, Sweeney & Williams 2005; Mertens & Urga 
2001). On an individual product basis, facilities and staff expertise involved in operating 
foreign exchange payments would be expected to facilitate the provision of trade finance 
and hedge products to manage foreign exchange risk as a consequence of the difficulty in 
accessing services. However, currently, the ability to service many products by alternative 
means such as computerised telecommunication systems is challenging the role of the 
traditional product delivery using new common electronic inputs.  
In this study, interestingly, the success of some specialised banking systems, such as 
Islamic finance institutions, suggests that there may be some banking niche products that 
are not well suited to joint production with other system products
86
 and, hence, economies 
of scope may not be present across the full spectrum of banking products.  
7.3 Computing Within the DEA Framework  
7.3.1 DEA as Non-Parametric Methodology  
‗The literature distinguishes two main approaches in measuring banking efficiency: 
parametric and non-parametric, in which the specification of a production cost function is 
required in both approaches‘ (Charnes 1994, p. 56). ‗The parametric approach engages in 
the specification and econometric estimation of a statistical or parametric function, while 
the non-parametric method offers a linear boundary by enveloping the experimental data 
point, known as data envelopment analysis–DEA‘ (Charnes 1994, p. 59). Thus, DEA uses 
mathematical programming to implicitly estimate the tradeoffs inherent in the empirical 
efficient frontier.     
DEA methodology has been extensively used in the banking literature. As reported less 
recently by Fukuyama (1995) and, more recently, by Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000), 
DEA is a linear programming technique for examining how a particular decision making 
unit (DMU) or bank in this study operates relative to the other banks in the sample. The 
technique creates a frontier set by efficient banks and compares it with inefficient banks 
to produce efficiency scores. Furthermore, such decision making units are assessed 
between 0 and 1 scores; with a completely efficient bank having an efficient score of 1 
(Farrell 1957). In DEA, the most efficient bank (with score of 1) does not necessarily 
generate the maximum level of output from the given inputs. Rather, this bank generates 
the best practice level of output among other banks in the sample. 
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 For example, point of view of shari`a board against some transactions which may be prohibited in such 
banks and not in others—which is known in Islamic literature as fatwa. 
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7.3.2 DEA Methodology  
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) has proven to be an efficient tool in identifying such an 
empirical frontier and in evaluating relative efficiency (Färe 1975; Zhu 2003). Figure 7.3 
illustrates alternative supply chain operations S1, S2, S3 and S and the efficient frontier or 
tradeoffs curve determined by them. A supply chain whose performance or (strategy) is 
on the efficient frontier is non-dominated (efficient) in the sense that no alternate supply 
chain performance is strictly better in both input and output. Consequently, through 
performance evaluation, the efficient frontier that represents the best practice is identified, 
and an efficient strategy (e.g. point S) can be improved (moved to the efficient frontier) 
with suggested directions for improvement (to S1, S2, S3 or other points along the 
frontier). 
Figure 7.3: Alternative Supply Chain Illustration 
 
Unfortunately, information that can be used to estimate the efficient frontier is not 
necessarily available (Brown 2001). Therefore, without prior information on the tradeoffs, 
the functional forms cannot be specified. Empirically, the efficient frontier estimate is 
based upon observations on one business operation/process over time, or similar business 
operations at a specific time period (Steering Committee for the Review of 
Commonwealth/State Service Provision 1997).   
Throughout the study, the researcher uses decision making units (DMUs) to represent 
business operations or processes. Each DMU has a set of input/s and output/s representing 
multiple performance measures. Consider a set of n observations on the DMUs. Each 
observation, DMUj (j=1,2,…,n), uses m inputs 
ijx  (i=1,2,…,m) to produce s outputs rjy  
(r=1,2,…,s). The empirical efficient frontier or best practice frontier is determined by 
these n observations. To ensure developing a piecewise linear approximation to the 
efficient frontier and the area dominated by the frontier, two characters should be 
considered (Farrell 1957): 
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Consider Figure 7.3 above, where total supply chain input and supply chain output 
represent two inputs. Applying property1 to S1, S2 and S3 yields the piecewise linear 
approximation to the curve shown in the same figure (Figure 7.3). Applying both 
property1 and property2 expands the segments of S1, S2 and S3 into the area dominated 
by the curve.   
7.3.3 Computing Input and Output  
Two alternative approaches are available in the DEA technique to estimate the efficient 
frontier characterised by property1, namely, input-oriented, and output oriented (Brown 
2001; Cooper, Seiford & Tone 2000; Zhu 2003). For n DMUs in industries, all of the 
sample input/s and output/s are characterised by m and s respectively, and the efficiency 
of each bank is computed as an input-oriented or output-oriented model.  
Table 7.1: Summary of Envelopment Models 
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A summary presentation for the two envelopment models orientation is depicted in Table 
7.1, whilst a mathematical derivation of these methodologies is explained in Appendix O 
part A and part B. (For a detailed review of the literature on frontier methodologies see 
(Brown 2001; Cooper, Seiford & Tone 2000; Farrell 1957; Kalirajan & Shand 1999; 
Mester 1987; Zhu 2003) 
7.3.4 Graphical Illustration of DEA  
The original Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) model (called CCR model), and Banker, 
Charnes and Cooper‘s (1984) model (called BCC model) are the two basic models of 
DEA most commonly used in empirical studies. Appendix O shows the frontier BCC 
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model determined by model 7.5 and 7.6 which exhibits variables returns to scale (VRS). 
The models (7.5 and 7.6) are practised as input-oriented VRS envelopment model and 
output-oriented VRS envelopment model respectively. The BCC model uses (VRS) for 
identifying the envelopment surface and, thus, the VRS model is graphically depicted (see 
Appendix O, 3a).  
Figure 7.4 depicts, for example, five DMUs (A, B, C, D and E) with one input (x) and one 
output (y). The VRS frontier consists of DMUs A, B, C and D. AB exhibits increasing 
returns to scale (IRS), B exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS), and BC and CD exhibits 
decreasing returns to scale (DRS). Based on the VRS input-oriented model as shown in 
Appendix O, DMU E is inefficient and is compared to F (a convex combination of A and 
B) on the VRS frontier. In this case, it should reduce its input to F, or F is the efficient 
target for E. On the other hand, if the output-oriented model is considered, E is compared 
to C by increasing output.  
Figure 7.4: VRS Frontier Model 
 
However, the following envelopment is a different DEA model (called CCR model) 
which is considered in various studies (Aly et al. 1990; Cooper, Seiford & Tone 2000; 
Fukuyama & Weber 2002; Jablonsky 2007). Contrary to the BCC model, the CCR model 
uses an optimisation method of mathematical programming to generalise the single 
output/input technical measure to the multiple output/input case. It is based on constant 
return to scale (CRS) when enveloping the actual data to determine the shape of the 
production frontier.  
Consequently, based on this constant return to scale (CRS) frontier—presented in model 
7.5 and 7.6 in Appendix O: 1 and 2—only B is efficient. This is exhibited in Figure 7.5.   
Figure 7.5: CRS Frontier Model 
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Accordingly, the constraint on

n
j
j
1
 actually determines the return to scale (RTS) type 
of an efficient frontier. If the equality of one 1
1


n
j
j  has been removed from the 
models 7.5 and 7.6, the constant return to scale (CRS) envelopment model is obtained 
where the frontier exhibits constant return to scale (CRS)
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. Therefore, referring to 
Appendix O 3b, which depicts this technique graphically, if 1
1
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j
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1
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j
j , a non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) envelopment model has occurred. 
In contrast, if 1
1
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n
j
j  is replaced with 1
1
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n
j
j , non-decreasing returns to scale 
(NDRS) envelopment model will occur. Consequently, the interpretation under this model 
is if 1  or 
 , then the DMU under evaluation is a frontier point, (e.g., there is no 
other DMU operating more efficiently than this DMU). Otherwise, if 1  or 1
 , 
then the DMU under evaluation is inefficient (e.g., this DMU can either increase its 
outputs level or decrease input levels).  
7.4 Estimating the Parameters under the Intermediation 
Approach 
7.4.1 Justification of Intermediation Approach  
There are different approaches for recognising banks‘ output/inputs. Leong, Dollery and 
Coelli (2003)––cited in (Seelanatha 2007)––identified production, intermediation and 
assets as three main approaches. However, Favero and Papi (1995) previously identified 
five approaches for the input/output specification in the banking industry under two 
groups: the production, intermediation and assets approaches which directly linked to 
operation functions of bank; and user cost and value-added approaches which indirectly 
linked to banks‘ operational functions. Notably, researchers have selected different 
variables even though they used identical approaches. Ray (2005) and Färe (1975) 
asserted that these variables highlighted both the technical and economic views of 
financial institutions. In a technical sense, output is a set of financial services to 
depositors and borrowers.   
Consider the production approach which treats banks as producers of services by use of 
labour and capital to generate deposits and loans (Altman 1980; Li 2005). Contrary to this 
approach, the intermediation approach regards deposits as an input which is used for 
producing the other banking outputs. Therefore, the intermediation approach is based on 
the assumption that the main role of banks is to arrange a meeting place for the savers and 
borrowers to perform a transformation function. Because of the main characteristics of 
IBs and CBs, they are often claimed to be joint stock firms within which shares are easily 
tradable. Favero and Papi (1995, p. 388) indicated that the intermediation approach is 
‗most appropriate for banks where most activities consist of turning large deposits and 
funds purchased from other financial institutions into loans and financial investments‘. 
                                                 
87
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For this study, the intermediation approach has been adopted as a consequence of its 
advantages over other approaches, namely: 
1. The intermediation approach is more inclusive of total costs88 (Huang & Wang 
2001).  
2. Since the deposits are used for making loans and investments with other inputs, 
they should be considered as inputs (Altman 1980). 
3. By giving a value to the banking system ideology, the inference of the 
intermediation approach is much more suited to the potential agency problem  
7.4.2 Input and Output Specification 
Despite many studies applying either the intermediation and/or production approaches, 
some have sought alternative ways of identifying input and output.  Studies that use DEA 
to model financial intermediaries show a wide variety of input and output specifications. 
As stated above, there is no general agreement about the components of banking inputs 
and outputs. However, in order to comprehend these tasks within DEA, it is significant to 
understand the related variables. 
7.4.2.1 Input and Output variables   
A survey of the relative literature shows the input and output variables widely used in 
financial institutions (Aly et al. 1990; Athanassopoulos 1998; Banker, Charnes & Cooper 
1984; Berger & Humphrey 1992; Cooper, Seiford & Zhu 2004; Cummins & Weiss 2000; 
Elyasiani & Mehdian 1995; Fukuyama 1995; Greene 2008; Kalirajan & Shand 1999). 
These variables are summarised in Figure 7.6 and Figure 7.7 respectively. 
Figure 7.6: Input Variables Used in Previous Studies in the Banking Field 
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Figure 7.7: Output Variables Used in Previous Studies in the Banking Field 
 
 
7.4.2.2 Data Definition  
The sample data set represented 48 banks operating in the Middle East region (Libya, 
Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Jordan), that is, 24 Islamic banks and 24 
conventional banks
89
. In addition, this study included banks that use different types of 
transactions such as aggregate and collateral loans. This period can be considered as the 
most active time period in the Middle East banking industry. During this period, crises hit 
Islamic economies after September 11, 2001 which led to a deterioration in financial 
institutions and a decrease in the international demand for investment in Islamic 
economies.  
Since the currencies of the sample countries are different, for the purposes of this 
analysis, currencies are denoted in US dollars. This conversion facilitated the use of 
comparable data for analytical purposes. The use of unified data sets avoided the 
systematic bias produced by errors of measurement. In order to assess the impact of data 
heterogeneity on efficiency estimates, the research uses panel data from conventional 
banks and Islamic banks to examine the sensitivity of DEA estimated mean efficiency 
scores amongst banks––decision making units––and sample size. In order to assess the 
impact of heterogeneity in size on efficiency estimates, a two-stage process is undertaken:  
 Each sample is stratified into more homogeneous sub-groups for DEA estimation 
presented in this study; and  
 The whole sample and all sub-groups are regressed separately to explain 
variables impacting on the efficiency of lending decisions in both systems. This 
process is presented in section 7.6.3. 
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 Descriptive data for these banks were fully explained in chapter five (Section 5.5.2).   
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7.4.3 Model Specification and Scope  
The process of developing a final model of service transaction/production is often 
interactive, with different combinations of inputs and outputs, and sometimes measures of 
inputs and output are trialled before a final model is reached (Berger & DeYoung 1996). 
This ensures the most appropriate measures for this study, that inputs and outputs are 
utilised in the assessment of relative efficiency, and also allows the sensitivity of the 
model to different specifications to be tested. Thus, several variables of efficiency were 
derived under CB and IB models and have been considered herein, as set out in Table 7.2.  
Table 7.2: Preferred Model Specification for CB and IB System 
INPUTS OUTPUTS 
CB system IB system CB system IB system 
 Total deposits  
 Operation costs  
 Interest 
expenditure  
 Total deposits  
 Operation costs  
 Non-interest 
expenditure  
 (ROE) & (ROA). 
 Revenues; (Pre-tax returns 
+ interest income ) 
 Loans (investment): loans 
& advances 
 Risk weighted assets* 
 Annual average increase in 
total assets 
 (ROE) & (ROA). 
 Revenues; (Pre-tax returns 
+ non-interest income)  
 Loans (investment): loans 
& advances 
 Risk weighted assets* 
 Annual average increase 
in total assets 
Return on Equity (ROE) = net income/shareholder equity.  
Return on Assets (ROA) = net operation income/total assets. 
*Capital to Risk (weighted) Assets Ratio (CRAR) = Capital/Risk.  
Where: Risk weighted Assets ratio respective national regulator‘s minimum total capital requirement. Cash 
& Government bonds have a 0% risk weighting, mortgage loan have a 50% risk weighting and others loans 
have a 100% risk weighting. 
Both conventional banking and Islamic banking systems attempt to ensure that their 
lending decisions are made within a rational policy framework. The focus in this study is 
to examine whether they are different in terms of maximising the efficiency of lending 
activities (maximising banks‘ outputs). To examine this question, the output needs to 
reflect the rational strategy of lending decision-making. In this study, the rational strategy 
of lending decision-making is measured by the quantity of successful loans across all 
transaction categories quantified by risk weighted price (called risk weighted assets).  
The inclusion of other income, non-interest income and risk factors‘ assessment in the 
analysis is particularly important, as Islamic banks have been very creative in avoiding 
interest rate products creating the movement from conventional financial intermediation 
into off-balance sheet and fee income-generating business (Amirteimoori & Shafiei 2006; 
Zaman & Movassaghi 2001). As a result, concentrating completely on earning assets 
would be insufficient to capture the overall output of the Islamic banking industry. 
Furthermore, the total loans of Islamic banks in the sample consist of mostly Islamic 
transactions. In the case of conventional banks, charging of interest and giving interest on 
deposits to the customers is permitted in the transaction policy. 
Unfortunately, the provision of different products will, however, affect operational costs 
of the financial institutions (Yu & Neus 2005). For example, the average size of the bad 
loans provision of transaction account versus the fixed deposit account will affect 
operating costs. The type of credit will be a function in the loan value and value 
securitisation, and requires additional monitoring. Table 7.3 shows the types of data used 
to construct the DEA model. A detailed descriptive definition of each item is given in 
Appendix P. 
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Table 7.3: Detailed Definition (Data 2002-2006) 
Inputs Units 
 Total deposits (for both) 
 Operation costs (for both) 
 Interest expenditure (for CB) 
 Non-interest expenditure (for IB) 
Monetary US $ 
Monetary US $ 
Monetary US $ 
Monetary US $ 
Outputs Units  
Traditional activities:  
 Profitability ratios: return on equity (ROE)* and return on 
assets (ROA)*. 
 Revenues; (Pre-tax returns + interest income ) (for CB) 
 Revenues; (Pre-tax returns + non-interest income) (for IB) 
 Loans (investment): loans & advances (for both) 
Non-traditional activities:  
 Risk weighted assets (for both) 
 Annual average increase in total assets (for both) 
 
Percentage % 
 
Monetary US $ 
Monetary US $ 
Monetary US $ 
 
Percentage % 
Percentage % 
The data supplied by conventional banks and Islamic banks for returns on the lending 
portfolio performance over the period 2002 to 2006, included information on: 
 The input used to provide outputs (monetary values). 
 Profitability and liquidity rates are treated as percentages (%) to such DMUs  
 Assets grouped into good and bad credits. 
In this study, the frontier is estimated using the output-oriented model outlined in section 
7.3. However, the effect of the input/output set is addressed by using two models. 
Model-1 has total deposits, operation costs and interest/non-interest expenditure inputs. 
Outputs are included profitability ratios ROE and ROA; revenues (pre-tax returns plus 
interest—income) or, for IB, pre-tax returns plus non-interest income and loans 
(investment); loans and advances (traditional banks‘ activities). However, Model-2 is less 
aggregated: the inputs are total deposits, operation costs and interest/non-interest 
expenditures, but two more outputs are specified as non-traditional banks activities; risk 
weighted assets (CAR) and annual average increase in total assets. 
7.4.4 Relative Efficiency to Rational Lending Decision-making 
A large number of studies have examined how the financial industry has some reaction––
positive/negative––against the variety of policy issues or new regulations that are 
introduced by institutions‘ regulators (Ahmad & Haron 2002; Alessi 1983; Beck, Cull & 
Jerome 2005). Particularly in the lending field, uncertainty in decision-making dominates 
these policies (Coulson & Monks 1999). Since the behaviour of the financial services 
industry directly influences the performance of overall economic activities, the diversity 
of banking systems also has some impact on the financial industry itself. In this sense, 
regulators generally attempt to introduce more productive policies for maximising overall 
production/services operations and effective performance.   
At this point, the outcomes of implemented policies or specific regulations must be 
evaluated to identify the most productive policy for rationalising decision making 
processes. Therefore, the success or otherwise of such transactions upon the variables of 
input/s that have been processed for lending decision making needs to be established. 
Hence, this particular issue is popular in efficiency studies relating to deregulation, risk 
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factors assessment, effective lending decision making policies, and ownership structure of 
the banks—all of which have been included for analysis in this study.    
As mentioned previously, prior DEA studies provide useful managerial information on 
improving performance, particularly in the efficiency of making lending decisions (Huang 
& Wang 2001). However, the ability of DEA to model multiple-input and multiple-output 
relationships without prior underlying concerns, for example, bank failure prediction 
(Berger & DeYoung 1996), market prices (Seelanatha 2007), or corporate governance 
(Suleiman 2000), resulted in the methodology for this study being designed to measure 
the relative efficiency where parametric data are not available.  
7.5 Empirical Findings  
This section will detail the results and answer the third principal research question of the 
relative efficiency level of CBs and IBs as found within the sample used to construct the 
grand frontier. An output oriented envelopment analysis model is dedicated to the 
assessment of whether CB or IB operations were more efficient, based on a comparison of 
average efficiency measures between the CB and IB systems. In addition, it presents an 
analysis of results on whether CBs outperformed IBs over the study period (2002-2006).  
7.5.1 Comparative Analysis for Efficiencies between IB and CB 
7.5.1.1 The Differences between IB and CB Efficiency Levels    
The key research objective in this chapter is to investigate the empirical evidence relating 
to efficiency of lending decision making in terms of ‗credit performance‘ between Islamic 
banking and conventional banking systems, benchmarked to efficient banks operating in 
the ME. Therefore, the evidence will be examined using financial statements data, which 
enable the decomposition of efficiency into technical efficiency TE, pure technical 
efficiency PTE, and scale efficiency SE. Detailed efficiency scores are provided in 
Appendix Q. The sample is decomposed into three main groups; large, medium and small 
banking size
90
. These efficiencies are compared in three categories of IB as well as CB: 
small Islamic and conventional banks (SIB & SCB); medium Islamic and conventional 
banks (MIB & MCB); large Islamic and conventional banks (LIB & LCB)  
7.5.1.1.1 Small IB vs. Small CB  
The presentation of data is begun by considering the TE results for small conventional 
and Islamic banks during five years (2002-2006). With reference to Figure 7.8, it is noted 
that throughout 2002-2006, small conventional banks (SCB) were the most efficient 
banks on average relative to increasing returns to scale (IRS) in the study. Within 2003, 
small conventional banks (SCB) were almost as efficient 0.94, and followed closely by 
small Islamic banks (SIB) at 0.90. There was, however, a considerable gap between the 
most efficient small conventional banks (SCB) and increasing returns to scale (IRS) in 
2004 with an average score of 0.94 and 0.85 respectively. 
                                                 
90
 Previous studies classified financial institutions according to regional indexes which were based on 
regional financial market indicators. Following Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995), this study adopts the 
absolute gross total asset as an index for categorising banks in both banking groups. ‗Large size‘ is defined 
as those banks that have total assets larger than a billion US$; and ‗small size‘ that have total assets lower 
than 400 million US$. 
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Figure 7.8: TE (CRS) for SIB & SCB Categories (by period) 
 
In terms of pure technical efficiency, Figure 7.9 indicates that variable returns to scale of 
small conventional banks (SCB) and small Islamic banks (SIB) have followed the same 
pattern of variable returns to scale over the examination period on average, and that small 
conventional banks (SCB) were more successful in allocating their inputs. As seen also 
from Figure 7.9, small conventional banks (SCB) were technically more appropriate in 
allocating their resources, and were operating efficiently during 2005 and 2006 (PTE 
=1.00). 
Figure 7.9: PTE (VRS) for SIB & SCB Categories (by period) 
 
Technically, Figure 7.10 shows that small Islamic banks (SIB) had a lower efficiency 
(0.92) than small conventional banks (SCB) efficiency (0.97) in terms of scale efficiency 
in 2002. Nevertheless, small Islamic banks‘ (SIB) efficiency value ranges fluctuated over 
time from 2003-2006, and seemed to outpace small conventional banks (SCB). However, 
due to the concurrent rise in the coefficient of variation of annual efficiency means, 
banks‘ efficiency scores became volatile over time. This indicates that banks‘ 
performances were diverging, but standard-practice banks, especially small and less 
efficient banks, generally managed to catch up with the best practice banks. 
Figure 7.10: SE (CRS/VRS) for SIB & SCB Categories (by period) 
 
Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006
SIB - Average TE Scores 0.76 0.90 0.85 0.94 0.88
SCB - Average TE Scores 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.92
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7.5.1.1.2 Medium IB vs. Medium CB  
Figure 7.11 depicts that both banking groups (Islamic and Conventional) with medium 
size did not boast very high levels of technical efficiency on average: medium Islamic 
banks (MIB) on average reported output level deterioration by 0.88 to 0.76 without 
increasing the level of input. Furthermore, although medium conventional banks (MCB) 
are shown to be the most efficient, their performance over the analytical periods was 
nevertheless inconsistent, as shown by their average coefficient of variation of 0.89 in 
2003 to 0.85 in 2006. In contrast, the medium Islamic banks (MIB) technical efficiency 
scores increased slightly during 2005 to 0.91 and during 2006 to 0.96. 
Figure 7.11: TE (CRS) for MIB & MCB Categories (by period) 
 
However, by contrasting TE with PTE, Figure 7.12 shows the measure of variation is 
small compared to all other banks‘ categories in terms of allocative efficiency. Medium 
conventional banks (MCB), in fact, had the most consistent performance according to 
variable returns to scale scores over the analytical period; medium Islamic banks (MIB), 
however, reported a better performance than medium conventional banks (MCB) in 2006 
with scores of 0.98 and 0.96 respectively. 
Figure 7.12: PTE (VRS) for MIB & MCB Categories (by period) 
 
In terms of scale efficiency, Figure 7.13 depicts medium conventional banks (MCB) as 
performing much the same as medium Islamic banks (MIB) on average. Medium Islamic 
banks (MIB) started with a better performance (0.93), whereas for the duration of the 
following analytical periods 2003 and 2004, it was the least efficient with an average of 
only 0.81 and 0.87 respectively. There were slight increases in 2005 and 2006 with 
averages of 0.93 and 0.98 respectively. As also shown in Figure 7.13, both banking 
categories have experienced continuous decline on average over the time period. 
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Figure 7.13: SE (CRS/VRS) for MIB & MCB Categories 
 
Overall, this finding indicates that efficiency differences across the sample data appear to 
be mainly determined by many factors, including default risk portfolio risks and lending 
decision making. Studies by Berger and DeYoung (1996), Mertens and Urga (2001), and 
Abdullah (2003) support the finding that problem loans precede reductions in measured 
efficiency; that efficiency precedes reductions in problem loans; and that reductions in 
capital at thinly capitalised banks precede increases in problem loans. Hence, efficiency 
may be an important indicator of future problem loans and problem banks. 
7.5.1.1.3 Large IB vs. Large CB   
Figure 7.14 reveals that large Islamic banks (LIB) technically were operating more 
efficiently than large conventional banks (LCB) during the period 2002-2006, with 
average scores of 0.93, 0.86, 0.83, 0.91, and 0.83 respectively. Both banking categories 
were mostly operating with decreasing returns to scale (DRS), although large 
conventional banks (LCB) managed to attain a fairly high score of 0.73 in 2002. 
However, mostly large Islamic banks (LIB) operations achieved the highest level of 
constant return to scales throughout 2002-2006. Hence, only a few banks managed to 
attain increasing returns to scale (IRS) consistently through to 2006. 
Figure 7.14: TE (CRS) for LIB & LCB Categories 
 
Figure 7.15 shows that there is considerably less efficiency variation between large 
Islamic banks (LIB) and large conventional banks (LCB) categories on a year to year 
basis, except that large Islamic banks (LIB) appear significantly efficient (0.94) in 2003. 
Likewise, large conventional banks (LCB) and large Islamic banks (LIB) were attaining 
quite high performance, which indicates that large conventional banks (LCB) and large 
Islamic banks (LIB) were quite heterogeneous even within the same banking group. 
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Overall, the results suggest that both large conventional banks (LCB) and large Islamic 
banks (LIB) suffered slight inefficiencies in operations after the Gulf War crisis. 
Figure 7.15: PTE (VRS) for LIB & LCB Categories 
 
Figure 7.16 highlights the scale efficiency scores for large Islamic banks (LIB) and large 
conventional banks (LCB) over the analytical period. Again, large Islamic banks (LIB) 
show higher performance than large conventional banks (LCB) over the time period 
(from 2002 to 2006) in terms of scale size efficiency. This indicates that large Islamic 
banks (LIB) have a greater ability to gain scale economies arising from the optimal/ideal 
scale size than large conventional banks (LCB), which experienced lower response to 
scale economies changes. 
Figure 7.16: SE (CRS/VRS) for LIB & LCB Categories (by period)  
 
Similar to technical efficiency of these large banks (see Figure 7.14), the range of scale 
size changes was almost constant over all analytical periods, whilst revealing a gradually 
declining pattern. However, the results were inclusive and it cannot be concluded that 
banks are converging in terms of SE. 
7.5.1.2 Overall Efficiency Scheme of the Banks  
This section illustrates how TE, PTE and SE can be monitored on average within overall 
IB and CB systems. Figure 7.17 shows the relative TE scores––on average––of six 
banking categories: small Islamic banks (SIB), small conventional banks (SCB), medium 
Islamic banks (MIB), medium conventional banks (MCB), large Islamic banks (LIB) and 
large conventional banks (LCB).  
As seen from Figure 7.17, medium Islamic banks (MIB) were mostly dominant in terms 
of technical efficiency in the 2002 and 2006 periods with average scores of 0.75 and 0.79 
respectively. Medium conventional banks (MCB), typically, were seen to operate with the 
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best technical efficiency scale in 2003 with average scores 0.64. However, small 
conventional banks (SCB) show the lowest scores of efficiency (0.09) among all banking 
sizes, in contrast to the small Islamic banks (SIB) which performed better than large 
Islamic banks (LIB) and large conventional banks (LCB) overall in the analytical period. 
Figure 7.17: TE (CRS) for All CB & IB Categories 
 
Decomposing technical efficiency into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency 
allows an insight into the source of inefficiencies. It also helps determine whether banks 
have been operating at optimal, increasing or decreasing returns to scale. Hence, the 
variable returns to scale represent pure technical efficiency, that is, an implication of a 
measure of efficiency without scale size efficiency. 
Figure 7.18: PTE (VRS) for All CB & IB Categories 
 
Figure 7.18, therefore, shows the nature of PTE among the banks‘ categories, and 
highlights the fact that medium Islamic banks (MIB) operate with the best scale size, 
realising average PTE of 0.82, 0.81 and 0.93 in 2002, 2004 and 2006 respectively, 
followed by medium conventional banks (MCB) with 0.78 in 2003 and small Islamic 
banks (SIB) with 0.88 in 2005. Even though LIB and large conventional banks (LCB) 
showed slightly different scale efficiencies in 2002 (0.59, 0.74 respectively), they were, 
however, not far behind and followed a similar pattern in the overall analytical periods. In 
contrast, a similarity was also apparent in measures of PTE variability for small 
conventional banks (SCB)—which appears consistent with TE once scale size has been 
considered. 
Nevertheless, the impact of scale size on relative efficiency was also assessed. Figure 
7.19 exhibits that medium Islamic banks (MIB) recorded the highest performance (0.87) 
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in 2002 in terms of SE, followed by small Islamic banks (SIB) (0.62) on average. Figure 
7.19 shows also that small conventional banks (SCB) were the most heterogeneous in 
terms of SE performance and when analysed across time both large and small 
conventional banks (LCB & SCB) had the most varied scale efficiency scores among 
banks‘ size. On the other hand, the nature of scale returns for all bank categories indicate 
that some banks are operating at decreasing returns to scale, while others are at optimal 
returns to scale or increasing returns to scale, which means that a rise in inputs will lead 
to a proportionate rise in outputs.  
Figure 7.19: SE (CRS/VRS) for All CB & IB Categories 
 
As noted from analysis of banks‘ scale size, decreasing returns to scale (DRS) dominated 
CB and, in large conventional banks (LCB), decreasing returns to scale DRS were most 
prevalent. However, increasing returns to scale (IRS) were reported in both small 
conventional banks (SCB) and small Islamic banks (SIB), but large Islamic banks (LIB) 
seemed to have exhausted these to the optimum level. Medium conventional banks 
(MCB), on the other hand, were operating with better scale sizes with fair shares in both 
increasing returns to scale (IRS) and decreasing returns to scale (DRS). 
7.5.1.3 Summary of DEA Performance   
On balance, the incentive of maximising the optimality of banking services provided was 
considered to be the most appropriate driver of productivity gains. Therefore, the 
principal results reported in these sections were derived by imposing the assumption of 
constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS) on each of the models 
outlined above. 
Figure 7.20: Efficiencies Coefficient for All CB & IB Categories 
 
 Note: efficiencies results were observed over a window of three years time. 
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To conclude, Figure 7.20 depicts the average of three efficiencies scales; 1) technical 
efficiency scores; 2) pure technical efficiency scores and; 3) scale efficiency scores for all 
banks categories, and indicates which banks‘ size is calculated by the model to be on the 
efficient (best practice) frontier––those with a score of 1––and which are calculated to be 
less efficient relative to banks on the frontier. (See Appendix O for more information.) 
Figure 7.21: Efficiencies Coefficient for IB & CB Systems 
 
 Note: efficiencies results were observed over a window of three years time. 
Furthermore, Figure 7.21 exhibits that the overall TE of Islamic banks on average was 
0.62, which was higher than the conventional banks with an average of 0.57. This result 
indicates that the Islamic banking system was somewhat more efficient than the 
conventional banking system––on average––in terms of rational decision making for 
resources usage. In contrast, in terms of PTE, the conventional banking system shows 
better resource allocation than the Islamic banking system, on average, with scores of 
0.85 and 0.81 respectively. Finally, in terms of SE, Figure 7.21 shows that the Islamic 
banking system ranks higher on scale performance (with an average of 0.73) than the 
conventional banking system (average of 0.62) within the sample under analysis.     
7.5.2 Trend Analysis of Banking Performance between 2001-2006  
7.5.2.1 Trend Analysis of TE 
Figure 7.22: TE (CRS) for IB & CB Categories (by period) 
 
 Note: efficiencies results were observed over a window of three years time.  
Figure 7.22 charts the trends for the annual DEA technical efficiency TE scores for both 
banking systems, CB and IB, over the study period. It shows that both banking systems 
suffered increased inefficiency between 2002 and 2004 with averages of 0.57 to 0.56 in 
the conventional system and 0.60 to 0.58 in the Islamic system, before a slight recovery in 
2005 in both CB and IB systems (0.59 and 0.69 respectively) with the banks becoming 
more efficient again. Although the efficiency trends for IB and CB were very similar, IB 
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experienced better technical efficiency over the study period. In brief, efficiency trends 
for both banking systems continued to decline in early 2003 and throughout 2004, and 
later improved during 2005—even as both banking systems charted a different course. 
7.5.2.2 Trend Analysis of PTE  
The variable returns to scale for CB and IB over the study period are exhibited in Figure 
7.23. For both banking systems‘ operations, PTE scores revealed the most inefficient 
levels occurred in the first three periods. This general performance deterioration was 
largely due to a deep contraction in PTE (allocation of sources), especially in CB, 
indicating that banks were somehow oversized and overstaffed and more vulnerable to the 
effects of the crisis in the Middle East. The narrowing range and slight improvements in 
efficiency in 2005 and 2006 also suggests that banks of both systems were becoming 
more homogeneous in terms of PTE levels, as the less efficient banks managed to catch 
up with the best banks. The efficiency recovery, however, was largely attributed to sharp 
improvement in PTE among both CB and IB operations alike, as Figure 7.23 suggests. 
Figure 7.23: PTE (VRS) for IB & CB Categories (by period) 
 
 Note: efficiencies results were observed over a window of three years time. 
7.5.2.3 Trend Analysis of SE 
A further extension in analysing the efficiency trends is SE. SE allows specifically 
benchmarking all differences in the operating environment. During 2003 and throughout 
2004, decreasing returns to scale (DRS) were prevalent among CB and IB systems. Since 
the higher gap––SE value––was recorded twice in 2003 and 2005, as depicted in Figure 
7.24, it highlights once again that banks‘ performance was not only deteriorating, but 
deviating from each other as well. Figure 7.24 reveals that the highest variation was 
attributed to both CB and IB. 
Figure 7.24: SE (CRS/VRS) for IB & CB Categories (by period) 
 
 Note: efficiencies results were observed over a window of three years time. 
Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006
IB - Average PTE Scores 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.89 0.89
CB - Average PTE Scores 0.80 0.84 0.84 0.89 0.86
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IB - Average SE Scores 0.74 0.72 0.69 0.76 0.75
CB - Average SE Scores 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.59
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Thus, banks‘ systems were quite heterogeneous in terms of their performance. Perhaps 
this, in turn, is linked to common trigger factors and common organisational and financial 
market structures. 
7.5.3 Banking Efficiency Analysis: Statistical Approach 
To investigate factors that may influence the estimated efficiency and productivity gain, 
many different techniques have been applied in prior studies, for instance, multivariate 
analysis, the longitudinal graphical approach and other non-parametric approaches such 
as DEA itself (Seelanatha 2007; Thanassoulis, Boussofiane & Dyson 1996). Among these 
approaches, multivariate analysis is the most important technique and is widely used in 
similar studies. This approach considers DEA-estimated efficiency scores as dependent 
variables and a range of other factors as explanatory variables. This approach has many 
advantages over other approaches, the most important one being it offers multivariate 
regression analysis (Levine et al. 2005).  
7.5.3.1 Determinants of Banking Efficiency and Model Specification 
It must be noted that the sample of 48 banking units represents the enlarged sample that 
includes conventional commercial banks and Islamic banks regardless of transaction 
instruments scope and market/economic environment. The DEA is initially applied with 
this sample––universal and separately––to project common grand frontiers to enable the 
derivation of TE indices and banks‘ trends. This approach provides the simplest and most 
direct way of comparing efficiency levels of all banking units relative to one another as a 
group, and all banking units in such systems together as different groups.  
However, this approach is not by any means the most accurate and desirable. (Avkiran 
2000) explains that one major limitation of generating TE scores using large samples is 
that one needs to estimate that all decision making units (DMUs) share the same 
efficiency frontier. However, this estimation may be too far-fetched if decision making 
units within a sample operate within a different ideology are subjected to different 
regulatory environments, are of different asset size, or differ by skill and transaction 
instruments type. In such circumstances, efficiency differences are likely to prevail and it 
can be difficult to attribute this to either differences in characteristics or actual operations 
on an equal footing (Avkiran 2000).  
‗Previous empirical studies present mixed evidence of factors affecting the estimated 
efficiency scores of banks. However, methodological different as well as differences in 
regulatory and economic environments, have greatly influenced the outcome of these 
studies. Thus, the comparison of these results with other research needs careful analysis‘ 
(Seelanatha 2007, p. 142). The quotation indicates that previous studies produced 
dissimilar evidence on factors affecting bank‘s performance (Ahmad 1995; Berger & 
DeYoung 1996; Casu, Girardone & Molyneux 2004; Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes 1979; 
Cummins & Gullone 2000; Warapatr et al. 1986; Zaman & Movassaghi 2001). 
Nonetheless, the main implication found in these studies is that the relationships among 
efficiency, productivity and other factors are inconsistent.  
In terms of Specification of the Model, despite other research in the same area selecting 
different combinations of variables according to the objectives of their analysis, this study 
gives a greater weight to the regulatory and reactionary factors by addressing lending 
policy matters, banking activities and loan problem particularly. However, for the general 
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assessment of efficiency, similar studies have selected variables from the sample 
environment that may assist in identifying efficiency determinants. Worthington and 
Dollery (2002) asserted that the examination of factors such as agency problem, regulator 
and institutional structure, risk management, size and technology in a study aims to 
identify appropriate DEA-estimated scores. 
In general, variables used in this model were divided into five main groups, namely, 
banking management system; banking environment; banking skill; banking size; and 
banking system. Broadly, variables under these groups can be presented in three main 
areas; 1) microeconomic factors; 2) macroeconomic factors; and 3) non-economic factors 
(Seelanatha 2007). However, some of these variables have limited influence over a 
particular industry, segments such as input utilisation, and the institution system and 
management style. On the other hand, the rest of the variables in the banking models are 
exogenous factors such as market share prices, market interest rate and market volatility, 
which may not be controlled through managerial decision. Thus, variables were presented 
in this model as a bank‘s determinants may influence the improvement in efficiency gain 
of financial institutions operating in ME.  
Since many researchers have often focused on the assets side of the balance sheet for 
financial analysis purposes, this study uses absolute size based on gross total assets. This 
is one of the best proxies available on financial intermediation size (Boyd & Runkle 
1993). Since a bank‘s size and activity are one of the main construct measures of banks‘ 
performance, the model of efficiency of such banking systems is as follows: 
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Where;  
IBCB ,
 
=Technical efficiency of Islamic and conventional banking systems.  
SA =Banking management system applied variable which is represented by transaction 
volume, specialisation in financial services provision, services range and 
affiliation to the network.  
IE =Industry environment variable which is represented by corporate governance, 
profitability and liquidity of the bank, transformation scope and location. 
BSk =Banking skill variable which is represented by lending portfolio structure, capital 
adequacy, risk assessment, decision making policy and staff productivity. 
BSi = Bank‘s size which is considered as a proxy variable and is presented by volume 
of total assets: large, medium and small. 
 BSy = Banking system differentiation variable which is considered as a dummy variable 
and is represented by Islamic banking system=0; conventional banking system=1.  
Testing banks‘ efficiencies may need control of efficiency by a bank‘s size, defined as the 
natural logarithm of the bank‘s total assets, and which may serve as proxy of performance 
for both conventional banking and Islamic banking systems. A similar Australian study 
by the Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision 
(1997) utilised the unit‘s size as a proxy, arguing that input availability and expected 
differences in operating structure and size (output) are practical issues encountered in 
applying DEA.  
Having considered the previous studies, this study uses the multivariate regression 
analysis approach to examine the factors defined above, and examines their influences on 
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banking performance. The empirical model used is taken from the literature which 
investigates the explanatory variables of efficiency of DMUs. Most studies that used a 
similar technique have conducted two-stage procedures to regress the point estimation of 
efficiency with a number of explanatory variables. This is performed, firstly; by an 
estimation of efficiency scores based on DEA model (analysis in sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2 
above), then estimated efficiency scores are regressed with rang of explanatory variables 
which will be analysed in this part.    
7.5.4 Testing the Selected Model - (H3) 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and independent variables used in the 
regression model are presented in Table 7.4. The average of estimated technical 
efficiency score for banks classified according to the banking size––large, small and 
medium––is 0.89. This score is slightly higher than the estimated technical efficiency 
score when the same banks were considered without classification, or classified according 
to the banking system (0.56 and 0.68 respectively). These figures confirm that the size of 
banks possibly affects the banks‘ efficiency and then overall performance. 
Table 7.4: Descriptive Statistics of Bank-Specific Variables ($ million) 
Feature Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Technical Efficiency - Overall 0.57 0.59 0.38 
Technical Efficiency – by System 0.68 0.92 0.36 
Technical Efficiency – by Categories 0.89 1.00 0.22 
    
Bank Size (total assets) $3533.470 $1227.791 $7737.614 
Affiliation to the Network (contribution to the society)  40.43% 14.56% 69.73% 
Services Range (number of branches) 31.7 27 21.65 
Profitability (return to assets) 2.84% 2.00% 3.88% 
Liquidity (liquid assets/total assets)   0.57% 0.21% 1.76% 
Location- Economy Power (per capita) 33.32% 33.90% 23.96% 
Lending Structure (total loans / total assets) 0.14% 0.05% 0.28% 
Capital Structure (total equity / total liabilities) 0.60% 0.19% 1.47% 
Decision Making Policy (total loans approved) $688.47 $58.40 $1421.03 
Risk Assessment (default loans)  12.77% 8.12% 13.82% 
Staff Salary (Productivity) $28.69 $12.96 $40.96 
Note: descriptive statistics summarise panel data, and the means, medians and standard deviations are 
calculated for all observations throughout the period of study (from 2002 to 2006) 
The results of the mean, median and standard deviation of each variable in Table 7.4 
show no outliers among the explanatory variables which may affect the estimated 
regression coefficients. In relation to banks‘ size, the median of total assets value is 
$ 1227.791 million on average—these data include very small banks ($ 17.803 million), 
as well as large banks ($ 6927.617 million). Furthermore, the mean of the banking 
affiliation to the network is 40.43% which is measured by the proportion of each bank‘s 
contribution to the community. Moreover, the average of the proportion of total equity on 
total liabilities is 59.5%—an indication of the capital structure of banks. Nevertheless, the 
test indicated that total loans approved during the study period was $ 688.47 million on 
average—among them 12.77% are classified as default loans. For the period of study, the 
median of bank branches is almost 27 branches on average (with range of 2 branches the 
lowest; to 86 branches the highest)—an indication of the volume of banks‘ services range.  
Chapter Seven                       Ensuring the Rationality Levels of Lending
            Decision Making: Comparative Interpretation and Results 
177 
 
Appendix R presents the correlation matrix of the dependent and independent variables. 
Coefficients of the correlation show that there are no independent variables utilised in the 
model with a high coefficient of correlation (i.e. more than 0.6), except banking 
categories variable which shows few high coefficients with other variables. This suggests 
that there is no evidence of multicollinearity
91
 among variables used in this model which 
may affect results of the test. Furthermore, test of homogeneity of variance, the Levene‘s 
test for equality of variance between groups in this model, reveals that the result is 
significant (p<0.05). This suggests that variances for the each group are not equal and, 
therefore, violates the assumptions of homogeneity of variance.  
7.5.4.1 Confirmatory Analysis 
Table 7.5 presents statistics of a fitted Tobit regression equation. As can be seen from 
Table 7.5, R
2
 values were fairly highly estimated in three sets of regression: 1) estimated 
overall technical efficiency scores TE_O; 2) estimated technical efficiency scores by 
banking system TE_S; and 3) estimated technical efficiency scores by banking categories 
TE_C. This indicates that all regressions were able to explain the influence of the 
variables on estimated technical efficiency scores by 30%, 38% and 32% respectively. 
The estimated Jargue-Bera test of normality for the TE_O and TE_S provides sufficient 
evidence to support the assumption that residuals of the regression estimates are fairly 
normally distributed (6.96 and 8.05 respectively). However, recorded Jargue-Bera test for 
the TE_C shows that residuals of the regression may not be normally distributed (144.59). 
7Table 7.5: Statistics of a Fitted Regression Equations 
TOBIT Regression (ML - Censored Normal) 
Explanatory variables TE_O TE_S TE_C 
R-squared 0.30 0.38 0.32 
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.35 0.27 
Mean dependent var 0.57 0.68 0.89 
S.D. dependent var 0.38 0.36 0.22 
Jarque-Bera 6.96 8.05 144.59 
Table 7.6 presents Tobit regression results, and the following discussion considers the 
implication of the findings of three regressions based on the various constructs employed 
in the model, as specified in section 7.5.4.  
Firstly: Bank Size  
As noted above, the controlling role of bank size observed in this study will apply for the 
Islamic and non-Islamic banking systems. The Tobit regression is performed to confirm 
the hypothesis that large size banks operate more efficiently than small or medium size 
banks. Consequently, the independent variable (bank size) is treated as a control variable–
–normal logarithm of total assets––in order to investigate whether the size influences 
banking efficiency or not. Table 7.6 shows that for the total assets owned there is a 
statistically positive significant relationship with estimated TE_O scores (z  = 10.11, 
p<0.01) and TE_S scores (z = 4.795, p<0.01) on average. However, the same variable 
reveals a statistically negatively significant relationship with estimated TE_C scores (z =  
- 4.265, p<0.01). Thus, it is important to observe that different size of identities have 
different implications for the efficiency of financial institutions in the finance industry. 
                                                 
91
 The assumption is that the samples are obtained from populations of equal variances meaning that the 
variability of score for each group technical efficiency scorer is similar.  
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Table 7.6: Tobit Regression Results  
TOBIT Regression (ML - Censored Normal) 
Explanatory variables 
TE_O TE_S TE_C 
z-Statistic z-Statistic z-Statistic 
Banking Size 10.11* 4.795* -04.265* 
    
Services Range -2.118** -5.616* -1.347 
Affiliation to Network -0.716 -1.240 -0.362 
    
Profitability 0.106 0.481 2.116** 
Liquidity 3.225* 2.899* 2.569** 
Location-Economy Power -3.386* -5.472* -3.068* 
    
Lending Structure 8.000* 4.276* 1.079 
Capital Structure -0.615 -0.601 -1.540 
Risk Assessment 4.992* 1.783*** 0.582 
Decision Making Policy -3.159* -2.888* -1.993** 
Staff Salary (Productivity) -1.613 -1.965** -0.168 
    
IB - (BSY, TOT, SISP, COB, TS) 6.988*  
CB - (BSY, TOT, SISP, COB, TS) 5.800*  
SIB - (BSY, BCAT, TOT, SISP, COB, TS) 16.08* 
MIB - (BSY, BCAT, TOT, SISP, COB, TS) 13.34* 
LIB - (BSY, BCAT, TOT, SISP, COB, TS) 12.00* 
SCB - (BSY, BCAT, TOT, SISP, COB, TS) 14.45* 
MCB - (BSY, BCAT, TOT, SISP, COB, TS) 12.02* 
LCB - (BSY, BCAT, TOT, SISP, COB, TS) 10.26* 
Note: [ * indicates significant coefficients under 0.01 confidence level,  ** indicates significant coefficients 
under 0.05 confidence level,  *** indicates significant coefficients under 0.10 confidence level]. 
Five explanatory dummy variables are used in the model [BSY: Banking System (IB & CB), BCAT: 
Banking Categories (SIB, MIB, LIB, SCB, MCB & LCB), TOT: Technique of Transactions, SISP: 
Specialisation in Services Provision, COB: Composition of the Board, TS: Transformation Scope] 
Secondly:  Bank system Applied 
The explanatory variable, bank system applied, is numerical: the subject is characterised 
by banking services range and affiliation to the network. These variables were regressed 
with TE_O, TE_S and TE_C. Based on the nature of these variables, Tobit regression was 
performed and the result is provided in the Table 7.6. Services range, which is represented 
by the number of bank branches, has a statistically negatively significant relationship with 
only estimated TE_O scores (z = -2.118, p<0.05) and TE_S scores (z = -5.616, p<0.01). 
This means that the range of bank services at the categorical level (large, medium and 
small) may not significantly affect banks‘ technical efficiency. Nevertheless, the model 
reveals that there is no statistically significant relationship between banks‘ affiliation to 
the network and estimated banking technical efficiency scores for all regression sets.  
Thirdly:  Bank Environment 
The explanatory variable—the bank environment—is based on three numerical variables: 
bank profitability, bank liability and bank location. The result, presented in Table 7.6, 
reveals that only TE_C has a statistically positive significant relationship with banks‘ 
profitability. Additionally, bank liquidity has a statistically positive significant 
relationship with all sets of the regression (TE_O: z = 3.22, p<0.01), (TE_S: z = 2.899, 
p<0.01) and (TE_C: z = 2.569, p<0.05). Furthermore, the results of TE_O, TE_S and 
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TE_C regressions, shown in Table 7.6, reveal that estimated banking technical efficiency 
scores are statistically significantly affected by the location of the bank (z = -3.886, -5.472 
and -3.068, p<0.01 respectively). The results for this study are not unexpected given the 
geographical location of the banks sample. This is consistent with results of a study by 
Carling and Lundberg (2002) which reports that banking circumstances include economy 
power that may have a potential influence on bank stability and bank lending.  
Fourthly: Banks’ Skills 
The independent variable is also numerical: the banks‘ skill is associated with lending 
structure, capital structure, risk assessment, decision making policy and staff productivity.  
Based on the nature of the variables, a Tobit regression was performed and the results are 
shown in Table 7.6. In terms of capital structure, the result shows that capital structure 
does not influence operating technical efficiency of both IB and CB, even when the size 
of these banks is controlled. However, the result shows that lending structure has a 
statistically positive significant relationship with only estimated TE_O and TE_S scores 
(z = 8.00 and 4.276, P<0.01 respectively). This means that lending structure is not 
necessarily related to the size (i.e. small, medium or large) of banks.  
Throughout differentiating the sample of banks to Islamic and non-Islamic, the result 
reveals that staff productivity has a statistically negative significant relationship with 
estimated banking efficiency scores (z  = -1.965, p<0.05). Table 7.6 also shows that 
decision making policy has a statistically negative significant relationship with banking 
technical efficiency over the three sets of regression (TE_O: z = -3.159, p< 0.01), (TE_S: 
z = -2.888, p<0.01) and (TE_C: z = -1.993, p<0.05). Finally, this study evaluates whether 
differences in assessing risk factors in Islamic and conventional banking, as suggested by 
the analyses in chapter six (section 6.5.1), lead to differences in banking performance. As 
noted, the result reveals that risk assessment has a statistically positive significant 
relationship with TE_O (z = 4.992, p< 0.01), and TE_S (z = 1.783, p<0.10), however, this 
response does not provide evidence for an association with TE_C (z = - 1.993, p<0.05). 
Finally: Dummy Variables  
Variables representing banking system: Islamic banking and conventional banking (IB & 
CB), banking categories: small, medium and large Islamic and conventional banks (SIB, 
MIB, LIB, SCB, MCB & LCB), technique of transactions (TOT), specialisation in 
services provision (SISP), composition of the board (COB) and transformation scope (TS) 
are regressed as explanatory variables. Therefore, regression results relating to dummy 
explanatory variables are also estimated. The estimated coefficients of these variables 
represent the line of both Islamic and conventional banking systems which indicate there 
is a statistically positive significant relationship with estimated technical efficiency scores 
over all sets of the regression. Technically, these results provide statistical evidence that 
Islamic banking operations and the management of their resources are more efficient than 
conventional banking on average, especially when the estimated technical efficiency 
scores were discriminated by banking system or banking categories. 
Overall, the regression model explained approximately TE_O: 38%, TE_S: 36% and 
TE_C: 22% of the variances. Although for some variables the signs of coefficient 
correlation for the regression model are contradictory (i.e. bank size, staff productivity), 
research findings indicate support of previous results on DEA analysis. Differences in the 
result might be attributable to the characteristics of the bank groups used in this study, 
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since the IB performance indicator utilises non-interest income in comparison to interest 
income in CB. 
In response to the last research question, is there a difference in credit department 
efficiency performance between CB and IB systems?, the study hypothesised that 
efficiency performance in the credit field between CB and IB systems is similar. The 
main finding of this study regarding this aspect is that portfolio risk assessment is a key 
factor in determining rational decision making and efficient credit-structure relationships. 
Throughout the study period, 2002-2006, the results discussed above reflect that the IB 
system varied from the CB system in terms of efficiency of lending decision making in 
general. While the DEA analysis and Tobit regression analysis for the determinants of 
estimated technical efficiency scores both revealed statistically and economically 
significant differences in efficiency performance in credit field between CB and IB 
systems, the results indicate that there is no statistical evidence to accept the predicted 
similarity that was addressed as ––null hypothesis-3, thus, the null hypothesis cannot be 
supported. The result of test hypothesis_3 has shown in Table 7.6.  
Table 7.7: Summary of Results of Test Hypothesis-3  
Feature Content of the Hypotheses Test results 
H3 
There is no difference in efficiency performance in the 
credit field between CB and IB systems   
Unsupported 
 
 
7.5.5 Discussion and Interpretation the Results  
The empirical findings, thus, are consistent with the models presented by (Bloomfield 
1973; Chapra & Ahmed 2002; DeGeorge 1992; Grossman & Hart 1983). Their results 
show that religion is not necessarily the overriding factor leading to a public embracement 
of Islamic banking but, rather, circumstances where there is the expectation of higher 
returns on deposits or better terms than might be available from the conventional banks. 
In fact, the religious and moral appeal of Islamic banking did very little to contribute to 
the growth of Islamic banking transactions in the ME economies prior to the 1980s (Zaher 
& Hassan 2001). This argument is significant considering that Islamic banking in the ME 
has relied heavily on public awareness among its majority Muslim population about the 
unlawfulness of interest to mobilise deposits since the 1970s, when the first IB was 
established. 
Hughes (1999) maintains that the most critical factors in sustaining growth in Islamic 
banking are: 1) the ability to provide modern banking facilities, supported by the latest 
technological advancements and; 2) the ability to offer rates of return comparable to those 
received by depositors in CB. It is apparent in the results, at least during the years 
between 2002 and 2006, that the second factor appears to be dominant. According to IB 
in the ME, experience appeared to deviate from the religious underpinnings claimed by 
IB proponents that require the business community to place first emphasis on contribution 
towards and growth of the institution over individual economic profits.  
The result is that currently the demand and supply for Islamic deposits and transactions 
far outstrips the supply of suitable financing/asset aspects of IB. Some of the major 
factors that contributed to this imbalance can be explained by the unique risks inherent in 
IB that have been discussed at length in chapter three. In contrast, there was a significant 
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contraction in interest income and increase in interest expenses in CB operations that led 
to a sharp decline in efficiencies, with the decline in interest income attributed to: 1) 
rising competition (Hakim & Neaime 2001); 2) negative loan growth (Zaman & 
Movassaghi 2001); and 3) higher loan loss provisions (Wilson 1999).   
The results show also that IBs meanwhile enjoyed rapid asset and deposit expansion in 
2003 as a result of spill-over effects from the improving economy. In the following years, 
IBs also recorded impressive profitability and efficiency increases, largely due to higher 
financing income and lower financing loss provision expenses as financing write-backs 
and recoveries increased. Further, since IBs benefited from a financial crisis (due to 
global restriction on Muslim deposits), the years 2005 and 2006 marked the rise of 
Islamic banking performance in general, and this finding is consistent with study results 
by Bashir (2000).  
The IB system eventually progressed to record the highest PTE and SE scores. 
Furthermore, IBs tend to operate at a more efficient size, with the majority of them 
attaining optimal return to scale. Nevertheless, all IBs experienced technical regress on 
average. Thus, IBs were superior in improving managerial efficiency and realising scale 
economies, but they were not as innovative as the CBs. Within IBs, there was a noted 
difference in efficiency and productivity performance among banks‘ categories (large, 
medium and small size). The aftermath of the financial crisis left many vulnerable to scale 
inefficiencies in the face of the rising costs of banks transactions, staff and overheads in 
the maintenance of overextended networks of branches—a finding which is consistent 
with that of Leong, Dollery and Coelli (2003). At the same time, Rosly and Bakar (2003) 
reported that the financial crisis prompted the banks to take correctional measures that 
saw mergers between banks and reintegration with financial companies that provide 
similar products and services. 
The large conventional banks (LCB), on the other hand, were becoming more reliant on 
non-financing income from free-based activities to generate profitable returns due to their 
greater access and participation in international money markets as a result of their wide 
international presence, and the existing supporting framework afforded by their CB 
operations. This distinctive feature sets the large conventional banks (LCB) apart from 
other CB sizes as is shown in Figures 7.17, 7.18 and 7.19, where it is apparent that 
although both financing and non-financing income increased at faster rates beyond 2000, 
non-financing income increases dominated financing income growth which is consistent 
with results by bt Shahimi and Ahmad (2005) who found that financing structure and loan 
loss provision affects net income margin positively. 
In general, it must be noted that throughout the study period, Islamic banking was not 
only constrained by the financing difficulties that Islamic banking often faces due to the 
heightened risks arising from asset/liability mismatches unique to Islamic banking, but 
was also subjected to a greater degree of political pressures in their operations. A study 
conducted by Batchelor (2005) on the cross-system banks productivity measures in 
Malaysia revealed that the Islamic banking operations had over 80% of Murabaha 
investments dedicated towards larger term (over 5year) investments, as compared to other 
Islamic banking operations in the ME. This finding suggests that IBs in the ME region—
much like other IBs elsewhere in Muslim countries—may have undertaken government‘s 
priorities due to: 
1. The assistance extended by government in the Islamisation of financial 
transactions system; and  
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2. The principal requirement of Islamic banks to support community-enhancing 
programs.  
These constraints often result in investment decisions that run contrary to economic profit 
interests and limit IBs in allocating resources to other more profitable but less morally 
optimal projects. At the same time, however, one cannot conclude that the interests of 
depositors are not taken care of since in Islamic banking, ‗shareholders activism‘ places 
the advancement of social interests first. Therefore, the results of this study are quite 
consistent with those reported by Favero and Papi (1995) and Fohlin (2000) wherein their 
findings suggested that although IBs were the most efficient in terms of decision making 
performance, another factor holds true to some extent within the IB context. As the results 
show, the medium Islamic banks (MIB) always outperformed the large Islamic banks 
(LIB) due to their ability to operate with better scale size. 
The comparative SE results also correspond well to the findings of Mester (1987), in 
which the author found that regional banks with substantially smaller bank size than the 
major trading banks tended to operate with increasing returns to scale (IRS), whilst the 
major trading banks operated at decreasing returns to scale (DRS). Nevertheless, the 
period throughout 2000 and 2001 was one of the most challenging for the Islamic banking 
system. The early 1990s (and up until 2000) was a period of high profitability and easy 
credit extension that prevailed. However, the onset of the Gulf War crisis in 2002 
following a prolonged period of depreciation was followed by a devaluation of the 
regional currencies and a number of another currencies (Abdullah 2003). In addition, the 
period also marked the beginning of an industry-wide regulatory consideration process 
where the financial restriction program was directed to control deposits and securities of 
Islamic banks around the world (Kahf 1999).       
7.6 Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrates that DEA is an excellent tool of measurement for improving 
the productivity of a service business. Therefore, by its ability to model multiple-input 
and multiple-output relationships, studies that use DEA provide useful managerial 
information on improving the performance. By respecting this study‘s results in this 
chapter, the Islamic banking system, even the large or small ones, have not as yet proved 
to be the expected formidable competitor. At the same time, the growth and experience of 
the Islamic banking system has allowed it to operate closer to efficient scales and with 
comparable or even better levels of managerial efficiency than conventional banks.  
To sum up, banks that have greater monitoring incentive and capabilities, higher risk, and 
greater controlling over borrowers, operate at higher yield efficiency and are well 
prepared for the challenges of the future. Thus, banks with lower monitoring of these 
factors actually attain lower performance. The following chapter, Chapter 8, provides an 
overall conclusion to the study, along with policy implications and recommendations for 
further research.  
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
8.1 Introduction  
Recorded relationships of risk factors and the rationality of lending decision making 
reveal that achieving a trade-off between risk and products quality is a pre-condition for 
having high technical efficiency in Islamic or conventional intermediation. Mainly, this 
study aimed to explore whether the risk factors are differently assessed between CB and 
IB, and whether these risk factors influence the rationality of lending decision-making. 
Furthermore, this study provides a comparison between banking systems, and highlights 
banks‘ efficiency scales in making rational lending decisions specifically. This chapter 
relates to the theoretical significance and field application according to the findings stated 
in the previous chapters and, presents recommendations for future research and field 
application.  
This chapter contains seven sections, including the introductory section above. An 
overview of the key aspects relevant to CB and IB is presented in Section 2. Section 3 
contains a summary relating to the conclusions comprising the major findings obtained 
from theoretical research and tests, together with the significance of the research results. 
Section 4 contains contributions to theory and practice. Section 5 provides limitations of 
the study. Policy implications and recommendations for further research are provided in 
section 6. Finally, a conclusion to this chapter is provided in section 7. Figure 8.1 
provides a visual overview of the structure of this chapter.  
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Figure 8.1: Outline of Chapter 8 Interrelations 
 
8.2 Overview of the Study 
The role of banks under the financial intermediation concept is to bridge the gap between 
the needs of lenders and borrowers by performing a transformation function. Banks‘ pool 
funds from surplus units––depositors––to provide loans to deficit units––borrowers––to 
enable the latter to undertake the use of the funds for either consumption or investment 
purposes. In return, the deficit units or borrowers compensate both the bank and the saver 
in the form of interest. This contractual design forms the basis of CB that has a record of 
almost 300 years of history (Archer & Karim 2002). The interest-based debt contracts 
have been able to effectively solve problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in the 
bank-borrower relationship, but at times they have fallen short. This happens in terms of 
the depositor-bank relationship as depositors often rely on bank shareholders to monitor 
banks for them when they delegate both agency problems and costs to the banks that act 
as their agents (Lewis & Algaoud 2001). This form of financial intermediation, 
nevertheless, has been able to generate acceptable risk and returns to all parties.  
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IB counterparts represent a new form of financial intermediation that is fast gaining 
popularity worldwide. Unlike CB, IB counterparts prohibit the charging and giving of 
interest and the practice of amassing wealth through speculative economic transactions 
that entail excessive risk. Instead, IB counterparts strive for economic justice and 
emphasize societal and community welfare development above the earning of economic 
profits. In short, the essence of IB counterparts is a dual partnership between the Islamic 
bank and its depositors, and between the Islamic bank and its investment clients to 
manage the depositors‘ financial resources towards productive uses. Rather than earning 
returns in the form of interest, both the Islamic bank and depositors, instead, share in the 
profits or loss in a particular project with the investors or entrepreneurs. Profit and loss 
sharing (PLS) arrangements in investment financing, therefore, form the key theoretical 
framework for IB counterparts.  
The forces of financial deregulation, consolidation, technological advances and financial 
innovation, however, are rapidly transforming the role of financial intermediaries, 
including banks, by increasing competition among them. Financial intermediaries often 
respond to these forces of change by engaging in financial innovation, a process where 
new financial solutions provide better investment opportunities, returns and risk 
management, thus helping to maintain their competitive positions. As a result, new 
financial instruments, or even new financial systems, are being introduced at increasing 
rates to serve the role of financial intermediation as financial innovation is assisted by 
advancements in technology, finance theory and the liberalisation of financial regulations.  
Nevertheless, the rejection of interest-based mechanisms exposes Islamic banking to 
heightened risks arising from (1) the nature of equity-like funding, (2) moral hazards, 
(3 adverse selection and (4) the lack of risk hedging and liquidity instruments that are 
based on PLS arrangements. To aggravate problems further, the fundamental differences 
inherent in Islamic banking could potentially result in friction and misunderstanding with 
regulatory bodies and other external agencies that Islamic banks need to deal with, as they 
often treat banks as authorized interest-based depository financial institutions: the 
regulations of many central banks to protect depositors in non-Muslim countries are in 
contradiction with the concept of PLS deposits of Islamic banks. Furthermore, 
conventional accounting standards are often inadequate for the provision of accurate 
disclosures of financial reporting to stakeholders.  
Collective evidence has shown that multinational banks and organisations have been more 
adept in operating IB than fully-fledged Islamic banks from Muslim countries. As a 
result, Islamic banking has experienced astounding growth rates over the past two 
decades compared to CB. IB counterparts hold great potential, especially in Muslim 
countries where the revival of IB is fast taking place as CB slowly gives way after being 
the principal financial intermediary since the colonial period. Furthermore, there has been 
much support and interest shown by non-Muslim depositors, investors and organisations. 
Eventually, the distinctive nature and challenges presented by IB counterparts call into 
question the sustainability of growth of the sector and its ability to compete against CB as 
an alternative banking mode, despite its impressive record so far. After all, the growth 
rates of Islamic banking are rather crude measures to gauge the competitiveness of IB 
with regard to CB. This is compounded by the fact that a cross-banking system 
performance assessment and analysis between IB and CB has never been widely 
researched before. Nevertheless, a credible cross-system bank performance would yield 
valuable insights to all participants in the financial intermediation process (including 
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regulators) whose decisions would have significant bearing on the eventual success or 
demise of IB as a viable alternative financial system to CB. The next section provides a 
summary of the findings of this study.  
8.3 Summary of the Study Methodology and Main 
Findings  
The profile of CB and IB systems above depicts the significance of conducting a 
comparative research between IB and CB. This study fundamentally shows that despite 
the fact that many aspects within Islamic counterparts deviate significantly from those of 
their conventional counterparts, Islamic banking is nevertheless performing the same role 
of financial intermediation function as CB. This argument then forms the basis for a 
comparative cross-system bank in general, and methodologies or approaches of 
performance risks assessment in particular, between IB and CB. Subsequently, the 
methodology is applied to banks originated in the Middle East region. Two different types 
of data
92
, along with two different analysis techniques
93
, have been used to drive a 
comparable set between IB and CB.  
The information obtained from 48 banks (including IBs and CBs) by using questionnaire 
method and data gathered from five financial periods were methodologically analysed 
using three analytical softwares, parametric statistical techniques such as SPSS software, 
non-parametric techniques such as E.Views econometric software, and DEA-Solver 
performance software. In brief, the study conducted factor analysis, and factor scores 
derived from the principal component (PC) were used as input values for the Multiple 
Regression (MR) analysis. Then, MR was carried out to measure the association between 
the project variables which were then measured by interval scales. Also, this study used 
non-linear Tobit econometric model to find what factors are relevant to the decision-
making process and, further, how much each factor affects the outcome. Finally, Data 
Envelopment Analysis was used to analyse the decision performance (efficiency and 
quality). 
With credible banking models ‗Islamic and conventional‘ to hand, the study proceeded to 
perform a comparative bank performance in terms of risk assessment and lending 
decision making policies. Without doubt, a fully-fledged banking system enables one to 
make the comparison of bank behaviour and bank performance between IB and CB more 
effectively and accurately than in a dual banking system and a mixed financial system. 
Therefore, the methodology was applied to the sample of fully-fledged banks––
Islamic/conventional––operating in Libya, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan and United Arab 
Emirates in the Middle East region. At this stage, it is very important to report that the 
principal objective of IB is two-fold: profit maximisation, as well as welfare falah 
maximisation––corporate wealth maximisation. This study investigated this aspect and 
clearly found that, unlike CB which only focuses on economic objectives, IB considers 
                                                 
92
 First, primary data were collected by using the questionnaire method, and second, secondary data were 
collected from annual reports for the period from 2002 to 2006. 
93
 First, a parametric method where Multivariate analysis (MA) and factoring Analysis (Principal 
component analysis method) techniques were used to analyse the primary data related to the risk factors 
assessment and their relation with the optimality of lending decision-making tests. Second, a non-
parametric method where Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique was used to analyse the secondary 
data related to the efficiency tests. 
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the benefit of the whole society as well as the other priorities of the Islamic community 
through the prohibition of injustice and the payment of rib`a (interest).  
8.3.1 Descriptive and Comparative Indicators 
This study investigated banks‘ and respondents‘ characteristics in both banking systems. 
Thereby, results suggested a similarity in terms of participants‘ characteristics between 
CB and IB systems (age, education level, experience in job and participation in lending 
decision making), which means that any potential differences are not likely to be due to 
the respondents. In terms of banks‘ characteristics, results showed some differences in the 
lending capacity in each banking system and their obligations. In this regard, even though 
the number of loan applications approved by both IB and CB are significantly different, 
the number of applications approved and classified as a ‗good loan‘ is almost similar. 
Banks‘ obligations and status are varied; however, no considerable difference was found 
in the range of banking activities and banks‘ size.   
In primary tests to determine the appropriate factor analysis model and the reliability level 
of overall scale measurement, results show that both banking samples are significantly 
adequate and reliable, and can be used to determine the factorability of the matrix as a 
whole. Basically, factor analysis is assumed to represent underlying or latent variables in 
terms of which correlations in R-matrix are counted both mathematically and 
theoretically. The number of factors, therefore, to be interpreted largely depends on the 
underlying purpose of the analysis. This study confirmed the factor structure of the scale 
(low/high) that can be used for further explanations. In relation to this aspect, the study 
also confirmed that factor analysis revealed some differences in terms of the number of 
risk factors extraction and loading factors‘ name between CB and IB groups. What 
follows is a presentation of the results and findings of the study according to the 
presentation of research questions and the thesis organisation.  
8.3.2 Achievement for the Function of Risk Assessment in CB 
and IB 
In reference to research sub-question 1 on a comparison of an achievement of risk factors 
assessment function between CB and IB, the principal findings of the study in this phase 
are indicated below in terms of the following: 
8.3.2.1 Scheme of Risk Factors  
Results show that risks in the CB system are classified differently from those in the IB 
system, and the variance was somewhat acceptable and sometimes considerable. 
Moreover, having considered the principal component analysis, results reveal that both 
CB and IB follow different patterns to indicate the rate of applicability of latent or 
underlying risks to the specific risk factors (transaction risk, business risk, treasury risk, 
governance risk and systematic risk).  
For the CB and IB, results also suggest that both banking systems are somewhat different 
in terms of risk factors visibility, but risk feasibility is almost similar. Thus, in relation to 
this segment, the study provided some evidence that CB and IB have different capabilities 
in considering and identifying these risk factors.   
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8.3.2.2 Approaches to Risk Factor Measurement  
There are many approaches to measure different risk factors that have been used in the 
finance industry. Among them, three approaches—internal rating and scoring model, 
value at risk model, and beta or asset pricing model—are commonly applied in both IB 
and CB. This study investigated the appropriateness of using these approaches to measure 
risk factors which might be faced in these systems, and the results reveal no evidence to 
indicate that CB performs differently to IB in terms of risk factors measurement.  
Nevertheless, the results clearly indicate that neither banks with Islamic compliance, nor 
banks with non-Islamic compliance, have applied specific models to measure such 
articulated risk factors. Thus, CB and IB are similar in terms of risk measurement, but 
vary in terms of conducting risk measurement approaches.     
8.3.2.3 Importance for Lending Portfolio Management  
As the tests assert, IB and CB are able to recognise risks that may frequently involve 
every single act and indicates the banks‘ consideration towards managing and controlling 
risk factors. The results ultimately indicate that there is a considerable relationship 
between assessment of risk factors and management of lending portfolio, although this 
conclusion is not similarly applicable for all types of risk factors. Thus, results provide 
the general magnitude of the relationship in both systems: IB and CB. 
Basically, the quality of lending portfolio should be properly assessed and administrated 
as much as the quantity of risk factors. In this regard, the results asserted that both 
positive and negative correlations exist between risk factors and the quality of lending 
portfolio.   
8.3.3 The Relation between Risk Factors and Lending Decision-
Making in CB and IB 
In relation to research sub-question 2 on a comparison of risk factors which influence the 
rationality of lending decision making between CB and IB, in general, the results revealed 
that the rationality of lending decision making can be influenced by different risk factors; 
and the influence level can be different from bank to bank in one system, and from system 
to system in the industry. The principal findings of the study in this phase can be 
summarised as follows:  
1. In an allocative loans stage, results reveal that some risk factors can 
significantly influence the rationality of lending decision-making in the CB 
system. This is in contrast to IB, where there is evidence that risk factors have 
no influence on the rationality of lending decision-making. 
2. In an authorisation stage, results assert that the rationality of lending decision 
making is, in the main, less influenced by risk factors. However, these risk 
factors which are applicable to the CB system and influence the rationality of 
lending decision making are mostly different from the IB system.  
3. Making a lending decision with consideration of risk measurement approaches: 
results also reveal that approaches of measuring risk factors may influence the 
rationality of lending decision-making significantly in both banking systems. 
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4. Finally, results suggest that even though the rationality of lending decision-
making in such banking systems has been affected similarly by different risk 
factors, the correlations among them are inconsistent and not clearly formed.    
8.3.4 Efficiency of Banks’ Operations - CB vs. IB 
With regard to the comparative efficiency of lending decision making between CB and 
IB, in research sub-question 3, conclusions are made according to average efficiencies 
scores observed over a window of three years. The results of technical efficiency (TE), 
pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE) for all banks‘ categories (small, 
medium and large sizes) in both banking systems are compared and presented as two 
main aspects as follows: 
8.3.4.1 Lending Efficiency 
1. In terms of constant returns to scale model, results revealed that medium 
Islamic bans (MIB) were mostly dominant in terms of technical efficiency 
during the testing period, followed by small Islamic banks (SIB) on average. 
These two banks‘ categories––MIB and SIB––reported better performance 
amongst all other categories overall in the analytical period.  
2.  With decomposing constant returns to scale model into variable returns to 
scale model to allow an insight into the sources of efficiency, results suggested 
that even though IB was operating more efficiently than CB, CB performed 
better in terms of allocative resources on average. 
3. Results showed that IB was better on scale performance on average than CB. In 
this regard, decreasing returns to scale (DRS) were dominant in CB, and 
increasing returns to scale (IRS) were reported in both small conventional and 
Islamic banks (SCB & SIB); while medium conventional and Islamic banks 
(MCB & MIB) operate with quite optimum scale size with share in both DRS 
and IRS.         
8.3.4.2 Trend Analysis  
1. Results revealed that CB and IB performed similarly and followed the same 
pattern in terms of technical efficiency, which continued to decline throughout 
2003 and 2004. Later, during 2005, results showed slight improvement, even 
though both banking systems charted a different course. 
2. Considering size of scale, results suggested that the most inefficient levels 
occurred in the period 2002–2004. In general, these inefficiencies were due to 
allocation of resources, especially in banks which were experiencing some 
difficulties—such as being oversized and overstaffed.  
3. Results asserted that both IB and CB were quite heterogeneous in their 
performance and results reported a wider gap between them overall in the 
analytical period.  
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8.3.4.3 Illustration of Efficiency Determinants 
DEA is initially applied with the study samples––universal and separately––to project 
common grand frontiers to enable the derivation of TE indices that banks‘ efficiency 
trends. This approach provides the simplest and most direct way of comparing efficiency 
levels of all banking units (see sections 7.6.1 and 7.6.2); however, it is not by any means 
the most accurate and desirable. A comment should be made here that one major 
limitation of generating TE scores using different samples is that one needs to estimate on 
the basis that all banking units share the same common technology or frontier. However, 
this estimation may be too far-fetched if banking units within a sample are operating with 
different ideology, are subjected to different banking environments and are of different 
asset size, or differ by skill and transaction instruments type. In such a circumstance, 
efficiency differences are likely to prevail and it can be difficult to attribute this to 
differences in characteristics, or actual operations, on an equal footing.  
The study investigated the reasons behind fluctuating performance of lending decision-
making throughout determinants of banks‘ efficiency, and the results are as follows:  
Banks’ size:  
The result suggests that controlling size of banks may possibly lead to an 
increase in banking performance, but may produce a value loss as discriminated 
by banking categories. The regression model for determinants of technical 
efficiency provides evidence for a statistical significant relationship between 
banking size and banking efficiency. 
Bank’s system applied:  
The study model for determinants of technical efficiency provides evidence for a 
statistical negative significant relationship between banking efficiency and their 
services range, while the model failed to provide statistical significant evidence 
for technical efficiency and affiliation to the network relationship.   
Banks’ environment: 
The study model for determinants of technical efficiency provides evidence for a 
statistical positive significant relationship between banking efficiency and 
banking liquidity and negative significant relationship with a bank‘s location or 
a bank‘s work environment. However, the model is quite able to provide 
evidence that banking profitability and banking efficiency are significantly 
correlated.  
Banks’ skills:   
The result in this construct reveals that decision making policy is a dominant 
variable among all sets of the regression, which provides evidence for a 
statistical negative significant relationship between decision making policies and 
technical efficiency. In addition, the relationship of banking technical efficiency 
with lending structure, risk assessment and staff productivity demonstrated 
significant differences between Islamic and non-Islamic systems. In other words, 
the results significantly distinguish the differences in Islamic and non-Islamic 
systems. Despite this, the model failed to provide statistical evidence for a 
significant relationship between banking efficiency and capital structure.  
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The results of testing the hypotheses of this study are summarised in the form of 
statistical decisions as follows:  
Feature 
Content of 
 the Study Hypotheses 
Test 
Results 
H1: 
H1a 
There is no difference in factors considered in credit risk assessment 
and lending decision in CB and IB systems. 
Supported 
H1b 
There is no difference in measurement approaches used for such risk 
factors in CB and IB systems. 
Supported 
 H1c 
There is no relationship between risk factors and default risks 
portfolio in CB and IB systems. 
Unsupported 
H2: 
H2a 
There is no difference in factors considered in credit risk which 
influence the rationality of lending decision in CB and IB systems. 
Supported 
H2b 
There is no difference in measurement approaches used for such risk 
factors that influence the rationality of lending decision in CB and IB 
systems. 
Supported 
H2c 
There is no relationship between risk factors and default risks 
portfolio which influence the rationality of lending decision in CB and 
IB systems. 
Unsupported 
H3:  
There is no difference in efficiency performance in the credit field 
between CB and IB systems   
Unsupported 
 
8.4 Contributions to Theory and Practice   
While the investigative effort in this thesis suggests further studies, it does make distinct 
contributions to theory and practice. In the areas of risk taking behaviour––risk factors 
assessment––and the effect of assessing these factors on the rationality of lending 
decision making, the thesis contributes to practitioners‘ knowledge and the literature in 
the following ways:  
Contribution to the Theory  
Information obtained from the related literature has resulted in the theories and model 
adopted for the study making the reseacher‘s suppositions the very best that they can be. 
Accordingly, referring to the research questions and research objectives, and the use of a 
combination of three theories and the model of lending decision-making to test the 
conceptual framework of this study, has resulted in ultimate benefits to this study and to 
finance knowledge in general.  
A number of factors that influence the rationality of lending decision-making are 
important to take into account when a decision is being made.  Moreover, no general 
studies highlight all the potential risks that may affect the lending decision-making 
process, or determine their influence on the rationality of lending policy. Therefore, this 
study contributes to the literature on finance in general, and on the banking industry in 
particular. 
Contribution to Practice  
In general, much of the literature points to risk taking behaviour as being homogenous 
throughout both the Islamic banking and the conventional banking systems. However, this 
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study aimed to evaluate how Islamic and conventional banking systems manage the 
different risk factors and recognise the lending and risks relationship. This study offers an 
insight into the function of risk factors assessment similarities and differences between 
the two banking systems, which in the past have been treated as one financial industry in 
the literature when investigating reasons behind increased lending defaults.  
The literature survey indicated there is no evidence of a study which has tested or applied 
the risk factors which influence lending decisions significantly. This study compared the 
performance of two different banking systems, CB and IB, and has clarified that the 
ability to manage and control risk factors which influence the rationality of lending 
decision making can vary from one banking system to the other, notwithstanding the 
differences in risk factors, policies of lending portfolio management and banks‘ efficiency 
in making rational lending decisions. Thus, via the aspects that have been considered, the 
study contributes to the theory on the similarities and differences between these two 
banking systems––CB and IB––to bankers and practitioners.     
A prime focus of the research has been to differentiate which banking system is 
considered a greater risk in their operations and decision-making on lending; and whether 
these banks are capable of better control when formulating and implementing lending 
decisions. These aspects added empirical depth and dimension for the researcher of this 
study, and will contribute to expanding knowledge on lending credit. This study covers 
Islamic countries in the ME region and attempts to fill the gap in this specific knowledge. 
It also introduces a model which employs factors expected to have an influence on the 
performance of lending decisions and supporting evaluation of lending decisions in both 
systems.  
Despite developments in Islamic banking, a number of challenges and obstacles still 
remain for banking institutions in Islamic countries. Therefore, this study has helped to 
clarify which system has the ability to better manage, measure, and control risk factors 
that may affect lending decisions. Moreover, the research will contribute to an increased 
understanding of dominating risk factors in both CB and IB systems. 
Finally, this study draws attention to the effect of risk factors on lending policies and the 
rationality of lending decision making, regardless of how powerfully it may be 
established. Ultimately, lending policies or strategies are not stable or fixed, but may be 
changed and affected by their circumstances or environments. Thus, to lending decision 
makers in the banking industry, this study offers effective establishment of evaluation and 
control risk factors and an understanding of the reasons behind the fluctuation in levels of 
making lending decisions.  
8.5 Limitations of the Study 
Despite the proportion of the research samples to the study population being quite high, 
the number of banks in each sample is still small. This allowed the researcher to collect 
87 data booklets from the CB sample and 76 data booklets from the IB sample, which is 
often considered unsuitable for using some statistical analysis. The results obtained in this 
study, therefore, may be confounded by the fact that the number of banks in the sample 
was simply too small to allow for suitable conclusions that can be appropriately 
generalised––to meet the external validity––on Islamic and conventional banks operating 
in Middle East region, and then on banking institutions worldwide. Hence, the larger 
number of banks‘ sample, if applied to this study, would better be able to reveal any 
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noticeable behaviour or trends. The results are to be interpreted with an understanding of 
the context of this study.  
In terms of the determinants of using linear regression to predict the response variables 
based on the value of explanatory variables, or to predict the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables, it is important to consider the relevant range of the 
independent variable(s) in making predictions. This range includes all values from the 
smallest to the largest used to develop the model. In this study, the results of the 
regression models used to predict the relationship of risk factors with the rationality of 
lending decision making may be influenced by the use of limit values which have been 
given as five Likert scale values. Hence, the use of absolute values with a relevant range 
can provide better prediction of the model. Thus, for interpretations in this part of the 
study it was assumed that values are quite representative within the relevant range.   
8.6 Implication for Further Research and Directions 
It would be unwise to say that the IB system completely provides an alternative real-
model to the CB system, but a risk assessment model and approaches of risk management 
have been developed and demonstrated in the study that provide a possible way of solving 
lending decision problems, especially under uncertainties and irregular risk factor 
circumstances. Given the use of a combination of Transaction Cost Theory (TCT), 
Agency Theory (AT), Decision Making Theory (DMT) and rational lending decision-
making model (DGK), rational lending decision-making can be performed by considering 
different objective functions and policy constraints. A great deal of research has focused 
on quantitative analysis models for corporate default problems, yet only a minority of 
researchers has developed models concerning the qualitative and irregular factors of the 
problem. However, these qualitative and irregular factors in the lending decision-making 
process are always inconsistent.  
Assessing different risk factors and determining their effect on the rationality of lending 
decision-making has provided new research direction for both the concepts and 
methodologies used to formulate and solve default problems. Performing functions of 
assessment of these risk factors and rational lending decision-making at the corporate and 
comparative project level can be solved. However, a number of problems remain to be 
solved in future research, namely:  
1. In the study, the relationships between risk factors and rational lending decision 
making were always reasonably and simply defined; however, in reality, the 
decision-making process needs more analysis for complicated––quantitative/ 
qualitative––risk factors to support critical lending decision-making. These 
factors should be generated and obtained in the form of a database or historical 
resources. Most decisions have time limits and, thus, rapid and rational decision-
making policy needs simple and well-defined risk taking behaviour for support. 
The behaviour of such risk factors should be defined prior to the process of 
making lending decisions. Further research work should focus on the 
development of effective risk factors assessment, or at least the most frequently 
used qualitative and irregular factors.  
2. Under the lending policy, the default problem is usually transformed into a crisp 
problem, followed by the establishment of an inventory of lending problems 
such as availability of liquidity and a bank‘s capital sustainability. This 
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transitional issue of credit problems could reduce the efficiency and rationality 
of lending decision-making policies. Moreover, the calculation in the lending 
decision model is complicated and the decision itself is always carried out with 
time limits. More research and development of methods used to assess 
internal/external factors that influence the rationality of lending decision making 
is urgently required.   
3. Since the decision makers‘ decisions on credits are subjective, the qualitative 
and irregular factors involved in the decision are the performance of the decision 
maker in accordance with his/her experience, knowledge, and priority with 
respect to the decision itself. Different decision makers may have different 
perspectives on the same decision, and the differences can sometimes be quite 
explicit. More research effort should be put into the development of a 
knowledge-base and practical-base of the qualitative and irregular factors. 
4. The assessment of risk factors is one of the most important functions in any 
institution, especially in multi-based funds structure institutions such as Islamic 
banking. A balance on returns and risk rate within the Islamic policies of a 
transactional activity is essential. The profit and loss sharing principle (PLS) 
reflects the ability of an institution to perform best management of their financial 
transactions, and regulatory and Islamic supervisory boards can also affect future 
transactions considerably. Future research should focus on these two areas as 
determinant factors in making rational lending decisions.   
8.7 Conclusion  
The strategy of assessing risk factors and making rational decisions is critical for every 
institution in every industry, and even more critical for financial institutions in terms of 
making lending decisions (employing rational lending policy). The institutions must take 
into account all relevant factors for making short-term and long-term decisions. In the 
case of IB and CB, during a period of deregulation/economic recession as a result of the 
global financial crisis, both banking systems were influenced by some risks that led them 
to focus on all potential risks that might occur in lending activities.  
This thesis attempts to enhance our understanding of how IB and CB systems assess risk 
factors, and to determine what risk factors influence the rationality of lending decision 
making, in addition to comparing the efficiency of such banking systems. Thus, the 
results of this thesis provide theoretical and practical guidelines and contributions to risk 
factors assessment and efficiency measurement for banks operating with ideologically 
different views. The results also indicate that while an assessment of risk factors may 
necessitate a focus on financial institutions alone, banks, strategically, cannot rely on 
assessing quantified risk factors without considering the effect of these factors on their 
lending decision processes. 
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10 APPENDICES  
APPENDIX A: Glossary and Arabic Terms 
Amana (Demand deposits): Deposits held at the bank for safekeeping purpose. They are 
guaranteed in capital value, and earn no return. 
Bay mu’ajal (Pre-delivery, deferred payment): The seller can sell a product on the basis of a 
deferred payment, in instalments or in a lump sum. The price of the product is agreed 
upon between the buyer and the seller at the time of the sale, and cannot include any 
charges for deferring payment. 
Bay salam (Pre-payment, deferred delivery): The buyer pays the seller the full negotiated price of 
a product that the seller promises to deliver at a future date. 
Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence): It refers to Islamic jurisprudence that covers all aspects of life: 
religious, political, social and economic. Fiqh is mainly based on interpretations of the 
Qur‟an and Sunna (sayings and deeds of the prophet). 
Ijara (Lease, lease purchase): A party leases a particular product for a specific sum and a specific 
time period. In the case of a lease purchase, each payment includes a portion that goes 
toward the final purchase and transfer of ownership of the product. 
Istisna (Deferred payment, deferred delivery): A manufacturer (contractor) agrees to produce 
(build) and to deliver a certain good (or premise) at a given price on a given date in the 
future. The price does not have to be paid in advance (in contrast to bay salam). It may be 
paid in instalments or part may be paid in advance while the balance to be paid later on 
based is the preferences of the parties. 
Ju’ala (Service charge): A party pays another a specified amount of money as a fee for rendering 
a specific service in accordance with the terms of the contract stipulated between the two 
parties. This mode usually applies to transactions such as consultations & professional 
services, fund placements and trust services. 
Kifala It is a pledge given to a creditor that the debtor will pay the debt, fine or liability. A third 
party becomes surety for the payment of the debt if unpaid by the person originally liable. 
Mudaraba (Trustee finance contract): Rabb -ul- mal (capital‘s owner) provides the entire capital 
needed to finance a project while the entrepreneur offers his labour and expertise. Profits 
are shared between them at a certain fixed ratio, whereas financial losses are exclusively 
borne by rabb -ul- mal. The liability of the entrepreneur is limited only to his time and 
effort. 
Murabaha (Mark–up financing): The seller informs the buyer of his cost of acquiring or 
producing a specified product. The profit margin is then negotiated between them. The 
total cost is usually paid in instalments. 
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Musharaka (Equity participation): The bank enters into an equity partnership agreement with one 
or more partners to jointly finance an investment project. Profits (and losses) are shared 
strictly in relation to the respective capital contributions. 
Qard Hassan (Beneficence loans): These are zero – return loans that the Qur‟an encourages 
Muslims to make to the needy. Banks are allowed to charge borrowers a service fee to 
cover the administrative expenses of handling the loan. The fee should not be related to 
the loan amount or maturity. 
Shari`a (Islamic Law): The Islamic Law extracted from the Qur‟an and Sunna (sayings & deeds 
of the Prophet) 
Wikala: An agency contract which may include in its terms a fee for the agent. The same contract 
can also be used to give a power of attorney to someone to represent another‘s interests. 
Zakat: Religious tax to be deducted from wealth to be paid to the needy.  
Source: El-Hawary, Grais & Iqbal 2004, pp. 45-6 (Annix I),and 
2007, pp. 775-6 (Annix I)) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Takaful: Arabic name for insurance based on Shari`a rules. An Islamic Insurance is a collective 
protection scheme. It literally means solidarity. Takaful reflects solidarity and is akin to 
mutual insurance. The permissibility of Takaful is supported by the Sunnah as; hadith 1) 
‗the seal of the prophets (Muhammad) said: whosoever removes a worldly hardship from 
a believer, Allah will remove from him one of the hardships of the day of the judgment. 
Whosoever alleviates from one, Allah will alleviate his lot in this world and the next‘ 
(narrated by Abu-huraira); hadith 2) ‗the seal of the prophets (Muhammad) told a Bedwin 
Arab who left his camel untied trusting to the will of Allah said: Tie the camel first and 
then leave it to Allah‘ (narrated by Anas Bin-malik). (Developed by the author, 2009 
based on Archer and Ahmed (2002, 2003). 
Concessionary Financing: Special credit lines from the bank should be done with the objective 
of such lends to provide credit to small business or to self-employed entrepreneurs (to 
who suffer with weak financial situation). It should be allowed to float bonds with 
government security, mobilise deposits and lend at lowest rates. Since they will pay 
higher rates for loans obtain through informal channels. (Developed by the author, 
2009). 
Rational decision making model is a process for making logically sound decisions. It is the 
process of realizing a problem, establishing and evaluating planning criteria, create 
alternatives, implementing alternatives, and monitoring progress of the alternatives which 
is known ‗rational planning model‘. This multi-step model aims to be logical and follow 
the orderly path from problem identification through solution.  
Rational lending decision-making means the process of adjusting one‘s trading system in an 
attempt to make it more effective. These adjustments include changing the number of 
periods used in moving averages, changing the number of indicators used, or simply 
taking away what does not work 
Funds availability: it means the decision to make deposits by cheque or electronic sources 
available to depositors for withdrawal, even though the bank itself may not have final 
viability in its own clearing account, is a credit decision. This is common practice in the 
banking industry and is usually driven by competitive pressures. 
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Return items: it means the decision not to return cheques or to reject electronic items presented 
for payment, even though the customer may not have sufficient funds deposited, is a 
credit decision.  
Irrevocable payments: the decision to initiate an irrevocable payment on behalf of customers, 
based on expected funding in the future, is a credit decision. 
Case-based means the decision to lend a new loan is based on the processes of similar past loans, 
while the term of class-based means the decision to lend is based on the recorded 
character sheet or policy recorded in an advance 
Moral hazard means the prospect that a party insulated from risk may behave differently from the 
way it would behave if it were fully exposed to the risk. It is related to information 
asymmetry, and arises because an institution does not bear the full consequences of its 
actions, and therefore has a tendency to act less carefully than it, otherwise would leaving 
another party to bear some responsibility for the consequences of these actions. A special 
case of moral hazard is called a principal-agent problem.  
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_hazard)  
Opportunism is a term forms an important rationale for transaction cost economics. It is 
interpreted in different ways. In this relation, means the practice of abandoning in reality 
some important empirical principles that were previously held, in the process of trying to 
increase one's economical power and influence. 
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunism) 
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APPENDIX B: Some Studies and Models used 
Relating to the Credit Field 
 
Author(s) The Scope Focus of the study and analysis Function of model 
Bessler and 
Norsworthy  
(2003) 
Measure 
performance  
Banking 
production 
Useful in resolving some of the 
ambiguities in the classification and 
measurement of outputs and inputs 
in particular, in sorting out the stock 
and flow dimensions of deposits, and 
in capturing their widely differing 
effect on bank operation and 
performance 
This model encompasses 
explicit treatment of several 
aspects of risk and maturity and 
risk transformation activities of 
the bank 
Banks (1993) 
Risk 
assessment 
( VaR ) 
Used to help forecast trends and 
developments in important macro 
prudential indicators of financial 
stability. 
Analysis of financial stability 
Stomper (2005) 
Industry 
specific credit  
risk 
Lending to 
industries 
Correlation between this risk of 
lending and the recovery rate, default 
rate, interest rate of bank loans. 
The model highlights that 
interest rate of bank loans 
depend not only on borrower-
specific, but also on the 
aggregate volume of bank‘s 
lending to the industries of their 
borrowers. 
Carling and 
Landbery 
(2002) 
Risk 
management  
Distance and 
location 
Analyze geographical proximity 
between borrowing firms and 
lending bank, matter in credit risk 
management 
Empirical assessment of the 
church tour principle CTP 
model 
Deshmukh, 
Greenbaum and 
Kanatas (1983) 
Lending 
policy   
Funding risks 
Focusing on uncertain demand in 
both quantity and quality. The 
rational sequential lending policy is 
shown to involve setting credit 
standards that become stricter with 
the length of the intermediary‘s 
planning horizon and the volume of 
loans outstanding  
Comparing the rational lending 
decision in different banking 
institutions system that differ in 
their risk exposure   
Jacobson and 
Roszbach 
(2003) 
Lending 
policy 
Credit scoring 
Individual default risk estimates are 
used to compose value- at-risk 
measure of risk. The model offered 
comparison with current practice, 
risk becomes more transparent, 
create future provision of losses 
To calculate portfolio  risk 
apply VaR before lending 
policy 
Berger, Frame 
and Miller 
(2005) 
Financial risk 
Used scoring and behavior technique 
to forecast financial risk of lending 
to consumers.  And points out degree 
of success in forecasting financial 
risk 
This technique helps 
organizations decide whether or 
not to grant credit to customers 
who apply to them. 
Dimakos and 
Aas (2003) 
Integrated 
risk modeling 
The approach respect improves upon 
conventional practice, and also the 
total economic capital required 
protecting financial institutions 
Now approach takes into 
account the correlation between 
risk types 
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against possible losses. 
Fabi, Laviola 
and Reedtz  
(2004) 
Lending 
decisions 
Lending decisions and the use of  
new Basel capital accord to measure 
probability default 
Internal ratings-based used to 
measure probability default 
Rochafeller and 
Uryasev (2000) 
More 
consistent 
measure of 
risk 
Used to rationalizing a portfolio of 
instruments to reduce risk is 
presented and tested on application 
also suitable for use by investment 
company, mutual funds and business 
that evaluate risks 
This model focuses on 
minimizing conditional value at 
risk CVaR rather than 
minimizing value at risk VaR 
Berger and 
DeYoung 
(1996) 
Cost 
efficiency 
Used to test the relationship among 
low quality, cost efficiency, bank 
capital precedes reductions in 
problem loans. 
Analyze the relationship 
between loan lending efficiency 
in commercial banks. 
Koford and 
Tschoel (1999) 
Lending  
decision 
improvement 
Focus on information asymmetry 
To solve problems related to 
bank  lending 
Elsinger et al 
(2003) 
Risk 
associated 
loan 
Used to evaluate the effect of auditor 
attestation and tolerance for 
ambiguity on commercial banks 
To evaluate commercial loans 
especially lending decisions 
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APPENDIX C: Bank Definitions 
Bank and Non-bank Bank: a non-bank bank is an institution that provides most of the services of a 
bank but is not a member of the state reserve system and does not have a charter from a state 
banking agency. A non-bank bank may offer credit cards, consumer and commercial loans, 
savings accounts, and accounts with services similar to bank checking accounts but avoids 
government regulation; such businesses may be able to be more innovative and profitable than 
traditional government-regulated banks. 
Commercial/Conventional Banks (CB): Commercial Banks: A state bank or National Bank which is 
owned by stockholders, which accepts demand deposits, grants commercial and industrial loans, 
and performs other banking services for the public. The term commercial bank is synonymous 
with Full Service Bank. Such bank offers the public most, if not all, of the services traditionally 
expected of banking institutions. Services typically found in full service banks include 
consumer credit, mortgage financing, commercial lending, trust services, and corporate agency 
services, such as funds transfer and securities registration. The term of commercial is used 
mainly for a normal bank to distinguish it from an investment bank. 
Investment Banks (InvB): underwrite (guarantee the sale of) stock and bond issues, trade for their 
own accounts, make markets and advise corporations on capital markets activities, such as 
mergers and acquisitions. Other services include underwriting, acting as an intermediary 
between an issuer of securities and the investing public, facilitating mergers and other corporate 
reorganizations, and also acting as a broker for institutional clients. 
Merchant Banks (MB): these were traditionally banks which engaged in trade financing. The modern 
definition, however, refers to banks which provide capital to firms in the form of shares, rather 
than loans. Unlike venture capital firms, they tend not to invest in new companies.  
Islamic Banks (IB): these adhere to the concepts of Islamic law. Islamic banking revolves around 
several well-established concepts which are based on Islamic canons. Since the concept of 
interest is forbidden in Islam, all banking activities must avoid interest. Instead of interest, the 
bank earns profit (mark-up) and fees on financing facilities that it extends to the customers. 
Also, deposit makers––holders––earn a share of the bank‘s profit as opposed to a predetermined 
intersegment.  
Ethical Banks (EB): these prioritize the transparency of all operations and make only what they 
consider to be socially-responsible investments.  
Savings Bank (SB): depository financial institutions that primarily accept consumer deposits and 
makes home mortgage loans. Its focus is on retail banking: payments, savings products, credits 
and insurances for individuals or small and medium-sized enterprises. They also differ from 
commercial banks in their broadly decentralised distribution network, providing local and 
regional outreach, and by their socially responsible approach to business and society. 
Mutual Savings Bank (MSB): a state chartered non-stock savings institution that accepts deposits 
from individuals and makes residential mortgage loans. Management is by a board of trustees. 
These savings institutions offer checking and other transaction account services, and may also 
originate consumer loans, commercial loans, and commercial mortgages, and invest in limited 
amounts of corporate bonds and corporate stock. State banking departments are the primary 
regulators of mutual savings institutions 
Agent Bank (AB): a bank named by members of a multi-bank lending syndicate to protect the 
interests of the participating banks in administering a loan to a foreign or domestic borrower. Its 
role is similar to a bond trustee. It is responsible for notifying other banks of advances or 
drawdowns by the borrower and changes in interest rates. Also, such a bank participates in the 
credit card program of another bank, by issuing credit cards and acting as a merchant 
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depository, but does not finance the card receivables. Most financial institutions participating in 
bank card programs are agents rather than principal issuers. 
Agreement Corporation (AC): this is a state chartered corporation engaged in international banking 
(IntB). These banking offices agree to limit their activities, under Federal Reserve Board 
regulations, to those permitted by Edge Act Corporations but have more liberal capital 
guidelines. Agreement corporations are chartered to conduct international operations through 
domestic offices, thereby allowing local firms access to international markets through local 
banks. 
Associate Bank (AssB): this is a member of a corporation or joint project providing common benefits. 
Examples include banks that are members in a clearing house association and those affiliated 
with a bank card system such as Visa or MasterCard International. Typically, associations have 
different classes of membership, depending on equity ownership, and other factors.  
Bridge Bank (BB): this is a bank organized to assume the deposits and secured liabilities of an 
insolvent bank. For instance, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was given authority to 
charter these temporary banks with competitive equality banks.  
Cooperative Bank (CoopB): this is a member-owned organization, similar to a mutual Savings and 
loan association, which makes loans and pays interest on pooled deposits. For example, banks 
for cooperatives in the Farm Credit System, and state chartered savings associations. 
Correspondent Bank (CorrB) this is a bank that holds deposits for other banks and performs 
services, such as check clearing. The deposit balance is a form of payment for services. Many 
community banks clear checks drawn on out-of-town banks through reserve accounts at a larger 
bank. Correspondent banks also buy participations in loans exceeding the legal lending limit of 
a smaller bank, called the respondent, and give these banks access to financial markets, such as 
the foreign exchange market or financial futures market, that are ordinarily beyond the reach of 
smaller financial institutions. 
Country Bank (ConB): a bank whose main office is outside a city. Country banks do not receive 
overnight credit on checks cleared in the reserve system, and generally have lower reserve 
Requirements than reserve city banks which are located in major cities.  
Independent Bank (IndB): a locally owned and operated commercial bank. It derives its sources of 
funds from, and it lends money to, the community where it operates, and is not affiliated with a 
multibank holding company. Also it may be called community bank. 
Industrial Bank (InduB): this is a state chartered finance company that makes consumer and 
commercial loans and accepts time deposits and interest-paying negotiable order of Withdrawal 
accounts. Industrial banks, once found in sixteen states, are today chartered in just five states, 
mostly in the western United States. The term has its roots in the early-20th-century finance 
companies that originated loans to industrial workers; back then, most commercial banks did 
not offer consumer loans. Also, such banks are often called industrial loan banks or industrial 
loan companies. 
Interstate Banking (Inter-sB): that is banking expansion across state lines through bank holding 
company acquisitions. Interstate expansion of commercial banking companies began in the mid-
1980s when state legislatures enacted laws permitting holding company acquisitions on a 
reciprocal basis with other states.  
Money Centre Bank (MCB): this is a bank in one of the major financial centres of the world, such as 
New York, London, Paris, and Tokyo. These banks play a major national and international 
economic role because they are large lenders, depositories, and buyers of money market 
instruments and securities as well as large lenders to international governments and 
corporations.  
National Bank (NB): this is a commercial bank chartered by the comptroller of the currency, an 
agency of the country (treasury department). A national bank is supervised by the comptroller 
and is a member bank in the countryside reserve system. 
Retail and Wholesale Banking (R&WB): wholesale banking consists of banking services offered to 
corporations with sound financial statements, and institutional customers, such as pension funds 
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and government agencies. Services include lending, cash management, commercial mortgages, 
working capital loans, leasing, trust services and loan building societies. On the other hand, 
retail banking consists of group of financial services offered to the general public. It includes 
instalment loans, residential mortgages, equity credit loans, deposit services, and individual 
retirement accounts. In contrast with wholesale banking or corporate banking, retail banking is a 
high volume business with many service providers competing for market share.  
Offshore Banks (Off-sB): these are banks located in jurisdictions with low taxation and regulation. 
Many offshore banks are essentially private banks.  
Relationship Banking (Rel-shipB): this is a concept in financial services marketing whereby an 
account officer or customer service representative tries to meet all of a consumer's needs, to the 
extent permitted by regulation. Relationship banking is an attempt to advance the sales culture 
in bank marketing beyond order taking to a more pro-active form of direct selling. Instead of 
selling financial services one at a time, an account officer attempts to gain an understanding of 
the consumer's needs and offer services that fulfil those needs. Commercial banks and other 
financial institutions have attempted to apply the concept of relationship banking through 
Personal Banker and Private Banking programs. 
State /Central Bank (S/CenB): this is a corporation chartered by a state or a country to engage in 
commercial banking, and subject to supervision under banking laws in the chartering state. State 
or central banks differ from national banks which are chartered and supervised by the 
comptroller of the currency. State banks have access to provide services, such as check 
collection, currency and coin delivery. 
Universal and Unit (limit) Banking (Uni&UB): this banking system has several branches distributed 
in several countries and provides several financial services. This type of bank is more 
commonly known as a financial services company which engages in several activities. For 
example, commercial banks make loans, underwrite corporate debt, and also take equity 
positions in corporate securities. It permits better use of customer information and allows banks 
to sell more services under one roof as a financial supermarket. In contrast, unit or limit banking 
is a banking system in several states that prohibits branching, or operation of more than one 
full-service banking office. 
Private banking (PB): is a term for banking, investment and other financial services provided by 
banks to private individuals, disposing of sizable assets. The term ‗private‘ refers to the 
customer service being rendered on a more personal basis than in mass-market retail banking, 
usually via dedicated bank advisers. This high-level form of private banking is often referred to 
as high net wealth management. 
Community Development Banks (CDB): regulated banks that provide financial services and credit 
to underserved markets or populations.  
Postal Savings Banks (PSB): savings banks associated with national postal systems.  
Mortgage Banker or Broker (MB/Bro): a bank when services mortgage loans for a fee, collect-ing 
principal and interest payments plus real estate taxes. 
Sources: definitions have been developed by the author, 2009 based on the electronic 
Banking dictionary).   
See suggested websites:  
http://www.allbusiness.com/glossaries/bank/4952184-1.html http://bank.askdefine.com/ 
http://uk.100links.com/s3/generic/bank_loans/google http://articles.gourt.com/en/Bank 
http://www.askaword.com/search.jsp?q=bank&d=ss&libs= http://obks.com/ 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Bank http://tripatlas.com/Bank 
http://schools-wikipedia.org/wp/b/Bank.htm http://finance.indiabizclub.com/info/bank 
http://www.myoffshoreaccounts.com/english/DeltaQuest_of
fshore-banks-banking-services 
http://www.answers.com/topic/agent-
bank-2 
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APPENDIX D: Risk Definitions  
1. TRANSACTION RISKS 
a. Credit risk is failure of counterparty to meet his or her obligations in a timely way and 
on the agreed terms of the contract. The bank faces counter-party risks in the various 
forms of contracts: such as, bay mua‟jal, mudaraba, musharaka, murabaha. These forms 
of contracts face the risk that the bank does not honour requests for withdrawals at face 
value. Also, these forms face the risk that the bank does not honour requests for 
withdrawals at market value. 
 
b. Market risk is the risk associated with change in the market value of held assets. 
 
c. Mark–up risk is risk of divergence between the murabaha contract mark–up and the 
market benchmark rate. The bank may incur losses if the benchmark rate changes 
adversely. 
 
d. Foreign Exchange risk is the risk of the impact of exchange rate movements on assets 
denominated in foreign currency. This exposes the bank to risks associated with their 
deferred–trading transactions. Business risk results from competitive pressures from 
existing counterparts. 
 
2. BUSINESS RISKS  
a. Displaced Commercial risk is the risk of divergence between assets‘ performance and 
expectations for returns on liabilities. Displaced commercial risk may adversely affect the 
value of the bank‘s capital. Return on equity goes down Shareholders are exposed to the 
risk of not receiving their share of the bank‘s profit Investment depositors may have to 
forgo receiving their mudarib share. 
 
b. Withdrawal risk owns when the bank is exposed to the risk of withdrawal of deposits 
Withdrawal risk exposes the bank to liquidity problems and erosion of its franchise value. 
 
c. Solvency risk is the risk of a bank having insufficient capital to continue operations. 
Solvency risk may expose the bank to loss of its reputation. Solvency risk exposes the 
different stakeholders to counter – party risks. 
 
3. TREASURY RISKS 
a. Asset & Liability Management (ALM) risk is a balance sheet mismatch risk resulting 
from the difference in terms and conditions of a bank‘s portfolio on its asset & liability 
sides. This may adversely affect the bank‘s capital. 
 
b. Liquidity risk is the risk of a bank‘s inability to access liquid funds to meet its 
obligations. The bank is exposed to risk of failure to honour requests for withdrawals 
from its depositors. The latter face the risk of not being able to access their deposits as 
needed. 
 
c. Hedging risk is the risk of failure to mitigate & manage the different types of risks. This 
increases the bank‘s overall risk exposure. 
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4. GOVERNANCE RISKS 
a. Operational risk is the risk of the failure of internal processes related to people or 
systems. The bank incurs losses due to occurrence of that risk; hence, it may fail to meet 
its obligations towards the different stakeholders. This risk adversely affects return on 
equity. This risk adversely affects return on assets 
 
b. Fiduciary risk is the risk of facing legal recourse action when the bank breaches its 
fiduciary responsibility towards depositors and shareholders. In the other word, potential 
losses that come from reputation legal recourse may lead to charging the bank a penalty 
or compensation. This may lead to withdrawal of deposits, sale of shares, and bad access 
to liquidity or a decline in the market price of shares if listed on the stock exchange. This 
risk adversely affects return on equity. This risk exposes investment depositors to 
economic losses. 
 
c. Transparency risk is the risk of the consequences of decisions which have been made 
based on inaccurate or incomplete information. This means, the outcome of poor 
disclosure losses may occur as a result of bad decisions. Also, this risk occurs when 
decision-makers are unable to access accurate telecommunications with their 
counterparties or gain complete information. 
 
5. SYSTEMIC RISKS 
a. Business environment risk is the risk of a poor, broad institutional environment, 
including legal risk whereby banks are unable to enforce their contracts. Business 
environment risk increases banks‘ exposure to counter-party risk as weak contracts are 
not easily enforceable.  
 
b. Institutional risk is the risk of divergence between product definition and practices 
Institutional risk exposes the bank to counter-party risks due to the unsettled nature of the 
contract. 
 
c. Regulatory risk is the risk of non-compliance with regulations due to confusion, bad 
management or mistakes. Banks may be penalized for not complying with the rules or 
regulations. It could be an issue with the regulator or supervisor. 
 
Source : El-Hawary, Grais & Iqbal 2004, pp. 47-8 (Annix II), and 
2007, pp. 777-8 (Annix II).  
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APPENDIX E: Surveyed Banks: Location, 
Identification and Remarks 
Bahrain Banks:  
 Islamic banks: 11 
 Conventional banks: 5 
 
 
Bank Name 
Type of 
Bank 
 
Contact Details  
 
Notes 
Isl. Conv. 
Al-Baraka Islamic 
Bank B.S.C 
*  Head office: P.O Box: 1882 Manama, 
Bahrain. 
 Tel: + 973 17535300 
Fax: + 973 17533993 
E-mail: Baraka@batelco.com.bh 
Just 2005,2006 and 
1
st
, 2
nd
 Q 2007 
highlights 2000-
2006 available 
online 
Arcapita Bank  
*  P.O. Box: 1406 Manama, Bahrain 
Tel: + 973 17 218333 
Fax: + 973 17 217555 
From 1998 to 2006 
available online 
Unicorn Investment 
Banks 
*  Unicorn Investment Bank  
Shari`a-compliant investment bank based 
in Manama. Activities: corporate finance 
and capital markets, mergers and 
acquisitions, asset management, private 
equity, and takaful (insurance) 
2004- 2007 Annual 
reports  
Shamil Bank  
*  General Tel: + 973 17 585000 
Fax: + 973 17 585151 
E-mail: alshamil@shamilbank.net 
Public relation Tel: + 973 17 585082 
From 2001 to 2007 
available online 
Bahrain Saudi Bank 
BSB 
 * Senior manager, treasury services 
Tel: + 973 17 578884 
Mob: + 973 39 615161 
E-mail: fouad.mohsin@bsb.com.bh 
From 2003 to 2007 
available online 
Gulf Finance House 
*  Alsalam Tower (6,7,8, 14 & 15) floor 
Diplomatic area P.O. Box: 10006 
Manama, Bahrain 
Tel; + 973 17 538 538 ext: 434 
       + 973 17 549 557 direct 
E-mail: info@gfhouse.com 
2005, 2006, 2007 
Unavailable online 
National Bank of 
Bahrain 
 * P.O Box; 106 Manama, Bahrain 
Tel: + 973 17 214433 
E-mail: nbb@nbbonline.com  
From 2001 to 2007 
available online 
International 
Investment Bank 
*  International Investment Bank B. S. C.  
Bahrain-based Islamic investment bank 
set up in 2003 in Manama, to provide 
investors with Shari`a-compliant 
investments. Regulated by Bahrain 
Monetary Agency (BMA) 
 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007 available 
online 
Faysal Bank 
*   (head of finance) 
 ( risk manager) 
E-mail: corpcomm@faysalbank.com 
2005 & highlight 
2007 available 
online 
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Bank of Bahrain and 
Kuwait 
 * Tel: +973 17 20 7480 
Fax: + 963 17 228200 
E-mail: noora@bbkonline.com 
from 2001 to 2007 
available online 
United Gulf Bank 
B.S.C 
 * P.O Box: 5964 Diplomatic area UGB 
Tower, Manama, Bahrain 
Tel: + 973 17 533233 
Fax: + 973bn 17  533137 
E-mail : info@ugbbah.com 
from 2002 to 2007  
available online 
Gulf International 
Bank 
 * Al-dowali building , 3 palace avenue 
P.O Box: 1017 Manama, Bahrain 
Tel: + 973 17 534 000 
Fax: + 973 17 522 633 
E-mail: info@gibbah.com 
from 1998 to 2006 
available online 
Taib Direct.com 
Bank 
*  Mena inquiries & trading 
Tel: + 973 17 544 499   
Fax: + 973 17 531 213 
E-mail: taibsecurities@taib.com 
From 2000 to 2007 
available online 
Al-Amin Bank 
*  Al Baraka tower, 3
rd
& 4
th
 floor 
Diplomatic area, Manama, Bahrain 
P.O Box: 3190 
Tel: + 973 17 537551,/ 17 53552 
E-mail: info@alaminbank.com 
2005 , 2006 and 
1
st
,2
nd
 Q2007 
available online 
RUSD Investment 
Bank 
*  Department 35, 3
rd
 floor, Al ahly building  
P.O Box: 2948 Manama Bahrain  
Tel: + 973 17 214 455 
E-mail: info@rusdbank.com 
2001- 2007 
available online 
Arab Banking 
Corporation  
*  Arab Banking Corporation  
Bahraini bank offering services in 
corporate banking, treasury, Islamic 
banking and private banking; syndicated 
loans, trade finance, project finance, 
investment banking, securities trading etc.  
1999-2006 A. R.  
 
 
Libya Banks: 
 Islamic banks: 00 
 Conventional banks: 07 
 
 
Bank Name 
Type of 
Bank 
 
Contact Details  
 
Notes 
Isl. Conv. 
Bank of Trading and 
Development  
 * Banghazi 
Tel:+ 218 61 9080230  + 218 61 2229630 
       + 218 61 2232638 
E-mail : info@bankofCD.com  
From 1999 to 2005  
British Arab 
Commercial Bank  
Ltd 
 * Head Office/ London, 8-10 Mansion house 
Tel: +44 20 7648 7777 
El-Fatah Tower, floor 15, Office 154.  
P.O Box: 91051 Tripoli 
Tel: + 218 21 335 1489  
Fax: + 218 21 335 1732 
From 2004 to 2007  
Wahda Bank 
 * P.O Box: 452 Benghazi 
Fax:+ 218 61 2224122/ 360 4071 
E-mail: info@wahdabank.com 
 wahda@wahdabank.com 
From 2000 to 2005  
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Bank of UBAE S.P.D 
 * Omer Muktar st. / Invest complex 
Tel: +218 21 4446598/ 444739 
Mahmudalielesawi@mail.ubae.it 
From 2004 to 2006  
Sahara Bank  
 * Main head office, Tripoli, first Sep. 
3332771/ 3337922  
http://www.saharabank.com.ly/ar/main.asp  
 (from 03 to 05)  
Umma Bank 
( Nation Bank) 
 * Omar Muktar str. Tripoli ( head office) 
P.O Box: 685 Tripoli, Libya 
Tel: + 218 21 4442541/44 
       + 218 21 3334031/ 35 
2003,2004 , 2005  
Jamhuria Bank 
 * Guryan ( head office) 
P.O Box:  
Assistant manager ;  
Mobile: 091 324 0576 
2000, 2005 
 
 
United Arab Emirate Banks UEA: 
 Islamic banks: 06 
 Conventional banks: 05 
 
 
Bank Name 
Type of Bank  
Contact Details  
 
Notes 
Isl. Conv. 
Dubai Islamic Bank 
*  (Head office ) P.O Box: 1080 Dubai. UAE 
Tel: + 971 4 295 3000      Fax; + 971 4 295 
4111 
(Customer services) 
Tel: + 971 4 211 7400/  local 8004008 Free 
Email: contactus@alislami.ae  
From 2002 to half 
2006 available 
online  
Abu-Dhabi Islamic 
Bank  
*   
 
1999-2006 A. R.  
Bank of Sharjah 
 * E-mail: 
Saudi.besharah@bankofsharjah.com 
Director 
Varouj.nerquizian@bankofsharjah.com 
General manager 
Just 2004, 2005 
and 2006 
available online 
Commercial Bank 
of Dubai 
 * General manager(admin & finance):  
General manager ( credit) 
 
From 2002 to 
2007 available 
online 
Emirate Banks 
Group(Emirates 
Islamic Bank) 
*  Beniyas read. P.O Box: 2923, Deira, Dubai 
Tel: + 971 4 2256256 
Tel: 04 3160101                Fax: 04 2227321 
E-mail: info@emiratesislamicbank.ae 
For banks group; 
from 2000 to 
2006,  For the 
Islamic; banks 
Just 2005 and  
reports of  2005 
and  2006 
available online 
Sahrjah Islamic 
Bank 
*  http://www.sib.ae/eng/sib_aboutus.asp 
Bank based in Sharjah with branches in 
Dubai and Abu Dhabi; founded in 1973 in 
association with Banque de Paris de des 
Pays-Bas, France 
 
National bank of 
Abu-Dhabi 
 * NBAD Centre 
Tel: + 971 4 8002211 
E-mail: customersupport@nbad.com  
From 1999 to 
2006 available 
online 
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Mashreq Bank 
*  head office 
Tel: + 971 4 207 7414 
Tel: + 971 4 207 7826 
E-mail: direct links within website 
From 2000 to 
2005 available 
online 
National Bank of 
Dubai  
 * General Tel: + 971 4 2222111 
Fax: + 971 4 228 3000 
2005 and 2006 
available online 
Dubai Bank  * 
Tel: + 971 4 336 5555 
 
Just 2004 
available online 
Ihilal financial 
services 
*  Tel: + 971 4 3300 399 
E-mail: info@ihilal.com 
Unavailable  
online 
 
 
Qatar Banks:  
 Islamic banks: 04 
 Conventional banks; 02 
 
 
Bank Name 
Type of Bank  
Contact Details  
 
Notes 
Isl. Conv. 
International 
Islamic Bank 
*  qiibit@qiib.com.qa Just 2003, 2004 
available online 
Qatar Islamic Bank  
*  risk manager From 2001 to 
2006 available 
online 
Islamic Finance 
Services (First 
Finance) 
*  Eihab Dabur- general management 
Tel: 4559900                         fax: 4559905 
Risk management;  
Tel: 4559942        OR             Tel:4559941 
5 years (from 02 
to 06) available 
online 
Qatar National 
Bank QNB 
 * Call centre: + 974 440 7777 
E-mail: ccsupport@qnb.com.qa 
4 years from 2003 
to 2006 available 
online 
Mashreq bank 
*  Direct Banking Centre 
T: +971 4 2174800       F: +971 4 2238830 
Corporate Customer Service 
T: +971 4 2994233       T: +971 4 6018333  
T: +971 4 6018444 
2000-2006 A. R.  
Commercial Bank 
of Qatar 
 * Head office; Grand St. P.O. Box: 3232 
Duha, State of Qatar 
Tel; + 974 449 0000   Fax: + 974 449 0070 
info@cbq.com.qa 
From 2001 to 
2005 available 
online 
 
 
Jordanian Banks:  
 Islamic banks: 03 
 Conventional banks: 05 
 
 
Bank Name 
Type of Bank  
Contact Details  
 
Notes 
Isl. Conv. 
Islamic 
International Arab 
Bank PLC 
*  Postal Code: 11190 Amman 
BO Box: 925802 
Tel: 5694901                       Fax: 5694914 
info@iiabank.com.jo 
Annual reports 
2005, A. R. 
Jordan Islamic *  Postal Code: 926225  2001-2-006  
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Bank for Finance 
and Investment 
 
11190 Amman  
Tel:5666325                       Fax.5666326 
jib@islamicbank.com  
Financial 
HIGHLIGHTS 
 
Arab Bank PLC 
 * Postal Code: 950545 
11195 Amman  
Tel:5607231                      Fax.5606793 
corpcomm@arabbank.com.jo 
Annual reports 
2005 
2006 A. R. 
Cairo Amman Bank 
 
 * Postal Code: 950661 
11195 Amman 
Tel:4616910                        Fax.4642890 
info@cab.jo 
Annual reports 
2005, 2006 A. R. 
Arab Jordan 
Investment Bank 
 
 * Postal Code: 8797 
11121 Amman 
Tel:5607126                       Fax.5681482 
info@ajib.com 
Annual reports 
2002-2006 A. R.  
 
 Jordan Kuwait 
Bank 
 
 * Postal Code: 9776 
11191 Amman 
Tel:5688814                     Fax.5695604 
webmaster@jkbank.com.jo 
Annual reports 
2001-2006 A. R.  
The Housing Bank 
for Trade & 
Finance 
 * Postal Code: 7693 
11118 Amman 
Tel:5607315                      Fax.5678121 
info@hbtf.com.jo 
Annual reports 
2003-2006 A. R. 
Jordan Ahli Bank 
*  Queen Noor Street-Shemesani 
P.O Box 3103, Amman 11181 Jordan 
Tel.  (+962 6) 5638800          Fax. (+962 6) 
5622281 
info@ahlibank.com.jo  
Annual reports 
from 2000 to 
2006 are 
available. 
 
 
 
Notices:  
 Number of the participated countries; Five (5) 
 Number of the Islamic banks; twenty four banks (24)  
 Number of the conventional banks; twenty four banks (24)  
 
 
Useful links:  
 http://www.nesnas.com/ac/banks/ 
 http://www.escapeartist.com/banks2/banks2.htm 
 http://islamic-finance.net/bank.html 
 http://www.islamicity.com/finance/IslamicBanking_References.htm 
 http://www.answers.com/topic/islamic-banking 
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APPENDIX F: Questionnaire Survey  
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25 May 2007  
 
 
Dear Sir / Madam  
 
Research Study 
 
An Assessment of Risk Factors, and Their Effects on the Rationality of Lending 
Decisions: A Comparative Study of Conventional Banks and Islamic Banks 
I am currently undertaking research that will be incorporated into my PhD on the ―assessment risk 
factors and their influence on the rationality of lending decisions in conventional banks (CBs) and 
Islamic banks (IBs) in the Middle East (ME) region‖. The research is aimed at comparing CBs 
with IBs, with the objective of contributing to the framework for policy development. In order to 
accomplish my research tasks, I am particularly interested in information from your institution, as 
I am aware of your proactive involvement in banking networks in the region. However, I 
understand your need to keep a competitive edge in business, and therefore I wish to assure you 
that any information provided would be treated as strictly confidential and that solicited 
information would be of a general nature only. 
I would appreciate it if you could provide me with an opportunity to sit with you for 
approximately one hour to gain your opinions and experiences on the banking sector. I fully 
understand your busy work commitments and would be willing to meet at any time suitable to 
you. I will contact you in the near future to seek your participation in this research. 
Sincerely yours 
 
Abdelnasir Abdallah 
PhD Candidate 
School of Accounting, Economics & Finance 
University of Southern Queensland (USQ) 
Toowoomba QLD 4350, Australia  
Tel: + 61 (7) 4631 5506  
Mob: 0432 48 46 24   
Email: w0027919@umail.usq.edu.au  
 
 
Thank you for participating in the research survey 
Thank you for discussing your banking experiences in the credit field with me. Your comments 
have proved to be not only extremely interesting, but also very useful to my research. I will 
forward a copy of the results once analysis has been completed. 
Once again, I thank you for being so generous with your time and wish you and your institution 
every success in your investments in the credit area.  
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Briefing the Respondent 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research. This survey is part of a PhD research study. 
Its purpose is to investigate the differences between conventional banks (CBs) and Islamic banks 
(IBs) in dealing with lending policy development and credit risk management. The perspective 
is from the viewpoint of Islamic banks, however, it is anticipated that differences exist 
between Islamic and conventional banks. The questions in this questionnaire are divided into 4 
main parts.  
Strategic considerations such as reading the questions carefully and the way you answer are very 
important. Thus, the findings of this research will assist financial intermediaries and bankers to 
build their investment expertise and success based on the opportunities available. This research is 
strictly confidential and your institution will not be identified in the research report. Because the 
participants in this study are from different countries in the ME, four respondents from such 
institutions are required as participants.  
1. Executive manager   2. Property board member/ Islamic board member  
3. Credit department manager   4. Treasurer / financial department manager  
If you agree to participate, you are welcome, at point during the process, to ask me to clarify any 
points. May I have your permission to assist you in completing this survey?  Protocol is not a 
questionnaire, but provides a framework for the survey. Therefore, I seek your assistance in 
completing this survey.  
Survey details:  
 
  
 
Case No: ______ Time commenced (date): _________ Country name: _____________ 
 
 
Institute name: ___________________________________________________________ 
 
Position held with the institution: ____________________________________________ 
 
Contact details: __________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________ 
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A. About Your Bank/ Financial Institution: 
 
1. Bank status (select all that apply)     
(   )1  Local         (   )2  Islamic      (   )3  Private   
(   )4  International       (   )5  Commercial   (   )6  Public   
 
2. Bank size—total assets (in million US $ ) (select one) 
(   )1  Less than 20       (   )2  20 – 49 (   )3  50 – 74           (   )4  75 and over  
 
3. Bank activities—products/services (select all that apply) 
  (   )1  Loans granting    (   )2  Deposits accepting  
 (   )3  Retirement products    (   )4  Insurance securities   
 (   )5  Investment banking   (   )6  Others (please 
specify)_______________  
 
4. Bank‘s obligations (select all that apply) 
  (   )1  Religious affiliation (shari`a complains)   (   )2  Customer needs & satisfaction 
(   )3  Monitoring & securing clients‘ assets  (   )4  Corporate governance 
 (   )5  Social & financial development in the way of shari`a teaching 
 
5. From the bank‘s lending statistics (please fill the following gaps) 
I. Applications unapproved ( provide numeric answer) 
 Successful lending (good loans); almost __________________ per-year 
 Unsuccessful lending (poor loans); almost   __________________ per-year 
II. Applications unapproved (for whatever reason); almost __________________ per-year 
 
B. On Risk Assessment:  
 
1. From your perspective in recognizing risk type, please indicate how difficult you think it is to 
assess each of the following types of risk (using the scale provided) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The following  table shows that each risk factor is classified into sub-factors, please indicate 
the rate of risk applying to each factors (select one please) 
 
 
 
I. Transaction risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
II. Business risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
III. Treasury risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
IV. Governance risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
V. Systemic risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
Risk factors  Risk variables  The scale 
i. 
Transacti
on Risks 
A. Credit risk ( grading risk)  (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
B. Products tenor plan risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
C. Mark-up risk  (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
D. Foreign exchange Risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
Very Easy 
 
Very Difficult  Difficult  Neutral 
 
Easy 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Very applicable  
 
Very inapplicable 
 
Inapplicable   Neutral 
 
Applicable  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Cont. B2 
 
3. Would you please rate the following items based on how frequently you think they are factors 
in your lending decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Please give your opinion about the usefulness of each of the following sources of risk in the 
following models (match all that apply). 
 
 
 
ii. E. Balance sheet risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
F. Single name single transaction risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
iii. Business 
Risks 
G. Trading activity risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
H. Displaced commercial risk  (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
I. Withdrawal risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
J. Solvency risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
iv. Treasury 
Risks 
K. Credit skill and training risk  (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
L. Asset & liability management risk 
ALM  
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
M. Liquidity risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
N. Hedging risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
v. 
Governan
ce Risks 
O. Fiduciary risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
P. Transparency risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
Q. Legal risk  (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
R. Operational risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
S. Event, natural disaster risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
T. Business environment risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
vi. Systematic 
Risks 
U. Fraud/ compliance risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
V. Technology/systems exposure  (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
W. Payment/settlement risk (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
X. Institutional risk   (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
Y. Shift in regulation(regulatory risk ) (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
I. Transaction risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
II. Business risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
III. Treasury risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
IV. Governance risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
V. Systemic risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
Internal rating and scoring models for evaluating risk asset backed securities (ABS), that is, 
securities backed by a pool of assets for meeting the basic Minimum Capital Requirements 
(MCR), such as Moody‘s model, S&P 500 model, Fitck model. 
i. Transaction risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
ii.  Business risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
iii.  Treasury risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
iv.  Governance risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
v.  Systemic risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
Always 
 
Never 
 
Rarely Occasionally 
 
Often 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Very Appropriate 
 
Very Inappropriate Inappropriate Uncertain  
 
Appropriate 
 1 2 3 4 5 
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5. This question is designed to clarify the measurement risk models that you have used in your 
institution. 
 
i. Are you using a specific model to measure the transaction risks? 
   No (   )    Yes (   ) If yes, please specify_________________________________ 
  
ii. Are you using a specific model to measure the business risks? 
   No (   )   Yes (   ) If yes, please specify______________________________ 
 
iii. Are you using a specific model to measure the treasury risks? 
   No (   )   Yes (   ) If yes, please specify______________________________ 
 
iv. Are you using a specific model to measure the governance risks? 
  No (   )   Yes (   ) If yes, please specify_______________________________   
 
v.  Are you using a specific model to measure the systemic risks? 
   No (   )   Yes (   ) If yes, please specify______________________________ 
 
C. On lending portfolio: 
 
1. Please rate your perception of the relationship between credit portfolio quality and credit risk 
quantity, using the scale below.  
 
 
 
         (    )1      (    )2  (    )3  (    )4         (    )5 
 
2. Please indicate your level of agreement to the following statements using the scale below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Value and risk model (V& R) model; for measuring and evaluating liquid rates, capital rates and 
default rates which include the difference between assets performance and expectation of returns 
liability. 
i. Transaction risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
ii. Business risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
iii. Treasury risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
iv. Governance risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
v. Systemic risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
Beta (B ) & Capital Assets Pricing model (CAP model); for any mismatched risk results from 
different of terms and conditions 
i. Transaction risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
ii. Business risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
iii. Treasury risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
iv. Governance risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
v. Systemic risks (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
Completely agree  
 
Totally disagree Disagree  
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly positive 
 
Strongly negative Negative 
 
Neutral 
 
Positive 
 1 2 3 4 5 
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I. Holding a non-diversified credit portfolio means the 
bank has non-risky assets  
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
II. A more highly-diversified credit portfolio means 
holding non-risky assets in estimated period 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
III. A more highly-diversified credit portfolio means more 
asset securitisation 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
IV. With regard to the efficiency concept, credit portfolio 
inputs and outputs are mostly equivalent 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
 
3. Your answer to the following question is very important to my research interpretation. Please 
tick which type of credit applies, as well as providing the corresponding percentage. 
(Percentages total should be 100%) 
 
– Personal/consumer credit      approximately_________ %. 
– Small business firms    approximately_________ %. 
– Large business firms   approximately_________ %. 
– Secured credit:  
 Collateral credit  approximately _________ %. 
 Aggregate credit  approximately _________ %. 
– Unsecured credit    approximately _________ %. 
– Others - please specify   
 _____________   Approximately _________%. 
 _____________  Approximately_________ %. 
 
4. Please indicate your agreement with the following statements using the scale below. 
 
 
 
 
I. Managing and controlling risk factors may lead to 
increased loan costs 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
II. Managing and controlling  risk factors may lead to a 
decrease in loan performance 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
III. Managing and controlling risk factors may influence loan 
maturity 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
IV. Managing and controlling risk factors may lead to bank 
stability 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
V. Managing and controlling risk factors may lead to 
making poor lending decisions 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
VI. Managing and controlling risk factors may not lead to 
optimising the decision-making 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
VII. Managing and controlling risk factors may not lead to 
default loans 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
VIII. Managing and controlling risk factors may not lead to 
improved bank productivity and efficiency 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
IX. Measuring risk factors may indemnify the bank from  
insolvency            
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
X. Measuring risk factors may lead to safeguarding the firm 
from insolvency 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
Highly Agree 
 
Highly Disagree Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Appendices 
    
247 
 
Cont. C4 
 
 
D. On optimising lending decision-making : 
  
1. Your expert opinions is sought on your institution board — Please rate the degree of 
consideration to the following statements when allocating loans using the scale below. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Referring to the loans granting process, please indicate the degree of your judgment (your 
authorisation) in relation to the following statements, using the scale below. 
 
 
 
XI. Measuring risk factors may lead to complicated loan 
application processes 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XII. Measuring risk factors may lead to improved 
efficiency units  
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XIII. Measuring risk factors may lead to enhancing the 
quality of the bank‘s loans portfolio.  
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XIV. Measuring risk factors may lead to an increase in the 
number of loans granted 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XV. Measuring risk factors may lead to a decrease in 
catastrophic credit defaults 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XVI. Measuring risk factors may lead to making lending 
decisions with a higher degree of certainty  
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XVII. Measuring risk factors may lead to improved decision-
making within units in the future  
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
I. The value you are giving to the relationship between 
credit portfolio and credit risk management  
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
II. The value you are giving to the relationship between 
loans refund efficiency and loan maturity 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
III. The value you are giving to the relationship between 
risks control and credit decision performance 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
IV. Personal characteristics for requested application  (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
V. Business characteristics for requested application  (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
VI. The relationship between institution and borrowers  (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
VII. Bank‘s characteristics, (e.g. culture, environment and 
events)    
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
VIII. The match between bank‘s purpose and goal  (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
IX. What type of activities the bank is involved in (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
X. The capital structure of the bank  (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XI. The return on assets and equity for applications  (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XII. When/where the bank accepts deposits and  granted 
loans  
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
Highly approve 
 
Highly disapprove Disapprove 
 
Neutral 
 
Approve 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Highly 
considerable 
 
Highly 
inconsiderable 
Inconsiderable Neutral  Considerable 
 2 3 4 5 1
m 
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I. The cost of the transaction is rising according to 
information availability 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
II. The institution has insufficient capital to continue 
operations 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
III. The institution has an inability to access liquid funds to 
meet its obligations 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
IV. The institution has failed to manage the different types of 
risks 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
V. The institution has flawed internal processes related to 
people or systems 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
VI. The institution has faced legal action (   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
VII. Consequences of decision based on inaccurate or 
incomplete information 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
VIII. The institution has faced legal risk whereby the 
institution is unable to enforce their contracts 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
IX. The provision of variety between the product (loan) 
identity  and practices is well disciplined institutionally 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
X. Non-compliance with acts and regulations result in 
confusion, bad management and mistakes     
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XI. The applicant provides clear and official statements 
about her/his financial situation 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XII. The result of your evaluation to the applicant is 
confidential 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XIII. Evidence that the applicant is capable of refunding the 
loan 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XIV. You do not know the source of the money which has 
been refunded 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XV. No evidence that the applicant is going to refund the loan 
in a certain timeframe  
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XVI. The internal auditor has positively reported on 
securitisations and investments  
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XVII. The geographical location of the applicant and the bank 
is different 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XVIII. The applicant has no previous association with the bank 
(first time application) 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
XIX. For somehow reason, the approved application conflicts 
with institutional lending policy 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
 
 
3. Credit risk models have become a focus for practitioners and financial supervisors; please rate 
your agreement with the following statements, using the scale below 
 
 
 
 
I. Credit risk models have emerged just as a significant 
shift has occurred in debt and loan markets  
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
II. Credit risk models have facilitated the pricing of 
portfolio of exposures included in securitisations 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
Highly Agree 
 
Highly Disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 
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III. Credit risk models are being used as a basis for bank‘s 
calculations of regulatory capital 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
IV. Credit risk models encompass bank efficiency 
performance directly, and are matched with non-
performing loans in cost or production 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
V. Credit risk models are possibly related to examiners‘ 
ratings of bank management quality 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
VI. Credit risk models exist because of new markets in credit 
derivatives and the unprecedented growth in the pre-
existing markets for loan sales and securitisations 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
VII. Credit risk models have presented a negative relation 
between problem loans and cost efficiency—and this 
statement holds for profitable banks,, as well as for the 
subset of failing banks 
(   )1  (   )2  (   )3  (   )4  (   )5 
 
 
E. About You: 
 
1. Age (select one) 
 (   )1 less than 30 (   )2  30 – 44   (   )3  45 – 59  (   )4 60 and over 
  
2. Education level (select one) 
(   )1  Primary school   (   )2  Secondary school  (   )3  Associate degree  
(   )4  Undergraduate degree (   )5  Postgraduate degree  
 
3. Experience in your job ( select one) 
 (   )1 Less than 5  (   )2  5 – 9  (   )3  10 – 14  (   )4 More than 14 
 
4. According to the decision-making anticipation rules, are you invited to participate in 
decision-making with others in your institution? (select one) 
(   )1  Regularly invited         (   )2  Seldom    (   )3  Often       (   )4  Never invited 
 
 
We greatly appreciate your contribution to this research by completing the questionnaire. We also 
invite any further comment from you that may help the researcher draw rigorous conclusions to 
this study.   
__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
  
****************************************** 
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APPENDIX G: Descriptive statistics - IB vs. CB  
RA1: Risk Factors 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Transaction risks factor 3.34 3.00 1.214 3.25 3.00 1.352 
Business risks factor 3.85 4.00 .940 3.81 4.00 1.000 
Treasury risks factor 3.71 4.00 .930 3.81 4.00 .892 
Governance risks factor 3.69 4.00 .898 3.62 4.00 .967 
Systemic risks factor 3.20 3.00 1.147 3.48 3.00 1.157 
 
RA2:  
TrR Classification 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Credit risk ( grading risk) 1.36 1.00 .650 1.56 1.00 .668 
Products tenor plan risk 2.08 2.00 .985 2.156 2.00 .844 
Mark-up risk 1.86 2.00 .843 1.70 2.00 .594 
Foreign exchange risk 1.63 1.00 .921 1.66 2.00 .65 
Balance sheet risk 2.23 2.00 .954 2.156 2.00 .828 
Single name single transaction risk 2.73 3.00 1.132 2.85 3.00 1.163 
BR Classification 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Trading activity risk 1.84 2.00 .780 1.81 2.00 .638 
Displaced commercial risk 1.78 2.00 .788 1.84 2.00 .667 
Withdrawal risk 1.80 2.00 .968 1.66 2.00 .650 
Solvency risk 1. 70 2.00 .841 1.64 2.00 .609 
TyR Classification 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Credit skill and training risk 1.78 2.00 .913 1.70 2.00 .639 
Asset & liability management risk  1.48 1.00 .793 1.34 1.00 .478 
Liquidity risk 1.47 1.00 .836 1.41 1.00 .620 
Hedging risk 1.79 2.00 .896 1.58 1.00 .665 
GR Classification 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Fiduciary risk 1.70 2.00 .783 1.82 2.00 .770 
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Transparency risk 1.65 1.00 .823 1.64 2.00 .674 
Legal risk 1.47 1.00 .762 1.51 1.00 .670 
Operational risk 1.67 1.00 .818 1.59 1.00 .663 
Event, natural disaster risk 2.21 2.00 .935 2.49 2.00 .899 
Business environment risk 2.17 2.00 1.061 2.22 2.00 .837 
SR Classification 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Fraud/ compliance risk 1.84 2.00 .807 2.77 2.00 1.517 
Technology/systems exposure 1.88 2.00 .7887 2.387 2.00 .981 
Payment/settlement risk 2.02 2.00 .8117 2.527 2.00 1.069 
Institutional risk 1.99 2.00 .819 2.237 2.00 .890 
Shift in regulation(regulatory risk ) 2.06 2.00 .950  2.00 .950 
 
RA3 
Risk Feasibility 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Transaction Risks Feasibility 2.60 2.00 1.098 2.81 3.00 1.138 
Business Risks Feasibility 2.71 3.00 .969 2.78 3.00 1.083 
Treasury Risks Feasibility 2.59 2.00 .938 2.66 3.00 .870 
Governance Risks Feasibility 2.51 2.00 1.015 2.44 2.00 .957 
Systemic Risks Feasibility 2.20 2.00 1.115 2.29 2.00 .993 
 
RA4 
Risk Measurement Approaches (Beta & Capital Pricing Models Applications) 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Transaction Risks  2.95 3.00 1.126 2.67 3.00 .883 
Business Risks  2.90 3.00 1.096 2.68 3.00 .831 
Treasury Risks  2.92 3.00 1.108 2.56 3.00 .913 
Governance Risks  2.23 2.00 1.002 2.15 2.00 .892 
Systemic Risks  1.52 1.00 1.003 1.73 2.00 .786 
 (Value at risk Models Applications) 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Transaction Risks  2.20 2.00 .764 2.63 2.00 1.219 
Business Risks  1.99 2.00 .728 2.27 2.00 1.004 
Treasury Risks  2.21 2.00 .738 2.51 2.00 .899 
Governance Risks  2.29 2.00 .852 2.23 2.00 .635 
Systemic Risks  2.94 3.00 1.099 2.42 2.00 .815 
(Internal rating & Scoring Models Applications) 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
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Transaction Risks -  1.67 1.00 .887 2.26 2.00 1.302 
Business Risks  1.92 2.00 .923 2.14 2.00 .855 
Treasury Risks  2.59 2.50 1.010 2.49 3.00 .748 
Governance Risks  2.74 3.00 1.119 3.10 3.00 1.314 
Systemic Risks  3.62 4.00 1.209 2.95 3.00 1.373 
 
RA5 
Specific Models Applied 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
for Transaction Risks Measurement 1.12 1.00 .322 1.11 1.00 .315 
for Business Risks Measurement 1.12 1.00 .322 1.10 1.00 .296 
for Treasury Risks Measurement 1.05 1.00 .212 1.10 1.00 .296 
for Governance Risks Measurement 1.07 1.00 .256 1.10 1.00 .296 
for Systemic Risks Measurement 1.13 1.00 .336 1.10 1.00 .315 
 
LP1 
The Relationship 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Lending Portfolio & Risk factors  1.76 1.50 .880 1.69 2.00 .724 
 
LP2 
Lending Portfolio Diversification 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Non-diversified portfolio means non-
risky assets 
3.19 3.00 1.368 3.19 3.00 1.243 
Highly-diversified portfolio means 
non-risky assets in estimated period 
2.13 2.00 .823 2.14 2.00 .976 
Highly-diversified portfolio means 
more asset securitisation 
2.13 2.00 .837 2.19 2.00 1.050 
Efficiency concept means portfolio 
inputs equivalent outputs mostly 
2.07 2.00 .892 1.93 2.00 .770 
 
ReLP3 
Profile of lending Portfolio 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Personal / Consumer Credit 1.99 2.00 1.012 3.00 3.00 1.443 
Small Business Credit 2.49 2.00 1.015 3.26 3.00 1.191 
Large Business Credit 2.64 3.00 1.167 3.58 3.00 1.013 
Collateral (Secured) Credit 3.09 3.00 1.343 3.66 4.00 1.283 
Mortgage (secured) Credit 3.21 3.00 1.284 3.64 4.00 1.240 
Unsecured Credit 4.78 5.00 .470 4.38 4.00 .592 
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Other Credit 4.21 4.00 .688 3.84 4.00 .764 
 
LP4a 
Managing & Controlling Risk Factors 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
increased loan costs 3.92 4.00 1.098 4.05 4.00 .685 
Decrease in loan performance 4.13 4.00 .665 4.21 4.00 .745 
Influence loan maturity 3.12 3.00 1.192 2.45 3.00 .898 
Bank stability 2.19 2.00 1.079 1.77 2.00 .773 
Making poor lending decisions 4.31 4.00 .801 4.36 4.00 .674 
rationalising the decision-making 4.33 5.00 1.034 4.47 5.00 .668 
Default loans 1.69 1.00 1.009 1.45 1.00 .602 
Improved bank productivity and 
efficiency 
3.93 4.00 1.135 4.25 4.00 .796 
 
LP4b 
Measuring Risk Factors 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Indemnify the bank from  insolvency 2.14 2.00 .769 2.23 2.00 .890 
Safeguarding the firm from insolvency 2.08 2.00 .897 1.92 2.00 .722 
Complicated loan application 
processes 
3.71 4.00 1.061 3.79 4.00 1.105 
Improved efficiency units 1.94 2.00 .741 1.73 2.00 .584 
Enhancing the quality of the bank‘s 
loans portfolio 
1.67 2.00 .758 1.63 2.00 .635 
Increase in the number of loans 
granted 
2.14 1.00 .754 2.45 3.00 .688 
Decrease in catastrophic credit 
defaults 
1.59 1.00 .709 1.73 2.000 .584 
Making lending decisions with a 
higher degree of certainty 
1.44 1.00 .586 1.53 1.00 .579 
improved decision-making within 
units in the future 
1.50 1.00 .682 1.78 2.00 .629 
 
DM1 
Allocating Loans Consideration 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
The relationship between credit 
portfolio and credit risk management 
1.91 2.00 .713 1.77 2.00 .698 
The relationship between loans refund 
efficiency and loan maturity 
1.81 2.00 .744 1.63 2.00 .677 
The relationship between risks control 
and credit decision performance 
1.92 2.00 .884 1.82 2.00 .714 
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Personal characteristics 1.66 2.00 .662 1.73 2.00 .672 
Business characteristics 1.66 2.00 .696 1.73 2.00 .692 
The relationship between institution 
and borrowers 
2.85 3.00 1.112 2.96 3.00 1.338 
Bank‘s characteristics 2.29 2.00 .919 1.96 2.00 .696 
The match between bank‘s purpose 
and goal 
1.60 1.00 .816 1.55 1.00 .625 
Type of activities 2.78 2.00 1.475 1.48 1.00 .670 
The capital structure  1.51 1.00 .664 1.77 2.00 .717 
The return on assets and equity 1.92 2.00 .948 1.95 2.00 .848 
When/where the bank accepts deposits 
and  granted loans 
3.19 3.00 1.133 2.18 2.00 1.316 
 
DM2a 
Lending Authorisation: Issues Referred to the Risk Portfolio Procedures 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Cost of the transaction is rising 
according to information availability 
3.90 4.00 4.00 4.34 4.00 .731 
Insufficient capital to continue 
operations 
4.09 4.00 4.00 4.30 4.00 .594 
Inability to access liquid funds to meet 
its obligations 
4.24 4.00 4.00 4.49 5.00 .556 
Failed to manage the different types of 
risks 
4.29 4.50 5.00 4.36 5.00 .752 
Flawed internal processes related to 
people or systems 
3.99 4.00 4.00 3.97 4.00 .763 
Issues Referred to the Risk Portfolio 
Procedures - Faced legal action 
4.13 4.00 4.00 4.49 5.00 .604 
Decision based on inaccurate or 
incomplete information 
4.05 4.00 4.00 4.16 4.00 .667 
Faced legal risk 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.12 4.00 .706 
The product (loan) identity  and 
practices is well disciplined 
2.48 2.00 2.00 2.48 2.00 .747 
Non-compliance with acts and 
regulations 
2.09 2.00 2.00 2.49 2.00 .766 
 
DM2b 
Lending Authorisation: Issues Referred to the Lending Portfolio Procedures  
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Providing clear statements about the 
financial situation 
1.72 2.00 .644 1.95 2.00 .743 
Confidential evaluation applicant 1.83 2.00 .754 1.55 1.00 .668 
Capable of refunding the loan 2.04 2.00 .758 1.90 2.00 .670 
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Source of the money 3.38 4.00 1.119 4.30 5.00 .811 
Refund the loan in a certain timeframe 3.83 4.00 .960 3.97 4.00 .849 
The internal auditor has positively 
reported 
2.63 3.00 .687 2.64 3.00 .695 
The geographical location 2.91 3.00 .849 2.96 3.00 .772 
First time application 3.00 3.00 1.006 2.84 3.00 .727 
Approved application conflicts with 
institutional lending policy 
3.66 4.00 1.047 3.88 4.00 .912 
 
DM3 
Practitioners Focus 
Feature 
Conventional Banks Islamic banks 
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
Risk models emerged just as a 
significant shift has occurred in debt 
and loan markets 
2.20 2.00 1.166 2.19 2.00 1.009 
Risk models facilitated the pricing of 
portfolio of exposures included in 
securitisations 
1.94 2.00 .859 1.99 2.00 .842 
Risk models used as a basis for bank‘s 
calculations of regulatory capital 
2.14 2.00 1.008 2.21 2.00 .957 
Risk models encompass bank 
efficiency performance directly and 
matched with non-performance loans 
in cost or production 
1.97 2.00 .860 1.78 2.00 .712 
Risk models possibly related to 
examiners‘ ratings of bank 
management quality 
1.86 2.00 .883 1.85 2.00 .660 
Risk models because of new markets 
in credit derivatives and the 
unprecedented growth in the pre-
existing markets for loan sales and 
securitisations 
1.76 2.00 .650 1.90 2.00 .730 
Risk models presented a negative 
relation between problem loans and 
cost efficiency 
2.19 2.00 .775 2.38 2.00 .907 
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APPENDIX H: Pilot Survey: Summary of 
Changes 
Summary of Changes after the Pilot Survey 
Variable 
Item Participants comment Action taken 
No Description 
Financial 
institution 
characteristics 
1 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
Banks status 
 
 
 
Bank 
obligations 
 
 
 
 
Lending 
statistics 
Three participants were found 
there is a replication in some 
measurements. 
 
Majority of participants were 
noticed there were no 
measurements relevant to the 
IB, and they suggest add some 
to modify this item. 
  
Seven participants noticed 
item needs re-arrangement    
Item was adjusted  
 
 
 
Item had been modified 
 
 
 
 
 
Item had re-arranged for the 
reliability concept  
Risk assessment 
2 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
Risk profile 
 
 
 
Risk 
measureme
nt models 
 
Distinguishi
ng risk 
factors 
Ten participants noticed the 
objective of the question 
unclear, and two noticed the 
question unable to answer  
 
The majority of participants 
found the item difficult to 
answer. 
 
Thirteen participants notice the 
item was contradicted with the 
study objectives  
The item was rebuild as a 
combining question 
(integrated) seeking for 
classifying risk not defining 
them  
 
The item was revised and made 
it simple by provide some 
definitions 
 
Item had been dropped due to 
gainsay  
Lending 
portfolio 
3 
 
 
5 
Managing 
risk factors 
 
Measuring 
risk factors 
Most participants were 
suggested combine item 3 with 
item 5, because they deal with 
the same objective.   
These items were combined 
together to increase their 
contribution 
Rationalising 
lending 
decisions 
 
N/a N/a N/a N/a 
Demographical 
data 
2 
 
 
4 
Gender 
 
 
Primary 
occupation   
The majority noticed these 
items were worthless to the 
study objectives 
Dropped: due to irrelevant 
 
 
Dropped: due to irrelevant 
Overall 
comments 
(general) 
The majority of participants suggest that questionnaire too long and has to be reduced, 
and also remaining that demographic data into the end may assist to increase the 
response rate. In contrast, to do so, the questionnaire will be able to gathering wealthy 
information.  
Note: after reviewing these comments, three items from the primary questionnaire draft were omitted.  
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APPENDIX J: Principal Component Analysis  
Total Variance Explained   
By using extraction method 
 
Conventional Banks  Islamic Banks  
Variables Details 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Details Component Initial Eigenvalues 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1.  Risks Profile Assessment 
Risks 
Evaluation 
Transaction Risks 
Business Risks  
Treasury Risks  
Systemic Risks  
Governance Risks  
1 2.84 56.77 56.77 
Treasury Risks  
Business Risks  
Governance Risks  
Systemic Risks  
Transaction Risks 
1 2.99 59.73 59.73 
Transaction 
Risks 
classification 
 
Credit risk ( grading risk) 
Single name single transaction risk 
Balance sheet risk 
 
1 2.00 40.07 40.07 
Mark-up risk 
Balance sheet risk 
Foreign exchange Risk 
Products tenor plan risk 
Single name single transaction risk 
1 2.53 50.64 50.64 
Mark-up risk 
Products tenor plan risk 2 1.10 21.94 62.01 
     
Business Risks 
Classification 
Withdrawal risk 
Solvency risk 
Displaced commercial risk 
Trading activity risk 
1 2.33 58.30 58.30 
Withdrawal risk 
Solvency risk 
Trading activity risk 
Displaced commercial risk 
1 2.21 55.23 55.23 
Treasury Risks 
classification 
Hedging risk 
Liquidity risk 
Credit skill and training risk 
Asset & liability management risk 
ALM 
1 2.39 59.75 59.75 
Credit skill and training risk 
Liquidity risk 
Hedging risk 
Asset & liability management risk 
ALM 
1 1.82 45.58 45.58 
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Governance 
Risks 
Classification 
Transparency risk 
Fiduciary risk 
Business environment risk 
1 2.08 41.60 41.60 
Event, natural disaster risk 
Legal risk 
Business environment risk 
1 1.47 48.909 48.91 
Legal risk 
Operational risk 2 
1.12 22.30 63.90      
Systematic 
Risks 
Classification 
Fraud/ compliance risk 
Payment/settlement risk 
Technology/systems exposure 
Institutional risk 
Shift in regulation(regulatory risk  
1 2.94 58.72 58.72 
Technology/systems exposure 
Fraud/ compliance risk 
Institutional risk 
Shift in regulation(regulatory risk ) 
Payment/settlement risk 
1 2.70 54.08 54.08 
All Risks 
classification 
Solvency risk 
Legal risk 
Asset & liability management risk 
Foreign exchange Risk 
Operational risk 
Credit skill and training risk 
Liquidity risk 
1 5.88 39.18 39.18 
Mark-up risk 
Hedging risk 
Single name single transaction risk 
Displaced commercial risk 
Foreign exchange Risk 
 
1 4.40 31.40 31.40 
Business environment risk 
Payment/settlement risk 
Institutional risk 
Mark-up risk 
Shift in regulation(regulatory risk  
2 1.76 11.67 50.85 
Technology/systems exposure 
Institutional risk 
Fraud/ compliance risk 
Shift in regulation(regulatory risk ) 
Payment/settlement risk 
2 2.29 16.39 47.78 
Fiduciary risk 
Credit risk ( grading risk) 
Trading activity risk 3 1.27 8.49 59.34 
Withdrawal risk 
Solvency risk 
Credit risk ( grading risk) 
Asset & liability management risk  
3 1.41 10.04 57.83 
Risks 
Appearance 
Transaction Risks  
Business Risks  
Governance Risks  
Systemic Risks  
Treasury Risks 
1 3.07 61.45 61.45 
Treasury Risks  
Transaction Risks  
Governance Risks  
Business Risks  
Systemic Risks 
1 3.75 74.91 74.91 
Internal rating 
& Scoring 
Models 
Transaction Risks Applications 
Business Risks Applications 1 1.96 48.90 48.90 
Business Risks  
Treasury Risks  
Transaction Risks  
1 2.05 68.21 68.21 
Governance Risks Applications 
Treasury Risks Applications 2 1.47 36.66 85.56 
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Value and Risk 
Model 
Transaction Risks Applications 
Business Risks Applications 
Treasury Risks Applications 
Governance Risks Applications 
Systemic Risks Applications 
1 2.46 49.24 49.24 
Transaction Risks  
Treasury Risks  
Governance Risks  
Business Risks  
1 2.15 53.67 53.67 
Beta & Assets 
Pricing Model 
Transaction Risks Applications 
Business Risks Applications  
Treasury Risks Applications  
Governance Risks Applications 
1 2.88 72.06 72.06 
Treasury Risks 
Transaction Risks  
Business Risks 1 2.29 76.46 76.46 
All Models 
Risks 
Business Risks Applications 
Transaction Risks Applications 
Treasury Risks Applications 
Governance Risks Applications 
1 3.49 38.81 38.81 
Treasury Risks and (Value  
Treasury Risks and (Beta  
Transaction Risks and (Beta  
Business Risks and (Value  
Business Risks and (Beta  
1 3.31 30.06 30.06 
Treasury Risks Applications 
Governance Risks Applications 
Business Risks Applications 
2 1.80 20.00 58.81 
Treasury Risks and (Internal  
Business Risks and (Internal  
Transaction Risks and (Internal  
2 2.58 23.48 53.54 
Governance Risks Applications 
Treasury Risks Applications 3 1.27 14.16 72.97 
Transaction Risks and (Value  
Governance Risks and (Value  
Systemic Risks and (Value  
3 1.33 12.12 65.66 
Applying Risks Treasury Risks Measurement 
Transaction Risks Measurement 
Governance Risks Measurement 
Systemic Risks Measurement 
Business Risks Measurement 
1 3.14 62.84 62.84 
Treasury Risks Measurement 
Transaction Risks Measurement 
Governance Risks Measurement 
Systemic Risks Measurement 
Business Risks Measurement 
1 3.71 74.20 74.20 
2.  Lending Portfolio Assessment 
Lending 
Portfolio 
Diversification 
efficiency concept means portfolio 
inputs equivalent outputs mostly  
- highly-diversified portfolio 
means more asset securitisation 
highly-diversified portfolio means 
non-risky assets in estimated  
The relationship Between Lending 
Portfolio & Risk factors 
1 1.78 44.45 44.45 
highly-diversified portfolio means 
more asset securitisation 
efficiency concept means portfolio 
inputs equivalent outputs mostly  
highly-diversified portfolio means 
non-risky assets in estimated period 
 
1 1.48 49.35 49.35 
Lending 
Portfolio 
Personal / consumer Credit 
Large Business Credit 
Small Business Credit 
 
1 1.78 59.27 59.27 
Personal / consumer Credit 
Mortgage (secured) Credit 
Large Business Credit 
Small Business Credit 
Collateral (Secured) Credit 
1 3.08 61.68 61.68 
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Managing and 
Controlling 
Lending 
Portfolio Risks 
- influence loan maturity 
- improved bank productivity and 
efficiency 
- increased loan costs 1 2.17 43.39 43.39 
making poor lending decisions 
rationalising the decision-making 
improved bank productivity and 
efficiency 
decrease in loan performance 
increased loan costs 
1 1.97 39.47 39.47 
- making poor lending decisions 
- decrease in loan performance 
2 1.07 21.46 64.86      
Measuring 
Lending 
Portfolio Risks 
enhancing the quality of the bank‘s 
loans portfolio 
improved efficiency units 
making lending decisions with a 
higher degree of certainty 
decrease in catastrophic credit 
defaults 
increase in the number of loans 
granted 
improved decision-making within 
units in the future 
1 2.79 46.57 46.57 
decrease in catastrophic credit defaults 
making lending decisions with a 
higher degree of certainty 
improved efficiency units 
increase in the number of loans 
granted 1 1.49 37.15 37.15 
3.  Decision Making Assessment 
Issues 
Considered 
when 
Allocating 
Loans 
business characteristics 
personal characteristics 
The capital structure  
the relationship between risks 
control and credit decision  
- the match between bank‘s 
purpose and goal 
1 3.48 38.69 38.69 
- business characteristics 
- the relationship between institution 
and borrowers 
- bank‘s characteristics 
- the match between bank‘s purpose 
and goal 
The return on assets and equity 
1 2.75 27.53 27.53 
The return on assets and equity 
- bank‘s characteristics 
- the relationship between loans 
refund efficiency and loan  
-  relationship between credit 
portfolio and credit risk  
2 1.27 14.11 52.81 
relationship between credit portfolio 
and credit risk management 
the relationship between risks control 
and credit decision performance 
- the relationship between loans refund 
efficiency and loan maturity 
2 1.64 16.43 43.96 
     
When/where the bank accepts deposits 
and  granted loans 
- type of activities 
3 1.32 13.23 57.18 
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Issues 
Accounted in 
Lending 
Decision –
making 
- cost of the transaction is rising 
according to  
- insufficient capital to continue 
operations 
- inability to access liquid funds to 
meet its obligations 
- faced legal action 
- decision based on inaccurate or 
incomplete  
- failed to manage the different 
types of risks 
- faced legal risk  
flawed internal processes related to 
people or  
1 4.06 50.72 50.72 
inability to access liquid funds to meet 
its obligations 
- flawed internal processes related to 
people or systems 
- faced legal action 
- decision based on inaccurate or 
incomplete information 
- insufficient capital to continue 
operations 
1 2.00 39.99 39.99 
Issues 
Considered in 
Lending 
Decision 
Making 
- providing clear statements about 
the  
- capable of refunding the loan 
confidential evaluation applicant 
1 1.96 32.66 32.66 
- capable of refunding the loan 
- first time application 
 
1 1.40 34.99 34.99 
source of the money  
The geographical location 
The internal auditor has positively 
reported 
2 1.36 22.67 55.33 
providing clear statements about the 
financial situation 
The internal auditor has positively 
reported 
2 1.22 30.54 65.53 
Issues related 
to Risks Modes 
and Decision 
Making 
used as a basis for bank‘s 
calculations of regulatory capital 
- facilitated the pricing of portfolio 
of exposures included in 
securitisations 
- presented a negative relation 
between problem loans and cost 
efficiency 
- possibly related to examiners‘ 
ratings of bank management 
quality 
1 2.55 50.97 50.97 
- possibly related to examiners‘ ratings 
of bank management quality 
- presented a negative relation between 
problem loans and cost efficiency 
- facilitated the pricing of portfolio of 
exposures included in securitisations 
- used as a basis for bank‘s 
calculations of regulatory capital 
- because of new markets in credit 
derivatives and the unprecedented 
growth in the pre-existing markets for 
loan sales and securitisations 
1 2.52 50.46 50.46 
because of new markets in credit 
derivatives and the unprecedented 
growth in the pre-existing markets 
for loan sales and securitisations 
2 1.01 20.22 71.19      
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APPENDIX K: Correlation Coefficient: Risk 
Portfolio & Lending Portfolio Factors 
A. Conventional Banking Group 
 
1. Transaction Risk Factor with Lending Portfolio Factors 
 TR LPD DLT ILT LP&P LPE CA 
TR 1.000       
LPD .068 1.000      
DLT -.087 -.002 1.000     
ILT .288* -.164 .000 1.000    
LP&P .158 -.159 .127 .186*** 1.000   
LPE -.031 .424* -.055 -.091 -.333* 1.000  
CA -.039 .188*** .020 -.289* -.264** .000 1.000 
TR: Transaction Risks Factor. LPD: Lending Portfolio Diversification Factor. DLT: Lending Types Factor (Secured 
loan). ILT: Lending Types Factor (Unsecured loan). LP&P: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending 
Productivity & Performance). LPE: Measuring Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending efficiency). CA: Measuring 
Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Capital adequacy).   
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
***.Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
 
2. Business Risk Factor with Lending Portfolio Factors 
 BR LPD DLT ILT LP&P LPE CA 
BR 1.000       
LPD 
.183*** 1.000      
DLT 
.205*** -.002 1.000     
ILT 
.152 -.164 .000 1.000    
LP&P 
.272** -.159 .127 .186*** 1.000   
LPE 
.069 .424* -.055 -.091 -.333* 1.000  
CA 
.004 .188*** .020 -.289* -.264** .000 1.000 
BR: Business Risks Factor. LPD: Lending Portfolio Diversification Factor. DLT: Lending Types Factor (Secured 
loan). ILT: Lending Types Factor (Unsecured loan). LP&P: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending 
Productivity & Performance). LPE: Measuring Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending efficiency). CA: Measuring 
Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Capital adequacy).   
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
***.Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
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3. Treasury Risk Factor with Lending Portfolio Factors 
 TyR LPD DLT ILT LP&P LPE CA 
TyR 1.000       
LPD 
-.032 1.000      
DLT 
.154 -.002 1.000     
ILT 
.040 -.164 .000 1.000    
LP&P 
.206*** -.159 .127 .186*** 1.000   
LPE 
-.041 .424* -.055 -.091 -.333* 1.000  
CA 
.018 .188*** .020 -.289* -.264** .000 1.000 
TyR: Treasury Risks Factor. LPD: Lending Portfolio Diversification Factor. DLT: Lending Types Factor (Secured 
loan). ILT: Lending Types Factor (Unsecured loan). LP&P: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending 
Productivity & Performance). LPE: Measuring Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending efficiency). CA: Measuring 
Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Capital adequacy).   
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
***.Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
 
4. Governance Risk Factor with Lending Portfolio Factors 
 GR LPD DLT ILT LP&P LPE CA 
GR 1.000       
LPD .156 1.000      
DLT .213** -.002 1.000     
ILT -.076 -.164 .000 1.000    
LP&P .235** -.159 .127 .186*** 1.000   
LPE .227** .424* -.055 -.091 -.333* 1.000  
CA .150 .188*** .020 -.289* -.264** .000 1.000 
GR: Governence Risks Factor. LPD: Lending Portfolio Diversification Factor. DLT: Lending Types Factor (Secured 
loan). ILT: Lending Types Factor (Unsecured loan). LP&P: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending 
Productivity & Performance). LPE: Measuring Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending efficiency). CA: Measuring 
Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Capital adequacy).   
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
***.Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
 
5. Systematic Risk Factor with Lending Portfolio Factors 
 SR LPD DLT ILT LP&P LPE CA 
SR 1.000       
LPD .069 1.000      
DLT .146 -.002 1.000     
ILT .070 -.164 .000 1.000    
LP&P -.153 -.159 .127 .186*** 1.000   
LP&P .237** .424* -.055 -.091 -.333* 1.000  
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CA .055 .188*** .020 -.289* -.264** .000 1.000 
SR: Systemic Risks Factor. LPD: Lending Portfolio Diversification Factor. DLT: Lending Types Factor (Secured 
loan). ILT: Lending Types Factor (Unsecured loan). LP&P: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending 
Productivity & Performance). LPE: Measuring Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending efficiency). CA: Measuring 
Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Capital adequacy).   
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
***.Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed), n: 86. 
 
======================================================= 
 
B.  Islamic Banking Group 
 
1. Transaction Risk Factor with Lending Portfolio Factors 
 TR LPD DLT ILT LPerM LProM  CA  LPE 
TR 1.000        
LPD -.119 1.000       
DLT .068 .102 1.000      
ILT  .097 .031 .000 1.000     
LPerM .041 -.343* -.214*** -.048 1.000    
LProM  -.083 -.032 .018 .053 .000 1.000   
CA  -.298** .060 .086 -.053 -.282** -.321* 1.000  
LPE .012 .183 .347* -.050 -.246** .003 .000 1.000 
TR: Transaction Risks Factor. LPD: Lending Portfolio Diversification Factor. DLP: Lending Types Factor (Direct 
loan). ILP: Lending Types Factor (Indirect loan). LPerM: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending 
performance). LProM: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending productivity). CA: Measuring Risks of 
Lending Portfolio Factor (Capital Adequacy).  LPE: Measuring Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (lending efficiency). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0. 01 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0. 05 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
***.Correlation is significant at the 0. 10 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
 
2. Business Risk Factor with Lending Portfolio Factors 
 BR LPD DLT ILT LPerM LProM  CA  LPE 
BR 1.000        
LPD -.139 1.000       
DLT .216*** .102 1.000      
ILT  .276** .031 .000 1.000     
LPerM .040 -.343* -.214*** -.048 1.000    
LProM  -.137 -.032 .018 .053 .000 1.000   
CA  -.051 .060 .086 -.053 -.282** -.321* 1.000  
LPE -.009 .183 .347* -.050 -.246** .003 .000 1.000 
BR: Business Risks Factor. LPD: Lending Portfolio Diversification Factor. DLP: Lending Types Factor (Direct loan). 
ILP: Lending Types Factor (Indirect loan). LPerM: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending 
performance). LProM: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending productivity). CA: Measuring Risks of 
Lending Portfolio Factor (Capital Adequacy).  LPE: Measuring Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (lending efficiency). 
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 BR LPD DLT ILT LPerM LProM  CA  LPE 
BR 1.000        
LPD -.139 1.000       
DLT .216*** .102 1.000      
ILT  .276** .031 .000 1.000     
LPerM .040 -.343* -.214*** -.048 1.000    
LProM  -.137 -.032 .018 .053 .000 1.000   
CA  -.051 .060 .086 -.053 -.282** -.321* 1.000  
LPE -.009 .183 .347* -.050 -.246** .003 .000 1.000 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0. 01 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0. 05 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
***.Correlation is significant at the 0. 10 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
 
1. Treasury Risk Factor with Lending Portfolio Factors 
 TyR LPD DLT ILT LPerM LProM  CA  LPE 
TyR 1.000        
LPD -.168 1.000       
DLT .082 .102 1.000      
ILT  .217*** .031 .000 1.000     
LPerM .013 -.343* -.214*** -.048 1.000    
LProM  -.130 -.032 .018 .053 .000 1.000   
CA  -.038 .060 .086 -.053 -.282** -.321* 1.000  
LPE .031 .183 .347* -.050 -.246** .003 .000 1.000 
TyR: Treasury Risks Factor. LPD: Lending Portfolio Diversification Factor. DLP: Lending Types Factor (Direct loan). 
ILP: Lending Types Factor (Indirect loan). LPerM: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending 
performance). LProM: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending productivity). CA: Measuring Risks of 
Lending Portfolio Factor (Capital Adequacy).  LPE: Measuring Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (lending efficiency). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0. 01 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0. 05 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
***.Correlation is significant at the 0. 10 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
 
1. Governance Risk Factor with Lending Portfolio Factors 
 GR LPD DLT ILT LPerM LProM  CA  LPE 
GR 1.000        
LPD -.115 1.000       
DLT .143 .102 1.000      
ILT  .192 .031 .000 1.000     
LPerM -.133 -.343* -.214*** -.048 1.000    
LProM  -.106 -.032 .018 .053 .000 1.000   
CA  -.142 .060 .086 -.053 -.282** -.321* 1.000  
LPE -.009 .183 .347* -.050 -.246** .003 .000 1.000 
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 GR LPD DLT ILT LPerM LProM  CA  LPE 
GR 1.000        
LPD -.115 1.000       
DLT .143 .102 1.000      
ILT  .192 .031 .000 1.000     
LPerM -.133 -.343* -.214*** -.048 1.000    
LProM  -.106 -.032 .018 .053 .000 1.000   
CA  -.142 .060 .086 -.053 -.282** -.321* 1.000  
LPE -.009 .183 .347* -.050 -.246** .003 .000 1.000 
GR: Governance Risks Factor. LPD: Lending Portfolio Diversification Factor. DLP: Lending Types Factor (Direct 
loan). ILP: Lending Types Factor (Indirect loan). LPerM: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending 
performance). LProM: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending productivity). CA: Measuring Risks of 
Lending Portfolio Factor (Capital Adequacy).  LPE: Measuring Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (lending efficiency). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0. 01 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0. 05 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
***.Correlation is significant at the 0. 10 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
 
1. Systematic Risk Factor with Lending Portfolio Factors 
 SR LPD DLT ILT LPerM LProM  CA  LPE 
SR 1.000        
LPD -.102 1.000       
DLT .146 .102 1.000      
ILT  .133 .031 .000 1.000     
LPerM -.118 -.343* -.214*** -.048 1.000    
LProM  -.239** -.032 .018 .053 .000 1.000   
CA  .011 .060 .086 -.053 -.282** -.321* 1.000  
LPE .112 .183 .347* -.050 -.246** .003 .000 1.000 
SR: Systemic Risks Factor. LPD: Lending Portfolio Diversification Factor. DLP: Lending Types Factor (Direct loan). 
ILP: Lending Types Factor (Indirect loan). LPerM: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending 
performance). LProM: Managing Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (Lending productivity). CA: Measuring Risks of 
Lending Portfolio Factor (Capital Adequacy).  LPE: Measuring Risks of Lending Portfolio Factor (lending efficiency). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0. 01 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0. 05 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
***.Correlation is significant at the 0. 10 level (2-tailed), n: 73. 
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APPENDIX L: Component Factors Extracted 
1. Factors Identification – CB 
 
VARIABLES OF ASSESSING RISK FACTORS  
Risks Portfolio 
Governance Risks  
Business Risks  
Treasury Risks  
Systemic Risks  
Transaction Risks  
 
Risks Portfolio Classification  
Transaction Risks Classification 
Mark-up risk 
Foreign exchange risk 
Products tenor plan risk 
 
Single name single transaction risk 
Balance sheet risk 
Business Risks Classification  
Solvency risk 
Displaced commercial risk 
Withdrawal risk 
Trading activity risk 
Treasury Risks Classification 
Asset & liability management risk (ALM) 
Liquidity risk 
Hedging risk 
Credit skill and training risk 
Governance Risks Classification 
Fiduciary risk 
Business environment risk 
Transparency risk 
 
Operational risk 
Event, natural disaster risk 
Legal risk 
Systemic Risks Classification 
Payment/settlement risk 
Technology/systems exposure 
Institutional risk 
Shift in regulation (regulatory risk) 
Fraud/ compliance risk 
 
Risks Visibility 
Treasury Risks Visibility 
Systemic Risks Visibility 
Business Risks Visibility 
Governance Risks Visibility 
 
Risks Portfolio Measures  
Internal rating & Scoring Models Applications 
Transaction Risks  
Business Risks  
 
Systemic Risks  
Governance Risks  
Internal & External risks 
portfolio 
TR~ applicable  
TR~less applicable 
BR~ applicable 
IR/S model – less appropriate 
RV~ external / 
internal 
TyR~ applicable 
GR~ applicable 
GR~ less applicable 
SR~ applicable 
IR/S model – appropriate  
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Value at Risk Models Applications 
Governance Risks  
Treasury Risks  
 
Transaction Risks  
Business Risks  
Beta & Capital Pricing Models Applications 
Treasury Risks  
Business Risks  
Transaction Risks  
Governance Risks  
 
Risks Models Actually Used for 
Transaction Risks Measurement 
Systemic Risks Measurement 
Business Risks Measurement 
 
Treasury Risks Measurement 
Governance Risks Measurement 
 
 
VARIABLES OF ASSESSING LENDING PORTFOLIO  
Lending Portfolio Diversification  
Highly-diversified portfolio means non-risky assets 
  in estimated period 
Highly-diversified portfolio means more asset securitisation 
Efficiency concept means portfolio inputs equivalent  
outputs mostly 
 
Re-Lending Types  
Collateral (Secured) Credit 
Mortgage (secured) Credit 
Large Business Credit 
 
Other Credit  
Unsecured Credit 
 
Default Risks Management 
Rationalising the decision-making 
Making poor lending decisions 
Decrease in loan performance 
Influence loan maturity 
Improved bank productivity and efficiency 
Increased loan costs 
 
Default Risks Measurement 
Increase in the number of loans granted 
Making lending decisions with a higher degree of certainty 
Decrease in catastrophic credit defaults 
Improved efficiency units 
Enhancing the quality of the bank’s loans portfolio 
Improved decision-making within units in the future 
 
Indemnify the bank from insolvency 
Safeguarding the firm from insolvency 
 
 
VARIABLES OF ASSESSING LENDING DECISION MAKING  
Allocating Loans Considerations  
Personal characteristics 
Business characteristics 
 
Bank’s characteristics 
VaR model –appropriate  
VaR model – less appropriate 
B & CP model – appropriate   
Available special models 
Unavailable special models 
Lending 
portfolio 
diversification 
LP~direct lend 
ILP~indirect lend  
DRMe~lending 
efficiency 
DRMe~Capital adequacy 
Diversification 
DRMa~Portfolio 
productivity & 
performance  
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The relationship between loans refund efficiency and loan maturity 
The relationship between credit portfolio and credit risk management 
The return on assets and equity 
 
The capital structure  
The relationship between risks control and credit decision performance 
The match between bank’s purpose and goal 
 
Authorising Loans Considerations – Issues Referred to Risks Portfolio  
Inability to access liquid funds to meet its obligations 
Insufficient capital to continue operations 
Decision based on inaccurate or incomplete information 
Faced legal action 
Faced legal risk 
 
Cost of the transaction is rising according to information availability  
Failed to manage the different types of risks 
 
Authorising Loans Considerations – Issues Referred to Lending Portfolio  
Providing clear statements about the financial situation 
Confidential evaluation applicant  
Source of the money 
 
Approved application conflicts with institutional lending policy 
Refund the loan in a certain timeframe 
 
First time application 
Capable of refunding the loan 
  
The geographical location 
The internal auditor has positively reported 
 
Issues referred to practitioners focus  
Risk models encompass bank efficiency performance directly  
and matched with non-performance loans in cost or production 
Risk models used as a basis for bank’s calculations  
of regulatory capital 
Risk models possibly related to examiners’ ratings  
of bank management quality 
Risk models facilitated the pricing of portfolio of exposures 
 included in securitisations 
 
  
External 
Internal 
Information asymmetry 
Risk exposure 
control 
Borrowers consider 
Shareholder 
consider 
Lenders consider 
Location consider 
Decision 
making 
focus 
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2. Factor Identification – IB 
 
 
VARIABLES OF ASSESSING RISK FACTORS  
Risks Portfolio 
Governance Risks  
Treasury Risks  
Business Risks  
Systemic Risks  
Transaction Risks  
 
Risks Portfolio Classification  
Transaction Risks Classification 
Mark-up risk 
Products tenor plan risk 
Foreign exchange risk 
Single name single transaction risk 
Balance sheet risk 
Business Risks Classification  
Withdrawal risk 
Displaced commercial risk 
Solvency risk 
Trading activity risk 
Treasury Risks Classification 
Asset & liability management risk (ALM) 
Liquidity risk 
Credit skill and training risk 
Hedging risk 
Governance Risks Classification 
Transparency risk 
Fiduciary risk 
Operational risk 
Legal risk 
 
Event, natural disaster risk 
Business environment risk 
Systemic Risks Classification 
Technology/systems exposure 
Institutional risk 
Payment/settlement risk 
Fraud/ compliance risk 
Shift in regulation (regulatory risk) 
 
Risks Visibility 
Treasury Risks Visibility 
Systemic Risks Visibility 
Business Risks Visibility 
Governance Risks Visibility 
 
Risks Portfolio Measures  
Internal rating & Scoring Models Applications 
Business Risks  
Treasury Risks Visibility  
Transaction Risks  
Governance Risks  
Systemic Risks  
Value at Risk Models Applications 
Business Risks  
Transaction Risks  
Treasury Risks  
Beta & Capital Pricing Models Applications 
Business Risks  
Treasury Risks  
Transaction Risks  
Internal & External risks 
portfolio 
TR~ applicable  
BR~ applicable 
TyR~ applicable 
GR~ applicable 
GR~ less applicable 
SR~ applicable 
RV~ external / internal 
IR/S model – appropriate  
VaR model –appropriate  
B & CP model appropriate 
ropriate   
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Governance Risks  
 
Risks Models Actually Used for 
Governance Risks Measurement 
Business Risks Measurement 
Systemic Risks Measurement 
Transaction Risks Measurement 
Treasury Risks Measurement 
 
 
VARIABLES OF ASSESSING LENDING PORTFOLIO  
Lending Portfolio Diversification  
Highly-diversified portfolio means more asset securitisation 
Highly-diversified portfolio means non-risky assets  
in estimated period 
Efficiency concept means portfolio inputs equivalent  
outputs mostly 
 
Re-Lending Types  
Mortgage (secured) Credit 
Collateral (Secured) Credit 
Small Business Credit 
 
Other Credit  
Large Business Credit 
 
Default Risks Management 
Making poor lending decisions 
Decrease in loan performance 
Rationalising the decision-making 
 
Increased loan costs  
Improved bank productivity and efficiency 
Influence loan maturity 
 
Default Risks Measurement 
Indemnify the bank from insolvency 
Enhancing the quality of the bank’s loans portfolio 
Safeguarding the firm from insolvency 
 
Decrease in catastrophic credit defaults 
Making lending decisions with a higher degree of certainty 
 Improved decision-making within units in the future 
 
 
VARIABLES OF ASSESSING LENDING DECISION MAKING  
Allocating Loans Considerations  
Business characteristics  
Personal characteristics  
The match between bank’s purpose and goal 
 
The relationship between institution and borrowers  
The return on assets and equity 
Bank’s characteristics 
The capital structure  
 
The relationship between loans refund efficiency and loan maturity 
The relationship between credit portfolio and credit risk management 
The relationship between risks control and credit decision performance 
 
Type of activities 
When/where the bank accepts deposits and granted loans 
 
Available special models 
Lending 
portfolio 
diversification 
LP~ direct lend 
ILP~ indirect lend  
DRMa ~ Portfolio productivity  
DRMa ~Portfolio performance  
 
DRMe ~ lending 
efficiency 
DRMe~Capital 
adequacy 
Diversification 
External 
Internal 
Ethics consideration 
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Authorising Loans Considerations – Issues Referred to Risks Portfolio  
Decision based on inaccurate or incomplete 
 information 
Inability to access liquid funds to meet its obligations 
Faced legal action 
 
Cost of the transaction is rising according to information availability  
Failed to manage the different types of risks 
 
The product (loan) identity and practices is well disciplined 
Faced legal risk 
 
Authorising Loans Considerations – Issues Referred to Lending Portfolio  
Confidential evaluation applicant  
Capable of refunding the loan 
Providing clear statements about the financial situation 
 
Source of the money 
Refund the loan in a certain timeframe 
Approved application conflicts with institutional lending policy 
 
Issues referred to practitioners focus  
Risk models possibly related to examiners’ ratings of bank  
management quality 
Risk models facilitated the pricing of portfolio of exposures  
included in securitisations  
Risk models encompass bank efficiency performance directly  
and matched with non-performance loans in cost or production 
Risk models because of new markets in credit derivatives and  
the unprecedented growth in the pre-existing markets  
for loan sales and securitisations 
Risk models presented a negative relation between  
problem loans and cost efficiency 
Risk models used as a basis for bank’s calculations of regulatory capital 
 
 
 
 
  
Information asymmetry 
Risk exposure 
control 
Borrowers consider 
Shareholder consider 
Location consider 
 
 
Decision 
making 
focus 
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APPENDIX M: Comparative Pearson Correlations 
for Risk Factors Influence Lending Decision-
making  
Matrixes for Risk Factors Influence LDM Significantly 
IB CB 
Model 1 : Consideration Issues in Loans Allocation  
N/A 
 T Risks 1 Try Risks  G Risks 2 CC EC IC 
T Risks 1 1.000      
Try Risks  .399
**
 1.000     
G Risks 2 .264
*
 .280
**
 1.000    
CC .155 .079 -.217
*
 1.000   
EC .202 -.024 -.181 .000 1.000  
IC .152 .520
**
 .289
**
 .000 .000 1.000 
 
Model 2a : Consideration Issues in Loan‘s Authorisation (risk portfolio consideration) 
 G Risks 2 G Risks 3 IA REC 
G Risks 2 1.000    
G Risks 3 .000 1.000   
IA -.283
*
 -.086 1.000  
REC .175 -.243
*
 .000 1.000 
 
 T Risks 1 Try Risks  G Risks 2  IA REC 
T Risks 1 1.000     
Try Risks  .399
**
 1.000    
G Risks 2 .264
*
 .280
**
 1.000   
IA -.173 -.353
**
 -.126 1.000  
REC -.376
**
 -.351
**
 .087 .000 1.000 
 
Model 2b : Consideration Issues in Loan‘s Authorisation (lending portfolio consideration) 
 G Risks 2 G Risks 3 S Risks  LeC SC 
G Risks 2 1.000     
G Risks 3 .000 1.000    
S Risks  .087 .506
**
 1.000   
LeC .106 -.285
*
 .068 1.000  
SC -.256
*
 -.044 .076 .000 1.000 
 
 G Risks 1 G Risks 2 S Risks  S&IC LeC LoC 
G Risks 1 1.000      
G Risks 2 .000 1.000     
S Risks  .325
**
 .519
**
 1.000    
S&IC -.299
**
 -.036 -.361
**
 1.000   
LeC .268
*
 -.107 -.103 .000 1.000  
LoC .158 -.262
*
 -.239
*
 .000 .000 1.000 
 
Model 3 : Consideration Issues in DM and Measurement of Risk Factors 
 G Risks 1 D/R 
G Risks 1 1.000  
D/R .256
*
 1.000 
 
 Try Risks  D/R 
Try Risks  1.000  
D/R .321
**
 1.000 
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APPENDIX N: Risk Factors which Significantly 
Influence Decision Making Policy 
IB CB 
Model 1 Non 
TR1: Mark-up risk, Foreign exchange risk, 
Products tenor plan risk. 
 
TrYR: Asset & liability management risk (ALM), 
Liquidity risk, Hedging risk, Credit skill & 
Training risk. 
 
GR2: Operational risk, Event, Natural disaster risk, 
Legal risk. 
 
Model 2a 
GR2: Operational risk, Legal risk. 
 
GR3: Event, Natural disaster risk, 
Business environment risk. 
TR1: Mark-up risk, Foreign exchange risk, 
Products tenor plan risk. 
 
TrYR: Asset & liability management risk (ALM), 
Liquidity risk, Hedging risk, Credit skill and 
Training risk. 
 
GR2: Operational risk, Event, Natural disaster risk, 
Legal risk. 
 
Model 2b 
GR2: Operational risk, Legal risk. 
 
GR3: Event, Natural disaster risk, 
Business environment risk. 
 
SR: Technology/Systems exposure 
Institutional risk, Payment 
/settlement risk, Fraud/ 
compliance risk, Shift in 
regulation (regulatory risk). 
 
GR1: Fiduciary risk, Business environment risk, 
Transparency risk. 
 
GR2: Operational risk, Event, natural disaster risk, 
Legal risk. 
 
SR: Payment/settlement risk, Technology/Systems 
Exposure, Institutional risk, Shift in regulation 
(regulatory risk), Fraud/ Compliance risk. 
Model 3 
GR1: Transparency risk, Fiduciary 
risk. 
TrYR: Asset & Liability Management risk (ALM), 
Liquidity risk, Hedging risk, Credit skill and 
Training risk. 
 
Total 
Risks in 
IB &CB 
 
Operational risk       Legal risk 
Transparency risk        Fiduciary risk 
Event & Natural disaster risk      
Business environment risk          
Technology & Systems exposure 
Institutional risk        Payment & 
settlement risk          Fraud risk 
Compliance risk           Shift in 
regulation (regulatory risk) 
 
Mark-up risk       Foreign exchange risk      
Products     tenor plan risk       Payment/settlement 
risk       Technology /Systems Exposure          
Institutional risk         Shift in regulation 
(regulatory risk)          Fraud/ Compliance risk 
Operational risk          Event, Natural disaster risk        
Legal risk         Fiduciary risk         Business 
environment risk          Transparency risk          
Asset & liability management risk (ALM)           
Liquidity risk         Hedging risk         Credit skill 
and Training risk 
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APPENDIX O: Computing DEA Models 
Input-oriented & Output-oriented Models 
Throughout, the researcher used decision making units (DMUs) to represent business operations 
or processes. Each DMU has a set of input/s and output/s representing multiple performance 
measures. Consider a set of n observations on the DMUs. Each observation, DMUj (j=1,2,…,n), 
uses m inputs 
ijx  (i=1,2,…,m) to produce s outputs rjy  (r=1,2,…,s). The empirical efficient 
frontier or best practice frontier is determined by these n observations. 
For specific ix  (i=1, 2,…,m) and ry  (r=1, 2,…,s): 
 
mi
xx iij
n
j
j
,.....,2,1
1




   
sr
yy rrj
n
j
j
,.....,2,1
1




  
nj
n
j
j
,.....,2,1
1
1




  (7.1) 
 
1. Input-oriented Model:  
For this DEA model, the input(s) is minimised and the output(s) is kept at their current levels.  
 min   
Subject to:  
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  (7.2) 
Where: 0DMU  represents one of the n DMUs under evaluation, and 0ix and 0ry  are the i
th
 input 
and r
th
 output for 0DMU , respectively.  
Since 1  is a feasible solution to (7.2) the optimal value to (7.2) 1  . If 1 , then the 
current input levels cannot be reduced (proportionally), indicating that 0DMU is on the frontier. 
Otherwise, if 1 , then 0DMU is dominated by the frontier. 
 represents the (input-oriented) 
efficiency score of 0DMU .  
The individual input reduction is called input slack and in fact both output and input slack values 
may exist in model (7.3) after calculating (7.2).  
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To determine the possible non-zero slacks after (7.3) and it is solved by 
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Therefore, 0DMU  is efficient if and only if 1
  and 0  ri ss  for all i and r.   
In fact model 7.1 and 7.2 represent a two-stage DEA process that involved in the model next 
(7.5). 
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 (7.5) 
The presence of non-Archimedean   in the objective faction efficiency allows minimisation over 
  to present the optimisation involving the slacks,  ri sands . 
 
 
2. Output-oriented Model: 
The output-oriented model can be expressed as follows; 
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Also this model is calculated in a two-stage process. First, calculating 
 by ignoring the slacks 
and then optimising the slacks by fixing the
  in the next model (7.7) 
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Whereas 0DMU is efficient if and only if 1
  and 0  ri ss  for all i and r. 
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3. Graphic Illustration of VRS and CRS Models   
 
a. The VRS model is graphically depicted as follows:   
VRS model (input-oriented & output-oriented) 
      VRS model (input-oriented)      VRS model (output-oriented)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. The CRS model is graphically depicted as follows:  
CRS model (NIRS oriented & NDRS oriented)  
  CRS_NIRS Model     CRS_NDRS Model 
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An output efficient frontier when 
inputs are fixed at their current levels 
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APPENDIX P: Descriptive Statistics of Input and Output Variables 
1.  Islamic Banking System: 
  
Total 
Deposits 
US$ 
Operation 
Costs US$ 
Non-Int. 
Expenses 
US$  ROE % ROA % 
Revenues 
US$ 
Loan 
(Investment) 
US$   CAR  
AAI in TA 
%  (2002 
based) 
AAI in TA %  
(yearly based) 
Year 2002 
Max 947.58 233.78 144.28 27.2 20.19 89 150.68 64.57 0 0 
Min 1.00 0.423 0.30 -455.6 -14.4 0.12 0.04 0.11 0 0 
Average 164.55 44.00 21.07 -10.18 86.10 17.69 25.73 18.59 0 0 
SD 285.14 56.41 30.30 93.24 403.07 24.04 42.93 19.07 0 0 
Year 2003 
Max 1129.88 265.06 156.04 44.22 20.5 120.60 154.62 63.02 156.67 156.67 
Min 1.10 0.21 0.14 0 -6.9 0.14 0.10 3.25 -32.66 -32.66 
Average 186.09 49.05 27.56 12.37 3.15 19.23 28.19 17.69 21.01 21.01 
SD 329.84 62.24 35.63 10.71 4.96 28.30 46.15 17.61 35.81 35.81 
Year 2004 
Max 1441.84 355.74 228.763 37.9 15.5 178.42 186.46 64.12 1008.120 331.72 
Min 1.23 0.20 0.121 -8.39 0.1 0.06 0.19 3.34 -98.69 -98.79 
Average 230.58 62.02 41.40 13.90 3.46 22.80 23.41 18.00 71.54 25.58 
SD 375.58 83.36 58.26 10.96 3.52 38.37 48.69 18.06 203.11 76.60 
Year 2005 
Max 1435.34 711.25 247.98 42.74 14.08 237.36 210.25 62.5 1609.66 310.77 
Min 3.55 0.21 0.13 0 0.5 0.19 0.17 3.12 -98.46 -85.54 
Average 265.98 115.59 44.23 19.28 4.69 32.77 28.94 16.49 180.19 57.36 
SD 425.51 171.69 57.15 10.78 3.94 50.95 56.71 16.56 335.93 91.95 
Year 2006 
Max 1482.71 1234.88 301.72 57.3 17.1 312.29 240.45 57.56 1582.61 825.85 
Min 1.07 0.26 0.18 0 0.128 0.48 0.11 2.64 -98.31 -54.74 
Average 258.65 163.52 64.284 20.62 5.19 39.91 33.04 16.69 242.51 59.00 
SD 445.72 266.58 79.22 12.11 4.70 65.74 62.44 16.25 363.39 166.38 
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2. Conventional Banking System 
 
Total 
Deposits 
US$ 
Operation 
Costs US$ 
Interest 
Expenses 
US$  ROE % ROA % 
Revenues 
US$ 
Loan 
(Investment) 
US$   CAR  
AAI in TA 
%  (2002 
based) 
AAI in TA %  
(yearly 
based) 
Year 2002 
Max 1895.41 377.69 225.66 32.69 9 83.05 600.08 42.67 0 0 
Min 0.12 3.48 0 -113 -11.9 0.00 0.09 1.38 0 0 
Average 325.97 81.26 41.90 7.72 1.56 22.91 102.91 8.71 0 0 
SD 505.18 107.75 61.70 26.69 3.55 28.67 157.82 8.08 0 0 
Year 2003 
Max 2019.60 496.61 269.96 31.7 6 90.57 448.81 20.76 149.34 149.34 
Min 0.23 3.5 0.98 0 0 0.043 0.06 1.49 -88.17 -88.17 
Average 312.12 98.36 51.19 12.72 1.68 24.79 89.88 7.79 5.40 5.40 
SD 532.63 128.38 73.81 8.47 1.36 30.78 135.25 3.93 47.69 47.69 
Year 2004 
Max 2353.74 487.92 297.44 36.1 4 102.61 630.08 21.66 156.57 215.70 
Min 0.66 2.9 1.25 0.93 0.08 0.084 0.09 1.52 -97.06 -97.08 
Average 357.15 108.63 54.77 15.15 1.702 27.04 99.44 7.83 20.46 21.44 
SD 610.75 137.15 73.75 8.44 1.08 32.55 164.01 4.26 63.32 57.76 
Year 2005 
Max 3720.31 634.91 631.15 40.13 10.46 244.86 971.75 20.23 1043.84 667.56 
Min 0.91 3.1 1.67 4.51 0.19 0.073 0.34 2.45 -97.65 -24.70 
Average 448.10 143.23 86.41 18.86 2.45 37.32 139.60 7.95 109.99 83.12 
SD 864.72 189.49 142.88 8.81 1.97 53.73 245.04 4.32 221.29 153.84 
Year 2006 
Max 4845.66 721.65 434.95 36.77 5 287.26 1352.85 18.74 1007.83 164.26 
Min 1.01 2.6 2.137 5.9 0.58 0.07 0.49 1.53 -93.79 -61.54 
Average 588.55 172.63 91.56 18.40 2.08 44.19 198.74 7.94 157.00 35.57 
SD 1141.51 224.27 128.09 6.77 1.05 64.48 372.15 4.45 231.47 46.61 
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APPENDIX Q: Efficiencies Scores (TE, PTE and 
ES) for IB and CB 
A. Average Efficiency scours for All CB and IB (As One Sample Data Yearly) 
 
BANKS CAREGORIES Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 
TE (CRS) for All CB & IB Categories 
SIB - Average TE Scores 0.47 0. 60 0.53 0.64 0.64 
MIB - Average TE Scores 0.75 0.57 0.63 0.71 0.79 
LIB - Average TE Scores 0.28 0.37 0.43 0.51 0.44 
SCB - Average TE Scores 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.34 
MCB - Average TE Scores 0.50 0.64 0.58 0.62 0.68 
LCB - Average TE Scores 0.41 0.36 0.40 0.47 0.45 
PTE (VRS) for All CB & IB Categories 
SIB - Average PTE Scores 0.67 0.71 0.76 0.88 0.90 
MIB - Average PTE Scores 0.82 0.75 0.81 0.87 0.93 
LIB - Average PTE Scores 0.59 0.68 0.70 0.83 0.75 
SCB - Average PTE Scores 0.32 0.40 0.40 0.51 0.58 
MCB - Average PTE Scores 0.69 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.80 
LCB - Average PTE Scores 0.74 0.66 0.70 0.79 0.75 
SE (CRS/VRS) for All CB & IB Categories 
SIB - Average SE Scores 0.62 0.73 0.63 0. 70 0.69 
MIB - Average SE Scores 0.87 0.72 0.77 0.82 0.85 
LIB - Average SE Scores 0.43 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.55 
SCB - Average SE Scores 0.33 0. 40 0.38 0.42 0.46 
MCB - Average SE Scores 0.61 0.70 0.66 0.70 0.77 
LCB - Average SE Scores 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.53 0.51 
 
 
Average Efficiency scours Efficiencies Coefficient for All CB & IB Categories 
 
BANKS CATEGORIES Technical Efficiency (CRS) Pure TE (VRS) Scale Efficiency 
SIB - Average Scores 0.52 0.74 0.64 
SCB - Average Scores 0.13 0.40 0.30 
MIB - Average  Scores 0.58 0.78 0.72 
MCB - Average Scores 0.55 0.73 0.65 
LIB - Average Scores 0.34 0.68 0.47 
LCB - Average Scores 0.19 0.58 0.29 
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B. Average Efficiency scours for All IB and CB as individual sample(Comparable 
Similar Banks Categories for Two Samples)  
 
BANKS CAREGORIES Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 
TE (CRS) for All CB & IB Categories (by period)   
SIB - Average TE Scores  0.76 0.90 0.85 0.94 0.88 
SCB - Average TE Scores  0.96 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.92 
      
MIB - Average TE Scores  0.88 0.78 0.83 0.91 0.96 
MCB - Average TE Scores  0.87 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.85 
      
LIB - Average TE Scores  0.93 0.86 0.83 0.91 0.83 
LCB - Average TE Scores  0.73 0.68 0.72 0.71 0.63 
PTE (VRS) for All CB & IB Categories (by period)   
SIB - Average PTE Scores  0.83 0.92 0.88 0.95 0.96 
SCB - Average PTE Scores  0.99 0.97 0.99 1 1 
      
MIB - Average PTE Scores  0.90 0.91 0.95 0.97 0.98 
MCB - Average PTE Scores  0.93 0.922 0.95 0.96 0.96 
      
LIB - Average PTE Scores  0.97 0.94 0.89 0.97 0.94 
LCB - Average PTE Scores  0.94 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.94 
SE (CRS/VRS) for All CB & IB Categories (by period)   
SIB - Average SE Scores  0.93 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.92 
SCB - Average SE Scores  0.97 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.92 
      
MIB - Average SE Scores  0.93 0.81 0.87 0.93 0.98 
MCB - Average SE Scores  0.93 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.89 
      
LIB - Average SE Scores  0.96 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.87 
LCB - Average SE Scores  0.74 0.72 0.77 0.72 0.66 
 
 
Average Efficiency Scours (Comparable Similar Banks Categories for Two Samples)  
 
BANKS CATEGORIES Technical Efficiency (CRS) Pure TE (VRS) Scale Efficiency 
SIB - Average Scores  0.85 0.88 0.96 
SCB - Average Scores  0.93 0.98 0.95 
    
MIB - Average Scores  0.80 0.90 0.87 
MCB - Average Scores  0.84 0.93 0.88 
    
LIB - Average Scores  0.86 0.93 0.91 
LCB - Average Scores  0.59 0.89 0.65 
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C. IB & CB (comparable two samples data) 
 
BANKS CAREGORIES Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 
TE (CRS) for All CB & IB Systems (by period)   
IB - Average TE Scores  0.60 0.60 0.58 0.69 0.68 
CB - Average TE Scores  0.57 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.55 
PTE (VRS) for All CB & IB Systems (by period) 
IB - Average PTE Scores  0.74 0.76 0.79 0.89 0.89 
CB - Average PTE Scores  0.80 0.85 0.85 0.89 0.86 
SE (CRS/VRS) for All CB & IB Systems (by period)   
IB - Average SE Scores  0.74 0.72 0.69 0.76 0.75 
CB - Average SE Scores  0.646 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.59 
 
 
Average Efficiency Scours for All IB and CB Systems (by efficiency coefficient) 
 
BANKS CATEGORIES Technical Efficiency (CRS) Pure TE (VRS) Scale Efficiency 
IB - Average Scores 0.62 0.81 0.73 
CB - Average Scores 0.57 0.85 0.62 
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APPENDIX R: Correlation Coefficients for Efficiency Determinants Model  
 Correlation matrix: TE_O 
 ATN BSI CS DMP L_EP LI LS PI RA SP SR TE_O 
ATN  1.000            
BSI  0.088  1.000           
CS  0.056 -0.063  1.000          
DMP  0.338  0.393 -0.098  1.000         
L_EP  0.240  0.271  0.017  0.024  1.000        
LI -0.111 -0.043  0.084  0.051 -0.194  1.000       
LS -0.012 -0.204  0.132 -0.081 -0.168 -0.032  1.000      
PI  0.116 -0.010  0.437 -0.033  0.175 -0.052  0.070  1.000     
RA  0.056 -0.114  0.564 -0.176  0.129 -0.089  0.090  0.547  1.000    
SP  0.443  0.219 -0.062  0.246  0.253 -0.0854 -0.180  0.043 -0.1237  1.000   
SR -0.144  0.078 -0.187  0.148 -0.426  0.218 -0.025 -0.265 -0.416  0.108  1.000  
TE_O -0.228 -0.281  0.211 -0.245 -0.235  0.172  0.297  0.138  0.285 -0.334 -0.199  1.000 
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Correlation matrix: TE_S 
 ATN BSI BSY COB CS DMP L_EP LI LS 
ATN  1.000         
BSI  0.088  1.000        
BSY  0.057  0.154  1.000       
COB 0.057 0.154 1.000 1.000      
CS 0.056 -0.062 -0.223 -0.223 1.000     
DMP 0.337 0.392 0.179 0.179 -0.092 1.000    
L_EP 0.239 0.270 -0.278 -0.278 0.017 0.024 1.000   
LI -0.111 -0.042 0.172 0.172 0.084 0.051 -0.194 1.000  
LS -0.012 -0.202 -0.138 -0.138 0.131 -0.081 -0.168 -0.032 1.000 
PI 0.115 -0.009 -0.261 -0.261 0.436 -0.033 0.175 -0.052 0.070 
RA 0.056 -0.114 -0.342 -0.342 0.563 -0.176 0.129 -0.089 0.090 
SISP 0.057 0.154 1.000 1.000 -0.223 0.179 -0.278 0.172 -0.138 
SP 0.4429 0.218 -0.004 -0.004 -0.0624 0.246 0.253 -0.085 -0.180 
SR -0.143 0.078 0.281 0.281 -0.187 0.148 -0.426 0.218 -0.025 
TOT 0.057 0.154 1.000 1.000 -0.223 0.179 -0.278 0.172 -0.138 
TS 0.057 0.154 1.000 1.000 -0.223 0.179 -0.278 0.172 -0.138 
TE_S -0.241 -0.307 -0.110 -0.110 0.169 -0.255 -0.2051 0.137 0.230 
 
 
 PI RA SISP SP SR TOT TS TE_S 
PI 1.000        
RA 0.547 1.000       
SISP -0.261 -0.342 1.000      
SP 0.043 -0.123 -0.004 1.000     
SR -0.265 -0.416 0.281 0.108 1.000    
TOT -0.261 -0.342 1.000 -0.004 0.281 1.000   
TS -0.261 -0.342 1.000 -0.004 0.281 1.000 1.000  
TE_S 0.134 0.251 -0.110 -0.343 -0.257 -0.110 -0.110 1.000 
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Correlation matrix: TE_C 
 ATN BCA BSI BSY COB CS DMP L_EP LI 
ATN 1.000         
BCA 0.069 1.000        
BSI 0.088 0.317 1.000       
BSY 0.057 0.888 0.154 1.000      
COB 0.057 0.888 0.154 1.000 1.000     
CS 0.056 -0.188 -0.062 -0.223 -0.223 1.000    
DMP 0.337 0.246 0.392 0.179 0.179 -0.092 1.000   
L_EP 0.239 -0.154 0.270 -0.278 -0.278 0.017 0.024 1.000  
LI -0.111 0.210 -0.042 0.172 0.172 0.084 0.051 -0.194 1.000 
LS -0.012 -0.306 -0.202 -0.138 -0.138 0.131 -0.081 -0.168 -0.032 
PI 0.115 -0.236 -0.009 -0.261 -0.261 0.436 -0.033 0.175 -0.052 
RA 0.056 -0.353 -0.114 -0.342 -0.342 0.563 -0.176 0.129 -0.089 
SISP 0.057 0.888 0.154 1.000 1.000 -0.223 0.179 -0.278 0.172 
SP 0.442 0.077 0.218 -0.004 -0.004 -0.062 0.246 0.253 -0.085 
SR -0.143 0.307 0.078 0.281 0.281 -0.187 0.148 -0.426 0.218 
TOT 0.057 0.888 0.154 1.000 1.000 -0.223 0.179 -0.278 0.172 
TS 0.057 0.888 0.154 1.000 1.000 -0.223 0.179 -0.278 0.172 
TE_C -0.047 -0.246 -0.555 -0.164 -0.164 0.069 -0.214 -0.287 0.100 
 
 LS PI RA SISP SP SR TOT TS TE_C 
LS 1.000         
PI 0.070 1.000        
RA 0.090 0.547 1.000       
SISP -0.138 -0.261 -0.342 1.000      
SP -0.180 0.043 -0.123 -0.004 1.000     
SR -0.025 -0.265 -0.416 0.281 0.108 1.000    
TOT -0.138 -0.261 -0.342 1.000 -0.004 0.281 1.000   
TS -0.138 -0.261 -0.342 1.000 -0.004 0.281 1.000 1.000  
TE_C 0.195 0.104 0.118 -0.164 -0.146 -0.033 -0.164 -0.164 1.000 
The End. 
